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TATWEER NATIONAL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT (NCD) PROGRAM IN NINEWA PROVINCE: TRAINING ACTIVITY REVIEW

Final Report

February 2011

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■ The difference, proven

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ACRONYMS

DG	Directorates General
GOI	Government of Iraq
KII	Key Informant Interviews
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOA	Ministry of Agriculture
MOE	Ministry of Electricity
MOH	Ministry of Health
NCCMD	National Center for Consultation and Management Development
NCD	National Capacity Development
PMP	Performance Management Plan
TOT	Training of Trainers
QED	The QED Group, LLC
SOW	Scope of Work
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/Iraq Performance Evaluation and Reporting for Results Management (PERFORM) project, implemented by The QED Group, LLC (QED), was requested to perform an activity review of the Tatweer training program in Iraq's Ninewa Province to determine its effects and impact. USAID requested a review of implementation challenges posed by Ninewa's unique political position, precarious security situation and barriers presented by individual Directorates General (DGs). PERFORM was also tasked to pinpoint issues specific to the province in terms of impact and make recommendations, and review the degree of integration of the Training/Trainer of Trainers (TOT) program.¹

Methodology

Two methods of study were utilized: key informant interviews (KIIs) and documentation review. PERFORM staff fielded a team of four data collectors, who spent a total of three weeks (Jan. 20-Feb. 10, 2011) interviewing DGs, trainees² and TOTs. In preparation for this activity, PERFORM sought a permission letter from the Governor to facilitate movement of the data collectors within the province (Annex 2). An orientation of the data collectors was carried out in Erbil on Jan. 20, 2011, facilitated by the PERFORM Technical and Operations Specialist. Team leaders were interviewed on Nov. 2010 by the PERFORM Senior Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) Advisor at the Tatweer compound. The tools used for the interviews were a series of KIIs, and a documentation review was also carried out to understand the historical evolution and performance of Tatweer with respect to training.

Program Overview

USAID/Iraq funded the National Capacity Development (NCD) program, or Tatweer ("development" in Arabic), in an effort to improve delivery of core public services to the Iraqi people. A three-pronged approach was utilized in which targeted ministries would receive training, systems development and capacity building.

The core of Tatweer is training, which began in 2006 and continued into 2010. According to the Scope of Work (SOW), Ninewa province has been a major beneficiary of direct and roll-out training to a total of 9,924 provincial staff. This means an increase from 87 trainees in 2006 to the present number. As in the other 17 provinces, training was expected to be in the five administrative areas as follows: fiscal management; human resources; information technology; leadership and communication; and project management. According to the quarterly records, one-third received their training in information technology, another third received training in leadership and communication and the rest were trained in the other three subject areas. Training slowly increased in the province of Ninewa by 2009, but according to training logs and surveys had significantly

¹ Scope of Work,' Annex I.

² For this review, a sample of 80 trainees was drawn from a list of approximately 8,000 trainees trained in the ministries as of Sept. 30, 2010. In this case, 80 interviews would have represented 1 percent of those trained. Due to insecurity, slow cooperation by the three ministries which would facilitate trainee interviews and the refusal of many trainees to be interviewed, 47 persons were interviewed, interviewed for the review was .01 far below what was intended for reliability. Since the method of data collection (design and interviewing) followed M&E standards, and interviewees were selected from random lists, the data collected is considered representative despite the small sample, considering these factors and that this study is a review not an evaluation.

slowed by 2010 due to many factors explored in this review, such as insecurity, inexperienced TOTs and continued resistance of DGs towards creating an enabling environment for training.³

Key Findings and Recommendations

There are many positive outcomes to the training intervention in Ninewa. These include improved fiscal management and human resource management, an increase in information technology leading to improved management information systems, improved leadership and communication and introduction of a project cycle approach to service delivery. A significant number (37 percent) of those interviewed stated they were able to implement what they learned from the training (Figure 8), while 63 percent said the training fully met their training needs (Figure 9). Seventy-six percent stated that their ministries were fully supportive of the training (Figure 10). Female participation was also significant at 2,424 women, representing 24 percent of enrollees (direct and rollout combined) by February 2011. The positive findings should be built on to address the challenges to the training program and the extension activities of Tatweer.

There were many challenges to the training, such as some ministries lacking an enabling environment towards training and change, TOTs inadequately preparing to implement rollout training, and growing insecurity in the province. The sharp drop in direct training from 2009 (when 4,454 persons were trained, to 933 persons in 2010) was expected to be replaced with rollout training by the TOTs trained by Tatweer (Table 2). However, the figures shown in Table 3 indicate that rollout training also dropped from 1,097 in 2009 to 422 in 2010. These results suggest that the TOTs may not be able to sustain the training learned without intervention. The TOTs interviewed by the field team indicated that they have not received adequate training to jump-start the rollout process. This is supported in Table 3, which shows that there have been no Master TOTs or Advanced TOTs conducted by the TOTs. TOTs expressed concern that they did not receive enough Master TOTs training and Advanced TOTs training from the Tatweer trainers to support their own training needs. Some other concerns were long training gaps between training provided, which was six to nine months for 33 percent of those interviewed (Figure 7). The inability of TOTs to implement what they had learned also remains high: only 37 percent of the trainees were able to implement what they had learned.

In light of the key findings, five recommendations are made:

- **Challenges to successful training should be addressed in this province.** The three project results are all dependant on the completion of Result 1, and obstacles to the training have to be removed. This means more direct training by Tatweer and a greater spread of enrollment by course type. Better follow-up, both remote or in nearby meeting sites such as Erbil, should be considered. The ministries where training was lower (Ministry of Interior, Human Rights, Environment, etc.) will require more intervention by Tatweer in the extension period.
- **TOTs should be retrained.** The pace of TOT rollout courses falls far below what is expected; in fact, rollout training should surpass the direct training at this point in the project. By retraining, especially more Master TOTs and Advanced TOTs (Refreshers), the project can create better teams of trainers.

³ Training numbers by province for April 2009 indicate 10 percent of attendees for training were from Ninewa province. The Tatweer Quarterly report 16 (April-June 30, 2010) indicates 7 percent of attendees for training were from Ninewa and by December 2010, the number of attendees from Ninewa was 9 percent (Figure 18). Since the method of data collection (design and interviewing) followed M&E standards, and interviewees were selected from random lists, the data collected is considered representative despite the small sample, considering these factors and that this study is a review and not an evaluation.

