

Mid-term Evaluation of the Civic Advocacy Partnership Project (CAPP II)

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Acronyms

ATV	AlternativaTV
BIH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CAC	Citizen Advocacy Center
CCI	Centres for Civic Initiatives
CHP	Center for Human Politics
CIN	Center for Investigative Journalism
GEA	Center for Research and Studies
PILPG	Public International Law & Policy Group
RS	Republika Srpska
SUNY/CID	State University of New York/Center for International Development
TI	Transparency International

Executive Summary

The Citizen Advocacy Partnership Program II (CAPP II) implemented by the Centres for Civil Initiatives (CCI) has resulted in a number of clear impacts on the policy reform process in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH) in the area of government accountability.

At the same time, the impacts are somewhat diffused in a manner that still does not add up to larger reform progress in any of the specific component areas within government accountability. Here employment policies stand out as perhaps the most coordinated set of ‘slices’ of the larger reform pie. Anti-corruption efforts within CAPP II are at the other end of the spectrum and reflect a more net flinging approach. These could result in a similar set of synergies – particularly in the university initiatives – but would require a clearer strategic coordination.

Why such results have not yet been forthcoming is partly due to timing: CAPP II is still only at its halfway mark, and particularly the last nine months after the elections have meant little movement in most reform efforts. A continued tough if not more difficult political climate has also meant that some areas – like civil society engagement in constitutional reform – have been less feasible than initially envisioned.

Notwithstanding such external factors, many of the reasons for such impacts to date are embedded in the CAPP II objectives and its actual implementation process. The complexity of the issues themselves in the multi-layered dysfunctional state suggest that the CAPP II agenda is very ambitious; the structure and objectives of the CAPP II and its partitioning of thematic areas and mechanisms for addressing these have spread CCI competencies thin and made prioritization of areas difficult. The degree to which CCI has taken strategic leadership of this process (perhaps partly due to the above) has been less than needed for such a complex project to be effective. It should be noted that CCI certainly has had oversight of the process and has managed the CAPP II in a very professional manner, but CCI’s strategic leadership has not fully shown through in the program.

In some ways, CCI efforts are encapsulated in its efforts to monitor government parliamentary performance. Initial responses have generally been positive and supportive, but more depth, coordination and use of such efforts are sought.

Practical manners of addressing these issues are possible and are still timely. There is roughly \$1.2 million left in grant funds plus the direct implementation resources for CCI. There is also additional funding for complementary initiatives related to anti-corruption and civil society engagement in constitutional reform. This means that there is plenty of opportunity to amplify some of the impacts anticipated. Now is the time to look critically at the CAPP II strategies developed for addressing each of the reform issues and to re-envision realistic impacts by the end of the project in 2013.

There is not the possibility of reaching clear results in all the target areas and doing this through new and mid-level organizations (at least in the next two years); there is the possibility to do this with select thematic areas and to emphasize the building of monitoring and advocacy skills in a set of ten to fifteen organizations around the country, which CCI is rightly trying to do.

Where there are clear successes, these should be replicated (as in the case of public procurement in the health sector) or built up (such as support for monitoring the implementation of state employment incentives for vulnerable populations). Where there has been less progress, decisions about continuing focus and priorities need to be undertaken now. CCI should lead this discussion and have the space to potentially restructure the funding and objectives in a manner that can enhance the program.

The need for further such skills training is likely to continue beyond the end of the CAPP II. The need for the advocacy and watchdog efforts of organizations like CCI is also likely to be in steady demand. The CAPP II has the potential to build up a set of organizations that can serve as a venerable platform for future growth of the sector and to support ongoing statebuilding efforts in BIH. CCI is a key actor of this sector, and how CCI evolves will also have an impact on the sector and should be of interest to USAID.

Methodology

The purpose of the Civic Advocacy Partnership Project (CAPP II) mid-term evaluation is to 1) Identify and document the overall impact of the CAPP II during the past three year. The evaluation will recommend improvements for the project so that the intended results might be achieved by the end of the project in 2013. 2). The evaluation also focuses on further USAID involvement, both current possibilities for possible joint funding with other donors and a ‘looking ahead’ analysis for USAID efforts to support civil society beyond the CAPP II.

The evaluation used several qualitative methods of assessment including: semi-structured interview; content analysis of CAPP II related project documents, project policy and advocacy products; and observation. Together these methods allowed the evaluators to make an assessment of the relative progress that the CAPP II has reached three years into its implementation.

Evaluation efforts began in mid July, 2010. Based on a telephone debriefing with USAID Sarajevo and a desk review of project related documents, a set of semi-structured interview templates were designed before arriving in Bosnia.

During the weeks of July 18-July 30, a two-person evaluation team together with a translator met with CCI, a cross-section of CCI grantees under the CAPP II program, a set of government officials, other donors, NGOs and journalists around BIH. Over forty different meetings were held; these included several follow-up meetings with CCI and one implementing partner and a debriefing with USAID. Meetings were held in Tuzla, Doboje, Banja Luka, and Sarajevo. A list of meetings can be found in *Appendix A*.

The evaluation team also examined a sample of policy and advocacy products that were given to the team while in BIH. These were assessed based on relative clarity of messaging and content.

Upon return to their respective countries, the evaluation report writing process was led by Kristie Evenson with review and finalization of the draft conducted in cooperation with Victoria Marchenko.

Throughout the evaluation, assistance from USAID/BIH’s Democracy Office and the efforts of Emir Balic in translating for the team were highly appreciated. It should also be noted that CCI and all of their subgrantee partners were very accommodating and open to the evaluation. CCI’s sincere efforts to work with the evaluators during the multiple meetings and willingness to answer many questions should particularly be highlighted.

Introduction and Context

Efforts to make a functional state in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH) are inherently political. The complex and overly burdensome administrative system cannot be easily managed without clear political will on all sides. This political will is lacking and is unlikely to emerge in the near future. Civil society efforts to work within such an environment are challenging. These environmental challenges were recognized when CAPP II was designed; CAPP II tried, regardless, to make inroads on specific reform issues of importance to BIH citizens.

Reform in BIH in any specific area is dependent on how the competencies for this reform are shared out amongst the different administrative levels. Sometimes, the matter can be local or exclusively addressed on the state level. Most issues, however, require a manoeuvring between entity and state Republika Srpska (RS) and or entity and canton (for the Federation) levels for development, harmonization, and implementation. This by definition becomes a complex and slow process and one that very few civil society organizations have the skills or resources to follow and influence. There are roughly a handful of civil society organizations that have the institutional depth and country-wide coverage to be considered national players in advocacy efforts. CCI is one of the leading, if not the leading organization of this select group.

The 2010 general elections electrified much of civil society. CCI amongst others brought together organizations of all spheres to encourage people to vote. For many the vote was for a change in political parties and government as usual. To some extent this change was realized, at least in the Federation. However, the consequent months of negotiations between political parties to form an entity (the Federation) and the state-level government sucked much of the enthusiasm of the election time from civil society. By the end of July 2011, little if any new government program had even begun, much the less been tested, given the delays in forming governments.

Civil society during this post-election and new government formation time was not silent, but also not particularly public in its presence. A sense of inertia was palpable during the evaluation visit (perhaps partly due to the slower summer months). Efforts to engage with the new governments will likely pick up in the fall. The relative receptivity of the new governments might in general be considered a bit better than before the elections. Still the challenges of advocating, monitoring, and engaging with these new governments will continue to be formidable.

Main Findings

The CAPP II has three interconnected objectives. Two of these are focused on thematic areas (progress on constitutional reform and government accountability issues), and one is focused on the more functional issue of increasing civil society abilities to engage in advocacy efforts and enhance civic activism in BIH. CAPP II addresses these objectives through a combination of CCI direct implementation, grantmaking with training and advisory services, and a hybrid combination of CCI and other organizations' joint efforts.

