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CONSORTIUM FOR ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PROCESS STRENGTHENING (CEPPS) II AND III EVALUATION

FINAL REPORT

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACE	Alliance for Credible Elections
AO	Assistance Objective
BEAT	Basic Election Administration Training
BRIDGE	Building Resources for Democracy, Governance, and Elections
CEPPS	Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening
CSCC	Civil Society Consultative Committee
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DFID	Department for International Development
EDR	Election Dispute Resolution
EMB	Elections Management Board
EMOU	Election Monitoring and Observation Unit
ERC	Election Review Committee
EVER	Electoral Violence Education and Resolution
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FOMWAN	Federation of Muslim Women Association of Nigeria
FOSIECON	Forum of State Independent Electoral Commission of Nigeria
ICT	Information, Communications, and Technology
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
INEC	Independent National Electoral Commission
IP	Implementing Partner
IR	Intermediate Results
IRI	International Republican Institute
KII	Key Informant Interview
MMC	MiraMonitor Consulting, Ltd.
MSA	Management Sciences for Africa
NAPE	Nigerian Alliance for Peaceful Elections
NAPEN	National Association for Peaceful Elections in Nigeria
NBA	Nigeria Bar Association
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NMEMS	Nigeria Monitoring and Evaluation Management Services
NYSC	National Youth Service Corps
PMC	Program Monitoring Committee
PPM&L	Political Party Monitoring and Liaison
PVT	Parallel Vote Tabulation
PWD	Persons with Disabilities
SIEC	State Independent Electoral Commission
SO	Strategic Objectives
TOT	Training of Trainers
TEI	The Electoral Institute
TMG	The Mitchell Group, Inc. (TMG)
UNDP	United Nation Development Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
YAIA	Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth and Advancement
YDI	Youngstars Development Initiative

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I. Executive Summary

This report provides the findings and recommendations from an evaluation of the assistance under the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS II and III) Cooperative Agreements as implemented in Nigeria from July 2005 to the present. The program evaluation was commissioned by USAID/Nigeria and was aimed at documenting evidence on progress and obstacles to CEPPS II and CEPPS III activities, in order to improve future CEPPS programming.

The purpose of the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS) Cooperative Agreements is to strengthen and support democratic electoral and political processes by providing access to a full array of activities in the field of elections and political processes. The emphasis is on long-term planning and sustainable development of electoral and political processes rather than event-driven, crisis orientated activities centered on a single election. The Cooperative Agreements were designed to allow for the initiation and implementation of activities without requiring a time-consuming competitive application process. The three implementing partners (IPs) of CEPPS are the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), all of which are leaders in the field of international assistance to elections and political processes and possess a vast amount of experience and expertise.¹

The CEPPS II programs officially began in July 2005, with the focus on partner organizations working in support of the 2007 National Election in Nigeria. IFES provided technical advice and training to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and other key election stakeholders, as well as strengthening the electoral framework in Nigeria. IRI worked to strengthen political parties, address voter apathy and to encourage international interest in the election by conducting an International Observation Mission. NDI worked to expand and sharpen domestic monitoring and to enhance the capacity of partner civic organizations to more effectively educate voters about the electoral process.² Unfortunately, the 2007 Nigerian National Election was criticized and viewed by international organizations as poorly managed, fraudulent, and lacking electoral transparency.³ Immediately following the 2007 election, CEPPS II was amended to focus almost exclusively on electoral reform and to carry out activities that address problems encountered during the 2007 elections.

CEPPS III programs began in July and appear to be a continuation of CEPPS II. IFES continued to work to strengthen the capacity of the INEC to carry out its mandate, worked to improve the Electoral Dispute Resolution System and supported the capacity of civil society to analyze, monitor, and advocate against election violence. IRI continued to work with political parties to more effectively and responsibly participate in the electoral process, promoted international support and interest for a transparent and democratic electoral process in Nigeria and worked to enhance the democratic role of the media during the electoral process. NDI continued its work with partner civil society organizations to monitor the electoral process, build the capacity of civil society organizations and to promote the transparency and integrity of Nigeria's electoral process through international assessments and monitoring.⁴ The 2011 National Elections were viewed as credible, not only by Nigerians, but also by the international community which determined the elections were conducted well and met international standards. Although an improved electoral event, the electoral reform process is ongoing in Nigeria.

A. Purpose of Evaluation

The purpose of this evaluation is to assess the results of the CEPPS project to date, to provide recommendations and strategies to improve the project and the design of similar interventions in order to determine how best to strengthen the electoral process in Nigeria and enhance its credibility. Evaluation objectives include 1) identifying evidence of programming strengths and weaknesses, lessons learned, and obstacles to the USAID-funded electoral assistance programs; 2) providing recommendations for program adjustments that may be necessary to increase the effectiveness and improve the implementation of electoral assistance activities in

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Nigeria; and 3) assessing the management of the program and recommending appropriate changes to the management structure specifically addressing local staff capacity and its long term development.

B. Evaluation Limitations

With only two weeks allocated for field work in Nigeria to review the CEPPS programs and only two lead evaluators, the process was restricted to working in Abuja. It was not possible to visit or observe any field activities or to meet with any of the participating CSOs outside of Abuja. The budget was also limiting in that a second round of field work in Nigeria by the two team evaluators was not possible, nor were the number of days allocated for the evaluation sufficient to allow for collecting a wide range of information by multiple methods. Most data for the CEPPS activities was found in CEPPS Quarterly Reports, which provided a general overview of the partner activities during a three month period.

The scheduling of the in-country work for 30 November to 13 December, proved to be problematic as many key stakeholders were not available. Both the IFES Chief of Party and Deputy Chief of Party were out of town. The IRI Chief of Party had only been in Nigeria for six weeks and was not available, although a Program Officer from IRI's Washington office was in Abuja to provide program information. The NDI Resident Senior Manager had been in Nigeria for more than three years, but was leaving his post in January 2012. Personal recollections of program staff, telephone interviews, and email questions were the only available contact mechanisms and sources of information on certain program subjects.

There were a limited number of work plans for most of 2005-2010. CEPPS Quarterly Reports had no consistent format, but were a combination of separate reports from each partner organization and were often lengthy, repetitive, and self-promoting. There were no summary reports or any databases containing a comprehensive list of CSOs and their contact persons, a workshop/seminar list of activities by topic and their dates, and no list of INEC departments where technical assistance was provided and when. It was difficult to determine jointly-sponsored program activities due to the manner in which activities were discussed in the partner reports. Also, although attempts were made to determine whether any of the programs or committees still exist and are functioning, definitive answers were not found. Programs goals and objectives, as stated in program documents, are vague and reflect no planning or requirement for program evaluations. With the vague program objectives it was difficult to determine the effectiveness, strengths, and weaknesses of program activities and the required performance measures or indicators do not reflect the management of the program activities. There were no reports or records of "before" and "after" results that could have proved useful.

C. Methodology

This evaluation used a mixed methodological approach, with an extensive review of program documents that included activities and work plans, results or outcomes of the programs, key informant interviews, group discussions regarding specific partner programs and activities, and two focus group discussions. In order to evaluate the CEPPS program activities, this evaluation answers the following questions through a qualitative analysis of CEPPS Quarterly Reports:

1. **Did CEPPS programs promote electoral reform in Nigeria?** CEPPS II and CEPPS III program activities were aimed at improving the electoral administration and credibility of the Nigerian elections in 2007 and 2011. CEPPS partners promoted and contributed to electoral reform through their work with key stakeholders and since electoral reform has occurred, these programs have achieved their stated results.
2. **What was the impact of these achievements on the relevant DG IR and AO?** The CEPPS Programs fall under Assistance Objective (AO) 1: Strengthen Civic Engagement for Good Governance, with Intermediate Results (IR) 1: Increased civic advocacy capacity, IR 2: Enhanced credibility of elections, and IR 3: Improved responsiveness in targeted government institutions.⁵ CEPPS' impact on this AO was that civil society organizations became more involved and educated in the electoral process and the INEC became more responsive to this involvement. CEPPS contributed to IR 1, IR 2, and IR 3.
3. **What explains the successes and/or failures?** Any successes or failures of CEPPS programs ultimately rest with the focus of the CEPPS interventions, INEC, political parties, civil society organizations, and the

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Nigerian electorate. The 2007 National Elections were conducted in an inefficient, non-transparent, and non-professional manner, which many classified as a failure. In several cases, INEC refused to heed the advice of IFES and other international advisors. The lack of political will by the government to conduct a transparent election in 2007 and the poor leadership of INEC impacted negatively on the election process and the election results. However, this should not be taken as a failure of CEPPS because the 2011 National Elections were viewed as meeting international standards and credible. Though CEPPS partners provided much of the same support and programs that were organized prior to the 2007 elections, there was a different INEC Chairman, more political will, more governmental support, and more support by local Nigerian stakeholders, all of which contributed to a better election.

4. **How could the program have done better?** The program could have done better with better coordination and more frequent communication among CEPPS partners, and between the IPs and Nigerian electoral stakeholders to ensure a more broad-based Nigerian support and ‘buy-in’. Benchmarks should have been established to identify program activities and the status of that activity. The program should have had periodic, mid-term and final evaluations to provide institutional assessments of activities as planned. Quarterly Reports should have been responded to in an effort to monitor the program. Comprehensive lists of partner CSOs and all program activities should have been developed and maintained.
5. **How sustainable are elements of the program?** The CEPPS programs did not operate with any pre-determined sustainability goals. All training opportunities for INEC staff and SIEC staff should be sustainable as long as the personnel continue to work for these commissions. Political party training and CSO advocacy training led to some degree of behavioral changes but did not demonstrate promising signs of sustainability. Programs require follow-up to determine whether the activities should remain the same, be revised or eliminated. Sustainability criteria must be established from the initial planning and design stages of future CEPPS programs.
6. **What lessons learned from this program are key to future programming?**
CEPPS partners should focus activities on long-range planning and sustainable outcomes. They must maintain open communication channels among themselves on the one hand, and with Nigerian electoral stakeholders on the other, in an effort to maximize impact and ensure value for money. Programs and activities should be planned in conjunction with appropriate stakeholders and civil society organizations because without definite ‘buy-in’ from key electoral stakeholders, programs may be difficult to implement. Every activity should be surveyed and assessed to determine whether there are program weaknesses and for each assessment there should be an implementation follow-up plan that addresses any problems or observed gaps to improve the activity.
7. **To what extent did the program reach its target population across Nigeria and how did it impact women, youth and persons with disabilities participation in the political processes?**
CEPPS partners worked to enlist participation in the electoral process from women’s organizations, youth organizations, and persons with disabilities. In the key informant interviews and focus group discussions, representatives from the Federation of Muslim Women Association of Nigeria (FOMWAN) and Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth and Advancement (YAIA) were enthusiastic proponents of their programs to increase the participation of their constituents in the electoral process. People with disability received support from CEPPS in the pursuit of the bill in the National Assembly to enforce their political and socio-economic rights.

D. Evaluation Team Composition

The evaluation team included two evaluators, an international Team Leader with extensive electoral experience and a Nigerian Local Consultant with expertise in interventions to increase the credibility of elections. The international Team Leader has more than 35 years of election experience and has provided technical electoral assistance in several countries including Afghanistan, Iraq, Turkey, Indonesia, South Africa, Kosovo, Zambia, Albania, and China. She has observed elections in Tunisia, Moldova, Kosovo, Albania, Indonesia, Azerbaijan, and the United Kingdom and has organized and facilitated workshops on election administration, international electoral standards, capacity-building programs, and assessment and evaluation efforts.

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The Nigerian Local Consultant has observed national elections in Nigeria since 1983 and conducted country governance risk assessments in West African countries, including Nigeria, Liberia, and Togo. He coordinated Nigeria's first Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA), and facilitated a multi-stakeholder process aimed at erecting peace-building infrastructure for reconciling the government, civil and political actors in Uganda. In addition, the team was supported by NMEMS II and its local partners, MiraMonitor Consulting Ltd. (MMC) and Management Sciences for Africa (MSA).

E. Findings

Extensive study of the CEPPS documents indicate that CEPPS is a project with numerous activities but no long-range strategic plan embraced by the three partner organizations and the key electoral stakeholders in Nigeria. Without support from key electoral stakeholders, CEPPS can become ineffective and less important than other assistance groups. An example of this situation occurred when IFES had difficulties working within INEC as explained in a case study regarding voter registration technical assistance.⁶ This case study also emphasized the lack of staff development and training in some departments of INEC, which did not appear to improve from CEPPS trainings. The reports, interviews and in-person discussions with INEC staff appeared to reflect inconsistent training, capacity, and skills among the electoral staff. The reports, work plans, and proposals appear to be drafted separately by each IP and then merged into a single document and not unique to Nigeria. Without a more holistic approach to the overall goal of CEPPS in Nigeria, the programs seem to be fragmented activities planned from one electoral event to another and not a comprehensive approach to electoral and political process strengthening in Nigeria. There do not appear to be consistent assessments of the CEPPS activities, making it difficult to determine the impact of CEPPS.

Past and current programming does not appear to contain adequate long-term institutional strengthening or sustainability components which can help promote continuation once CEPPS completes its mission and as such, have had limited impact. Although there have been several post election 'retreats' and dialogues resulting in various recommendations, CEPPS programs do not appear to reflect revised programming for long term support of the democracy development objectives of Nigeria including conflict and violence mitigation and poverty reduction. Most recommendations appear to indicate what needs to be done, but neglect to suggest an implementation plan or development tools to improve electoral deficiencies. The program goal of CEPPS Nigeria is to 'enhance the credibility of the Nigerian electoral process', but there does not appear to be a clear understanding of how the activities undertaken by CEPPS will reach this goal or how to determine whether the electoral process has been 'enhanced'. The most obvious method is to apply international electoral standards to determine whether an election was free, fair, and transparent. However, that criteria can not serve as a method of determining the value of the CEPPS programming. Certain representative activities were determined (through this evaluation process) to support program objectives and the CEPPS goal to 'enhance the electoral process in Nigeria' and are identified below. Section 6 contains detailed findings of this evaluation.