- **More virtual training should be utilized.** Insecurity is ongoing and sporadic, so equipping one of the ministry sites with a generator and the other required equipment, under the management of a technical expert, can support computer systems. This can help with courses where there is less need for face-to-face interaction between trainer and trainee, such as budgeting.
- **There should be training offered to the younger generation.** The largest group of trainees interviewed, shown in Figure 14, is between 40 and 49 years old (63 percent) while those less than 30 years old are not represented at all. Trainees between 30 and 39 years old comprise 21 percent, but should be the majority (since the older ones will retire soon and the younger generation will build the country). Continued attention to female participation is necessary.
- **Tatweer and follow-on projects should do more monitoring in Ninewa.** There was a common request for increasing follow-up of the TOTs and trainees, using more effective tools than the post-training evaluation. More useful tools to assess organizational capacity changes over time can be developed, but the TOTs want their skills to be better developed – a solution which only monitoring can address. The follow-up has been conducted mostly by surveys, telephone calls and emails, which need to be supported by more visits.

OBJECTIVES AND BACKGROUND

Objectives

In October 2010, the USAID/Iraq Performance Evaluation and Reporting for Results Management (PERFORM) project implemented by The QED Group, LLC (QED) was requested to perform an activity review of the Tatweer training program in Ninewa Province. As stated in the SOW, USAID requested the review in order to clarify various implementation issues specific to Ninewa Province. The Directorates General (DGs) selected were Electricity, Health and Agriculture.⁴

A second area of importance was examining problems with instituting administrative change within the selected DGs, and ways in which these problems and barriers might be addressed in a follow-on public administration capacity-building program.

For PERFORM, this meant studying factors outside of Tatweer's manageable interest that affect service delivery (e.g. budget, infrastructure, security), and lower-level impact related to administrative effectiveness. It was expected that the study would analyze whether or not the Tatweer training was instrumental in creating an enabling environment for change. The study was also expected to identify how many Trainer of Trainers (TOTs) were trained, and the degree to which the ministry training centers have assumed responsibility for training.

The study was expected to place emphasis on perception by customers (attendees at training and DGs) for whom service delivery had improved. The following were the key questions to be examined in the review:

1. Has the Tatweer training provided to DG staff precipitated changes/improvements in DG policies/regulations/procedures in the administration of service provision?
2. Have there been institutional or wider political-contextual barriers to change in DG administration improvement, and if so, what are these?
3. What changes/interventions (especially by a USAID follow-on program) are needed to best address these barriers?

Finally, it is noted that the current program Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) is not designed to examine results at the provincial level. The study will provide insight into these areas. The Tatweer provincial program has tracked training outputs and satisfaction at the trainee/customer level through training logs and trainee surveys; however, higher-level results, such as improvements in provincial DG policies and procedures, have not been examined. A provincial level of analysis is provided in this study, which can provide information not available from current monitoring and evaluation frameworks and systems.

Background

Tatweer delivers capacity-building assistance to ten ministries and five executive offices. The program utilizes a three-pronged approach, including training, systems development and capacity-building. Under a collaborative approach, Tatweer advisors and team leaders were expected to interact daily with their ministerial colleagues, using a mentoring approach to support process

⁴ Table I show that these three ministries trained amongst the highest number of persons by December 2010, other than Ministry of Education which trained 689 persons and Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works which trained 2,311 persons. (The Ministry of Electricity trained 1,245 persons, compared to Health which trained 1,652 and Agriculture which trained 581. Fifteen of the 33 ministries in Ninewa Province trained less than 10 persons by December 2010.

changes in public administration. This approach necessitated Arabic-speaking internationals and Iraqi professionals able to interact as trainers and TOTs. The Tatweer quarterly reports state that a wide range of training courses were conducted at competency, advanced and expert levels in both direct and rollout training. Tatweer's strategy was to make the training Iraqi-owned so that after direct training, the various ministries and executive offices would conduct rollout training at the same pace.

Year 1 of the program focused on getting immediate training started in Sept. 2006 with training programs, refining of courses and training materials. The primary goal for Year 1 (Sept. 2006-Sept. 2007) was to reach 21, 500 civil servants in all of Iraq.⁵ The results matrix for Year 1 shows training was carried out in six key subject matters. These were originally five key study areas, later expanded to six when project management was added:

- Project Management
- Fiscal Management and Procurement
- Leadership and Communication
- Strategic Planning
- Information Technology
- Human Resource Management

Additional courses in anti-corruption, TOT, M&E, technical assistance and quality management were added. The annual report also indicates a regional training office was established in Mosul, in addition to two others. For Year 2 (Oct. 2007-Sept. 2008), the annual report makes reference to an expanded provincial outreach using two the National Center for Consultation and Management Development (NCCMD) and the Al Quds School for Computers and Information Technology in Mosul and Basra. The same report suggests that due to serious security difficulties in the two provinces of Mosul and Basra, by the end of the second year, only 29 people were trained in Mosul, compared to 4,700 in Basra and 15,768 grand total attendees at TOT training.⁶

The Year 3 annual report (Oct. 2008-Sept. 2009) refers to expansion of the mandate of the training center in Mosul to include delivery of technical assistance and embedded staff in government offices.⁷ The same report refers to Tatweer meeting the target of 58,391 attendees of which 7 percent were from Ninewa province.

In the Year 4 annual report (Oct. 2009-Sept. 2010) and the quarterly reports for the same time period, Tatweer refers to meeting the expected number of trainees, but there is no specific reference to Ninewa province, neither in terms of number of attendees from Ninewa nor the type of training received.⁸ The same pattern of reporting is noted in all the quarterlies for Year 4. A Year 4 summary of training numbers by core area through December 2010 indicates 9 percent of the overall trainees were from Ninewa, or a total of 9,815 attendees (Figures 18 and 19, Annex 3).

In terms of enrollments of Ninewa trainees in the original five study areas, the database through December 2010 indicates lower enrollment in strategic planning (0.2 percent) as compared to the other study areas (Figure 16 and 17). There is also low enrollment in TOT training, which comprised 0.2 percent, or 21 people. This pattern of low enrollment in TOT is not unique to Ninewa and lower numbers are reflected in provinces such as Anbar and Diyala, to name a few.