CAPP II Objectives
<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Support the finalization of the Constitutional reform by the end of 2010 by advocating EU values and public opinion.▪ To strengthen BIH government accountability by 2013 through running campaigns for the adoption of anti-corruption policies, active employment measures and better administration of public funds.▪ To enhance active civic participation in decision-making processes and improve public image of NGOs

The findings focus firstly on describing the relative progress in the two thematic areas. They then turn to some of the mechanics of the process with a section on grantmaking and a section on CCI as an institution in relation to the CAPP II. Findings on the third objective that focuses on enhancing civil society capacities to engage in decision-making processes can be found throughout the report with a special focus on this objective in the grantmaking section.

Objective One: Support of Constitutional Reform Process

CAPP II progress in supporting the constitutional reform process has been minimal. To date, little public demand has been generated for constitutional reform. Few, if any, citizen demands have been incorporated into constitutional reform legislation. This appears to be due to the difficult political environment, the lack of interested NGOs, and the mixed enthusiasm that CCI might have for the issue.

CCI has given three grants totalling \$200k of the \$500k allocated for this effort. Of these, one grant was given for polling on this issue; a second grant was given for a policy brief to a local think tank;¹ the third and largest was given to an established NGO that organized expert discussions and fora around the country on the subject. The third organization's efforts are described as well meaning, but legalistic and generally only interesting for those already interested in constitutional reform rather than engaging for a wider public.² To what extent there

¹ It should be noted that the policy research product was conducted to a high standard. Arguments and methods of analysis were clear. Conclusions and recommendations were appropriate to the focus of the paper.

² A review of the products from the project suggests that the expertise and ideas are clearly present. Their presentation was less clear. Dense text and few 'take away' messages or main points make such products less accessible to the 'average citizen' even as the efforts were targeted at such an audience.

might be more NGOs interested to engage in constitutional reform issues is purely speculative. Efforts by the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG) in the past few months to identify additional organizations throughout the country for engagement on this issue have resulted in approximately 10-15 organizations that show an interest and ability to address some aspects of the larger issue in cooperation with PILPG and their related project.

CCI's interest in constitutional reform is present; they recognize the importance of the issue, but they have not taken the initiative to strategically engage with other organizations on constitutional reform. They have been rather passive in issuing grant calls and waiting for NGOs to demonstrate interest. Whether this is due to CCI's own unease with the issue or simply due to having competing demands on their time, is unclear. What is clear is that the political environment has not encouraged them to be proactive in this area.

Things to consider: A main finding from the PILPG assessment on constitutional reform in late spring/summer is that concrete, real life themes are the only way that constitutional reform can be palatable to the public and eventually to policy makers. Discussions held during the two weeks support such a finding, and CCI also recognizes that such an approach might be more useful than their efforts to date. CCI is receptive to working with PILPG on constitutional reform, but also noted concerns about coordination of efforts and how to not work at cross purposes. The extent to which the CCI role effectively is a grant mechanism over a strategic granting mechanism needs to be thoroughly discussed. (More details on grantmaking and related administration issues are discussed later in the report).

Objective Two: Strengthen BIH Government Accountability

CAPP II addresses accountability through CCI direct implementation efforts, thematically focused subgrants, and a combination of CCI and subgrantee implementation. Progress by theme is described below:

Monitoring of government performance

CCI's monitoring of government performance has become a working brand for CCI and to some extent the efforts of the CAPP II. Their monitoring reports have become widely read by a diverse audience including politicians themselves, journalists, donors, other civil society organizations, and the general public. CCI points to their monitoring efforts as instrumental in lessening the incumbency rate for parliamentarians in 2010 elections.

Almost to a person, people interviewed reacted favorably to the efforts of CCI in this area. CCI's application of a systematic monitoring system to the activities of parliamentarians throughout the country was the first effort of this type to both shine a light on the actual performance of government officials and a manner for the public to feel some level of power over their public figures. As one parliamentarian described, "we needed this, and will continue to need this for some time."

At the same time, a good portion of those expressing their support for the monitoring now want to see more. The quantitative nature of the reports is dense and does not provide clear take away points for the average reader. This is partly due to length. In order to cover all of the methodology, the reports range from around 20 to almost 100 pages. Such detail is needed in order to create trend series and for a certain portion of the audience, but it is not necessarily needed for the general public. Main points are noted in the beginning portion of the reports, but it is easy to get lost in the charts and graphs and to potentially miss what CCI thinks are the main points to note with the specific report.

The manner of monitoring also does not distinguish between quantity and quality. For example, the amount of legislation is not scrutinized for its relative importance or its potential impact on citizens. Nor is the number of times a person speaks a clear indication of their relative ‘worth’ in the legislative process. Analysis per se is missing. While there are conclusions, these are mostly descriptive of the findings rather than a more nuanced examination of the performance described and or the possible effects of such a performance in the near term.³

The level of monitoring also does not sufficiently cover committee meetings, which are seen as a key component of the legislative process. Covering more closely what might go on in these committee meetings could shine more light on the development of legislation rather than the actions of passing it. It could also respond to parliamentarians’ concerns that they might be ‘unfairly’ targeted in the monitoring exercise.

Others point out that even with more analysis, CCI needs to find a more interactive way to present this information to the public. Except the web-based application that allowed citizens to ‘clean up’ their parliament with a broom on the screen before the elections, the display of the reports is static and does not allow citizens to respond and interact with the findings. As one person noted, “we have statistics – so what?”

In short, the project is widely known and has resulted in many reactions, but there needs to be more: more depth, more use of its findings, more and better outreach efforts and more linking of interventions into the policy process to heighten effects.

Things to consider: Methodology of this monitoring needs to be deepened and extended to include more qualitative analysis and a broader set of government meetings. Whether the current funding will allow for this expansion is not a point considered by the evaluators. However it is clear that CCI efforts to improve this model need to be supported in order to capitalize on the product created by their efforts. Secondly, specific focus on how to use some of this analysis for other initiatives and by other groups needs to be a component of the next step support. In this

³ Recommendations also are part of the report, but they tend towards the normative – the officials ‘should do this...’ – rather than politically clear and feasible actionable recommendations.

process, the issue of presentation will become more important, and this might provide additional ideas on how to better present key points in more useable formats. For example a separate one-two pager that would have main points and prioritized recommendations in each level could improve the use of such reports.

One way to consider developing this monitoring is to not only deepen the analytical quality, but to also expand the lens of examination. Specifically developing a monitoring methodologically that would tie all of the legislation and their contents to EU standardization would in one stroke provide a clear analytical measurement, provide a relevancy for the wider public, and provide a user friendly way for other organizations to use such work.

Anti-corruption

(CCI direct implementation and subgrants with approximately \$580,000 of \$1,000,000 spent⁴)

There have been dispersed effects in the area of anti-corruption. These can be described as some progress in high level legislation supplemented by slices of specific sector legislation gains. Public procurement legislation for medical supplies is a notable success; other efforts in education and the health sector are still ongoing. How these efforts come together and/or amplify each other is not completely clear. Anti-corruption awareness appears to be high among the population; but this is not matched by empowerment to take on corruption and/or the sense that corrupt practices will actually be sanctioned.

On the state level, the Anti-corruption Strategy with Action Plan was adopted by the parliament partly due to civil society and specifically CCI efforts. CCI grants also achieved some results. A grant to Transparency International (TI) has followed efforts to harmonize the higher education frameworks on the state level. A grant to the organization “Tender” analyzed and then proposed changes to legislation to ensure better transparency in the health sector procurement.

Why these efforts are still dispersed: Subject areas do not easily come together into something ‘greater’ without clear strategic coordination. This was apparently not present. The various ways of carrying out the work (direct CCI implementation, subgrantee implementation, joint) and the actors carrying out the implementation (subgrantee as less experienced, as more experienced, and media partners) have meant different approaches and effectiveness.