1. Program Results

- a. CEPPS partners appear to have been instrumental in effectuating change in the legal framework due to the education, legal advice, and advocacy methods they taught to key electoral stakeholders. Electoral reform did occur prior to both the 2007 and 2011 elections and CEPPS activities contributed to these reforms.
- b. As a result of participation in CEPPS programs, numerous civil society organizations seem to have become more educated and involved in the electoral process new partnerships and coordinating committees which previously did not exist, were established.
- c. The Election Dispute Resolution System, which was flawed and unable to resolve election disputes in a timely manner or consistently apply the law among all cases during the 2003 election cycle, seems to have been improved through the work of IFES⁷.
- d. Political parties appear to have improved their capacity to participate in the electoral process through the work of IRI.⁸
- e. Election credibility appears to have been enhanced in the 2011 National Elections by the involvement of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), initiated by CEPPS, as presiding officers in polling units.⁹

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- f. The Electoral Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) program, the Nigerian Alliance for Peaceful Elections (NAPE), and the National Association for Peaceful Elections in Nigeria (NAPEN) were established to provide valuable electoral violence monitoring information as a result of IFES' assistance.¹⁰
- g. There was improved responsiveness in targeted government institutions (INEC) due to CEPPS sponsored activities.¹¹
- h. CEPPS partners encouraged participation in the electoral process by women, youth, and persons with disabilities.¹²
- i. CEPPS partners facilitated the development of a comprehensive framework intended to curb the influence of money in politics.¹³

2. Lessons Learned

CEPPS programs have been implemented with most emphasis placed on previous activities and program design toward a single electoral event. Each continuation of CEPPS has been directed at improving the upcoming election in Nigeria and not on long-term strategic efforts. An important and overlooked component of the CEPPS programs is the lack of a holistic approach of continued electoral assistance, legal framework development, and interventions to improve democratic understanding. There does not appear to be an understanding of the electoral reality in Nigeria specifically that the numerous components of a credible election are dependent on one another. Without an accurate voter registry, informed candidates and electorate, improved legal framework and electoral regulations, and professional and competent electoral workers, future elections in Nigeria may just limp toward free and fair standards.

CEPPS does contain programs that address various electoral components, but there does not appear to be a cohesive strategy between the CEPPS partners and key electoral stakeholders. The working experience of IPs displays various approaches to several types of training. It is not apparent when, how, and why trainings and workshops are planned, although many have been provided under CEPPS. BEAT workshops, BRIDGE training, poll worker training, political party agent training, civil society development are just a few of the types of efforts that have been supported by CEPPS, but the impact and sustainability of these efforts on electoral stakeholders is difficult to discover.

The security and political situation in Nigeria has also impacted electoral interventions by CEPPS and causes some program activities to be tentative, depending upon certain external issues. The EVER project, successfully implemented in the six geo-political zones, shows that it is possible to establish effective efforts in all geo-political zones and indicates a possible redirection of some CEPPS efforts following that model.

CEPPS is only one assistance group of several working toward enhanced democratic governance in Nigeria. But there does not seem to be a coordinated sharing of information between these groups to avoid duplication of efforts. Although the Evaluation Team met briefly with representatives from UNDP who are also providing electoral assistance to INEC, the team was unable to receive or even view the project document under which UNDP was working. There appears to be a secrecy regarding 'who is doing what' assistance in the electoral realm, however there does appear to be limited mutual sponsorship of some activities. There were a number of lessons learned as detailed in Section VI, which can be implemented in future program designs with similar goals and objectives. Below is a summary of some key lessons.

- a. **Program Design** – CEPPS program design does not appear to empower electoral stakeholders with relevant skills to improve their inclusion in the electoral cycle. Although some civic education programs have helped expand participation by some partner CSOs, there does not appear to be any long-range planning to continue and improve this support. Programs aimed at enhanced dialogue between citizen groups, political parties, and governmental leaders are key to improving democratization in Nigeria. The program should have done had more frequent communication among CEPPS partners and the Nigerian electoral stakeholders to ensure more broad-based Nigerian support and 'buy-in' to project activities. CEPPS partners should have focused activities on long-range planning and sustainable outcomes that are clearly defined

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- b. **Training Design** - Although INEC was provided specialized trainings, study trips abroad, and electoral education, the administration of the 2007 election was seriously flawed, suggesting the trainings were inadequate for the task at hand. However, the training did increase some electoral officers' knowledge on the conduct of elections.¹⁴
- c. **Program Monitoring** - CEPPS programs should have had periodic, mid-term, and final evaluations to provide institutional assessments of planned activities by either USAID or an outside source. Benchmarks should have been established to identify specific program activities, due dates for completion, and the status of each activity. Comprehensive lists of partner CSOs and all program activities should have been developed and maintained by CEPPS. For every activity, an assessment and implementation follow-up plan should have been developed to address any observed difficulties or short-comings of the activity.
- d. **Project Continuity** – CEPPS partners should continue to work with their Nigerian CSOs and key electoral stakeholders, which will promote sustainability and expand activities. CEPPS partners should focus activities on long-range planning and sustainable outcomes that are clearly defined. CEPPS partners must follow-up on and monitor activities with CSO partners, political parties, INEC and SIECs so as to ensure that the outcomes are sustainable.

3. Challenges and Obstacles to Program Implementation

In proposing activities to meet their program objectives, CEPPS partners identified several challenges and obstacles to project implementation. External challenges and obstacles are beyond the control of CEPPS. Internal challenges and obstacles may be addressed by CEPPS.

a. External Challenges and Obstacles

- i. **Political Will** - In CEPPS Quarterly Reports, the political situation in Nigeria was frequently discussed as a major obstacle, with the lack of political will to improve electoral management as another problem. Political interference and the lack of independence of INEC were also frequently mentioned as a challenge.
- ii. **Party Organization** - Political parties in Nigeria were characterized as “networks of patronage” with very weak party organizations, focused on promoting their own interests rather than those of the public. IRI found that most political parties were driven by the choices of the senior leadership, not the consensus within the party.
- iii. **Civic Organization Coordination** - Nigerian CSOs that participated as monitors for the 2007 election felt they had limited impact on enhancing the transparency and credibility of the electoral process due to poor coordination between organizations. Voter education activities prior to the 2007 elections did not reach a large number of voters and were not successful at reaching representatives of marginal communities, including women, youth, rural and first-time voters. Major organizations partnering with NDI in election program activities found it a challenge to compromise on ownership of the data collection process, but the creation and joint use of a National Information Center helped them to overcome this hurdle for the most part.¹⁵

b. Internal Challenges and Obstacles

- i. **Changing leadership** – All three partner organizations have had several Chiefs of Party during the implementation of CEPPS. Each management change presents concerns for local staff, partner CSOs, and electoral stakeholders. Changing leadership within CEPPS partners should be addressed in future program designs to ensure continued focus on development of program activities.
- ii. **Lack of Program Monitoring** – CEPPS activities seem to be monitored by USAID through the submission of the Quarterly Reports which are lengthy narratives with numerous attachments. However, there does not seem to be any response or feedback to the reports provided to the CEPPS partners from USAID. Without any response to the quarterly reports, program activities continue without change or reassessment as if on ‘remote control’. Better monitoring of CEPPS activities can lead to better reporting and improved activities.

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- iii. **Limited Partner Coordination** – There is no person serving CEPPS in a partner coordinating capacity in Nigeria and any coordination of activities seems to occur in an informal, casual manner or as an after-thought. Although there is a CEPPS Director and a Deputy Director in Washington, D.C., in-country coordination can contribute to a better program by maintaining frequent communication between partners, ensuring program records are available and accurate for all activities, and by maintaining up-to-date calendars on program events and operations.

4. Assessment of the Management of the Program

During both CEPPS II and CEPPS III, program objectives and activities of the three partner organizations were similar. In continuing similar strategies that had been previously implemented, the CEPPS partners clearly assumed that their past activities were successful and/or adequate although the 2007 elections had been roundly condemned. This assumption was based on a faulty logic and not on any formal program evaluation results. From the apparent acquiescence to continue past activities, CEPPS partners presented similar strategic approaches and assumptions in the Cooperative Agreement for CEPPS III that was used for CEPPS II.¹⁶ By continuing similar strategies and activities that had been previously implemented, the CEPPS partners clearly assumed that USAID was in agreement with their approaches. Therefore, each partner essentially presented their proposals for CEPPS III by building upon their CEPPS II programs with little change and without addressing program issues such as operating without any pre-determined sustainability benchmarks, compiling databases containing a comprehensive list of CSOs and their contact persons, establishing a list of workshop/seminar activities by topic and their dates, and preparing a comprehensive list of INEC departments where technical assistance was provided and when. There was also no listing of joint program activities, making it difficult to distinguish between partner activities and no apparent follow-up to determine whether the activities should remain the same, be revised or eliminated.

Although many training opportunities were provided for INEC staff, SIEC staff, political party agents, CSOs, and other key electoral stakeholders, there were no assessments of the trainings or follow ups on training implementation and results. Sustainability issues did not seem to be considered during the planning and design stages of CEPPS III activities as most seem to be event-driven. There were no reports or records of “before” and “after” results, although CEPPS had provided electoral and political processes assistance for more than eight years and through three electoral cycles (2003, 2007, and 2011). Program goals and objectives, as stated in program documents, are vague and reflect no planning or a requirement for program evaluations. With the vague program objectives it is difficult to determine the effectiveness, strengths, and weaknesses of program activities and the lack of required performance measures or indicators do not reflect inadequate management of the program activities.

5. Conclusions

- a. **Partner Organization Management:** The three partner organizations, IFES, IRI, and NDI, maintain separate offices in Nigeria, with separate staff, objectives and activities. And although CEPPS programs may be implemented by one member of the Consortium or jointly,¹⁷ the majority of activities are individually planned and implemented by each partner organization. Activities jointly implemented by Consortium partners are limited, which leads one to believe that the ‘Consortium’ was established merely to circumvent restrictive funding mechanisms of USAID. However, CEPPS III can be tweaked to provide more collaborative partner programming and planning for long-range activities by establishing a CEPPS program coordinator in Nigeria who can work with all three groups and possibly consolidate certain activities into long-range programs.
- b. **Program Design Issues:** The design for CEPPS programs was developed several years ago and is not unique to Nigeria. Most of the programs are electoral ‘standards’ including numerous training efforts, voter education and civic education activities, technical election assistance to the electoral commission, political party programs, and various seminars on international electoral subjects. In order to develop programs unique to Nigeria, CEPPS can identify specific areas to work in and design program activities in those areas. A good example of this is the EVER program and the establishment of NAPEN, both of

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which are important in Nigeria. The Electoral Institute is another project that should be expanded. Programs should not only be electoral event based, but should also include long-range planning and sustainability efforts to strengthen the electoral stakeholders.

- c. **Reporting:** There is no consistent format in the reports produced for the program. Each CEPPS Quarterly Report contains separate reports and attachments from the partner organizations. There are three work plans, one for each organization, with no merging of the three plans into a concise and cohesive document. This point was clearly illustrated when Prof. Okey Ibeanu, a key advisor to the INEC Chairman, suggested that IFES, IRI, and NDI present a combined long term plan of electoral assistance to INEC. With a CEPPS coordinator and better review of the reports by USAID, useful reports can be written which can tell what was done, when it was done, whether it was successful, and whether it should/will be continued.
- d. **CSO Coordination:** All three partner organizations have worked with or supported civil society organizations for specific targeted objectives at some point during the implementation of CEPPS II and III. A CSO may sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), win a sub-grant, or obtain funding for a particular effort by submitting proposal, but there is no standard process among the partner organizations for obtaining CEPPS support. During each key informant interview and the focus group discussion with CSO representatives, each person related an issue with either the slow response time for a decision on a proposal by a CEPPS partner or the lack of capacity building to support the project. An additional respondent commented that the CEPPS partners judge a proposal based on the individual applicant, not the content of the proposal.
- e. **Impact on Election Credibility:** The post-election environment following the 2007 National Elections created continuous calls for electoral reform. Even with changes to the electoral framework and various CEPPS programs in support of electoral processes, there was extensive violence during the electoral campaign period and there was apparent manipulation by INEC, causing it to become non-transparent and inefficient. The 2007 elections were seriously flawed and showed no improvement in the credibility of Nigeria's electoral process, regardless of CEPPS interventions. However, the 2011 elections did show improvement in electoral process.