Strategic planning training was delivered to 23 people and reflected 0.2 percent of the Ninewa training, but was lower in provinces such as Dahuk and Sulamaniya. The SOW for the study

⁵ Tatweer Annual Report Year 1, page 1.

⁶ Tatweer Annual Report Year 2, page 18.

⁷ Tatweer Annual Report Year 3, page 4.

⁸ Tatweer Quarterly Report 14, Training update page 55, Quarterly Report Training update page 73.

suggested that from quarterly records, one-third of trainees received their training in information technology, while another third received training in leadership and communication with the rest received training divided between the other three subject areas. As shown in Figures 16 and 17, this figure is accurate as 33 percent of the 9,815 attendees by December 2010 did receive training in IT and 24.2 percent received training in leadership and communication.

Although training slowly increased in the province of Ninewa from 2006 to 2009, it is noted in the SOW and from extrapolation of results from Tatweer databases that by the end of 2010, training had slowed significantly. Tables 2, 3, and 4 illustrate this statement in the SOW and show that direct trainees have declined since the end of 2009 and that rollout trainees have also dropped.

METHODOLOGY

Methodology

The review of the Tatweer training activity in Ninewa province was a review of a specific activity with an expected result linked to the other two activities and their expected results. In order to separate the three activities, PERFORM studied 56 documents, including annual reports, monthly reports and quarterly reports. A full list is shown in Annex 4.

Since the study was a review, not an evaluation, and since study subjects were in an increasingly insecure environment, two reliable methods would be used for a small number of in-depth interviews: KIIs and document reviews. Documentation study is a core M&E method that helps evaluators understand the history and performance of a project, and explains why and how changes are occurring.

Key informant interviews (KIIs) are also reliable core M&E methods to gain secondary data both qualitative and quantitative in a structured way. As many of the questions were open ended, they served to gain information on satisfaction, feelings and attitude. PERFORM developed a series of five tools to be used in open ended discussions with DGs/advisors, team leaders, TOTs and trainees (Annex 6).

The USAID/Iraq PERFORM project staff conducted five team leader interviews in October 2010 at the Tatweer compound. In November 2010, two QED PERFORM staff travelled to Ninewa to conduct DG, TOT and trainee interviews. Their efforts were hindered by insecurity. Therefore, in January 2011, PERFORM fielded a team of four data collectors working for a local market survey contractor. After orientation by PERFORM staff, the data collectors spent a total of three weeks (January 20-February 10) interviewing 52 persons.

These included DGs, Trainees⁹ and Training of Trainers (TOTs), distributed throughout several ministries and sampled as shown below:

1. Team Leaders (5)
2. DGs (4): Ministry of Health (MOH), Ministry of Education (MOE) (2), Ministry of Agriculture (MOA)
3. TOTs (5)
4. Trainees (38)¹⁰

In preparation for this activity, a permission letter was sought from the Governor to facilitate movement of the data collectors within the province (Annex 3). The PERFORM technical and operations specialist oriented collectors in Erbil on January 20. Team Leaders were interviewed in November 2010 by PERFORM's Senior M&E Advisor in the Tatweer compound. The tools used for the interviews were a series of key informant interviews (KIIs) selected to elicit interviewees' perceptions of the quality of the Tatweer training and its impact on the ministries in Ninewa. A documentation review was also carried out to understand the historical evolution and performance of Tatweer with respect to training.

⁹ A sample of 80 trainees was drawn from an estimate list of 800 trainees trained in the ministries provided to PERFORM. In this case, 80 interviews would have represented 10 percent of those trained. Due to insecurity, slow cooperation by the three ministries and refusal of many trainees to be interviewed, only 38 persons were interviewed, or 4.7 percent of the total.

¹⁰ The data collectors received a list of 80 trainees to be interviewed, but were able to interview 38. This figure included 12 females and 26 males.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The Delivery of Tatweer Training in Ninewa Province

Databases and interviews confirm direct training and rollout training have been delivered to the province over the period of 2007-2010. The total through February 2010 is 9,924 persons (or 9 percent of total training delivered in the country), of which 2,424 are female (24 percent) and 7,500 are male. This figure reflects significant female participation. Of the trainees interviewed for this review, 79 percent indicated that female participation was adequate (Figure 13) but 50 percent maintained there are still barriers to female participation due to continued lower opportunities for females to advance. Figure 14 shows that the age range of sampled younger persons (30-39 years) was only 21 percent when compared to those 50 and above who received 26 percent of training. The largest category of trainees 53 percent were 40-49 years. This finding was supported by other interviews suggesting selection of younger workforce members was less than the older.

Tatweer successfully conducted a wide range of training courses in Ninewa province. As shown in Figures 15 and 16, it is clear that this training comprised all six key courses plus additional courses. However, there was high delivery of two of the courses (Information Technology, 33 percent, and Leadership and Communications, 24.5 percent) compared to the other courses. If all the courses are considered important, the Ninewa province did not receive enough training in the other subject matters. The interviews with trainees also indicate that although they were satisfied with the training, there was too wide a gap between training activities. Figure 7 shows how the training gap went as long as 6-9 months for 33 percent of trainees.

Of particular importance is the Training of Trainers course, since the TOTs were expected to do rollout training, sustaining the program. TOT training was 0.2 percent of the total training delivered. Some of the trainees interviewed for the major courses (other than TOT) suggested that the training met their expectations (76 percent), that 45 percent attained both Competency and Advanced training, and that the training improved their skills (76 percent). In addition 65 percent suggested that the training improved their ministry performance in many areas. These areas are shown below as positive outcomes.

However, as Table I shows, the training did not reach all the ministries to the same extent by December 2010. For example, highest numbers of trainees were in three ministries, namely the Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works (2,311 persons, or 26 percent), Ministry of Health (1,652 persons, or 18.6 percent), and Ministry of Electricity (1,245, or 14 percent) while the other 30 ministries had less than 600 trainees each, and 15 had less than 10 trainees. Interviews with key informants indicated this was due to resistance of some of the ministries towards the training and insecurity preventing the program from penetrating and embedding.