During implementation efforts, there was no clear leader for the set of anti-corruption efforts, either strategically or sometimes even in basic coordination. One grantee interviewed, for example, did not know about some of the other similar efforts. CCI held grantee meetings, but

Anti-corruption Actions/Grants at a Glance

- CCI conducted its own advocacy campaign in relation to the national Anti-corruption Strategy and Action Plan and also on health care corruption;
- CCI gave **1** grant to TI to do the same with a national level campaign (plus analysis) on harmonization of the higher education legal frameworks;
- CCI gave **3** grants for public awareness (to CIN before elections, Radio Kameleon, and an advocacy campaign to the NGO ‘Stop Mobbing’ in Trebinje on the health sector);
- Only **3** additional organizations had grants for sector specific work: Tender received three grants for public procurement; Helsinki Bijeljina received a grant for anticorruption in the university system of East Sarajevo and Vermont Youth Group for similar efforts in Brcko.

⁴ Grant figures are estimates and based on the grant information provided by CCI and USAID. Any grants now under consideration by CCI are not included in these figures.

apparently these did not provide the strategic mapping that grantees might have wanted. As one grantee described, “I am very much afraid that we are isolated islands.”

Even given more coordination, the manner of using the grants does not suggest a larger strategy, rather an attempt to address multiple issues in multiple ways. This is fine, but given that the anti-corruption field is now becoming increasingly crowded in Bosnia (both due to donor attention and NGO interest), having a clearer strategic point of intervention into the larger issue would be necessary for any meaningful impacts. The education and health sectors are still relatively big ‘bites’ of the corruption issue. To some degree the education sector efforts have an organizing logic. NGOs can likely emulate the establishment of mechanisms for corruption prevention now being done at the university in Brcko or Bijeljina in other universities around BIH and through this process create a certain momentum and effect beyond the grants given. However, in the healthcare sector it is more difficult to see how the campaign and related activities done during the first two years can be concretely built upon or replicated.

The exception here is the example of Tender. The Tender organization project can be considered a model to emulate –for any of the anti-corruption sectors – for a number of reasons. They addressed specific, concrete issues, analyzed the current practices, proposed alternative, and are now working on seeing these implemented and moving forward in the efforts. Secondly, their organization is new, started in 2007, and assisted by CCI to develop to the point of securing EU funds for their activities. Both the first and second points have created a bit of excitement in the community and ‘ripple effects’ as they demonstrate that something can be done, and not only by established organizations. Thirdly the organization represents a specific constituency of small business owners interested in health sector procurement. This suggests that they have a core set of supporters that will continue to be involved into monitoring and follow-on work of such a project.

Things to consider: Anti-corruption efforts need an organizing and leading mechanism beyond the grant scheme system currently in place. Prioritization between education and/or health sector and/or general awareness and state level reform issues needs to be made. Whichever the prioritization, projects probably need to focus on an approach which ensures something concrete and replicable, like that of Tender. Again the lack of quality applications has resulted in established partner organization involvement, but only a few new or mid level organizations’ involvement. Efforts to do awareness campaigns on anti-corruption (either by CCI directly or through other grantees) were described as less effective than concrete initiatives. This is partly due again to the sense of the population that campaigning is not useful if sanctioning tools are not present and enforced.

The expertise of partners like TI has not been fully utilized. TI has the methodological expertise and ability to coordinate such efforts in a manner that could yield a greater set of results. Here TI was a partner for one component of a larger more complex project, but they were not a partner,

per se, in the anti-corruption design of strategy and its implementation, something which perhaps could be reconsidered.

Besides the strategic coordination issue, there is a need for younger organizations to have an 'anti-corruption toolbox. Knowledge on the basic legal frameworks for anti-corruption, simple (yet robust) methodologies for monitoring, and basic manners of communicating these to the public are some of the areas of assistance noted during the evaluation that could be helpful to support.

Public Funds

(Subgrants: approximately \$420,000 of \$750,000 spent)

Efforts to monitoring the expenditure of public funds have had some success in their specific areas, but as of yet of not connected to create a bigger effect on the use of public funds. Public funds monitoring has got the attention of specific government bodies, and to some extent the public. Despite the technical nature of the issues, of the four watchdog or think tank organizations⁵ receiving funds, each has managed to push forward either the monitoring process or new legislation guidelines in their specific part of tackling the larger issue.

At the same time, the technical nature of the issue has made it a particularly challenging area for gaining wider attention to the NGOs' work and recommendations. The pace of examination can be plodding, and any conclusions and recommendations from such efforts are likely to also be technical. The fact that the different subgrantees' products were relatively robust reports and analysis is encouraging and speaks to the increasing depth of locally generated policy research.⁶ Connecting this depth with clear manners of presentation and follow up would appear to be the next step.

For example, the Center for Humane Politic's (CHP) monitoring of the parliamentary bodies responsible for examining the auditing reports is a task even more immersed in data and statistics than the general parliamentary monitoring efforts of CCI. Specific media assistance has been built into the design of the second (and ongoing) project. Alternativa TV (ATV) of the RS entity and Hayat TV of the Federation entity are considered partners in the project and will be filming specific segments of the parliamentary hearings. Presentation of CHP efforts will likely be enhanced with these partnerships. However the inclusion of media outlets as specific partners (who receive a significant component of grant funding) in such projects is not always feasible.

⁵ These include: the Citizen Advocacy Center (CAC); the Center for Research Studies (GEA); the Center for Humane Politics (CPH); and Association KULT.

⁶ GEA research was particularly noted to be useful given its comparison to other models around Europe for mechanisms to regulate parliamentary salaries. Still as one respondent noted, their recommendations and presentations of these needed to be more 'calibrated' to the actual political feasibility of their proposal.

CCI efforts to enhance grantees' presentation skills and relations with the media have assisted these organizations when partnerships with media are not available. Still overall the ability of organizations (at least in this thematic area) to engage and present their efforts in the media and wider public are still relatively low (more on media in general will be covered later).

Things to consider: Monitoring of public funds is making steady progress and needs to continue, if with enhanced media efforts. However the relative point of intervention in the public finance issue might partially need to be reconsidered. Most of the projects focus on monitoring the expenditure or monitoring the auditing of the public expenditures – in other words to see how the money was spent. This in many ways is the last step in the policy process. Only the GEA project attempted to intervene at the level of policy making for public expenditures – or to see how to spend it.

The distinction here is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, the monitoring process of already spent funds can only address one level of the problem – the misuse of allocated funds. This is a serious issue, but it is only a component of the larger lack of accountability that is part of the budgeting and spending process. Being able to sanction misuse of budgeted funds will improve the situation, but many of the larger systematic problems with fund allocation are actually legal by the budgets. Shining a light on more of these budgeting processes, consequently, could open up yet another level of monitoring and engagement for civil society. It could also provide a balance to the 'don't' messaging of the monitoring process and give more 'do' ability to NGOs to both improve engagement in development of budgets/legislation as well as their implementation.

Employment Policies

(CCI on direct advocacy for state level employment policy and subgrants of approximately \$570,000 of \$750,000)

This area of engagement has had a number of clear successes. On the national level CCI helped to get the Strategies for Employment for 2010-2014 at the state level adopted. In relation to specific sectoral successes, efforts to allocate specific employment funding subsidies to vulnerable groups such as the disabled and Roma can be pointed to as having reached their first step of completion. Funds have been allocated, and a dialogue between these organizations and the respective government agencies has become quite normalized.

Each of the organizations has taken a somewhat similar approach in their projects, and CCI efforts to work with and train up the organizations is noteworthy. Here most of the organizations were less experienced, and the advocacy and presentation training provided by CCI was positively referred to by the organizations when interviewed. The experience of CCI and its reputation was also considered in these cases helpful for 'opening doors' for some of the organizations.