6. Recommendations

- a. Strategies within the programming should be integrated with national programs and good governance programs in Nigeria and reflect inclusion of civil society organizations, political parties, and marginalized groups including the youth, physically disabled, and women. To be most effective, CEPPS must continue dialogue with all electoral stakeholders to reach consensus on program components for the long-term.
- b. Political issues in Nigeria should be addressed in CEPPS programming through long-range planning and strategic objectives which focus on the electoral realities in Nigeria. CEPPS Nigeria programs should not be copied from CEPPS programs in other countries or as a key respondent in INEC commented, should not be "consultants and groups who come to impose American standards in the Nigerian political system and way of doing things". CEPPS must take into consideration the circumstances of the Nigerian nation and its development history.
- c. CEPPS should address transparency in party financing in order to promote a level playing field for all candidates and prevent the laundering of corrupt and other criminally sourced funds through political party and candidate financing. This area needs a comprehensive program to help prevent crime and illicit funding of political activities by transnational organized criminal networks, including terrorist cells.
- d. CEPPS programs should strike a balance between the technical management of elections and the sustained integrity of the full electoral process, from one election to another, including the associated issues of political will of the government. Programs should be a joint effort with support from other assistance agencies and key electoral stakeholders.
- e. Electoral reform programs should be expanded to continue focus on areas yet to be resolved including political party quotas for women, barriers to complete participation in the electoral process by people

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- with disabilities, the youth, and other marginalized groups, candidate quotas, INEC independence, and electoral violence penalties.
- f. CEPPS should develop programs to address issues of poverty, unemployment, crime, ethnic tensions, and other societal problems that can undermine the integrity of electoral processes.
 - g. CEPPS should continue support for Project Swift Count 2011 to include a full package, similar to the Ushahidi platform in Kenya, and as adapted in Eastern Congo and the Gaza Strip.
 - h. CEPPS should initiate programs of sustained professional development for electoral workers, political party agents, civil society organization staff, and elected officials in order to promote a broader understanding of electoral processes.
 - i. Functional needs and capacity assessment that compare the structures and resources currently available in relevant national institutions, including CSOs, should take place at the initial phase of the planning process prior to commencing another phase of CEPPS, so as to minimize the danger of either wasting resources or having inadequate resource levels, distribution, or management which can lead to poor service delivery that vitiates the integrity of the political and election processes.
 - j. Program objectives should be more clearly defined in order to provide specific areas of assistance and to enable better evaluation of programs. Currently, program objectives are vague providing CEPPS partners with little restriction on activities and allowing generic activities to be proposed with little or no advance planning. There should be specific program objectives because objective dictates the activity. For example, instead of an objective “Strengthen the capacity of INEC to carry out its mandate”, one objective can be “Establish an inter-agency communication network within INEC”. This type of specific objective requires advance planning with INEC support and can be clearly evaluated. Each objective in CEPPS should be redefined to establish specific objectives, activities and timelines.
 - k. Communication between partners in-country should be consistent, with regularly scheduled meetings and program updates. Meetings should include written program updates which contain upcoming program activities, program logistics, and activities planned for the future. This will encourage strategic planning and increase the probability for program success. Staff with similar positions in each organization should meet regularly to discuss program activities and issues. This can serve as a learning, communication, and sustainability exercise that will promote partnerships rather than a competition among IFES, IRI, and NDI. There should be an agenda and brief minutes of each CEPPS meeting.
 - l. CEPPS partners should develop a long term work plan, combining the planned activities of all three partners which are discussed and agreed to by the partners, USAID/Nigeria, and INEC, as appropriate. Currently, there are three work plans, one from each partner organization, which are not shared or combined, thereby creating possible duplication and/or conflict in programming. Benchmarks should be established to enable each partner to determine the status of their work plan on a regular basis, including periodic performance evaluations of program activities and a uniform reporting format. In addition, standard assessments of each activity should be conducted and made part of the work plan.
 - m. A uniform method of requesting and reviewing proposals from CSOs should be established with specific deadlines for applications, approvals, and funding. All three CEPPS partners work with Nigerian CSOs in some manner, therefore, it is necessary that the same ‘rules’ apply to working with the CSOs. The way CEPPS partners treat proposals from CSOs is arbitrary. To ensure the integrity of their programming procedures, CEPPS partners should ensure full disclosure regarding request for proposals and the criteria for obtaining grants. CEPPS partners should know and understand the planned activities, know and understand the obligations for both parties to the MOUs, and monitor CSO activities in order to evaluate them and report problems and progress to USAID.
 - n. CEPPS partners should maintain a database of partner CSOs, a database of activities by type and date, and a database of departmental assistance to INEC. It is apparent that no evaluation methodology was planned for when CEPPS first began operation, as there is no specific requirement to maintain records of partner CSOs, activities, or other assistance. This failure should be rectified by requiring databases to be maintained in a form that can easily be accessed for program evaluation and review purposes. These

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- databases will also enable the partners to monitor program activities and provide updates on the status of each project, CSO partner, activity, and program.
- o. CEPPS partners should promote long-time, qualified local staff to senior management positions to ensure sustainability and ownership of programs. The management of each partner organization includes an expatriate as Chief of Party/Country Director, with middle-level program staff being a combination of Nigerian local staff and international staff. All three partners should work on in-house capacity building to support their local staff and improve their programming skills. Partners should also offer their staff additional education opportunities in several fields, including report writing, computer programs, and communication skills that would enhance their credentials for promotion to management positions. CEPPS partners should attempt to provide consistent leadership in the role of Chief of Party for the duration of the project.
 - p. CEPPS partners should hire a CEPPS Coordinator or Project Manager to work in Nigeria. A Coordinator could provide overall consolidation of CEPPS activities, maintain databases and reports, and serve to enhance the long-range planning and sustainability of CEPPS programs. The Coordinator should reside in Nigeria and not function in any other capacity, i.e. serve as the CEPPS director and deputy director in Washington, D.C. This Coordinator could also assess, evaluate, and monitor program activities of all partners.
 - q. IFES, in consultation with INEC, UNDP, IRI, and NDI, should develop a comprehensive and harmonized work plan that identifies areas of technical assistance within INEC. This INEC work plan should be prepared so that all stakeholders understand what organization is working with what department and when. A similar work plan should be developed for the SIECs so that electoral support can permeate to the local government level. This will make for effective and more judicious use of international development funding with increased chances of helping to consolidate Nigeria's fledgling democracy. With UNDP also assisting INEC, close collaboration is imperative in order to have appropriate planning to avoid duplication, competition, and other difficulties within each agency.
 - r. INEC should be urged to update and maintain its website and to establish functional twitter and Facebook accounts. Information and communication technology (ICT) can help in educating the public on electoral matters and can reach millions of Nigerians. INEC should improve the IT literacy of its staff; ensure internet availability and/or accessibility in all its offices in the Headquarters, States and Local Government Areas.
 - s. INEC should be urged to establish a Commission-wide intranet and an interdepartmental communication network, including adequately equipped offices. The physical condition of the Abuja INEC office is poor, with varying degrees of obsolete equipment and technology. The Commission cannot operate in a professional manner without adequate equipment. There is no functional internet service for all of the Departments, some were perceived as receiving CEPPS operational assistance more than others. CEPPS partners should assist in providing computers, printers, and internet capabilities for INEC, SIECs, and partner CSOs, or assist in finding funds to purchase equipment necessary to enable them work more effectively and efficiently.
 - t. INEC should be encouraged to establish a permanent formal training program with the NYSC so that corps members can continue to serve as presiding officers in future elections. CEPPS partners should encourage and promote the continued participation of NYSC members in the electoral process through a formal training program for the NYSC. Beyond the one-off lecture to corps members on election duties during their orientation, a module on civic duties and basic election administration training should be offered to youth corps members to last through the period of the NYSC orientation camping.
 - u. CEPPS should develop a comprehensive curriculum specifically aimed at political party development and organization, and consider partnering with Nigerian educational institutions to assist in the implementation.
 - v. Political parties should be supported in the formation of their 'platforms' and encouraged to include issues effecting their party members. Platforms must represent Nigerian concerns, not those of other countries.

II. Introduction

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), in collaboration with the United Kingdom's (UK) Department for International Development (DFID), provided assistance to Nigerian governmental institutions and key electoral stakeholders in an effort to strengthen the electoral process and enhance the credibility of Nigerian elections.¹⁸ Through the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS), the three partner organizations, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), brought experience and expertise as leaders in the field of international assistance to elections and political processes.

The programs of the CEPPS partners sought to enhance the capacity of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to carry out its mandate of transparent and democratic election administration, train political parties to effectively and responsibly participate in the electoral process, improve the electoral dispute resolution system, educate voters, encourage participation of key stakeholders in the electoral process, including women, youth groups, and people with disabilities, and increase the capacity of civil society organizations (CSOs) to observe, analyze, monitor the election process.

Country and Political Background

Nigeria gained its independence from the United Kingdom on October 1, 1960 and has witnessed 29 years of military rule and 21 years of civilian rule. Currently, Nigeria is experiencing 12 years of uninterrupted civilian rule, with four national elections held in 1999, 2003, 2007, and 2011. It is the most populous country in Africa, with present population estimated to be 167 million. Its political structure is a Federal Republic with a three-tier system: the Federal, the States, and Local Government Areas. Nigeria has 36 States and a Federal Capital Territory, six geo political zones and 774 local government areas.

The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is a permanent body created by the Nigerian Constitution to organize Federal and State elections. The elections in 2003 and 2007 were criticized by national and international organizations as lacking independence, leadership, professionalism, and transparency and were followed by attempts to reform the Nigerian electoral system. CEPPS programs have been instrumental in these reforms, but many electoral reform issues remain unresolved.

INEC has a permanent staff of about 12,000 people spread across the national, state and local government areas. In each of the general elections held in 2003, 2007 and 2011, INEC deployed an average of 411,000 ad hoc staff for election duties throughout the 120,000 polling units across the country. The total number of registered voters in Nigeria prior to the 2011 National Elections was 73,528,040.¹⁹

With some improvements in the electoral system, INEC continues to struggle with management, operational, and implementation problems. The current INEC leadership of Chairman Professor Attahiru Jega, appointed in June 2010, is in the process of assessing and restructuring the massive agency. In addition, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is also providing electoral assistance to INEC and has five key advisors working with Chairman Jega to strengthen his office.

CEPPS II (July 2005-June 2010)

Under CEPPS II programs, the partner organizations carried out activities in support of the 2007 National Election in Nigeria. IFES provided technical advice and training to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and other key election stakeholders, as well as strengthening the electoral framework in Nigeria. IRI worked to strengthen political parties, address voter apathy and to encourage international interest in the election by conducting an International Observation Mission. NDI worked to expand and sharpen domestic monitoring and to enhance the capacity of partner civil society organizations to more effectively educate voters about the electoral process.

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Unfortunately, the 2007 Nigerian National Election was criticized and viewed by international organizations as poorly managed, fraudulent, and lacking electoral transparency. Therefore, immediately following the 2007 election, CEPPS II was amended to focus almost exclusively on electoral reform and to carry out activities to address problems encountered during 2007 elections. An Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) was established by President Musa Yar'Adua and it worked to draft a set of recommendations to improve future Nigerian elections.

USAID provided assistance to the ERC and helped to increase the national consensus on electoral reform, which put the executive and legislature under pressure to expedite the reform process. In 2009, to promote inclusive electoral reforms and broaden citizen participation and awareness, the CEPPS partners helped to establish the Civil Society Coordinating Committee (CSCC), made up of seven major coalitions, including labor groups, people with disabilities (PWD), the business community, eminent persons, political parties, and civil society organizations (CSOs).²⁰

CEPPS III (July 2010-Present)

CEPPS III programs aimed to support civil society organizations and political parties to play a more effective role in strengthening the 2011 electoral process and enhancing its credibility. Partner organizations continued to provide activities in support of their program objectives, while addressing the ongoing problems of electoral reform.

IFES continued to work to strengthen the capacity of the INEC to carry out its mandate, worked to improve the Electoral Dispute Resolution System and supported the capacity of civil society to analyze, monitor, and advocate against election violence. IRI continued to work with political parties to more effectively and responsibly participate in the electoral process, promoted international support and interest for a transparent and democratic electoral process in Nigeria and worked to enhance the democratic role of the media during the electoral process. NDI continued its work with partner civil society organizations to monitor the electoral process, build the capacity of civil society organizations and to promote the transparency and integrity of Nigeria's electoral process through international assessments and monitoring missions.

Under the leadership of Professor Attahiru Jega, appointed as INEC Chairman in June 2010, the 2011 national elections were viewed as credible, not only by Nigerians, but also by the international community which determined the elections were conducted well and met international standards. Although an improved electoral event, the electoral reform process is ongoing in Nigeria. Therefore, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) contracted for an evaluation of the CEPPS II and CEPPS III programs to respond to immediate and long-term strategies in advance of the 2015 elections.

Currently, IFES is focused on working with and supporting the INEC in continuing to build its capacity to organize and manage the elections. In addition, IFES continues to support reforms and public awareness of the election dispute resolution system and election violence monitoring and mitigation. IRI continues to take the lead in working with political parties to strengthen their capacity to more effectively participate in the electoral process, as well as to conduct party poll watching activities. Building on its previous work with civil society groups engaged in voter education and domestic monitoring in Nigeria, NDI has taken the lead in working with civil society organizations to conduct voter education campaigns and domestic monitoring efforts.

CEPPS partners meet regularly, including with USAID, to share program information and ensure coordination on such activities as voter education and international observation deployment.²¹ However there are challenges the partners have faced in implementing CEPPS programs, which this evaluation seeks to identify and address.

Evaluation Team Composition

The evaluation team includes two evaluators, an international Team Leader with extensive electoral experience and a local Nigerian consultant with expertise in interventions to increase the credibility of elections. The international Team Leader has more than 35 years of election experience and has provided technical electoral

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assistance in several countries including Afghanistan, Iraq, Turkey, Indonesia, South Africa, Kosovo, Zambia, Albania, and China. She has observed elections in Tunisia, Moldova, Kosovo, Albania, Indonesia, Azerbaijan, and the United Kingdom and has organized and facilitated workshops on election administration, international electoral standards, and capacity-building programs.

The Nigerian Local Consultant has observed national elections in Nigeria since 1983 and conducted country governance risk assessments of West African countries, including Nigeria, Liberia and Togo. He coordinated Nigeria's first Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA), and facilitated a multi-stakeholder process aimed at erecting peace-building infrastructure for reconciling the government, civil and political actors in Uganda.

In addition, the team was supported by NMEMS II and its local partners, MiraMonitor Consulting, Ltd. (MMC) and Management Sciences for Africa (MSA).

Limitations of this Evaluation

With only two weeks allocated for field work in Nigeria to review the CEPPS programs and only two lead evaluators, the process was restricted to working in Abuja. It was not possible to visit or observe any field activities or to meet with any of the participating CSOs outside of Abuja. The budget was also limiting in that a second round of field work in Nigeria with the two team evaluators was not possible, nor were the number of days allocated for the evaluation sufficient to allow for collecting a wide range of information by multiple methods. Most data for the CEPPS activities was found in CEPPS Quarterly reports which provided a general overview of the partner activities during a three month period.

The scheduling of the in-country work for 30 November to 13 December, proved to be problematic as many key stakeholders were not available. Both the IFES Chief of Party and Deputy Chief of Party were out of town. The IRI Chief of Party had only been in Nigeria for six weeks and was not available, although a Program Officer from IRI's Washington office was in Abuja to provide program information. The NDI Resident Senior Manager had been in Nigeria for more than three years, but was leaving his post in January 2012. Personal recollections of program staff, telephone interviews, and email questions and answers were the only available contact mechanisms and sources of information on certain program subjects.

There were a limited number of work plans for most of 2005-2010. CEPPS Quarterly Reports had no consistent format, but were a combination of separate reports from each partner organization and were often lengthy, repetitive, and self-promoting. There were no summary reports or any databases containing a comprehensive list of CSOs and their contact persons, a workshop/seminar list of activities by topic and their dates, and no list of INEC departments where technical assistance was provided and when. It was difficult to determine jointly-sponsored program activities due to the manner in which activities were discussed in the partner reports. Also, although attempts were made to determine whether any of the programs or committees still exist and are functioning, definitive answers were not found.