Where the project has been embedded there was reportedly more positive change at all levels, including the DG. Therefore it can be stated that where Tatweer trained larger numbers of trainees (600 or more) they likely precipitated positive improvements in DG policies, regulations and procedures. The project has therefore been relatively successful in this area and it is likely that the other ministries could follow suit. There is no evidence of wider political contextual barriers being fully overcome in all the ministries, but the review results suggest this is happening. At this point in time there is no evidence that service provision to the general public has improved, but this was not what Tatweer was trying to achieve based on its PMP.

The Delivery of Rollout Training by the TOTs

The review provided an opportunity to interview Tatweer Team Leaders who were familiar with the process of training, including TOT training and some of the TOTs working in Ninewa province. According to the Tatweer staff interviewed, training was delivered to a significant number of TOTs, but some parts of the Master and Advanced TOTs were delivered in Erbil or virtually due to

insecurity. Table I shows 35 persons including nine women received TOT training, most of these in 2007. This early training was appropriate so that the TOTs could then prepare to do rollout training. However Master TOTs were not started until 2009 and only delivered to eight persons, none of them female. Advanced TOTs or refreshers were also only delivered to three persons, all male. According to the TOTs and Team Leaders it takes significant training to produce competent TOTs. The TOTs receiving basic training did not all received the Masters and Advanced training. Despite this 78 percent of the trainees interviewed indicated satisfaction with their trainers, and 63 percent said their trainers were able to meet their training needs.

Direct training increased from 2007-2009 in the province, increasing from 202 in 2007 to 4,454 by the end of 2009. However, there was a drop from 2010 to 933 trainees, which was explained by Tatweer to be due to increased rollout. However the rollout figures shown in Table 3 indicate that rollout trainees numbered 1,671 by mid February 2011 with numbers increasing from 2008 when there were 29 trainees, to end of 2009 when there were 1,097 trainees. This figure dropped to 423 trainees in 2010. The TOTs and Tatweer staff explained that this was due to lack of training delivered on time to the TOTs and not at a high enough level or sustained so they could do their task. A second reason was due to insecurity and continued resistance by some ministries towards expanding training in their ministries.

The results of interviews with trainees are shown in Figures 2, 3, and 4. However of the total enrollees, 83 percent received direct training from Tatweer trainers while 17 percent received rollout training from TOTs trained by Tatweer trainers.¹¹ The training was delivered to both men and women, although the percentage of women receiving the training is 25 percent compared to 75 percent male enrollees. This may be a reflection of the number of men employed in the ministries, which is higher than the number of women.

Table I reflects training up to Sept. 30, 2010. The table illustrates that enrollees for training have been drawn from all the ministries, but the majority came from three ministries.¹² The figures for ministry training, current as of Dec. 31, 2010, indicate there were 9,815 enrollees by the end of Year 4. All five courses were delivered to the ministry enrollees, including the Project Management course added after the Tatweer project started training in the five core subject areas. Figures 16 and 17 show that these six received the most attention, but that there were also a wide range of courses provided, ranging from quality management and strategic planning to anti-corruption. These course types match those for the other provinces.

It was originally intended that NCCMD be in the forefront for TOT and subsequent rollout training, but this was not realized in either Ninewa province or the other provinces where Tatweer worked to the degree expected. Three regional training centers were set up in the country, including one in Mosul. There is evidence that this training center was used more in the first two years than the latter years, as the Ministries of Oil and Electricity now have their own training centers. This is another positive result, and the ministries interviewed suggested they modeled theirs on the Tatweer model for training centers.

Training centers for the MOH and MOE are now under construction, and the MOA has two training centers. It is understood that these four centers and the two to be constructed in the MOH and MOE are solely due to the integration of the training courses along with greater emphasis on human resource development, due to the Tatweer project. The regional center is therefore little used compared to the other centers, and this is appropriate.

¹¹ The Ninewa province results show a higher percentage of direct trainees (8,253) when compared to rollout trainees (1,671). This differs to the combined results for all provinces which indicate substantially higher percentage of rollout enrollees (51.6 percent) as compared to direct enrollees (44.8 percent).

¹² Table I shows enrollees were drawn from all ministries, but mainly the Ministries of Municipalities and Public works, Health and Electricity.

On the other hand, as the challenges section of the findings indicate, if Tatweer is to increase systems development and capacity building in Ninewa Province, it must surmount several challenges, from security to resistance within the ministries.

The number of rollout trainees, those trained by the TOTs, is far lower than the number of direct trainees, who were trained by Tatweer. This contradicts the suggestion by Tatweer that TOTs are doing more rollout training than the direct training provided in 2007. For example, Tables 2 and 4 indicate 83 percent of training was direct, whereas 17 percent of the training was rollout as of Sept. 30, 2010. Combined statistics for all the provinces show that while rollout enrollees increased from 2007 (12.6 percent) to 2008 (59.49 percent) they declined in 2010 (35.22 percent).

This result reflects a decline in TOT training, even expressed by the TOTs themselves, who face many obstacles in getting support to carry out the training.

Positive Outcomes on Ministry Performance

The successful introduction of the training programs was essentially dependant on the advisory role provided by advisors or team leaders, who in turn gained trust and convinced DGs to integrate the training programs and better practices. This meant the ministries and their staff would be able to better deliver services to the public, develop their systems and build their capacity. The interviews with DGs and TOTs confirm that the training courses, build-up activities for systems development, and capacity building by Tatweer are positively received. The training impacted the ministries' ability to deliver public services in the six target areas, as illustrated in these quotations from DGs and others interviewed:

Fiscal management improved:

- “Before payroll standards were introduced, paychecks were handled in an unorganized way. Employees piled up in front of an office waiting for their paychecks. Now payroll is handled more efficiently. Employees know what time to pick their pay checks.”

Human resource management improved:

- “Before, the employee appraisal system was not transparent. Employees simply didn't know on what they were being appraised. It was secretive. Now they do. It is a transparent appraisal system. Employees now know their weakness and their strengths. It is also a motivational tool.”
- “Before, employees were placed anywhere. There was not a good match between employee skills and position requirements. Now with the help of the job description manuals, ministries are hiring the right person for the right place.”