The question in this thematic area is really what comes next? For many of the six grantees it would make sense to continue their respective sector efforts to monitor the actual implementation of their advocacy efforts. Actual allocation of funds for employment of vulnerable groups is a success, but how each of the governmental bodies implements such legislation is questionable. Experience not only in BIH has shown that such funds are often unspent or implemented in a manner that is not in keeping with the spirit of the legislation. Having the same groups that have a stake in these issues monitor their implementation would allow the progress reached in these areas to be somewhat cemented.

Each project has slightly different issues that they have dealt with, but the general strategies have been enough similar to image that development of a monitoring process could be somewhat systematic and comparative. CCI should play a more proactive leadership role in coordinating various efforts and developing further steps to monitor these processes.

Things to consider:

There is roughly \$180,000 left in this thematic area for funding of monitoring and other initiatives. Given the successes to date, monitoring support would seem to a logical follow on. Here the question is whether the remaining funds are sufficient for such monitoring or whether thought needs to be given to ways to supplement this current level of funding, either by shifting funds around within the CAPP II and or identifying other donors that would be willing to fund portions of these monitoring initiatives.

The other issue in this thematic area is whether it makes sense to tackle more sensitive employment areas in a similar way. Few can speak against employment of marginalized groups, even given the dramatically bad employment situations throughout Bosnia. But such policies really only touch the fringes. Whether this component needs to tackle more entrenched issues that affect a larger portion of the population (besides through the state level employment strategy) is something to consider.

To some extent, the project on volunteerism by the Youth Communication Center (OKC) for youth in universities and high schools⁷ provides an indirect manner for improving job market chances (through acquired volunteer experience) for the young population.⁸ The additional youth funding might also include some focus on employment in a manner that would provide synergies for the CAPP II employment policies focus.

⁷ This project was not classified under employment policies, but rather as ‘Other reforms.’

⁸ This project should also be noted as a ‘reform’ success – legislation on volunteerism was passed. It is also a good example of constructive engagement with the government.

Another component of employment policies that seems to be missing in the larger employment issue is some effort to address the widely held perception (and perhaps practice) that employment is not based on merit, but rather connections. This is closely linked to corruption issues, but by itself thinking about innovative ways to encourage transparent job hiring practices and sanctioning against the bad, for example, would certainly be of interest to wide portion of the population.

Election Program

Additional USAID support (\$1.3million) through CAPP II was given to CCI for the elections in 2010. In response to this, much of CCI grants during 2010 were focused on the general elections. To their credit CCI managed to mobilize and bring together a diverse set of actors to work towards the goal of an engaged and voting citizenry. Many NGOs praised CCI for their leadership and coordination efforts in this pre-election period. Efforts to educate voters on the actual performance of their political representatives, to image a political class responsible to its citizens, and to encourage people to get out were significant. Election results do show a slightly higher percentage of citizens voting (including a higher youth vote), they do show a certain ‘house cleaning’ of incumbent members of parliament) particularly in the Federation, and the election results did give a certain ‘buzz’ to civil society and the population and the feeling that they could take back the power.

However, all of these efforts were relatively short-lived. Now almost ten months later, that buzz has dissipated. Slow and acrimonious formation of the state and Federation level governments has reminded citizens of their actual lack of power. Civil society has missed the spirit of coordination and camaraderie in 2010 and has been a bit aimless in its focus of how to ‘deal’ with the delays.⁹ Some see the process as inherently political and not their issue; others notably have tried to connect their efforts during the pre-election time with their continued work (like Radio Kameleon), but many of the grants given during elections – even in the prioritized issue areas like anti-corruption – were specifically election focused and have not had follow-on efforts.

Account ability efforts overall... The working strategy for all grant and shared responsibility thematic areas of public accountability has been to address gaps in state level legislation while tackling specific components of this within each theme. This approach has been difficult given the sheer complexity of the issues and the lack of a functioning state system that normally implements state level decisions or that would allow small victories to bubble out to affect the many levels of government.

Such a working strategy might work, if Bosnia were not Bosnia. Given that this is not the case; the question here turns to how to make such types of interventions and engagement more strategic. And secondly which of these efforts are likely to have the most effect given all the other political context, ‘NGO supply’ and related factors.

⁹ Post-election monitoring of government performance (or non-performance), monitoring of deliveries on promises, and surveys/analysis by NGOs are important for keeping the “buzz.” The post-election government formation has a specific political context in BIH, but still many of these types of activities have been missing.

Grantmaking

A significant component of the CAPP II is CCI's management of subgrants to other local NGOs. In general, CCI's grant management can be assessed as very professional; they are seen as a 'good donor.' Grant recipients cite CCI as being flexible, transparent, and invested in their grantees. Regardless of the experience and expertise of grantees that the evaluators met, all exhibited a certain passion for their issue, and it was clear that CCI had managed to select organizations that were dedicated to the issues of their projects. This is no small thing in an environment where organizations often 'chase' funds, and it should be commended.

Having noted this, a number of both technical and strategic aspects of the granting process do require some consideration. These are described below:

On the technical side, some grantees suggested that the grant process was overly complicated. To some degree this feedback can be anticipated, particularly from less experienced grantees. USAID requirements guide much of the CCI application and reporting requirements. Here specifically concern over the need for comprehensive/complex monthly reports and monthly instalments of payments was noted as burdensome, at least for grants of only a few months and around \$20k. As described by one interviewee, "We lose five to seven days a month in administration of a project that only lasted four months."

Secondly, the media component of grants needs to be clarified and amplified. Grants should be designed with the media component more clearly in mind. Many of the new organizations have little media and PR experience. The media environment in BIH is tough. Few quality and independent media are present and interested in the efforts of civil society. This has meant that even with good presentational skills, many of the NGOs have not benefitted as fully as they could from media coverage. CCI has assisted some subgrantees to build up PR and media relations capacities. However, grants per se have not had the media component built into them in a manner that properly emphasizes working with the media as partners. The CHP grants which literally has television outlets partnering and receiving funds from the project is (and perhaps should remain given the ethical dilemmas of 'buying' air time) an extreme example of what 'partnering' means.

CCI's grant to Zurnal (\$300,000), a media portal, was intended to partially address the lack of media space. Similarly, their work with the Center for Investigative Journalism (CIN) has been part of the effort to shine more light on anti-corruption related efforts. But at least in the case of Zurnal, this media's exposure is also quite limited. If the media outlets themselves only have a small targeted audience (and likely one that already is sympathetic to the reform issues) then reaching a bigger audience is only possible by having one of their stories picked up by mainstream media (which sometimes happens). Accordingly, having willing media outlets like CIN or Zurnal who are direct partners might not actually improve the media exposure problem facing the grantee organizations.

Other concerns focused more on the overall strategy of the grant program. The thematic areas of grants are clearly outlined in the grant application online, and by “type” these should be mostly advocacy grants. The rolling nature of the call allows really anyone and everyone to approach CCI with an idea or proposal. However not all NGOs are aware of this flexible mechanism. Some do come with ideas, which if holding promise, are assisted by CCI to be shaped into proposals. Such a grant design might seem to be ideal, but two and a half years into the grant scheme, a number of effects of such a mechanism have become clearer.

Firstly, the set of NGOs able and interested to engage in a) advocacy and b) such thematic areas is perhaps not as high as was anticipated. Lack of good proposals and particularly lack of good proposals from mid-level or young organizations and from some geographic areas (like Herzegovina) was a frustration cited by CCI. This limitation was partly why they looked to other established partners, like TI, to work with them on some of the thematic issues. In effect, CCI has felt hampered in achieving its results in the various thematic areas due to lower levels of grantee abilities and numbers than they had anticipated.

Whether there is truly a lack of capacities and interest in civil society in BIH is difficult to determine. To some extent this type of advocacy and watchdog activities are a new level of civil society engagement in BIH, and it not unsurprising that there might be fewer partners than anticipated.