Programs goals and objectives, as stated in program documents, are vague and reflect no planning or requirement for program evaluation. With the vague program objectives it is difficult to determine the effectiveness, strengths, and weaknesses of program activities and the required performance measures or indicators do not reflect the management of the program activities. There were no reports or records of "before" and "after" results that could have proved useful.

III. Evaluation Purpose and Methodology

The purpose of this evaluation is to assess the results of the CEPPS project to date, from 2005 through 2011 and to provide recommendations and strategies to improve the project and to determine how best to strengthen the electoral process in Nigeria and enhance its credibility.

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Evaluation objectives include:

- Identifying evidence of programming successes, lessons learned, and obstacles to the USAID-funded electoral assistance programs;
- Providing recommendations for program adjustments that may be necessary to increase the effectiveness and improve the implementation of electoral assistance activities in Nigeria; and
- Assessing the management of the program and recommending appropriate changes to the management structure specifically addressing local staff capacity and its long term development.

In addition, the evaluation will:

- Provide a brief assessment of the post-election political environment in Nigeria, including a discussion of the enabling environment for and the constraints to providing technical assistance in the areas of electoral and political processes;
- Summarize and describe activities and strategies employed for achieving results, with particular emphasis on how actual activities compared to planned activities as defined in the agreements (proposals) and work plans;
- Describe the results or outcomes of the programs, and compare them with the objectives and indicators set forth in their contracts and/or cooperative agreements, work plans and performance monitoring plans;
- Describe the assumptions implicit in the IFES, IRI, NDI chosen implementation strategies, and an assessment of the appropriateness and strengths of the chosen implementation strategies and activities;
- Describe the impact of the programs on women's and youth, and persons with disabilities' participation in political processes;
- Assess the management of the program, and recommend appropriate changes to the management structure; the team should specifically address local staff capacity and its long term development;
- Summarize lessons learned; and
- Make programmatic recommendations for activities with defensible potential for measurable impact on the promotion of credible elections in Nigeria. The recommendations should be forward-looking, with an emphasis on what should be done over the next few years and should be specific to Nigeria. The report should identify any areas in which the team concludes that USAID/Nigeria should not be involved for any reason and the areas in which USAID/Nigeria has comparative advantage.

Methodology

This evaluation used a mixed methodological approach, with extensive review of program documents indicating activities and work plans, results or outcomes of the programs and key informant interviews, and focus group discussions regarding specific partner programs and activities.

This evaluation will also answer the following questions:

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Evaluation Question	Data Type	Data Source
1. To what extent did the program promote electoral reforms in Nigeria? Did these programs achieve their stated results?	Qualitative	CEPPS Quarterly Reports
2. What was the impact of these achievements on the relevant Democracy/Governance Intermediate Results and Administrative Objectives?	Qualitative	CEPPS Quarterly Reports
3. What explains the successes and/or failures?	Qualitative	CEPPS Quarterly Reports
4. How could the program have done better?	Qualitative	CEPPS Quarterly Reports
5. How sustainable are elements of the program?	Qualitative	CEPPS Quarterly Reports
6. What lessons learned from this program are key to future programming?	Qualitative	CEPPS Quarterly Reports
7. To what extent did the program reach its target population across Nigeria and how did it impact women, youth and persons with disabilities participation in the political processes?	Qualitative	CEPPS Quarterly Reports

IV. Findings

Although all three implementing partners had been working in Nigeria prior to the 2003 election, CEPPS II activities officially began in July 2005 in anticipation of the 2007 National Elections. CEPPS III programs officially began in July 2010 to provide support for the 2011 Nigerian Elections.

Extensive study of the CEPPS documents indicate that CEPPS is a project with numerous activities but no long-range strategic plan embraced by the three partner organizations and the key electoral stakeholders in Nigeria. Without support from key electoral stakeholders, CEPPS can become ineffective and less important than other assistance groups. An example of this situation occurred when IFES had difficulties working within INEC as explained in a case study regarding voter registration technical assistance.²² This case study also emphasized the lack of staff development and training in some departments of INEC, which did not appear to improve from CEPPS trainings. The reports, interviews and in-person discussions with INEC staff appeared to reflect inconsistent training, capacity, and skills among the electoral staff.

The reports, work plans, and proposals appear to be drafted separately by each IP and then merged into a single document and not unique to Nigeria. Without a more holistic approach to the overall goal of CEPPS in Nigeria, the programs seem to be fragmented activities planned from one electoral event to another and not a comprehensive approach to electoral and political process strengthening in Nigeria. youth, physically disabled, and women.

Past and current programming does not appear to contain adequate long-term institutional strengthening or sustainability components which can help promote continuation once CEPPS completes its mission and as such, have had limited impact. Although there have been several post election ‘retreats’ and dialogues resulting in various recommendations, CEPPS programs do not appear to reflect revised programming for long term support of the democracy development objectives of Nigeria including conflict and violence mitigation and poverty reduction. Most recommendations appear to indicate what needs to be done, but neglect to suggest an implementation plan or development tools to improve electoral deficiencies.

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The program goal of CEPPS Nigeria is to ‘enhance the credibility of the Nigerian electoral process’, but there does not appear to be a clear understanding of how the activities undertaken by CEPPS will reach this goal or how to determine whether the electoral process has been ‘enhanced’. The most obvious method is to apply international electoral standards to determine whether an election was free, fair, and transparent. However, that criteria can not serve as a method of determining the value of the CEPPS programming. Certain representative activities were determined (through this evaluation process) to support program objectives and the CEPPS goal to ‘enhance the electoral process in Nigeria’ and are identified below.

1. CEPPS Co-sponsored Activities

CEPPS programs may be implemented by one member of the Consortium, by two or more members working on activities separately, or by two or more members working jointly.²³ In Nigeria, CEPPS partners did co-sponsor certain events, but the majority of activities were individually planned and implemented by each partner organization.

It should be noted that it was difficult to determine joint program activities due to the manner in which activities were reported in the partner reports. Also, although attempts were made to determine whether any of these programs or committees still exist and are functioning, definitive answers were not found.

Objective	Activity	Sponsors
Improve political party campaign finance procedures.	Political party workshops on campaign finance.	IFES and IRI
Improve communication between political parties	Established Political Party Consultative Committees and held round table discussions and forums.	IFES, IRI, and INEC
Improve civil society structures and communication with INEC	Established Civil Society Consultative Committees, which allowed CSOs to provide input and feedback to INEC on electoral issues.	IFES, NDI, and INEC
Promote an ethical and peaceful electoral campaign	Sponsored and supported establishment of a Code of Conduct that political parties and candidates signed.	IRI, NDI, and INEC
Encourage key electoral stakeholders to participate in electoral reform.	Sponsored a two-day event titled “National Dialogue on Electoral Reform”	IFES, IRI, and NDI
Promoted electoral reform.	Supported creation of Civil Society Coordinating Committee (CSCC) to coordinate civil society efforts in electoral reform.	IFES, IRI, and NDI
Sponsor International Observation Missions to monitor national elections.	Conducted pre-election assessments, long term observations of electoral campaign period, deployed international observers throughout the country, and impartially reported on the conduct of the election.	IRI and NDI

2. IFES Objectives and Activities

The main focus of IFES’ work in Nigeria was strengthening the capacity of INEC to help ensure credible elections and strategic planning for future elections. Two additional areas for assistance and reform identified in the analyses of the 2003 elections were the legal framework for elections and the system of election dispute resolution.

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In the lead-up to the 2007 National Elections, IFES sponsored numerous activities to reach the program goals, but the administration of the 2007 election was disappointing. With a new INEC leadership, and continued technical assistance from IFES, the administration of the 2011 National Elections was much improved. In 2009, given INEC's performance during the April 2007 election and USAID requested that IFES put a temporary hold on its funding for INEC activities.²⁴ IFES resumed its technical assistance to INEC in 2010 and the administration of the 2011 National Elections was much improved. IFES currently is working to assist the agency in strategic planning, boundary delimitation, and post election assessments and recommendations.

Objective	Activity	Results
Improve electoral framework	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provided legal advice to INEC and electoral stakeholders. 2. Assisted and supported hearings held by House Committee on Electoral Matters. 3. Printed copies of the Electoral Bill for public. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Draft reform bill improved in the area of political party finance regulations, candidate nominations and electoral dispute resolutions regulations.²⁵ 2. Publication and Distribution of the Report of Senate and House Committees public Hearings on draft bill.²⁶ 3. 1,000 copies distributed to increase public participation in the electoral reform discourse.²⁷
Strengthen the capacity of INEC in electoral administration	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provided study tours for INEC Commissioners and staff. 2. Supported INEC education at American University Summer Institute of Democracy and Elections 3. Assisted in expansion of INEC training unit. 4. Supported establishment of Electoral Institute. 5. Conducted Basic Electoral Administration Training (BEAT) for INEC staff. 6. Provided technical assistance to INEC for voter registration efforts. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. INEC staff observed and learned from other electoral organizations and management bodies.²⁸ 2. Eight INEC staff, one National Assembly member and one CSO person sponsored.²⁹ 3. INEC training unit helped to train a large cadre of master trainers.³⁰ 4. The Electoral Institute formed as INEC's in-house Education arm.³¹ 5. 1,159 INEC employees completed the BEAT training course.³² 6. Staff of INEC IT and Logistics Departments training activities provided the opportunities for INEC staff to observe and learn from other electoral organizations and management bodies.
Improve the Election Dispute Resolution System	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provided technical advice to INEC and key election stakeholders. 2. Worked with civil society organizations to monitor tribunal process. 3. Conducted seminars and workshops on enhancing the election dispute resolution system and legal principles of election dispute adjudication. 4. Trained and provided case management techniques to tribunal judges. 5. Provided training and 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Prepared and conducted training for 200 Election Petitions Tribunal Judges.³³ 2. IFES work with the Legal Defense Center contributed to a more efficient election adjudication system. 3. Judges were introduced to international perspectives and case management techniques for organizing and streamlining election petitions for fair hearing.³⁴ 4. 200 Election Tribunal Judges were trained prior to 2011 polls.³⁵ 5. Lawyers were trained through their umbrella union, the Nigeria Bar Association (NBA).³⁶

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	information to lawyers regarding the election dispute resolution system.	
Support to the State Independent Electoral Commissions (SIECs)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Designed modified BEAT training for SIECs. 2. Worked toward improved strategic planning for local elections. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Partnered with SIECs to work towards capacity building and enhanced electoral administration.³⁷ 2. Provided abbreviated BEAT course for 70 SIEC officials in consultation with FOSIECON.³⁸
Increase the capacity of civil society organizations to monitor and report on electoral violence.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Designed a program for monitoring and reporting incidences of election violence, in collaboration with civil society organizations and other election stakeholders. 2. Sponsored electoral violence seminar. 3. Provided information and education on electoral violence to civil society organizations. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Six civil society organizations managed activities of the Nigerian Alliance for Peaceful Elections (NAPE) and implemented the Electoral Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) project. 2. 100 participants from CSOs, INEC, political parties, media, security, etc. 3. Stakeholders utilized the information to work against election violence, culminating in the formation of NAPE.³⁹
Improve INEC electoral administration following 2007 national elections.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sponsored a post-election retreat addressing problems in 2007 election. 2. Sponsored event showcasing BRIDGE curriculum to INEC staff. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Identified numerous problems within INEC and made recommendations for the 2011 national elections.⁴⁰ 2. IFES organized a one-day showcase of BRIDGE for about 50 participants drawn from the various departments of INEC and The Electoral Institute (TEI).⁴¹
Continue support for EVER project for 2011 election.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Continued support for training program on monitoring and reporting incidences of election violence. 2. Provided information and education on electoral violence to civil society organizations. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Conducted a ToT for the National Association for Peaceful Elections in Nigeria (NAPEN).⁴² 2. EVER program and website launched in Abuja.⁴³
Strengthen INEC in preparation for 2011 National Elections.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provide assistance to voter registration planning. 2. Participated in training on political finance monitoring for civil society organizations. 3. Visited INEC state office to observe election preparations. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Held voter and civic education outreach.⁴⁴ 2. INEC supported to strengthen oversight of party finances.⁴⁵ 3. Pre-election visits paid to INEC offices in Kogi, Kaduna to assess readiness.⁴⁶
Provide on-going assessments of INEC administration and provide expert technical assistance to various INEC	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sponsored a post-election retreat to address problems identified during the 2011 electoral process. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Post-election retreats held in Calabar.⁴⁷ 2. Abbreviated BEAT course for INEC field staff.⁴⁸ 3. IFES retreat advanced

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departments.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Provide customized training for INEC field staff. 3. Identified areas of assistance to INEC moving forward. 	recommendations for the 2011 elections, including additional areas of technical assistance to INEC. ⁴⁹
Expand and improve relationship between INEC and SIEC to promote more professional electoral processes.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sponsored consultative workshop between INEC and SIECs. 2. Established orientation training program for SIECs in cooperation with Forum of State Independent Electoral Commissions in Nigeria (FOSIECON). 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. IFES worked with FOSIECON to address deficiencies in electoral operations at the state level.⁵⁰ <p>Expanded relationship with SIECs and encouraged more cooperation between INEC and SIECs.⁵¹</p>

3. IRI Objectives and Activities

IRI program activities supported Nigeria's political parties at both the national and state levels by increasing their capacity to participate in elections and promote improved democratic development in Nigeria. IRI also supported an International Observation Mission to observe and monitor Nigeria's 2007 and 2011 national elections.