Information Technology improved:

- “Before 2003, there was little development in IT. The most important [development] is the infrastructure we have developed, and we all are using CISCO equipment. After people got trained, they started using the equipment and knowing how to troubleshoot it.”
- “Before trainees did not know how to use a computer, much less what to do with them.”
- “When team leaders and TOTs first visited some of these offices they found the computers to be not even connected to an electric outlet. The computers served just as a decoration. We asked, ‘Do you know what to do with them?’ No one answered. After

training they knew Microsoft Word and Excel. They went from paper to electronic forms.”

Leadership and communication improved:

- “There is growing evidence of strategic planning within ministries due to management changes within the DGs, making them more efficient and effective in providing services.”

Improved mandate communication style:

- “Within the ministries there are now indications of an improved mandate communication style, evidenced in the formation of working groups and committees to execute organization plans. There is a new confidence.”

Project management improved:

- “Trainees, we were told, benefit from the training courses, because the skills they acquire can be taken back to the workplace and use right away. Some of those tools and skills with immediate application capability are: Gantt Charts, Primavera and Microsoft Project Management.”

Challenges to the Institutionalization of Training and Getting Administrative Change

Factors affecting training implementation outside of Tatweer’s control:

- **Approval must first come from the top.** Many interviewees reported that implementation of training skills sometimes cannot be carried out because top management needs to approve changes in governance and administration laws. For example, human resources training on employee performance appraisal and its implementation have been encountering resistance because Iraqi personnel management laws need to be changed first to give Tatweer Human Resources new ways and means to work. Another example came from an interviewee at the Ministry of Health in Mosul, who said, “Our key problem is getting the approvals from the Ministry of Health in Baghdad at every step. For example, we have a good cadre with capabilities to conduct the sessions, but those are on the shelf because we have to get approval from Baghdad first.”
- **Security.** Due to prevalent high security threats in Ninewa, Tatweer hasn’t been able to conduct training sessions or conduct site visits to monitor training activities and implementation. Interviewees told us that they have not been able to fully monitor training implementation.
- **Trainee selection.** In many cases, trainees did not exhibit the skills required to maximize training knowledge acquisition. PERFORM was told this is a hindrance to training impact. One Team Leader commented, “They don’t stick to trainee selection criteria. They send their relatives and people they like. There are politics involved in their selections.” And another interviewee said, “At the beginning, they just sent people to us just to oblige.”
- **Inadequate communication between provincial government and central government.** Communication between directorates and the central government is infrequent and superficial. For example, the Director of Agriculture needs to send a letter to Baghdad to ask for approval to conduct leadership and communication training courses from

Tatweer. This takes time, since is not done electronically, and results in misunderstandings and approval delays.

- **Weak management support for trainees to transfer skills to the work place.** Interviewees told PERFORM some of their immediate managers do not support the transference of skills to their work place. This is sometimes reflected in a lack of basic working materials, such as computers, or software to implement training. The trainees also face a lack of opportunities to simply implement a technique, formula, or procedure.

According to interviewees, there are several reasons for management not to be supportive of training: they feel threatened, unaware of the training subject matter and unfamiliar with Tatweer and its representatives. IT managers believe their staff would be replaced by computers, robbing them of seniority and influence in their organization.

- **Bottom-up approach perceived as challenging and difficult.** Some interviewees felt Tatweer's bottom-up approach to training government employees was a challenging and difficult method.
- **Management resistance to change.** Managers are reluctant to adopt new ways and means to do business. Resistance to change varied, but feedback from focus groups agreed on the following:
 - Managers are afraid to lose jobs and prestige within the organization.
 - Managers feel unable to learn new skills.
 - Managers feel a need to protect the status quo.

Factors affecting implementation of the project activities which can be controlled:

- **Inadequate monitoring.** One interviewee said: "Tatweer is big. We don't have sufficient people to do monitoring ... there is not enough manpower."
- **Training feedback not taken into account at times.** When advisers get feedback from trainees to change or enhance the curriculum, this goes to the curriculum development team in Karrada. But future training content does not reflect this feedback, or it takes one year to be included in the training handouts, if at all.
- **Training time.** Interviewees said most of the training courses weren't long enough to cover the syllabus, and trainees didn't have sufficient time to understand the concepts or practice the new skills. For example, the five training days allocated to procurement were not enough to cover course topics. Consequently, trainees couldn't fully understand the subject matter and as a result they find themselves less than fully capable of transferring procurement course knowledge to the workplace.
- **Inadequate sharing of best practices among staff.** Some interviewees felt there was not enough emphasis put on learning from each other's success stories. During interviews, PERFORM noticed certain proven ways of doing business were completely unknown to others, such as ways to approach ministries and gain their buy-in and support, or how to go about ensuring that trainees that were sent to training met the established selection criteria. An interviewee said: "*This is a gap in the work we do. We are very busy; we are small team and huge program. We never have the time to share progress with others and it is the responsibility of the leadership to implement that.*"

- **Quantitative training monitoring reports without qualitative data.** Tatweer was unable to provide PERFORM with open-ended comments for its post-training survey analysis. Open-ended questions are valuable because they are designed to encourage the respondents to answer in a spontaneous manner and explain the answers to earlier questions. Such responses can help training managers create action-item lists for the relevant staff.
- **Trainees responding to questionnaires can feel disappointed if they don't have the chance to add a comment.** It is particularly useful for the respondent to be able to comment on an issue, and for management to understand the plusses and minuses of training. Detailed feedback from trainees is fundamental in helping solve problems and continue good practices.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Challenges to successful training should be addressed in all the provinces. Where there is resistance in the ministries and other barriers such as TOT competency, the project has to address these. The completion of the three project results are all dependant on the completion of Result 1: training.

TOTs should be retrained. The pace of TOT rollout courses falls far below what is expected. In fact, rollout training should have surpassed direct training by now. Because of insecurity and need for more Master and Advanced TOT training, this may mean more training for Ninewa ministry workers, conducted in Erbil and Baghdad if necessary.

The creation of an enabling environment for TOTs also needs to be addressed. By conducting retraining, the project can create better teams of Master Trainers and TOTs, which in time can build the internal capacity of the ministries and create a better cascading training environment. At the same time, penetrating the ministries which are not doing the training is important so that senior management is convinced of the importance of training and capacity building.

More virtual training for Ninewa province should be utilized. Insecurity is ongoing and sometimes sporadic, so equipping one of the ministry sites with a generator and other required equipment, all under the management of a technical expert, can support computer systems in case of insecurity. This can help with courses where there is less need for face-to-face interaction between trainer and trainee, such as budgeting.