The presentation of the Request for Grant Applications (RFAs) could be partially responsible. At least two mid-level organizations who had worked with CCI in the past felt that the grant calls were not available for their work. Both were engaged in some type of ‘government accountability efforts’ and presumably could have ‘fit’ into at least the ‘other’ category of the themes if they had approached CCI. However they did not approach CCI with ideas, because even the other category seemed to them to be geared towards specific topics like youth. This is a shame as it was apparent that the organizations did have ideas that could have complimented other ongoing initiatives. The grant mechanism has some flexibility in its interpretation of themes as well as an ‘others’ category for the next good idea or emerging priority. There is a lack of awareness about both these options, and this needs to be addressed.

CCI’s management of the grant process may be a factor in the lower than expected set of applicants. CCI has not engaged in an overly active type of grantmaking. They have advertised their grant scheme, and they as an organization are certainly well known. However on a day-to-day basis they have managed the grant process primarily by having people ‘come to them’ rather than ‘going to the people’ and or actively finding organizations to match up with their efforts. CCI needs to be more proactive in CAAP II outreach efforts.

In relation to the grantmaking itself, coordination of grantee efforts was found to be uneven. In some areas, the meetings between organizations engaging in similar efforts – like employment

policies – were noted as useful. In other areas like anti-corruption (as noted earlier) the coordination (both strategic and technical) was felt to be lacking.

Coordination problems were also cited beyond CCI grantee in relation to other USAID implementing partners. For example, the SUNY/CID parliamentary assistance project was not aware of the policy research completed by GEA on parliamentary salary mechanisms until they coincidentally clicked a link for GEA on the CCI site. They are now cooperating with GEA, but having had earlier information about the GEA research they could have helped GEA to more effectively present their research to parliamentarians.

Perhaps such coordination and matchmaking is not realistic given CCI’s understanding of their role in managing the grant process and given the many demands on their time within the CAPP II program. Even though CCI is an experienced grantmaking organization for USAID and others, there is the sense, regardless, that they have not felt (or at least not taken) the ‘freedom’ to push, prod, and redecorate their grant giving box in coordination with USAID. They have felt obligated to produce policy reform results, build up younger NGOs’ capacities in these areas, and to somehow do their own CAPP II work and coordinate the entire process.

These requirements by definition lead to conflicting emphasis: should CCI prioritize young organizations over established organizations to build capacities or will this maybe jeopardize their abilities to reach clear results? Should they put more time into coordination and creating thematic platforms and ‘action coalitions’ in specific areas or try to give even

Grantmaking by thematic area:

- In anti-corruption, more resources were given to established NGOs and media organizations;
- In public finances, an early to mid set of organizations received the bulk of funds;
- In employment policies, newer and mid level organizations were the primary targets.

coverage to all grant areas? The questions are rhetorical, and clearly there can always be a middle ground. Yet tension between somewhat competing underlying objectives of the program become manifest when examining which types of organizations have gotten which levels of funding and what considerations have driven these decisions.

This is all to say that strategic grantmaking is somewhat lacking. Within the specific thematic areas, there are attempts to imagine and manage sectoral and entity/state level projects that can work towards larger reform objectives (as described earlier some of these are more coherent and successful than others). However on the macro grant giving level, there has not been the necessary visioning to see how and where to use funds in a manner that could make the most impact and balance the somewhat competing objectives.

CCI has described a desire to see between ten and fifteen organizations built up to take on monitoring and advocacy activities during the course of the CAPP II. This is already a significant statement of intent and provides some answers to how to prioritize grant funds. When looking at the funds spent to date, roughly twelve young and mid-level organizations can be identified as having received grants where CCI guidance has improved their monitoring/and or advocacy efforts. One of these, Tender, is a clear, ‘rags to riches’ success case. Others like GEA, Euro Roma, or CHP are continuing or likely to have follow-on grants to further strengthen these components. There is an intuitive sense within CCI that following up on such efforts makes good sense both for the organizations and the reform process.

However when asked how they could imagine spending the over \$1million left in grant funds of the CAPP II, there was less certainty. Clearly, giving time to CCI and possibly helping to develop a game plan would be the fair thing to do. Sitting across from two evaluators in a multi-hour discussion does not provide such a setting. But the lack of an answer also points to the fact that CCI has perhaps had less ownership of the funds and thought less about the big strategic picture than necessary.

Another factor to consider is how additional funds that CAPP II has received through its funding mechanism might have affected CCI’s grantmaking. CCI has received election funds, youth funds, and funds for Zurnal. These are generally in line with CAPP II objectives, and having more funds is usually a good thing. However in this case the addition of these funds might have distracted and distorted the CCI grantmaking process to some degree.

Finally, it should be noted that CAPP II is not CCI’s only focus. They are significantly involved in other major projects; CCI is working with the British Embassy as one of five organizations monitoring government performance in justice and security; they have been working with the EU Delegation to BIH on local citizen responsibility forums (amongst other things); they have been working with the Dutch to fund NGOs on supporting health, education, and the environment. This list is only partial. There are more projects and more areas of CCI engagement. Some of these areas are relevant to CAPP II –if not directly, than at least indirectly; how and to what extent CCI has seized on synergies from its other work is not clear.

CCI cannot attempt to bring coordination to such a diverse field, but it can be more focused on its efforts to ensure that its engagements outside of CAPP II and its efforts within are enhancing each other (where applicable).

In relation to other donor efforts, coordination of donor support for civic participation type activities in BIH is ongoing, but still partial. Anti-corruption efforts are perhaps the best example of lots of resources but little coordination of approach in relation in the field. Here there is clear room for more leadership and engagement (either by CCI through CAPP II) or for USAID with other related mechanisms. Other areas are receiving more focused coordination, but

particularly when the civic engagement includes government participation, different donors tend to take approaches which see either the government or the civil society as their main partner and not both. One of the few projects that makes this link is the SUNY/CID through both its approach and knowledge of the actors on both sides.

CCI as an Institution

CCI as an institution has been a critical component of the CAPP II. Its direct implementation of monitoring and advocacy activities, its cooperation with grantees and other organizations in the CAPP thematic areas, and its efforts to manage a significant grant portfolio have been the biggest determinants of success of the CAPP II.

But what is CCI? Is it a donor or is it civil society? Is it a watchdog? Is it an advocacy group? Is it a USAID implementer? Does it speak for its constituency? Who is its constituency? All of these questions are relevant to ask due to the dominant role and personality played by CCI in CAPP II and due to the history that CCI has had with USAID in implementing civil society programs in BIH.

No one description of CCI probably captures what it is and what it does. Even CCI prefers to see itself as having multiple identities and filling multiple roles as needed. The description of a ‘multi-legged’ chair in some ways is apt. CCI does do all of these things and somehow balances them out. Yet certain themes do emerge:

CCI for many is most closely associated with the idea of a watchdog organization. This is their brand and one that they have used to good measure for themselves and their grantees. Whether a government official fears, respects, or dis/likes CCI depends on the official and the latest CCI initiative. Yet it is clear that CCI has come to mean something in the government circles as well as the wider public, and that this image draws attention. In some cases, it can open doors for less known NGO actors. The Euro Roma director described how their use of CCI as their partner donor helped not only to open doors in the government, but to help him as the director of the organization to be regarded in the media as a possible guest and commentator.

Whether this role also translates to being the capacity builder for watchdog activities is a question. As described by one NGO, “we see CCI as the engine for watchdog activities.” CCI clearly serves as an advisor and mentor for its grantees and other organizations that engage with it. However judging by their reluctance to participate as trainers outside of their own efforts, their training interests can probably be described as less broad than those of a more traditional NGO resource center or organization.

Do they sometimes dominate the NGO arena over other NGOs? Maybe, but it is not conclusive. Some feedback suggested that CCI required its logo and branding to be part of an organization’s public outreach. One donor suggested that CAPP II should be less CCI and more CAPP II. CCI suggested that they actually have too much media exposure and try to limit their use of the CCI

brand to those areas where it is really relevant. Again the truth here is likely somewhere in between. CCI as an established organization is likely to have significant influence on other organizations; the fact that they are doing a bit of everything also means that they are commonly reported on in the media and have to some degree come to expect such attention.