Objectives	Activities	Results
Strengthen political party contributions to promote electoral reform	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sponsored political party training on organizational and campaign capacity building. 2. Trained political party agents on effective Election Day monitoring and reporting activities. 3. Helped political parties monitor voter registration process. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Political parties became more involved in electoral reform process. 2. Leading up to the 2007 election, IRI trained more than 1,100 party agents and printed and distributed poll watcher manuals. 3. IRI organized a Training of Trainers effort on voter registration for 281 participants from 12 local CSOs.⁵²
Foster more peaceful and viable electoral and political competition incorporating political agents and stakeholders	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sponsored political roundtables with political parties. 2. Encouraged inter-party dialogues through workshops and forums. 3. Assisted with the drafting and implementation of a Code of Conduct for political parties. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. IRI organized Zonal Political Party and CSOs Roundtable on the 2011 primaries/congresses.⁵³ 2. Political parties and key electoral stakeholders began to communicate more openly on political issues. 3. In February 2007, 38 political parties formally signed the Code of Conduct.
Expand political party competitiveness by building organizational structures	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Conducted training session on campaign planning and management. 2. Worked to help political parties to expand their activities to include citizens and civil society. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Political parties were urged to broaden their memberships and worked toward consensus in electoral matters. 2. Political Parties and CSOs activists began to communicate on constructively on electoral matters.⁵⁴
Expand and encourage women and youth participation in the electoral	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Created "Women's Forum" to support and assist in developing women's 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. IRI's advocacy efforts led to increased participation of women in the electoral reform process and the formation of the

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process.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> coalition. 2. Conducted training for women political candidates. 3. Developed programs for youth organizations to increase their knowledge of the electoral process. 4. Partnered with CSOs through sub-grants or co-sponsorships. 	<p>Nigerian Coalition for Political Development of Women and the launching of <i>Dreams for Nigeria</i>.⁵⁵</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Trained women on advocacy strategies and launched Women's Manifesto.⁵⁶ 3. Organized youth forums, including Nigeria Youth Manifesto Harmonization and Validation Workshop 4. Facilitated cross-cutting partnerships among political groups and CSOs.⁵⁷ 5. Youth programming helped expand and create regional youth networks aimed at providing education and training on electoral participation.
Promote international interest and support for the 2007 National Elections.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A 32-member international team of observers were deployed to observe the elections in 16 states. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The International Observation Mission reported on their election observations and noted the urgent need for electoral reform.
Enhance the democratic role of the media during the electoral process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. IRI facilitated workshops for the media to improve election reporting. 2. IRI assisted media in drafting and implementing a code of conduct including specific guidelines on elections broadcasting and reporting. 3. Provided training on how to facilitate, host and broadcast forums for candidates. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Participants acquired the necessary skills and expertise to improve election reporting and encouraged the development of broadcast forums for candidates.⁵⁸ 2. Effective partnership with NPC and NBC produced Election Reporting Manual.⁵⁹ 3. Collaborated with NPC and NBC to train 97 and 523 journalists respectively.⁶⁰
Following 2007 election, IRI supported electoral reform by working with political parties to understand the nature of electoral reform.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. IRI printed and distributed over 200,000 booklets summarizing the electoral reform recommendations. 2. Electoral reform was a major component of the civic education programming. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The Electoral reform recommendations were widely discussed in the electronic and print media in Nigeria.⁶¹ 2. Political parties participated meaningfully in the electoral reform process due to education on the new legal framework.
Strengthen the capacity of political parties to more effectively and responsibly participate in the electoral process.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. IRI conducted seminars on voter outreach, developing effective platforms and messages, membership and candidate recruiting, and building strategic political coalitions. 2. Seminars targeted grassroots party organizations and mid-level party leaders. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. IRI's trainings helped political parties to strengthen and build their organizational capacity.⁶²
Strengthen Party Agents' capacity to monitor the 2011 elections		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Due to budgetary constraints, IRI did not conduct party agent training.

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Promote stakeholder dialogues on the electoral process.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. IRI worked to create consultative forums between electoral officials, political parties and civil society organizations. 2. Forums were held at the national level and in selected states across Nigeria's six geopolitical zones. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The creation of these forums helped to address contentious issues related to elections and the activities of political parties. 2. Consensus-building multi-stakeholder forums organized across the country.
Strengthen the voter registration process.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. IRI worked with political parties to observe and monitor the voter registration process. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Observing the voter registration process allowed key electoral stakeholders the opportunity to determine whether the voter lists would be credible.
Expand participation of young people in the electoral process.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. IRI facilitated the partnership between INEC and the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC). 2. NYSC members served as presiding officers in polling units. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Formalizing the use of NYSC members in the electoral process gave a boost to the credibility of the 2011 election and provided a source of ad hoc election day workers.⁶³
Promote international interest and support for 2011 National Elections.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. An international team of long-term observers and Election Day observers were deployed throughout the country. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The international observers helped to deter fraud and provide relevant Nigerian stakeholders and the public with accurate, impartial information on the electoral process.

4. NDI Objectives and Activities

NDI's programs expanded the capacity for domestic and international election monitoring and partnered with civil society organizations representing traditionally under-represented groups including women and young people. Additional programs included voter education messages and activities to engage citizens in the electoral process. NDI would support partner organizations to implement multi-media messages and programs on radio and television as a means of raising awareness on the elections.

Objectives	Activities	Results
Expand participation of groups that have not historically been involved in the electoral process.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. NDI partnered with local CSOs and developed voter education materials in several languages. 2. Assisted National Assembly members to organize constituency outreach programs. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. NDI identified and partnered with CSOs representing women, youth, and other marginalized groups to support their programs.⁶⁴ 2. Constituency outreach programs held in Kaduna and Akwa Ibom states.⁶⁵
Strengthen the capacity of civil society organizations to promote the integrity of the electoral process through monitoring of pre-election, election day, and post-election activities.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Organized forums on the electoral process for partner CSOs. 2. Presented information on free and fair elections and how CSOs could address electoral problems. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. CSOs partnered with NDI to mobilize domestic election monitors and agreed on common strategies for election monitoring. 2. CSCC given technical support to encourage CSOs contribution toward addressing electoral problems.
Strengthen the ability	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Worked with domestic monitoring 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. By supporting and funding issue-based

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<p>of civil society groups to organize voter education initiatives and Get Out the Vote (GOTV) efforts.</p>	<p>groups to track and report on voter registration activities.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Supported development of issue-based voter education in all geo political zones. 3. Hosted town hall meetings. 	<p>local groups, NDI assisted in voter education campaigns in all geo political zones.⁶⁶</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. NDI also provided financial and technical support to organizers of Nigerian presidential debates as part of civic and voter education, as well as a mechanism to mitigate conflict.⁶⁷ 3. Six Town Hall Meetings held in three geo-political zones and FCT.⁶⁸
<p>Demonstrate international support of the election process by deploying long term observers and short term observers throughout the country prior to the 2007 election.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. NDI supported an international observation mission to observe and report on electoral activities during the election period. 2. Supported the establishment of a National Information Center (NIC) to serve as a central location to collect and evaluate observer data nationwide. 3. NDI supported four Nigerian CSOs to improve their domestic monitoring efforts by providing technical and financial assistance and strengthening their capacity to coordinate nationwide domestic monitoring activities through innovative technologies. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. NDI deployed three LTOs throughout Nigeria for six weeks, and 61 STOs.⁶⁹ 2. The election day observation effort involved assisting CSO partners with the recruitment, training and deployment of approximately 8,000 volunteer observers nationwide to collect information on key elements of the process.⁷⁰
<p>Build the capacity of civil society organizations to employ advanced statistical based monitoring methodologies.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. NDI provided technical and financial support for a pilot comprehensive monitoring initiative which included parallel vote tabulation (PVT). 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. This initiative led the way for a partnership of four CSOs to coordinate Project 2011 Swift Count.⁷¹
<p>Identify real or potential problems in the electoral process and offer solutions and recommendations.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. NDI facilitated a series of six public hearings on the Electoral Reform Bill. 2. Assisted the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) in organizing a conference for the public to build confidence in the election process. 3. Facilitated briefings between CSO representatives and international observation delegations to build public confidence in the electoral process. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. More than 20 National Assembly members, including the Senate President participated.⁷² 2. NDI assisted by the NBA and NLC organized a two-day, “All Nigeria Civil Society Pre-Election Conference”.⁷³ 3. NDI encouraged, and helped facilitated meetings among domestic monitoring groups and international observer groups to discuss issues of common concern, such as the accreditation and guidelines for access to polling stations.
<p>Support the work of the Electoral Reform Committee.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Organized seminars for the House Committee on Electoral Matters. 2. Facilitated the Senate Committee Retreat on the review of the Constitution to play a more active role in the election reform process. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. State and National Assembly members were enlightened on their roles in the Electoral Reform matter.⁷⁴ 2. Senators were mobilized to support the law and CSOs became more engaged with the National Assembly.⁷⁵
<p>Following the 2007</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Assisted civil society organizations 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. NDI organized National Dialogue on

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National Election, support civil society organizations to participate more fully in Electoral Reform.	<p>to learn more about the electoral reform process.</p> <p>2. Worked with CSOs to educate the public on electoral reform.</p>	<p>Election Reforms and set up CSCC.⁷⁶</p> <p>2. Series of awareness-raising forums organized for CSCC members and other stakeholders to effectively engage the reform process.⁷⁷</p>
Supported Project 2011 Swift Count, domestic program for election day observation, reporting, and parallel vote tabulation (PVT).	<p>1. Worked to bring four partner CSOs together to coordinate project.</p> <p>2. Provided technical advice and support to project.</p> <p>3. Introduced concept of PVT.</p>	<p>1. Project 2011 Swift Count enhanced the credibility of the election and supported the timely reporting on electoral incidents and problems.⁷⁸</p> <p>2. NDI recruited and trained 74 data entry clerks and acquired the software for data processing for the NIC.⁷⁹</p> <p>3. Project 2011 Swift Count was an adaptation of the PVT.⁸⁰ NDI's support to Project 2011 Swift Count was vital in ensuring the activity met the potential goals of verifying the credibility of the election and timely reporting on electoral incidents and problems.</p>

6. Program Results

A. CEPPS partners appear to have been instrumental in effectuating change in the legal framework due to the education, legal advice, and advocacy methods they taught to key electoral stakeholders. Electoral reform did occur prior to both the 2007 and 2011 elections and CEPPS activities contributed to these reforms, as a result of:

1. IFES attending Senate Public Hearings on the Draft Electoral Reform Bill and providing copies of the electoral bill and a booklet of recommendations on changes to the draft law. The distribution of this report increased the level of public information on the electoral law and the amendment process, which in turn contributed to the public discourse and participation in the electoral process.⁸¹
2. IRI working with opposition political parties to understand electoral reform and to formulate their electoral reform priorities, resulting in consensus-building between the electoral stakeholders.⁸²
3. NDI facilitating public hearing on the Electoral Reform Bill and providing expertise resulting in smoothly running hearings.⁸³
4. CEPPS partners organizing a two-day “National Dialogue on Electoral Reform” with participants from CSOs, political parties, media, women’s groups, Nigerian legislators, and former members of the Electoral Reform Committee.⁸⁴ At the conclusion of the event, participants developed and released a *communiqué* that called on the Nigerian government to release the ERC report. It also announced the creation of a Civil Society Coordinating Committee on Electoral Reform (CSCC) to serve as a platform for civil society groups to continue electoral reform advocacy.
5. IFES, NDI, and IRI, working to ensure that public feedback on election law reform, which ranged from the need for changes to the Constitution to solidify INEC’s independence, to furthering the interests of underserved or disenfranchised populations, impacted upon the Electoral Bill that INEC submitted to the National Assembly.⁸⁵

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- B. As a result of participation in CEPPS programs, numerous civil society organizations seem to have become more educated and involved in the electoral process and new partnerships and coordinating committees which previously did not exist, were established.**
1. CEPPS partners facilitated the creation of the Civil Society Coordinating Committee (CSCC) and provided technical support to the group.⁸⁶
 2. IFES organized a national seminar on preventing electoral violence and sub-awarded grants to six CSOs to manage activities of the Nigerian Alliance for Peaceful Elections (NAPE).⁸⁷
 3. NDI partnered with CSOs to mobilize 11,000 domestic election monitors for the 2007 elections and helped coordinate their activities and reports.⁸⁸
 4. NDI selected 12 local CSO partners that focused on previously underrepresented groups like women, rural voters, youth, and the disabled community. The concerns of these groups were reflected in the voter education programming and recruitment for domestic observation.⁸⁹
 5. NDI's engagement with domestic monitoring groups helped a number of local CSOs to come to a consensus to use the same election checklists, share information, and coordinate deployment. A number of groups formed a coalition called the Alliance for Credible Elections, and even more came together to coordinate under the umbrella of the Domestic Election Observer Groups (DEOG), which released a joint statement after each of the state and national elections.
 6. NDI supported Project 2011 Swift Count which deployed more than 7,000 stationary observers for the 2011 elections resulting in enhance capacity of domestic CSOs to effectively communicate observation findings and add to the credibility of the 2011 elections.⁹⁰
- C. The Election Dispute Resolution System which was flawed and unable to resolve election disputes in a timely manner or consistently apply the law among all cases during the 2003 election cycle. seems to have been improved through the work of IFES⁹¹.**
1. Prior to IFES' intervention, the electoral dispute resolution process lacked a definite timeframe or deadline for rendering of judgments on corruption and threats of violence to claimants led to an erosion of confidence in the tribunals' ability to deliver justice. Tribunal judgments routinely went unenforced, and claimants in election dispute cases frequently were not safe.⁹²
 2. IFES provided technical advice to INEC and key election stakeholders regarding the election dispute process and worked with civil society organizations to monitor the tribunal process.
 3. IFES conducted seminars and workshops on enhancing the election dispute resolution system and legal principles of election dispute adjudication.
 4. As a result of training in case management techniques to tribunal judges, as well as to lawyers regarding the election dispute resolution system, IFES was able to contribute to a more efficient adjudication system. In contrast to 2003, all election petitions were heard within one year of the April 2007 elections.
- D. Political parties appear to have improved their capacity to participate in the electoral process through the work of IRI⁹³ as a result of:**
1. IRI facilitating the signing of a Political Party Code of Conduct.
 2. IRI helping political parties to monitor INEC's voter registration process.
 3. IRI training political poll agents in effective methods of monitoring and reporting on Election Day conditions in polling units.
 4. IRI printing and distributing 500,000 poll watcher manuals and assisted political parties to develop a tool kit for Election Day.
 5. Many fraudulent activities in the 2007 election were observed and reported on by political party agents who had been trained through the efforts of IRI.