Training should be offered to the younger generation. Figure 14 shows the age range of the trainees interviewed. Those between 30-39 years old comprise only 21 percent of trainees, yet should be the majority. Continued attention to female participation is necessary.

Tatweer and follow-on projects should do more monitoring in Ninewa. There was a common request for increasing follow-up on the TOTs and trainees, using more effective follow-up tools than the post-training evaluation. More useful tools to assess organizational capacity changes over time can be developed, but TOTs want their skills to be better developed – a solution which only monitoring can address. Follow-up has been conducted mostly through paper surveys, telephone calls and emails, which should be supported with more visits.

ANNEX I: SCOPE OF WORK

Activity Review of Tatweer National Capacity Development Program Ninewa Province

Project Description:

The Tatweer program has been primarily focused on improving administrative capacity at the central service-ministry level. As it became clear that provincial Directorates General or DGs (the ministries' provincial offices) were the linchpin for improved delivery, the program expanded to improve basic administrative skills for employees at that level.

The provincial rollout program began in 2008, focused on both training of provincial DG staff and building a cadre of Iraqi trainers at regional training centers through a Training of Trainers (TOT) program. Ninewa province has been a major beneficiary of the training with over 8,000 provincial staff in multiple service DGs trained in the five administrative areas: fiscal management; human resources; information technology; leadership and communication; and project management. Tatweer also provided some specialized courses as requested and appropriate to the individual DGs.

Statistics from the Tatweer program for Ninewa indicate that more than approximately one third of trainees received their training in information technology. Another quarter received training in leadership and communication. The rest are mostly divided between project management, human resources and fiscal management. Most of the training occurred in 2009 with a large decrease in numbers trained beginning in September of 2009. Beginning in 2010, direct Tatweer training sessions have slowed to a trickle, with an average of one training per week for Ninewa.

Background:

The Tatweer provincial program has tracked training outputs and satisfaction at the trainee/customer level through training logs and trainee surveys; however, higher-level results such as improvements in provincial DG policies and procedures have not been examined.

The current program Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) is not designed to examine results at the provincial level; therefore, it is difficult to determine results in a particular province. The situation in each province is unique- both politically and in terms of DG capacity. A provincial level of analysis would provide information not available from current monitoring and evaluation frameworks and systems.

Purpose:

USAID seeks to examine the USAID/Tatweer program's provincial rollout training component in Ninewa province. The purpose of this study is therefore to determine if selected DGs that have received staff training from Tatweer have improved their organizational policies, procedures, and efficiency that in theory would positively impact service delivery. Selected DGs are the DG of Electricity, DG of Health and DG of Agriculture. The study will also examine some of the barriers or problems with instituting administrative change within the selected DGs and examine ways that these problems and barriers might be addressed in a follow-on public administration capacity-building program.

It is unclear how the TOT program has been integrated into the program for Ninewa. It is also unclear how many training staff have been trained through the Tot program for Ninewa, or whether the training centers have taken over much of the training.

With so many factors that affect service delivery outside of Tatweer's manageable interest (i.e. budget, infrastructure, security), this study will also focus on lower-level impact related to

administrative effectiveness—administrative/management changes within the DG that are now more efficient and effective in providing services. This study will document administrative changes that have occurred, analyze whether Tatweer training was instrumental in those changes, and if those changes have improved DG administrative efficiency.

The study described in this document would provide specific information on provincial DG utilization of Tatweer training and its effectiveness in improving overall DG performance. It could also pinpoint issues specific to the provinces that could indicate a need to broaden the evaluation study to include several key provinces to determine any variance in impact of the Tatweer program in different regions. This study comes toward the end of the Tatweer program will serve as an assessment of current project status.

Research Questions:

The best measure of improved service delivery would be a perception by customers that service delivery has improved. However, given the challenges associated with collecting opinion data from customers, the targeted interview subjects will be DG staff: Tatweer trainees and other key informant observers of Tatweer results.

Key questions to examine in this study:

1. Has the Tatweer training provided to DG staff precipitated changes/improvements in DG policies/regulations/procedures in the administration of service provision?
2. Have there been institutional or wider political-contextual barriers to change in DG administration improvement, and if so, what are these?
3. What changes/interventions (especially by a USAID follow-on program) are needed to best address these barriers?

Suggested Methodology and Study Tasks:

The research team will interview DG staff and analyze Tatweer training effectiveness in the DGs of Agriculture, Health and Electricity. It is envisioned that the research team will first conduct qualitative in-depth interviews of the DG directors, probing their understanding of Tatweer's program and what they expected and received from the program. The researchers will also assess the director's support for Tatweer initiatives and perception of the barriers to staff-led administrative changes meant to improve policies/regulations/procedures that support better service delivery.

The team will conduct interviews with the DG coordinators of Tatweer's training activities to identify the training plan for each DG, criteria for selection of trainees, and what the goal is for the overall training plan. They will also discuss the issues and problems the coordinator sees with the program and its impact on DG performance overall.

Finally, the team will conduct focus groups of Tatweer trainees to find out how they have been able to utilize their training in their jobs, particularly as it relates to improving policies/regulations/procedures of their agency. Researchers will determine what trainees see as barriers to substantive administrative change in their DG and how a future USAID program could provide support to overcome those barriers.

Team Composition:

A team leader familiar with Iraq and issues in Iraq related to governance, administrative reform, and capacity development. The research team should include the USAID Representative for Ninewa, plus additional M&E specialists who are Arabic speakers to set up and handle the interviews and focus groups. An additional USAID CBO team member would also be useful.