Is CCI political? Yes and no. Their efforts to put items on the reform agenda, to encourage citizens to take responsibility for their elected officials and to vote, and their adherence to the idea of a functioning state are political. Whether they are overly partisan in one direction or another is another issue. A few concerns over the exclusivity of CCI and its serving particular political interests need to be noted as voiced by several international actors. Notably these impressions were not voiced by domestic actors. How CCI initiates advocacy and responds to the new political situation once the government begins working in the fall will likely provide a better sense of where they stand in this regard.

Is CCI a donor? Yes, in some ways. They manage USAID money (and others), and this gives them a certain additional weight in the sector. However the fact that they are a domestic organization and have other core competencies also gives them credibility with the domestic NGOs.

So what does CCI want to become? This question is important to ask for two reasons. Firstly since CCI is one of the dominant players in civil society in BIH, their development affects the sector. As one respondent remarked, “CCI must exist.” Secondly CCI’s partnership with USAID and USAID implementing partners for most of its history suggests a certain responsibility on behalf of USAID to consider the ‘what next’ question.

Clearly CCI must lead this thinking, and discussions with CCI suggest that they are very much thinking about how to further develop. Ideas to develop a type of hybrid operational foundation (like the Polish Stefan Batory Foundation or Slovak Pontis Foundation) that would have an endowed advocacy fund were part of the visions of key staff within CCI. How to concretely realize such development has been less thought through. Challenging them to articulate such an organizational development strategy would likely assist them in managing the CAPP II as well as plan for the post 2013 eventualities.

Looking Ahead – 2013 and Beyond

What the political landscape might look like in 2013 is not an easy guess. However, it is reasonable to expect that if progress has been made in building up state functionality, further civil society efforts to strengthen this functionality still will be needed for the foreseeable future.

It also reasonable to expect that civil society will continue to reflect the differences of opinion within the larger society. While a good number of the NGOs in BIH today support the general idea of a better future and a more functional state, this when understood in more detail often

reflects the mosaic of approaches that are part of the political landscape. This is the case now and is likely to be the case in the coming years. Even those that focus on democratic governance and human rights often have different manners for understanding what this means in their society.

Government accountability issues, writ large, are likely to be the main area of concentration. However, accountability should not suggest only keeping governments accountable for misbehaviour, but for demanding a certain competency, expertise, professionalism, and real actions in their management and development of the government and state. This demand – that politicians not only be ‘clean’ but also competent and performing – has been missing from much of the public debate and civil society initiatives.

Additional emphasis on using the EU standards, mechanisms, and measurements to focus attentions and to find points of agreement (both in civil society and in government) will need to be made and to be dynamitized. The EU is a nice and complex animal of institutions that many commonly refer to now. Using EU standards in a more advocacy functional way is still not part of the common parlance of organizations in BIH, not even CCI. Infusing (in digestible amounts) this lens of analysis in watchdog activities, in advocacy targets (BIH is particularly a place where NGOs need to also consider how they lobby international actors as well as domestic actors), and in advocacy messaging would provide an additional point around which NGOs and citizens could convene.

In relation to capacities, continued watchdog, advocacy and policy engagement skills and activities will still be needed. A set of mid-level NGOs might certainly have better capacities by the end of the CAPP II in their specific sectors, but intensification of these activities, support of, and perhaps a spread of such activities will likely be needed in the years ahead.

Here consideration of how to better mix the policy research side and the policy advocacy and/or activist side might need to be made. Each type of organization has a certain strength in Bosnia. However, NGOs do not always coordinate or even know about each others’ efforts and sometimes engage out of their expert areas to take on everything in the policy research and advocacy area rather than the activities where they excel. This is partly due to the structuring of funds for such efforts. Other donor efforts in these areas are present, but not coordinated. Support of research – a private foundation, a bilateral donor, or the EU – often does not also include support of advocacy, and vice versa.

How to support such research based advocacy processes is a challenge faced in many countries of the region and usually involves a combination of different types of grants to both advocacy and research focused organizations in a coordinated way. The formula for BIH will depend on how each set of organizations develops in the next several years. It is worth thinking now how to address the need for continued research-infused policy engagement by civil society and the mechanisms to encourage this.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The CAPP II program has managed to achieve a number of notable successes in government accountability in a tough political environment. The program can take credit for making the performance of parliamentarians something that common citizens now see as relevant and their right to monitor. The program also can point to slices of legislation monitoring public procurement, addressing university corruption, and appropriating funds for employing vulnerable people as resulting from its efforts. The program can point to a handful (maybe two) of organizations that now have better skills in monitoring and engaging with the government. All of these results are good for being mid-way through a challenging and multi-focused program.

Whether there could have been better results and impacts to date is difficult to say. What is clear is that the momentum that has been created to date needs to be built upon. The strategizing for the larger program and its reachable objectives needs to be tightened to anticipate what is possible until 2013 and in preparation of the environment beyond.

Many issues to consider are noted throughout the text, but for general guidelines, the following set of recommendations is made with these issues in mind. These include:

Make government accountability the main focus and organizing point for all CAPP II activities. It might be a matter of semantics, but semantics are important when trying to strategize the focus of the program. De facto, this program has been about accountability, but presentation-wise, it has had a number of labels and foci – constitution reform, elections, now youth, anti-corruption etc. This may have distracted and confused staff of CCI, possible partners, and the public alike. CAPP II needs to have a clear identity and with it a clear prioritization of efforts. It is a big program, but it not big enough to effectively target all the areas it was designed for in 2008.

In relation to this larger conceptual (re)focusing, it is recommended to:

Build on linkages and activities that have been done so far: there is roughly \$1.2 million left for regranting. A clear strategy for these funds needs to be developed by CCI and USAID. Here decisions on how to prioritize funding for levels of organizations need to be made. Also decisions on how to prioritize funding for ‘next step’ monitoring and related activities for already existing CAPP II grantees need to be made.

Consideration here might also be given to how to team up ‘CAPP II trained’ organizations among themselves and with new ones carrying out similar work either in the university sector, employment issues, etc.

Given the results so far, consolidating funding to concentrate primarily on employment policies and public monitoring should be considered. Anti-corruption effort funding (which currently has the most remaining funds at \$420,000) needs to be assessed in relation to the upcoming anti-corruption program.

Finding funding for these priorities should also include a look at how other USAID funding might be matched up for complementary effects – for example if youth employment were an area more prioritized.

Matching or complementary funding from other donors for specific components of the prioritized actions might also be an area to explore. For example, monitoring of the implementation of the employment policies of vulnerable populations might be an area of interest to other donors.

Consider how to expand NGO and citizen engagement beyond sanctioning: The current manner for engagement with government is primarily one that has lots of ‘don’t’ messaging. How to balance this out needs to be discussed not only for public funding, but for all areas. Next step advocacy assumes that NGOs play a dual role as both watchdog and interlocutor with the government. Having this role as one organization is difficult, but having the skills to take on both of these types of tasks would be important for organizations’ development. Imagining projects/grants where activities are balancing between ‘reporting misconduct’ and ‘helping to structure’ conduct’ would help to broaden civil society skills, their public credibility, and their set of tools to engage in decision making. Such a balancing can also provide a good basis for further civil society engagement efforts following the end of CAPP II.

Expanding such engagement might also (re)enliven the civic engagement and advocacy aspects of the program. It is difficult to keep the enthusiasm of the pre-election time amongst the population and NGOs. Broadening the set of engagement methods to include more constructive activism could assist CCI and its partners to re-engage with portions of the population.