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- E. Election credibility appears to have been enhanced in the 2011 national elections by the involvement of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), initiated by CEPPS, as presiding officers in polling units⁹⁴ as a result of:**
1. IRI facilitating key meetings with key electoral stakeholders to increase youth participation in the 2011 elections.
 2. Meetings led to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between INEC and NYSC for the 2011 elections.
 3. Both NDI and IRI partnering with other youth CSOs to encourage their involvement in the electoral process.
 4. Signing of the MOU between INEC and NYSC brought two key national institutions together to enhance the credibility of the elections.
- F. The Electoral Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) program, the Nigerian Alliance for Peaceful Elections (NAPE), and the National Association for Peaceful Elections in Nigeria (NAPEN) were established to provide valuable electoral violence monitoring information as a result of IFES' assistance in:⁹⁵**
1. Facilitating the program design meeting with the six partner organizations and getting buy-in and building ownership of EVER Nigeria. These organizations became the founders of NAPE.
 2. Over 400 EVER monitors were trained and contributed to IFES electoral violence reports.
 3. Between January and June 2007 six EVER reports were released. The last report covered the period May 1-30, 2007, the period immediately after the elections.⁹⁶
 4. At least 42 civil society organizations and various representatives of the election management body, security, political, and public communities were involved and informed about the EVER project, and its findings.
- G. There was improved responsiveness in targeted government institutions (INEC) due to CEPPS sponsored activities including:⁹⁷**
1. IFES was officially recognized as a key partner by INEC and gained confidence and support of INEC to deliver program activities.
 2. IFES sponsored the establishment of The Electoral Institute (TEI) and the expansion of INEC's training unit, which contributed to strengthening INEC's capacity to carry out its mandate.
 3. Through an IFES supported activity, INEC committed to working in partnership with other voter/civic education agencies to undertake activities to ensure the promotion of voter education and public enlightenment on the electoral process.
 4. NDI's pre-election assessment provided an opportunity for INEC and key electoral stakeholders to discuss concerns for the upcoming election. INEC distributed the NDI recommendations to all state commissions, reflecting INEC's support of the document.
 5. CEPPS partners hosted INEC Chairman Jega at a World Affairs Briefing where INEC declared support for Project 2011 Swift Count by providing its observers with accreditation and access to the polls.
- H. CEPPS partners encouraged participation in the electoral process by women, youth, and persons with disabilities.⁹⁸**
1. IRI created a "Women's Forum" to support and assist in developing a women's coalition.
 2. IRI conducted training for women political candidates.
 3. IRI developed programs for youth organizations to increase their knowledge of the electoral process.
 4. NDI CSO partner, the Human Rights Law Service, a voter education partner, encouraged youth to participate in the electoral process. Also, domestic monitoring partner the Federation of Muslim Women's Associations in Nigeria (FOMWAN) involved Muslim women in election

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monitoring, and among all domestic monitors trained directly by NDI, thirty-nine percent were women.⁹⁹

I. The development of a comprehensive framework intended to curb the influence of money in politics was facilitated by IFES.¹⁰⁰

1. Nigeria became the first country in Africa to adopt campaign finance regulations that include limits on candidate/political party spending.
2. Nigerian political parties have complied to a higher degree than in most other countries.
3. INEC, the Courts, civil society and other stakeholders could benefit from further initiatives in this area.

6. Lessons Learned

CEPPS programs have been implemented with most emphasis placed on previous activities and program design toward a single electoral event. Each continuation of CEPPS has been directed at improving the upcoming election in Nigeria and not on long-term strategic efforts. An important and overlooked component of the CEPPS programs is the lack of a holistic approach of continued electoral assistance, legal framework development, and interventions to improve democratic understanding. There does not appear to be an understanding of the electoral reality in Nigeria specifically that the numerous components of a credible election are dependent on one another. Without an accurate voter registry, informed candidates and electorate, improved legal framework and electoral regulations, and professional and competent electoral workers, future elections in Nigeria may just limp toward free and fair standards.

CEPPS does contain programs that address various electoral components, but there does not appear to be a cohesive strategy between the CEPPS partners and key electoral stakeholders. The working experience of IPs displays various approaches to several types of training. It is not apparent when, how, and why trainings and workshops are planned, although many have been provided under CEPPS. BEAT workshops, BRIDGE training, poll worker training, political party agent training, civil society development are just a few of the types of efforts that have been supported by CEPPS, but the impact and sustainability of these education efforts on electoral stakeholders is difficult to discover.

The security and political situation in Nigeria has also impacted electoral interventions by CEPPS and causes some program activities to be tentative, depending upon certain external issues. The EVER project, successfully implemented in the six geo-political zones, shows that it is possible to establish effective efforts in the all geo-political zones and indicates a possible redirection of some CEPPS efforts following that model.

CEPPS is only one assistance group of several working toward enhanced democratic governance in Nigeria. But there does not seem to be a coordinated sharing of information between these groups to avoid duplication of efforts. Although the Evaluation Team met briefly with representatives from UNDP who are also providing electoral assistance to INEC, the team was unable to receive or even view the project document under which UNDP was working. There appears to be a secrecy regarding ‘who is doing what’ assistance in the electoral realm, however there does appear to be limited mutual sponsorship of some activities.

There were a number of lessons learned as detailed in Section 6, which can be implemented in future program designs with similar goals and objectives. Below is a summary of some key lessons.

- a. **Program Design** – CEPPS program design does not appear to empower electoral stakeholders with relevant skills to improve their inclusion in the electoral cycle. Although some civic education programs have helped expand participation by some partner CSOs, there does not appear to be any long-range planning to continue and improve this support. Programs aimed at

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enhanced dialogue between citizen groups, political parties, and governmental leaders are key to improving democratization in Nigeria.

- b. **Training Design** - Although INEC was provided specialized trainings, study trips abroad, and electoral education, the administration of the 2007 election was seriously flawed, suggesting the training were inadequate for the task at hand. However, the training did increase some electoral officers' knowledge on the conduct of elections.¹⁰¹
- c. **Communication** - The program could have done better with more frequent communication among CEPPS partners and Nigerian electoral stakeholders to ensure more broad-based Nigerian support and 'buy-in' to project activities.
- d. **Reference Data** - Benchmarks should have been established to identify specific program activities and the status of that activity.
- e. **Program Monitoring** - CEPPS programs should have had periodic, mid-term and final evaluations to provide institutional assessment of planned activities.
- f. **Program Data** - Comprehensive lists of partner CSOs and all program activities should have been developed and maintained.
- g. **Program Focus** - CEPPS partners should focus activities on long-range planning and sustainable outcomes.
- h. **Program Management** - CEPPS partners should develop definite procedures and timelines for sub-grantees to submit proposals in order to allow for better planning and implementation.
- i. **Program Implementation** - CEPPS partners must follow-up on and monitor activities with CSO partners, political parties, INEC and SIECs so as to ensure that the outcomes are sustainable.
- j. **Activity Assessments** - For every activity, an assessment and implementation follow-up plan should be developed to address any observed difficulties or short-comings of the activity.
- k. **Project Continuity** – CEPPS partners should continue to work with their Nigerian CSOs and key electoral stakeholders, since to promote sustainability and to expand successful activities.
- l. **CEPPS Management** – CEPPS should employ an in-country coordinator to collect, coordinate, and report on partner activities in a comprehensive manner and on a regular basis.

7. Assessment of the Management of the Program

During both CEPPS II and CEPPS III, program objectives and activities of the three partner organizations were similar. In continuing similar strategies that had been previously implemented, the CEPPS partners clearly assumed that their past activities were successful and/or adequate although the 2007 elections had been roundly condemned. This assumption was based on a faulty logic and not on any formal program evaluation results. From the apparent acquiescence to continue past activities, CEPPS partners presented their strategic approach and assumptions in the Cooperative Agreement for CEPPS III.¹⁰²

In continuing similar strategies that had been previously implemented, the CEPPS partners clearly assumed that their previous activities were successful and/or adequate. This assumption was not based on any formal program evaluation, but on apparent acquiescence to continue past activities. In addition,

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each partner presented their strategic approach and assumptions in the Cooperative Agreement for CEPPS III.

- a. The CEPPS programs did not operate with any pre-determined sustainability benchmarks.
- b. Although many training opportunities were provided for INEC staff, SIEC staff, political party agents, CSOs, and other key electoral stakeholders, there were no assessments of the trainings.
- c. There is no apparent follow-up to determine whether the activities should be refreshed, revised or eliminated.
- d. Sustainability issues did not seem to be considered with the planning and design stages of CEPPS.
- e. There were no summary reports or any databases containing a comprehensive list of CSOs and their contact persons, a workshop/seminar list of activities by topic and their dates, and no list of INEC departments where technical assistance was provided and when.
- f. There was no listing of joint program activities, making it difficult to determine partner activities.
- g. Attempts were made to determine whether any of the programs or committees still exist and are functioning, but definitive answers were not found.
- h. Program goals and objectives, as stated in program documents, are vague and reflect no planning or requirement for program evaluation. With the vague program objectives it is difficult to determine the effectiveness, strengths, and weaknesses of program activities and the required performance measures or indicators do not reflect the management of the program activities.
- i. There were no reports or records of “before” and “after” results.

The following are the responses to the evaluation questions in the Scope of Work:

1. To what extent did the program promote electoral reforms in Nigeria? Did these programs achieve their stated results?

CEPPS II and CEPPS III program activities were aimed at improving the electoral administration and credibility of the Nigerian elections in 2007 and 2011. Prior to each election, there was a desire to undertake electoral reform and to strengthen the legal framework in the country. In support of these goals, the partners provided legal advice to INEC, CSOs, the National Assembly, and key electoral stakeholders. Workshops, public hearings, and advocacy methodology helped to encourage more active participation in the electoral reform process. Political parties signed a Code of Conduct and new dialogues were open between INEC, CSOs and political parties. After years of discussion and deliberation, electoral reform bills were passed, although several electoral issues have yet to be addressed in the legal framework.

CEPPS partners were instrumental in effectuating change in the legal framework due to the education, legal advice and advocacy methods they taught to key electoral stakeholders. There is no question the CEPPS partners promoted electoral reform and since electoral reform has occurred, these programs have achieved their stated results.

2. What was the impact of these achievements on the relevant Democracy and Governance Intermediate Results (IR) and Administrative Objectives (AO)?

The CEPPS Programs fall under **AO 1: Strengthen Civic Engagement for Good Governance**. The impact on this AO was that civil society organizations became more involved and educated in the electoral process and the Independent Electoral Commission became more responsive to this involvement.

IR 1: Increased civic advocacy capacity was met in that CSOs were active in the electoral reform process, participated in election monitoring activities, and anticipate continuing this involvement.

IR 2: Enhanced credibility of elections was met for the 2011 National Elections by the work of 8,000 domestic election monitors who participated in the Project 2011 Swift Count by reporting on Election Day problems and results. In addition, the formalization of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) involvement,

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initiated by CEPPS, as presiding officers of the polling units provided tremendous credibility to the 2011 election since the Corps members were seen as young, impartial, enthusiastic workers who “are the future of Nigeria”, as some respondents commented.

IR 3: Improved responsiveness in targeted government institutions was apparent in the most recent elections when INEC co-sponsored discussions with political party representatives, supported voter and civic education outreach efforts, and was receptive to technical electoral management assistance.

3. What explains the successes and/or failures?

Any successes or failures of CEPPS programs ultimately rest with the subjects of the CEPPS interventions, INEC, political parties, civil society organizations, and the Nigerian electorate. The 2007 National Elections were conducted in an inefficient, non-transparent, and non-professional manner, which many have classified as a failure. There were allegations of vote fraud, electoral violence, and poor logistical support. However, the election was held and the winner did take office. Unfortunately, prior to the 2007 elections, CEPPS partners raised no red flag and believed their programming would contribute to a positive outcome in the form of a credible poll. Could the CEPPS partners have provided more assistance to improve the electoral process? Without political will and governmental support to conduct a better election, it is doubtful that the election results would have changed.

The 2011 National Elections were viewed as meeting international standards and credible. CEPPS partners provided much of the same support and programs that were organized prior to the 2007 elections. There was, however, a different Chairman of INEC and a partnership of civil society organizations working on Project 2011 Swift Count, which added credibility to the Election Day results. In addition, the employment of NYSC members as presiding officers in polling units enhanced the credibility of the elections. There was more political will, more governmental support, and more awareness and support by local Nigerian stakeholders contributing to a better election.

4. How could the program have done better?

The program could have done better with more frequent communication between CEPPS partners and Nigerian electoral stakeholders to ensure Nigerian support and ‘buy-in’. Benchmarks should be established to identify responsible person(s) in charge of activity and status of activity. The program should have been evaluated to some degree on a yearly basis providing institutional assessment of activities, including milestones and lessons learned. Comprehensive lists of partner CSOs and all program activities should have been developed and maintained.

5. How sustainable are elements of the program?

The sustainability of all CEPPS programs is contingent on what has been accomplished, what is yet to be accomplished, and whether there is a strategic plan with sustainability benchmarks determined. All training opportunities for INEC staff and SIEC staff should be sustainable as long as the personnel continue to work for the agency. Political party training and CSO advocacy training should be sustainable as well. However, there also needs to be follow-up on all efforts to determine whether the programs need to be refreshed or revised. Some efforts may require continuous activities in order to become sustainable and these should be identified and taken care of at the planning stages.

6. What lessons learned from this program are key to future programming?

CEPPS partners must maintain open communication channels with Nigerian electoral stakeholders in an effort to work on mutually agreed upon activities. Programs should not be forced on stakeholders and sustainability should also be factored into budgets. Without definite ‘buy-in’ from key stakeholders programs may be difficult to implement. CEPPS partners must follow-up on activities with partners, political parties, INEC and SIEC. For every assessment, there should be an implementation follow-up plan to fix identified problems.

7. To what extent did the program reach its target population across Nigeria and how did it impact women, youth and persons with disabilities participation in the political processes?

CEPPS partners worked to enlist participation in the electoral process from women's organizations, youth organizations, and persons with disabilities. In the key informant interviews and focus group discussion, representatives from the Federation of Muslim Women Association of Nigeria (FOMWAN) and Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth and Advancement (YAIA) were enthusiastic proponents of their programs to increase their participation in the electoral process. CEPPS partners supported advocacy work towards having the bill on persons with disabilities (PWD) passed by the National Assembly, thus raising public awareness on their inclusion in the political/electoral process. With a country as populous, diverse and vast as Nigeria, there must be continued focus on the inclusion of all marginal groups in the political process in order to make a real impact on the electoral process.