Schedule and Timeline:

The schedule for the evaluation is as follows:

September 2010

- DG director introductory meetings-- USAID representative with possible evaluation team member(s) meet with DGs to secure permission for the study
- First interviews with DG directors and training coordinators
- Interviews/research with Tatweer provincial training staff—purpose, training plan, trainee survey results

October 2010

- Finish interviews with DG directors
- Interviews with training coordinators
- Development of questions and format for focus group meetings

November 2010

- Finish training coordinator interviews
- Finish focus group interviews
- Draft evaluation results

December 2010

- Final draft
- Review by USAID Ninewa Rep and Tatweer COTR
- Final report due

Deliverables:

- Interim report on in-depth interviews with DG directors and training coordinators— information consolidation of province data and preliminary analysis to inform questions for discussion with trainee focus groups. (Mid-October)
- First draft of report for USAID review. (End of November)
- Final report in English and Arabic. (Mid-December)

ANNEX 2: GOVERNOR'S LETTER OF AUTHORIZATION

(Removed – For Internal Use Only)

ANNEX 3: FIGURES AND TABLES (BASED ON SAMPLED TRAINEES)




Figure 1




Figure 2




Figure 3




Figure 4




Figure 5




Figure 7




Figure 9




Figure 10




Figure 8




Figure 11




Figure 12




Figure 13




Figure 14




Figure 15




Figure 16




Figure 17




Figure 18




Figure 19




Figure 20

Table I: Participants by Ministries in Ninewa since Provincial Rollout (Dec. 30, 2010)

Ministry		Enrollments			Ministry		Enrollments		
		Total	Male	Female			Total	Male	Female
1	Council of Ministers Secretariat (COMSEC)	1	1	0	18	Ministry of Industry	146	120	26
2	Ministry of Planning	330	231	99	19	Ministry of Communication	40	21	19
3	Ministry of Finance	101	83	18	20	Ministry of Tourism	10	8	2
4	Ministry of Oil	536	448	88	21	Tameem Governorate	1	1	0
5	Ministry of Electricity	1,245	1,005	240	22	Missan Governorate	1	0	1
6	Ministry of Water Resources	529	406	123	23	Ministry of Natural Resources	1	1	0
7	Ministry of Health	1,652	1,181	471	24	Ministry of Work	9	6	3
8	Ministry of Agriculture	581	437	144	25	Ministry of Transportation	53	35	18
9	Ministry of Justice	178	149	29	26	Ministry of Youth & Sports	17	13	4
10	Municipalities & Public Works	2,311	1,760	551	27	Others	69	54	15
11	Ministry of Higher Education	7	5	2	28	Ninewa Governorate	2	2	0
12	Construction/ Housing	252	226	26	29	Muthana Governorate	1	1	0
13	Ministry of Education	689	447	242	30	Ministry of Displaced & Emigrants	4	3	1
14	Ministry of Interior	6	4	2	31	Presidency Council (PC)	1	1	0
15	Ministry of Human Rights	3	3	0	32	Sunni Endowment	5	4	1
16	Ministry of Environment	1	1	0	33	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	2	2	0
17	Ministry of Trade	86	67	19	Total		8870	6726	2144

Level	2007				2008				2009				2010				2011				Total Enrollments direct in all years
	Table 2																				
	Enrollments (Direct) 2007				Enrollments (Direct) 2008				Enrollments (Direct) 2009				Enrollments (Direct) 2010				Enrollments (Direct) 2011				
	Male	Fem.	Total	%	Male	Fem.	Total	%	Male	Fem.	Total	%	Male	Fem.	Total	%	Male	Fem.	Total	%	
Competency	88	58	146	72	1,570	635	2,205	88	2,972	813	3,785	85	239	70	309	33	0	0	0	0	6,445
Advanced	32	4	36	18	229	42	271	11	227	99	326	7	72	27	99	11	2	0	2	1	734
Expert	0	0	0	0	16	2	18	1	9	3	12	0	51	6	57	6	16	7	23	15	110
Training of Trainers	16	4	20	10	1	0	1	0	4	1	5	0	3	4	7	1	2	0	2	1	35
Special workshop	0	0	0	0	19	0	19	1	252	70	322	7	377	77	454	49	104	19	123	82	918
Master TOT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	7	0	7	1	0	0	0	0	8
Advanced TOT(Refresher)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Total	136	66	202	100	1,835	679	2,514	100	3,468	986	4,454	100	749	184	933	100	124	26	150	100	8,253

Table 3

Level	Enrollments(Rollout) 2007				Enrollments(Rollout) 2008				Enrollments(Rollout) 2009				Enrollments(Rollout) 2010				Enrollments(Rollout) 2011				Total Enrollments Rollout in all years
	Male	Fem.	Total	%	Male	Fem.	Total	%	Male	Fem.	Total	%	Male	Fem.	Total	%	Male	Fem.	Total	%	
Competency (Rollout)	0	0	0	0	7	1	8	28	715	264	979	89	224	92	316	75	38	68	106	86.18	1409
Advanced (Rollout)	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	89	29	118	11	83	23	106	25	15	2	17	13.82	242
Training of Trainers(Rollout)	0	0	0	0	17	3	20	69	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20
Total	0	0	0	0	24	5	29	100	804	293	1,097	100	307	115	422	100	53	70	123	100	1671

ANNEX 4: LIST OF REFERENCES

Tatweer Annual Reports

USAID Tatweer Annual Report Year 1 2007

USAID Tatweer Annual Report Year 2 2008

USAID Tatweer Annual Report Year 3 2009

Tatweer Monthly Reports

August 2007 Monthly Report

December 2007 Monthly Report

November 2007 Monthly Report

October 2007 Monthly Report

September 2007 Monthly Report

April 2008 Monthly Report

August 2008 Monthly Report

December 2008 Monthly Report

February 2008 Monthly Report

January 2008 Monthly Report

September 2008 Monthly Report

May 2008 Monthly Report

November 2008 Monthly Report

October 2008 Monthly Report

April 2009 Monthly Report

August 2009 Monthly Report

December 2009 Monthly Report

February 2009 Monthly Report

January 2009 Monthly Report

July 2009 Monthly Report

June 2009 Monthly Report

March 2009 Monthly Report

May 2009 Monthly Report

November 2009 Monthly Report

October 2009 Monthly Report

September 2009 Monthly Report

SSN Monthly Report December 2009

April 2010 Monthly Report

August 2010 Monthly Report

February 2010 Monthly Report

Tatweer Quarterly Reports

Quarterly Report-1 (Aug-Oct) 2006

Quarterly Report -2 (Nov-Dec) 2006

Quarterly Report -3 (Jan-Mar) 2007

Quarterly Report -4 (Apr-Jun) 2007

Quarterly Report -6 (Oct-Dec) 2007

Quarterly Report 7 (Jan-Mar 2008)