Clarify CCI position within CAPP II: The cooperative agreement between USAID and CCI would seem to suggest a partnership. However, the dynamics noted in this evaluation suggest that CCI has not fully assumed the ownership and leadership over CAPP II that might be expected. This leadership needs to be strengthened. It also needs to be supported by ensuring that other USAID and USG initiatives do not inadvertently ‘hollow out’ the CAPP II program or CCI’s decision making powers. Addition of funds, using the grant mechanism as a ‘pass through’ and running similar if not parallel thematic efforts all have the risk of distracting or diminishing CCI efforts within CAPP II.

Here particular attention to the new PILPG constitutional reform and anticipated anti-corruption efforts should be made. Every effort to integrate and coordinate efforts should be made, and tough decisions on how to either ‘share’ grant funds in these areas or more closely coordinate them need to be made earlier rather than later.

Review or articulate the legacy objectives of CAPP II: Consideration of how CCI might be a legacy for CAPP II either in a CAPP III version or something else needs to be discussed now. Clearly having CCI streamline/strengthen its role during the remainder of CAPP II will help to

determine its interest and potential role beyond CAPP II. CCI's own institutional interests and their convergence points with those of USAID should also be more clearly considered. For example, the 'advocacy fund' mentioned by CCI could be one mechanism by which to support civic engagement and the work of CCI after CAPP II.

Appendix A

Civic Advocacy Partnership Project (CAPP) II Mid-term Evaluation List of Meetings July 18-30, 2011

NGO SUB-GRANTEES:

1. Vehid Sehic, Forum of Tuzla Citizens
2. Zlatko Berbic, NGO Kameleon
3. Mirza Jasarevic, Center for research and support (CRP)
4. Nedzad Jusic, Roma Association "Euro Rom" Tuzla
5. Branko Todorovic, Helsinki Committee RS, Bijeljina
6. Momir Dejanovic, The Center for Humane Politics (CHP)
7. Igor Vukajlovic, Association of citizens TENDER
8. Ognjen Djukic, GEA (Center for Research and Studies)
9. Srdjan Blagovcanin, Transparency International
10. Jugoslav Jevđić, Youth Communication Center (OKC)
11. Lejla Bicakcic, The Center for Investigative Reporting
12. Dzenana Aladjuz, INFOHOUSE
13. Darko Brkan, Association of Citizens Why Not
14. Denisa Sarajlic-Maglic, Foreign Policy Initiative
15. Eldin Karic, Center for Media Development and Analysis, Web magazine Zurnal

U.S. Government

16. Dana Beegun, USAID Democracy Office Director
Selma Sijercic, USAID Program Management Specialist
17. Traver Gudie, POL Political Officer
Steve Gillen, POL Political Officer
Mirsad Ziga, POL Political Assistant
18. James Hagenruber, OPA Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer
Rahela Djidic OPA Education Training Specialist

CCI

19. Zlatan Ohranovic, CCI Executive Director
20. Igor Cocic and Igor Stojanovic CCI grant managers

USAID IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS

21. Valery Perry, PILPG
22. Aida Daguda, Center for Civil Society Promotion-CPCD
23. Sue Folger, Internews
24. David Hamilton, National Democratic Institute-NDI
25. Christian Haupt, State University of New York/ Center for International Development (SUNY/CID)

Appendix A

MEDIA OUTLETS

- 26.** Natasa Tesanovic, Alternative TV
- 27.** Rubina Cengic, journalist at Magazine START
- 28.** Kenan Cerimagic, Journalist, TV Hayat

GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

- 29.** Nikola Baštinac, SNSD, Member of RS National Assembly
- 30.** Branislav Borenović, PDP, Member of RS National Assembly
- 31.** Šefik Džaferović, SDA Rep, House of Representatives, BiH Parliament

OTHER DONORS

- 32.** Ivana Howard, National Endowment for Democracy NED
- 33.** Vladimir Pandurevic, European Union Delegation
- 34.** Sabina Djapo, British Embassy
- 35.** Leila Fetahagic, the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

OTHER NGOs

- 36.** Lajla Zaimović Kurtović, ACIPS
- 37.** Vera Jovanovic, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights
- 38.** Snjezana Ivandic, Association of Democratic Initiatives (ADI)
- 39.** Vesna Baisanski-Agic and Zoran Puljic, MOZAIK Community Foundation
- 40.** Slavica Draskovic, TACSO Bosnia and Herzegovina

SCOPE OF WORK
for
MID-TERM EVALUATION
of
USAID/CIVIC ADVOCACY PARTNERSHIP PROJECT (CAPP) II

Purpose of Evaluation

The purpose of this mid-term evaluation is twofold. First, it will identify and document the overall impact of the Civic Advocacy Partnership Project (CAPP) II during the past three years. The evaluation will recommend improvements for this ambitious project so that the intended results will be achieved by the time the project ends in August 2013. Second, the evaluation will recommend possible areas of further USAID involvement in the civil society sector with a particular focus on the possibilities for joint funding with other donors. The evaluation will assess whether, based on the impact of the program and the current political environment, continuing the project for two more years is a good investment.

Background

A. Country Context

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) suffers from extremely complex governance structures, a general lack of transparency and accountability among elected officials, a lack of democratic tradition, apathy of citizens, and wide-spread public corruption that plagues all aspects of government and society, and also severely impedes reforms.

Many of the governance problems stem from the overly complex, ethnically divided, and inefficient system created by the Constitution that was part of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The EU Enlargement Strategy encourages BiH to amend its complex constitutional framework, to improve the functioning of the institutions, and to bring them into a position to adopt, implement and enforce the laws and rules of the EU. There is an obvious need for BiH to better define the roles and responsibilities for all levels of government and increase transparency and accountability of government officials. The lack of individual accountability disables citizens to assess the work of elected representatives. Instead, they negatively assess the whole government. Most citizens do not believe that politicians do their jobs responsibly, and most of them perceive political parties and parliaments as the most corrupted institutions in the country. Moreover, citizens consider government's efforts to fight corruption ineffective.

Citizens of BiH are faced with the consequences of government inefficiency every day. They receive poor quality and expensive services. Pensioners receive low pensions. Citizens are losing faith in social change, and public dissatisfaction is growing. The engagement of citizens in oversight of government and decision making processes is mainly channeled through various activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). However, the government is still reluctant to use unique skills of NGOs and engage them in issue-based discussions on specific structural, political, economic and social reforms that are in line with EU standards. Instead, NGOs are still perceived as competitors and/or irrelevant. Since the public funds for civil society activities are not transparently allocated and are void of an

evaluation system, civil society is still deeply dependent on international funding. Financial viability is the most difficult aspect of NGO sustainability in BiH. With international assistance over the past several years, the civil society sector in general, and NGOs in particular, have increasingly affirmed their public monitoring and advocacy role. NGO activism in BiH is already having some impact. They are increasing their visibility and their access to stakeholders, and have more frequent and sustained contacts with different levels of government. However, there is a great need to continue enhancing this communication and strengthening the constructive role of non-governmental independent actors in decision-making processes.

B. Project Information

In August 2008, USAID awarded a five-year Cooperative Agreement to a local NGO, the Centers of Civic Initiatives in the amount of \$8 million. In the last three years, CAPP II was amended twice to add two additional tasks. First, in 2009, additional funds in the amount of \$300,000 were added to support a two-year activity with the Center for Media Development and Analysis to establish a media web portal. Second, prior to the 2010 General Elections, USAID/BiH added an additional \$1.3 million to fund media pre-election programming.

The main challenge of CAPP II is to change the political dynamics in BiH so that citizens believe in a common future for the Bosnian State. Given the lack of political will by BiH politicians, civil society must apply pressure for much needed economic and social reforms. CAPP II was originally designed to utilize the skills of civil society organizations to make progress on key structural, political, social, and economic reforms in BiH essential to moving BiH closer to EU integration and to improving the quality of life of BiH citizens. The specific reform areas include the following: civil society engagement in BiH Constitutional Reform, anti-corruption, public funds administration, and unemployment of marginalized groups.