V. Challenges and Obstacles to program implementation

In proposing activities to meet their program objectives, CEPPS partners identified several challenges and obstacles to project implementation. External challenges and obstacles are beyond the control of CEPPS. Internal challenges and obstacles may be addressed by CEPPS.

External Challenges and Obstacles

Political will - In CEPPS Quarterly Reports, the political situation in Nigeria was frequently discussed as a major obstacle, with the lack of political will to improve electoral management another problem. Political interference and the lack of independence of INEC were also frequently mentioned as a challenge.

Party organization - Political parties in Nigeria were characterized as "networks of patronage" with very weak party organizations, focused on promoting their own interests rather than those of the public. IRI found that most political parties were driven by the choices of the senior leadership, not the consensus within the party.

Civic organization coordination - Nigerian CSOs that participated as monitors for the 2007 election felt they had limited impact on enhancing the transparency and credibility of the electoral process due to poor coordination between organizations. Voter education activities prior to the 2007 elections did not reach a large number of voters and were not successful at reaching representatives of marginal communities, including women, youth, rural and first-time voters. Major organizations partnering with NDI in election program activities found it a challenge to compromise on ownership of the data collection process, but the creation and joint use of a National Information Center helped them to overcome this hurdle for the most part.¹⁰³

Internal Challenges and Obstacles

Changing leadership – All three partner organizations have had several Chiefs of Party during the duration of CEPPS. Each management change presents concerns for local staff, partner CSOs, and electoral stakeholders. Changing leadership within CEPPS partners should be addressed in future program designs to ensure continued focus on development of program activities.

Lack of Program Monitoring – CEPPS activities seem to be monitored by USAID through the submission of the Quarterly Reports which are lengthy narratives with numerous attachments. However, there does not seem to be any response or feedback to the reports provided to the CEPPS partners from USAID. Without any response to the quarterly reports, program activities continue without change or reassessment as if on 'remote control'. Better monitoring of CEPPS activities can lead to better reporting and improved activities.

Limited Partner Coordination – There is no person serving CEPPS in a partner coordinating capacity in Nigeria and any coordination of activities seems to occur in an informal, casual manner or as an after-

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thought. Although there is a CEPPS Director and a Deputy Director in Washington, D.C., in-country coordination can contribute to a better program by maintaining frequent communication between partners, ensuring program records are available and accurate for all activities, and by maintaining up-to date calendars on program events and operations.

VI. Conclusions

The focus of the CEPPS programs in Nigeria have been more event driven, than long-term, although the main purpose of CEPPS is to strengthen and support democratic electoral and political processes by long-term planning and sustainable development, not event-driven, crisis orientated activities centered on a single election.¹⁰⁴ However, as stated in their proposals and plans, CEPPS II was to enhance the credibility of the 2007 Nigerian Elections and CEPPS III was to enhance the credibility of the 2011 Nigerian Elections. One can only conclude that there is no long-term planning or sustainability planning other than from election to election. This result may be attributable to the funding mechanism of the process or the specific directions provided by USAID.

Assessment of Management of Program - CEPPS program management is not defined or uniform. The number of local national staff, international staff, and short and long term consultants varies from organization to organization. Each partner organization has at least one long term national employee in a management role, but not in an executive position. There is no template for compiling reports and no universal assessment survey to grade program activities. There does not seem to be any management coordination between the three CEPPS partner offices. The partners relied to a large extent on the memory of long-serving personnel rather than an objectively verifiable institutional database.

Partner Organization Management - The three partner organizations, IFES, IRI, and NDI, maintain separate offices in Nigeria, with separate staffs, objectives, and activities. And although CEPPS programs may be implemented by one member of the consortium, by two or more members working on activities separately, or by two or more members working jointly¹⁰⁵, the majority of activities are individually planned and implemented by each partner organization. Consortium partner activities are limited, which leads one to believe that the 'consortium' was established merely to circumvent restrictive funding mechanisms of USAID. However, CEPPS can be tweaked to provide more partner programming and long-range activities by establishing a CEPPS program coordinator in Nigeria who can work with all three groups and consolidate certain activities into long-range programs.

Program Design Issues – The design for CEPPS programs was developed several years ago and is not unique to Nigeria. Most of the programs are electoral 'standards' including numerous training efforts, voter education and civic education activities, technical election assistance to the electoral commission, political party programs, and various seminars on international electoral subjects. In order to develop programs unique to Nigeria, CEPPS can identify specific areas to work in and design program activities in those areas. A good example of this is the EVER program and the establishment of NAPEN, both of which are important in Nigeria. The Electoral Institute is another project that should be expanded.

Reporting - There is no consistent format in the reports produced for the program. Each CEPPS Quarterly report contains separate reports and attachments from the partner organizations. There are three work plans, one for each organization, with no merging of the three plans into a concise document. This point was clearly illustrated when Prof. Okey Ibeanu, a key advisor to the INEC Chairman, suggested that IFES, IRI, and NDI present a combined long term plan of electoral assistance to INEC. With a CEPPS coordinator and better review of the reports by USAID, useful reports can be written which can tell what was done, when it was done, whether it was successful, and whether it will be continued.

Program Coordination – As mentioned above in Partner Organization Management, a CEPPS coordinator in Nigeria could make a difference in how CEPPS activities are programmed, how reporting and monitoring of activities is accomplished, and how programs are made sustainable.

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CSO Coordination- All three partner organizations have worked with or supported civil society organizations for specific targeted objectives at some point during CEPPS. A CSO may sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), win a sub-grant, or obtain funding for a particular effort. During each key informant interview and the focus group discussion with CSO representatives, each person related an issue with either the slow response time for a decision by a CEPPS partner or the lack of capacity building to support the project. An additional respondent commented that the CEPPS partners judge a proposal based on the individual applicant, not the content of the proposal and there was no uniform process for obtaining CEPPS support.

Impact on Election Credibility- The post-election environment following the 2007 National Elections created continuous calls for electoral reform. Even with changes to the electoral framework and various CEPPS programs in support of electoral processes, the electoral campaign period suffered from extensive violence and there was apparent manipulation of the Independent National Electoral Commission, causing it to become non-transparent and inefficient. The 2007 elections were seriously flawed and showed no improvement in the credibility of Nigeria's electoral process, regardless of CEPPS interventions. However, the 2011 elections did show improvement in electoral process.

Post-Election Political Environment - The post-election environment following both the 2003 and 2007 National Elections created continuous calls for electoral reform, some of which was finally enacted in 2006 and additionally in 2010. However, both the 2003 and 2007 elections were seriously flawed and did not improve Nigeria's electoral credentials.

Prior to the 2007 elections, even with changes to the electoral framework and various CEPPS programs in support of electoral processes, the electoral campaign period suffered from extensive violence and there was apparent manipulation of the Independent National Electoral Commission. The calls for electoral reform came from political parties, candidates, Nigerian CSOs, and international organizations. INEC was accused of partisanship and operational incompetence, which also contributed to calls for a judicial inquiry into the activities of INEC.

During the 2007 electoral process, there was a lack of coordination and use of appropriate monitoring tools that hindered the overall effectiveness of domestic monitoring efforts and Nigerian civil society organizations that conducted election monitoring had limited impact in enhancing the transparency and credibility of the electoral process. Voter education activities did not reach a large number of voters and were not successful at reaching representatives of marginal communities, including women, youth, people with disabilities, rural and first-time voters.¹⁰⁶

INEC, during both the 2003 and 2007 elections, displayed a lack of political will to improve its electoral management. There was limited inter-departmental communication and cooperation, departmental responsibilities were not clearly defined, and communication, logistics and cooperation between headquarters and state offices were poor and affected electoral operations.

INEC lacked the capacity or will to conduct long-term strategic and operational planning and failed to effectively implement continuous voter registration, contributing to a flawed voter registry. INEC did not conduct its operations in a transparent manner, reducing trust among stakeholders and the general public. INEC did not effectively recruit and train ad-hoc voter registration and poll workers, contributing to unprofessional and inefficient management of registration and polling stations. INEC did not adequately inform voters about key electoral processes, reducing voter trust and limiting voters' ability to participate in key processes such as voter registration. INEC did not effectively or transparently handle voting operations or manage results on Election Day, resulting in a lack of accountability. INEC did not enforce existing political finance laws and regulations, resulting in inappropriate and illegal use of campaign funds.¹⁰⁷

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Activities and Strategies

CEPPS partners proposed a comprehensive effort to provide technical assistance to address electoral matters prior to the 2011 National Elections. However, the strategies and activities of the CEPPS partners were as vague as those previously established and the partner organizations essentially planned a continuation of their past activities. Each organization proposed to continue its work in substantively the same areas and the Consortium had no improved communication strategy to ensure cohesion of support to INEC and CSOs.

IFES focused on working with and supporting the INEC in continuing to build its capacity to organize and manage the upcoming elections. IFES also continued to build on its previous program to provide support to election dispute resolution and election violence monitoring and mitigation. IRI led in working with political parties to strengthen their capacity to more effectively participate in the electoral process, as well as to conduct party poll watching activities. They also worked with the media to improve electoral reporting. Both IRI and NDI conducted an international election observation. Building on its previous work with civil society organizations engaged in voter education and domestic monitoring in Nigeria, NDI took the lead in working with civil society organizations to conduct voter education campaigns and domestic monitoring efforts. They also supported the four CSOs that coordinate the Project 2011 SwiftCount observation and parallel vote tabulation program.

To reach program goals, CEPPS partners provided activities including, but not limited to, workshops, seminars, public forums, CSO support, training efforts, town hall meetings, IEC materials, technical advice, media messages, civic education programs, political party finance education and training, etc.

Results or Outcomes of the Programs

The charts in the ‘Findings’ portion of this evaluation indicate results of many of the CEPPS program activities.

Assumptions Implicit in Implementation Strategies and Assessment

In continuing similar strategies that had been previously implemented, the CEPPS partners clearly assumed that their previous activities were successful and/or adequate although the 2007 elections had been roundly condemned. This assumption was based on a faulty logic and not on any formal program evaluation results. From the apparent acquiescence to continue past activities, CEPPS partners presented their strategic approach and assumptions in the Cooperative Agreement for CEPPS III.

IFES’ program activities assumed that INEC would be receptive and open to their support and advice in the run-up to the 2011 elections and beyond. IFES also planned to keep USAID and other international stakeholders informed of their activities, especially should INEC become unresponsive to IFES’ technical assistance. Two additional assumptions were that the elections would occur in 2011 and that Nigeria would remain politically stable. These three assumptions proved to be on-point and allowed for the implementation of IFES’ technical support to INEC.¹⁰⁸

IRI’s assumptions were based on working in Nigeria since 1992, specifically stating that the political parties in Nigeria are perceived as the weakest link in the chain of democratic institutions, have no long term programmatic platforms, are active only near elections, and function with little input from the public. Programs to address these party weaknesses were based on these assumptions.¹⁰⁹

The strategic approach of NDI was based upon years of NDI’s in-country presence and its relationship with Nigerian CSOs.¹¹⁰ Building upon previous relationships, NDI planned to assist CSOs with sub-grants and coalition building. NDI also based its programs on the assumption that elections would occur in April 2011, the country would remain politically stable, and that NDI staff and consultants would be secure while providing assistance.

Impact of Programs on Women, the Youth, and Persons with Disabilities and their Participation in the Political Process

CEPPS partners worked to enlist participation in the electoral process from women's organizations, youth organizations, and persons with disabilities. In the key informant interviews and focus group discussion, representatives from the Federation of Muslim Women Association of Nigeria (FOMWAN) and Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth and Advancement (YAIA) were enthusiastic proponents of their programs to increase their participation in the electoral process. With a country as populous, diverse and vast as Nigeria, there must be continued focus on these target groups in order to make a real impact on the electoral process.

VII. Recommendations

CEPPS Programs and Management

Strategies within the programming should be integrated with additional national programs and good governance programs in Nigeria and reflect inclusion of civil society organizations, political parties, and marginalized groups including the

1. It should be noted that there are political issues in Nigeria which should be addressed in CEPPS programming through long-range planning and strategic objectives which focus on the electoral realities in Nigeria. CEPPS Nigeria programs should not be copied from CEPPS programs in other countries or as a key respondent in INEC commented, should not be "consultants and groups who come to impose American standards in the Nigerian political system and way of doing things". CEPPS must take into consideration the circumstances of the Nigerian nation and its development history.
2. **CEPPS should address transparency in party financing in order to promote a level playing field for all candidates and prevent the laundering of corrupt and other criminally sourced funds through political party and candidate financing.** This area needs a comprehensive program to help prevent crime and illicit funding of political activities by transnational organized criminal networks, including terrorist cells.
3. CEPPS programs should strike a balance between the technical management of elections and the sustained integrity of the full electoral process, from one election to another, including the associated issues of political will of the government.
4. Electoral reform programs should be expanded to continue focus on areas yet to be resolved including political party quotas for women, people with disabilities, the youth, and other marginalized groups, candidate quotas, INEC independence, and electoral violence penalties.
5. CEPPS should develop programs to address social issues of poverty, unemployment, crime, ethnic tensions, and other societal problems that can undermine the integrity of electoral processes.
6. CEPPS should continue support for Project Swift Count 2011 to include a full package, similar to the Ushahidi platform in Kenya, and as adapted in Eastern Congo and the Gaza Strip¹¹¹.