Quarterly Report 8 (April- June 2008)
Quarterly Report 9 (Jul-Sep 2008) Tables and Indicators only
Quarterly Report 10 (Oct-Dec 2008)
Quarterly Report 11 (Jan-Mar 2009)
Quarterly Report 12 (Apr-Jun 2009)
Quarterly Report 13 (Jul-Sep 2009) Tables and Indicators only
Quarterly Report 14 (Oct-Dec 2009)
Quarterly Report 15 (Jan-Mar 2010)
Quarterly Report 16 (Apr-Jun 2010)

Miscellaneous

USAID-Tatweer Indicators Matrix
USAID-Tatweer Program PMP 2006-2009
USAID-Tatweer Project PMP 2006 - 2009 Final
USAID-Tatweer Project PMP 2006 - 2011 v24
USAID_Tatweer Employees who have Provided TA to Ninewa Province
USAID_Tatweer Program & Level with Total Participants in Ninewa Province
USAID_Tatweer Trainees in Ninewa Province
USAID_Tatweer Training of Trainers in Ninewa Provinces
Major Problems with implementing change PTS Q10
Rollout Trainers-Ninewa
Tatweer Trainers from Ninewa - Names
Training courses- Tot names- Trainee names

ANNEX 5: LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED (PARTIAL)

(Removed – For Internal Use Only)

ANNEX 6: FIELD QUESTIONNAIRES

Director General (DG) questions

1. Interviewee Name:
2. Ministry:
3. Location:
4. Contact Information:
5. Location:
6. Explain your role in the Tatweer program?
7. Have you been able to implement this role?
 - Yes
 - No
8. Give reasons/ explanations for your answer:
9. What was the overall goal for the training?
10. Was the goal achieved?
 - Yes
 - No
11. Give reasons/explanations for your answer:
12. What were the criteria to select trainees?
13. Has the criteria been followed?
 - Yes
 - No
14. Explain reasons/ explanations for your answer:
15. What problems/challenges have been faced in selection of trainees?
16. Does the trainee selection process have any effect on DG overall performance?
 - Yes
 - No
17. Give reasons/ explanations for your answer:
18. Give suggestions on how to address this problem/challenge on trainee selection:
19. What are the overall problems/ challenges faced:
20. What do you recommend to address these problems/challenges?
21. Name of the Interviewer:
22. Mobile Number of Interviewer:
23. Date of the interview:

Trainer of Trainers (TOT) questions

24. Interviewee Name:
25. Age:
26. Gender
 - Male
 - Female
27. Ministry:
28. Location:
29. Contact Information
30. Location:
31. Explain your role in the Tatweer training plan?

32. Have you been able to implement your role?
 - Yes
 - No
33. Give reasons for your answer:
34. Were you trained to be a TOT?
 - Yes
 - No
35. When did you receive your training as a TOT?
36. How many days was the training?
37. Was the trainer able to meet your training needs:
 - Yes
 - No
38. Give reasons for your answer:
39. Was the time allocated for the TOT raining adequate?
 - Yes
 - No
40. Give reasons for your answer:
41. Have you been able to implement what you learned from the TOT training in the ministry?
 - Yes, fully
 - To some extent
 - No
42. Give reasons for your answer:
43. Has the TOT training resulted in any changes/improvements in your ministry at the level of policy (upper management)?
 - Yes
 - No
44. Give reasons and examples for your answer:
45. Has the TOT training resulted in any changes/improvements in your ministry at organizational level?
 - Yes
 - No
46. Give reasons and examples for your answer:
47. What support has the ministry give to the training?
48. Are there changes in your ministry in these areas:
 - Program Management Yes/No
 - Human Resources Yes/No
 - IT Yes/No
 - Fiscal Management Yes/No
 - Leadership and Communication Yes/No
49. If yes, give examples:
 - Program Management
 - Human Resources
 - IT
 - Fiscal Management
 - Leadership and Communication
50. Are there any barrier/problems (including political, geographical, etc) affecting the training results?
 - Yes
 - No
51. Give reasons and examples for your answer:
52. Did females participate in the training?

- Yes
 - No
53. Was the female participation adequate?
- Yes
 - No
54. What can be done to increase female participation?
55. What can a next training program do to address these and other issues?
56. What do you recommend to improve future TOT training?
57. Name of the Interviewer:
58. Mobile Number of Interviewer:
59. Date of the interview:

Trainee questions

60. Interviewee Name:
61. Age:
62. Gender
- Male
 - Female
63. Ministry:
64. Location:
65. Contact Information
66. Location:
67. Job title:
68. What area of training did you attend?
- Fiscal management
 - Human Resources
 - Information Technology
 - Leadership and Communication
 - Project Management
69. Did the training match your expectations
- Yes
 - No
70. Give reasons for your answer:
71. What level of training did you attend?
- Competency
 - Advance
 - Both
 - Other (specify)
72. Did the training improve your skills?
- Yes
 - No
73. Give reasons for your answer:
74. In what year did you receive the training and how many times per year:
- 2010.....times
 - 2009.....times
 - 2008.....times
 - 2007.....times
75. Did the training improve your ministry performance?
- Yes
 - No
76. Give reasons for your answer:

77. If yes, explain how in the following areas- i.e. Unit division directorate, commission and the ministry as a whole:
- Unit policies and procedures
 - Division policies and procedures
 - Directorate policies and procedures
 - Commission policies and procedures
 - Ministry policies and procedures
78. How long was the gap between training levels?
- One month
 - 1-3 months
 - 3-6 months
 - 6-9 months
 - 1 year
 - More than one year
79. Have you been able to implement what you learned from the training?
- Yes, fully
 - To some extent
 - Not at all
80. Give reasons for your answer:
81. Was the trainer able to meet your training needs:
- Yes, fully
 - To some extent
 - Not at all
82. Give reasons for your answer:
83. Has your ministry been supportive of the training?
- Yes, fully
 - To some extent
 - Not at all
84. Are there any barrier/problems (including political, geographical, etc) affecting the training results?
- Yes
 - No
85. Give reasons and examples for your answer:
86. Did females participate in the training?
- Yes
 - No
87. Was the female participation adequate?
- Yes
 - No
88. What can be done to increase female participation?
89. What can a next training program do to address this and other issues?
90. Name of the Interviewer:
91. Mobile Number of Interviewer:
92. Date of the interview:

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