CAPP II provides direct sub-grants to local NGOs to conduct advocacy campaigns, research, and watch-dog activities within these policy areas. CAPP II also provides training and technical assistance to local NGO partners. In addition, CCI monitors and publicly reports on government accountability and efficiency levels. In total, CCI monitors the work of 26 government structures (state, entity and cantonal).

C. Statement of Work

USAID/BiH intends to use this assessment as a tool to evaluate performance, identify good practices and possible areas for improvements, and to objectively decide if the project needs to re-focus from the current assistance program to other technical assistance in areas that are not currently covered by CAPP II.

The following are illustrative topics and questions that USAID/BiH would like the CAPP II Mid-term Evaluation to address:

- What has been the overall impact of CAPP II so far?
- What was the impact of CAPP II in selected reform areas?
- Are the activities supported by CAPP II leading to the results identified in the original program description and its amendments?

- Overall, how has the assistance provided to local NGOs improved their advocacy and watchdog capacity? What kind of assistance has been the most effective and appreciated by local sub-grantees? What kind of assistance has not been so successful?
- What is the perception of CAPP II among key stakeholders (sub-grantees, other donors, government officials)? What is the level of satisfaction with CCI's role?
- Given the wide-range of support CAPP II provides to local NGOs, are there any new reform areas where assistance can and should be focused? If so, what are those key areas and why should assistance be focused in these reform areas?
- Are there any strategic advantages of CAPP II over the other donors' civil society programs? If so, what are those advantages and is CCI utilizing them properly?
- What are the areas where CAPP II cooperates with projects funded by other donors? How does CAPP II cooperate with other USAID projects, especially with USAID civil society projects? Is there sufficient level of coordination? What are the areas where this cooperation can and should be improved?
- Given the current political situation in BiH and USAID's strategy for creating space for consensus and dialogue building among political parties and civil society, is there an opportunity to enhance these linkages through CAPP II? What would be the main challenges and opportunities that USAID should take into consideration?
- Since CAPP II is such a comprehensive and expansive program, the Mid-term Evaluation Team is requested to provide information and suggestions regarding the current management of the program.

D. Team Structure

The Mid-term Evaluation Team will be composed of two persons, the Team Leader and the Team Member. The Team Leader will be responsible for coordinating the writing of the final evaluation report. The Team Member will be responsible for contributing his/her portion of the final report within his/her respective area under the overall direction of the Team Leader.

Both individuals should have a range of experience with a primary focus on civil society, but also encompassing other key areas of DG programming. They should have some E&E regional experience, along with comparative experience in the DG sector in other countries or regions. At least one member of the team must have BiH experience and be familiar with the overall macro-political situation and the structure of government in the country.

Team Leader: This will be an international consultant with at least 10 years of relevant experience, an understanding of civil society in transition countries (and ideally a specific understanding of these issues in BiH), and excellent organizational, analytical, and writing skills.

Team Member: This will be a regional expert, and ideally a Foreign Service National (FSN) from another USAID E&E Mission, with at least 10 years of relevant experience and understanding of civil society in general, and USAID civil society programming in the E&E region in particular.

E. Evaluation Tasks

Task 1: Desk Review

Prior to beginning the assessment, both team members will be required to review all relevant background materials provided by USAID/BiH. This review shall include background interviews and at least one conference call with staff from USAID/BiH's Democracy Office. The conference call is important to ensure that the Mission and the evaluation team are in agreement on the scope and purpose of the evaluation.

Task 2: Develop a Written Fieldwork Plan

Using the information gained from the desk review along with this SOW, the evaluation team will develop a plan for how the fieldwork will be conducted. The plan should clearly outline the methodological approach that the team will use to complete the evaluation as described in this SOW. The plan should be approved by USAID/BiH five days prior to arrival in country.

Task 3: Field Evaluation

The evaluation team will spend two weeks in-country to conduct the evaluation according to the written plan approved by USAID/BiH. Fieldwork will begin on July 11, 2011. While in BiH, the team will meet with key NGO beneficiaries of CAPP II, other donors, government officials, U.S. Embassy personnel, USAID staff, USAID implementing partners, and others (see Attachment A).

Task 4: Brief Embassy and Mission

Before departing the country, the evaluation team will brief interested personnel from USAID/BiH and the U.S. Embassy on the team's preliminary findings and recommendations.

F. Deliverables

- 1. Written Fieldwork Plan** as described in task one due not less than 4 business days before fieldwork commences.
- 2. Rough Draft Report / Field Evaluation Notes** due after Field Evaluation and before departing Sarajevo.
- 3. Draft Evaluation Report** due within 7 calendar days following completion of fieldwork. USAID/BiH will provide written comments within 7 calendar days after receiving the first draft report.
- 4. Final Draft Evaluation Report** due not more than 7 calendar days after receipt of USAID/BiH's comments on the draft evaluation report. The final draft evaluation report should be concise and will include, at minimum, an executive summary; major findings and conclusions; a description of the evaluation methodology; a review of CAPP II key efforts to date and the overall impact of these efforts, and specific program recommendations. The final evaluation report will be submitted to Selma Sijercic, Project Management Specialist, in electronic format as well as in hard copy within 5 business days after receiving USAID/BiH's final written comments and/or questions.

G. Logistical Support

The Evaluation team will budget all logistical support, including, transportation to meetings in and outside of Sarajevo, accommodation, interpretation and communications. USAID/Bosnia and Herzegovina will provide logistical assistance to the team members with scheduling meetings, computer access, and office supplies. Technical direction during the performance of this delivery order will be provided by the USAID/Democracy Office Team.

H. Period of Performance

The period of performance for this activity will be from about July 11, 2011 and ending on/about August 18, 2011. Fieldwork should be conducted during the period from July 18, 2011 to July 30, 2011.

Proposed timeline for the evaluation:

July 11 – 14 Desk review, background interviews & development of fieldwork plan
July 18 – 30 Field Evaluation
August 8 Draft evaluation report due
August 12 Mission comments are due
August 18 Final report due

I. LEVEL OF EFFORT

The Team shall provide 43 days of personnel effort in performance of the evaluation, in the following illustrative breakdown:

Tasks to be performed	Team Leader	Team Member
<i>July 11-14 – Desk review, development of fieldwork plan</i>	4	3
<i>July 18 - 30 – Field Evaluation*</i>	11	11
<i>August 1 – August 6 - Draft assessment report</i>	6	2
Finalization of the report	4	2
TOTAL	25	18

*Six-day workweek is authorized while performing the assessment on the field. The last day of fieldwork should be the Friday of the second week.

Technical Direction

The point of contact for this activity is Selma Sijercic, CTO for the Civic Advocacy Partnership Project II.

Attachment A --Individuals and Organizations to Interview

International Organizations

- USAID/BiH
- U.S. Embassy/POL
- U.S. Embassy/OPA
- European Commission
- Technical Assistance for Civil Society Organizations (TACSO) Project
- Swedish Embassy/SIDA
- British Embassy
- Open Society Fund
- Swiss Embassy
- Norwegian Embassy
- Council of Europe

Local Organizations

- At least 15 CAPP II Sub-grantees
- Foreign Policy Initiative
- ACIPS

USAID Implementing Partners

- National Democratic Institute
- State University of New York/Center for International Development (SUNY/CID)
- Center for Civil Society Promotion (CCSP)
- Chemonic (USAID Governance Accountability Project)

Host Government Institutions

- Ministry of Justice/Office for cooperation with NGOs, Ms. Sadeta Skaljc
- BiH Parliament

Attachment B – Documents for Review

- USAID's draft Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) 2012-2016
- Civil Society Task Force Paper
- EU 2010 Progress Report
- USAID 2007 Civil Society Evaluation Report
- 2008 Civil Society Evaluation Report
- CAPP II Cooperative Agreement
- CAPP II Quarterly Reports from Year 1,2,3
- CAPP II Work Plan for Year 1,2,3
- CAPP II Performance Monitoring Plan