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7. CEPPS should initiate programs of sustained professional development for electoral workers, political party agents, civil society organization staff, and elected officials in order to promote a broader understanding of electoral processes.
8. Functional needs and capacity assessment that compares the structures and resources currently available in relevant national institutions, including CSOs, should take place at the initial phase of the planning process prior to commencing CEPPS IV, so as to minimize the danger of either wasting resources or having inadequate resource levels, distribution, or management which can lead to poor service delivery that vitiates the integrity of the political and election processes.
9. Program objectives should be more clearly defined in order to provide specific areas of assistance and to enable better evaluation of programs. Currently, program objectives are vague with generic activities proposed, thereby providing CEPPS partners with little restriction on activities and little advance planning. With specific program objectives, the objective dictates the activity. For example, instead of an objective “Strengthen the capacity of INEC to carry out its mandate”, one objective can be “Establish an inter-agency communication network within INEC”. This type of objective requires advance planning with INEC support and can be clearly evaluated. Each objective in CEPPS should be redefined to establish specific activities and timelines.
10. **Communication between partners in-country must be consistent, with regularly scheduled meeting and program updates.** Meetings should include written program updates which contain upcoming program activities, program logistics, and activities planned for the future. This will enable planning in a strategic manner, enabling better program success. Staff with similar positions in each organization should meet regularly to discuss program activities and issues. This can serve as both a learning and communication exercise and promote more of a partnership than a competition among IFES, IRI, and NDI. There should be an agenda and brief minutes of each CEPPS meeting.
11. **CEPPS partners should develop a long term work plan, combining the planned activities of all three partners which are discussed and agreed to by the partners, USAID/Nigeria, and INEC (where necessary).** Currently, there are three work plans, one from each partner organization, which are not shared or combined, thereby creating possible duplication and/or conflict in programming. Benchmarks should be established to enable each partner to determine the status of the work plan on a regular basis, including periodic performance evaluation of program activities and a uniform reporting format. In addition, standard assessments of each activity should be conducted and made part of the work plan.
12. **A uniform method of requesting and reviewing proposals from CSOs should be established with specific deadlines for applications, approvals, and funding.** All three CEPPS partners work with Nigerian CSOs in some manner, therefore, it is necessary that the same ‘rules’ apply to working with the CSOs. The CSO FGD pointed to some form of arbitrariness in the way CEPPS partners treated proposals from CSOs. To ensure the integrity of their programming, CEPPS partners should ensure full disclosure regarding request for proposals and criteria for obtaining grants. CEPPS partners should know and understand the planned activities, know and understand the obligations on both sides, and monitor CSO activities in order to evaluate them and report to USAID/Nigeria on activities and their progress.
13. **CEPPS partners should maintain a database of partner CSOs, a database of activities by type and date, and a database of departmental assistance to INEC.** It is apparent that no evaluation methodology was planned for when CEPPS first began operation, as there is no specific requirement to maintain records of partner CSOs, activities, or other assistance. This failure should be rectified by requiring databases to be maintained in a form that can easily be accessed for program evaluation and review. These databases will also enable the partners to monitor program activities and provide updates on the status of each project, CSO partner, activity, and program.

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14. **CEPPS partners should promote long-time, qualified local staff to senior management positions to ensure sustainability and ownership of programs.** The management of each partner organization includes an international as Chief of Party/Country Director, with middle-level program staff being a combination of Nigerian local staff and international staff. All three partners should work on in-house capacity building to support their local staff and improve their programming skills. Partners should also look to additional education in several fields including report writing, computer programs, and speaking skills to enable promotion of their local staff to management positions. CEPPS partners should attempt to provide consistent leadership in the role of Chief of Party for the duration of the project.
15. **CEPPS partners should hire a CEPPS Coordinator or Project Manager to work in Nigeria.** This coordinator can provide overall consolidation of CEPPS activities, can maintain databases and reports, and can serve to enhance the long-range planning and sustainability of CEPPS programs. This person would be unique to Nigeria and would not function in the same manner as the CEPPS director and deputy director in Washington, D.C. This coordinator could also assess, evaluate, and monitor program activities of all partners.

Electoral Assistance

1. **IFES, in consultation with INEC, UNDP, IRI, and NDI, should develop a comprehensive and harmonized work plan that identifies areas of technical assistance within INEC.** This work plan should be prepared so that all stakeholders understand what organization is working with what department and when. A similar work plan should be developed for the SIECs so that electoral support can permeate to the local government level. This will make for effective and more judicious use of international development funding with increased chances of helping to consolidate Nigeria's fledgling democracy. With UNDP also assisting INEC, it is imperative to have appropriate planning to avoid duplication, competition, and difficulties within each agency.
2. **INEC s should be urged to update and maintain its website and to establish functional twitter and Facebook accounts.** Information and communication technology (ICT) can help in educating the public on electoral matters and can reach millions of Nigerians. INEC should improve on the IT literacy of its staff; ensure internet availability and/or accessibility in all its offices in the Headquarters, States and Local Government Areas. INEC should understand the importance of these mediums for the future credibility of the electoral processes.
3. **INEC should be urged to establish a Commission-wide intranet and an interdepartmental communication network, including adequately equipped offices.** The physical condition of the Abuja INEC office is poor, with varying degrees of obsolete equipment and technology. The agency cannot operate in a professional manner without adequate equipment. There is no functional internet service and among the Departments, some were perceived as enjoying CEPPS assistance more than others. CEPPS partners should assist in providing computers, printers, and internet capabilities for INEC, SIECs, and partner CSOs, or assist in finding funds to purchase equipment necessary to enable them work professionally.
4. **INEC should be encouraged to establish a permanent formal training program with the NYSC so that corps members can continue to serve as presiding officers in future elections.** CEPPS partners should encourage and promote the continued participation of NYSC members in the electoral process through a formal training program for the NYSC. Beyond the one-off lecture to corps members on election duties during their orientation, a module on civic duties and basic election administration training should be offered to youth corps members to last through the period of the NYSC orientation camping.

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Annexes

- 1. Statement of Work**
- 2. Evaluation Design and Methodology**
- 3. List of Persons Interviewed**
- 4. List of Documents Reviewed**

¹ A Guide to DCHA/DG Activities, p. 14, updated October 2008.

² Attachment B – Program Description, Enhancing the Credibility of Nigeria’s 2007 Elections

³ International Crisis Group, “Nigeria: Failed Elections, Failing State?”, 30 May 2007

⁴ Attachment B – Program Description, Enhancing the Credibility of Nigeria’s 2011 Elections, pg.15-16.

⁵ Original Results Framework: Peace and Democratic Governance, p. 1

⁶ IFES Final Report, July 2005-June 2009, p. 31-34

⁷ IFES Final Report, July 1, 2005-June 30, 2009, p 34-35

⁸ CEPPS/IRI Final Report, July 1, 2005-June 30, 2010, p. 2, 4

⁹ CEPPS Quarterly Report: October 1-December 31, 2010, p.5

¹⁰ IFES Final Report, July 1, 2005-June 30, 2009, p. 40

¹¹ CEPPS Quarterly Report: October 1-December 31, 2010, p.7-8

¹² CEPPS/IRI Final Report, July 1, 2005-June 30, 2010, p. 6

¹³ IFES Final Report, July 1, 2005-June 30, 2009, p. 65

¹⁴ IFES Final Report, July 1, 2005-June 30, 2009, p 19

¹⁵ CEPPS/NDI Final Report, July 1, 2005-June 30, 2010, p.36

¹⁶ Attachment B – Program Description, Enhancing the Credibility of Nigeria’s 2011 Elections

¹⁷ A Guide to DCHA/DG Activities, p. 14, updated October 2008.

¹⁸ Scope of Work, p. 2

¹⁹ INEC web site

²⁰ Scope of Work, p. 3

²¹ Scope of Work, p. 6

²² IFES Final Report, July 2005-June 2009, p. 31-34

²³ A Guide to DCHA/DG Activities, p. 14, updated October 2008

²⁴ IFES Final Report, July 2005-June 2009, p. 50

²⁵ IFES Final Report: Support to the Electoral Process in Nigeria, July 1, 2005 – June 30, 2009.

²⁶ Ibid, p.12.

²⁷ IFES Final Report: Support to the Electoral Process in Nigeria, July 1, 2005 – June 30, 2009, p. 12.

²⁸ Ibid, pp.16-17.

²⁹ Ibid, p. 17.

³⁰ Ibid, p.18. Also, INEC FGD, December 15, 2011.

³¹ Ibid, p.18. Also, CEPPS Quarterly Report: January 1, 2011 – March 31, 2011, p.17.

³² Ibid, pp.19-20.

³³ CEPPS Quarterly Report: January 1, 2011 – March 31, 2011, p.14.

³⁴ CEPPS Quarterly Report: January1, 2011 – March 31, 2011, p.19

³⁵ CEPPS Quarterly Report: January1, 2011 – March 31, 2011, p.21. KII with Deputy Chief of Party and Program Manager, IFES.

³⁶ IFES Final Report: Support to the Electoral Process in Nigeria, July 1, 2005 – June 30, 2009, p. 37. Also, CEPPS Quarterly Report: January1, 2011 – March 31, 2011, p.21

³⁷ IFES Final Report: Support to the Electoral Process in Nigeria, July 1, 2005 – June 30, 2009, p. 19.

³⁸ IFES Final Report: Support to the Electoral Process in Nigeria, July 1, 2005 – June 30, 2009, p. 20.

³⁹ IFES Final Report: Support to the Electoral Process in Nigeria, July 1, 2005 – June 30, 2009, pp. 38-39.

⁴⁰ CEPPS Quarterly Report: January1, 2011 – March 31, 2011, p.3 and pp.7-8.

⁴¹ IFES Final Report: Support to the Electoral Process in Nigeria, July 1, 2005 – June 30, 2009, pp.49-50.

⁴² Ibid., p.14

⁴³ Ibid., p.14

⁴⁴ IFES Final Report: Support to the Electoral Process in Nigeria, July 1, 2005 – June 30, 2009, pp.21-23.

⁴⁵ IFES Final Report: Support to the Electoral Process in Nigeria, July 1, 2005 – June 30, 2009, p.24.

⁴⁶ CEPPS Quarterly Report: January1, 2011 – March 31, 2011, p.3 and pp.17.

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- ⁴⁷ IFES Final Report: Support to the Electoral Process in Nigeria, July 1, 2005 – June 30, 2009, pp. 45-46.
- ⁴⁸ IFES Final Report: Support to the Electoral Process in Nigeria, July 1, 2005 – June 30, 2009, p. 20.
- ⁴⁹ IFES Final Report: Support to the Electoral Process in Nigeria, July 1, 2005 – June 30, 2009, pp.48-49.
- ⁵⁰ IFES Final Report: Support to the Electoral Process in Nigeria, July 1, 2005 – June 30, 2009, p. 20. Also, KII with IFES DCOP and Program Manager.
- ⁵¹ KII with IFES DCoP and Program Manager. IFES Final Report: Support to the Electoral Process in Nigeria, July 1, 2005 – June 30, 2009, p.20.
- ⁵² CEPPS Quarterly Report: January1, 2011 – March 31, 2011, p.38.
- ⁵³ Ibid, p.33
- ⁵⁴ Ibid., p.33
- ⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 32-34
- ⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 38
- ⁵⁷ Ibid, pp. 33-40
- ⁵⁸ Ibid, p.34-35
- ⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 34
- ⁶⁰ Ibid, p. 27 and 34.
- ⁶¹ Ibid, p. 26-27
- ⁶² Nigeria National Survey, 29 November-7December 2010
- ⁶³ Key Informant Interviews
- ⁶⁴ CEPPS/NDI Final Report, July 1, 2005-June 30, 2010, p. 6
- ⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 20
- ⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 19-22
- ⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 11
- ⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 11
- ⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 12-14
- ⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 7-8
- ⁷¹ CEPPS Quarterly Report, January 1, 2011-March 31, 2011, p. 69
- ⁷² CEPPS/NDI Final Report, July 1, 2005-June 30, 2010, p. 15
- ⁷³ Ibid, p. 16
- ⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 17-18
- ⁷⁵ Ibid, p. 18
- ⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 18-19
- ⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 19-21
- ⁷⁸ Project 2011 Swift Count Final Report on the Nigeria's 2011 General Election, p. iv-v
- ⁷⁹ Project 2011 Swift Count Final Report on the Nigeria's 2011 General Election, p. 49-50
- ⁸⁰ Project 2011 Swift Count Final Report on the Nigeria's 2011 General Election, p. iv-v
- ⁸¹ IFES Final Report, July 2005-June 2009, p. 11
- ⁸² CEPPS/IRI Final Report, July 1, 2005-June 30, 2010, p. 5
- ⁸³ CEPPS/NDI Final Report, July 1, 2005-June 30, 2010, p. 15
- ⁸⁴ Ibid, p. 18
- ⁸⁵ IFES Final Report, July 2005-June 2009, p. 12
- ⁸⁶ CEPPS/NDI Final Report, July 1, 2005-June 30, 2010, p. 19
- ⁸⁷ IFES Final Report, July 1, 2005-June 30, 2009, p. 39
- ⁸⁸ CEPPS/NDI Final Report, July 1, 2005-June 30, 2010, p.7
- ⁸⁹ CEPPS/NDI Final Report, July 1, 2005-June 30, 2010, p. 19
- ⁹⁰ NDI Project 2011 Swift Count Factsheet
- ⁹¹ IFES Final Report, July 1, 2005-June 30, 2009, p 34-35
- ⁹² Scope of Work, p. 10
- ⁹³ CEPPS/IRI Final Report, July 1, 2005-June 30, 2010, p. 2, 4
- ⁹⁴ CEPPS Quarterly Report: October 1-December 31, 2010, p.5
- ⁹⁵ IFES Final Report, July 1, 2005-June 30, 2009, p. 40
- ⁹⁶ Ibid, p. 60
- ⁹⁷ CEPPS Quarterly Report: October 1-December 31, 2010, p.7-8
- ⁹⁸ CEPPS/IRI Final Report, July 1, 2005-June 30, 2010, p. 6
- ⁹⁹ CEPPS/NDI Final Report, July 1, 2005-June 30, 2010, p.6

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¹⁰⁰ IFES Final Report, July 1, 2005-June 30, 2009, p. 65

¹⁰¹ IFES Final Report, July 1, 2005-June 30, 2009, p 19

¹⁰² Attachment B – Program Description, Enhancing the Credibility of Nigeria’s 2011 Elections

¹⁰³ CEPPS/NDI Final Report, July 1, 2005-June 30, 2010, p.36

¹⁰⁴ A Guide to DCHA/DG Activities, p. 14, updated October 2008

¹⁰⁵ A Guide to DCHA/DG Activities, p. 14, updated October 2008.

¹⁰⁶ CEPPS Elections Project Description, Nigeria: Enhancing Credibility of 2011 Elections, p. 3

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, p. 3-4

¹⁰⁸ Attachment B – Program Description, Enhancing the Credibility of Nigeria’s 2011 Elections, p. 26

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, p. 43

¹¹⁰ Ibid, p. 56

¹¹¹ IDEA, Towards a Global Framework for the Prevention of Election Conflict and Violence, p. 46, www.aceproject.org