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FINAL EVALUATION OF THE HAITI TRANSITION INITIATIVE

OCTOBER 2006

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this evaluation is to provide the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) with an independent review of its Haiti Transition Initiative (HTI), which supported efforts to build citizen confidence and participation, develop frameworks for peaceful interaction between citizens and government, and ensure peaceful interaction among groups within Haitian society that are divided by political, social and economic cleavages. The evaluation was conducted in July and August of 2006. The OTI/IOM team developed a model for work at the community level. This model served as the core of their approach to implementing the OTI program and was based on four key principles:

- Base actions on an in-depth knowledge of the communities;
- Empower communities by ensuring community involvement and ownership and by promoting communities as agents for problem solving;
- Empower local and national governments by involving local authorities and national service delivery agencies in implementing projects;
- Generate meaningful cooperation with other donors and international actors.

The HTI Model has been able to achieve various specific impacts over the two years of its operation. These include:

- **Communities have learned to manage conflict within institutionalized arrangements:** The HTI program has fostered a greater sense of community and a set of informal arrangements to promote community as opposed to individual interests. Therefore, although conflicts still exist, violence has diminished as communities have found a basis for their peaceful resolution.
- **Communities, local governments and national service agencies have established working relationships even in the absence of government resources:** In Saint Marc, in Petit Goave and in the town of Milot outside Cap Haitien, the evaluation team was able to witness a high degree of cooperation between local governments, national service agencies and communities. Similar cooperation between specific agencies such as the metropolitan water agency, and communities in Port-au-Prince also has taken place. This cooperation has taken the form of planning and prioritization of projects, their implementation and their maintenance.
- **Effective cooperation has taken place between HTI and other donor programs and with MINUSTAH's military:** HTI is viewed as an asset by the military arm of the MINUSTAH. It also has cooperated closely with other donor programs in implementing elements of its own program, drawing in approximately \$1.5 million in other donor contributions.
- **Community organizations have been revitalized and made more effective agents of development:** HTI, through its timely and responsive interventions supporting community needs and involving as much as possible authorities from local and national government, has revitalized many community organizations. These organizations now know that they can provide effective solutions to community concerns and manage development projects. Members of the community can turn to these organizations as vehicles for that community's development. Moreover, in Port-au-Prince and other sites, the communities have acquired increased capacity to sustain certain improvements.
- **Project benefits reach beyond the immediate neighborhood of implementation:** While the focus of HTI activities has in general been at the individual community level, within a neighborhood of Port-au-Prince or within a municipality outside the capital, the benefits have extended beyond those discrete neighborhoods. The most obvious form of that extension has been

the overall reduction of violent conflict, particularly visible within Bel Air in Port-au-Prince and in the sites where HTI worked outside the capital. There also have been instances where a single project has had a clear benefit beyond a single community. For example, the building of retaining walls to prevent soil erosion in Saint Marc and the development of a series of inter-connecting drainage canals in that same municipality benefited not only the community where the construction took place, but the entire municipality.

Limitations of the model: In presenting the model and its impact, it is important to remember that the model has limitations — arising in part from its focus and in part from contextual conditions. The model is a short-term instrument for establishing a basis for community conflict mitigation and prevention. To maintain the momentum achieved, there is a need for follow-up with longer term actions. The model represents two legs of what its implementers have described as a three-legged stool. Those two legs are community involvement and donor assistance. The third and vital leg that has been present in some cases, but not all, is effective law enforcement. The revitalized communities have enhanced security in their neighborhoods by generating areas where gangs no longer are free to operate because of community pressure and cohesion. These communities can assist in the role of security forces such as those of MINUSTAH by facilitating access through road improvement or increasing the lighting of public spaces. But, they cannot be a substitute for effective action by law enforcement.

Overall Significance of the Model: Key to understanding the relationship between the model and HTI's successes is recognizing that the model represents a process for conflict management, mitigation and prevention. Accordingly, its success should not be measured by what is built under the HTI program, but by the impact of HTI activities on community cohesion and strengthening community organizations. The model's greatest impact has been in revitalizing community organizations — making them more effective tools for development with enhanced capabilities to sustain community development activities after HTI. The model also links communities and their governments, building a broader instrument for conflict prevention and mitigation. Newly-established relationships will serve as a significant building block toward a broader and more cohesive Haitian democratic state.

LESSONS LEARNED

For USAID/Haiti, there are two important lessons:

- ***Importance of a conflict lens in programming and implementing assistance:*** The HTI program is a conflict prevention and mitigation effort. The choice of target communities and the shifts in strategy all respond to this overarching objective. The HTI program is not a long-term development program. Thus, the actual projects are less important than their impact on building community cohesion, increasing community capacity, building links between citizens and their governments and demonstrating that positive change is possible. The USAID Mission should continue to look at the HTI activity as a conflict management tool.
- ***Importance of linking short term/long term interventions using similar implementation criteria:*** HTI has been an effective program, but it is not an end in and of itself. Communities and authorities recognize that the HTI is a short-term solution for what are deep-seated and long-term problems. In order to take advantage of the momentum gained by HTI, the Mission needs to link this short-term program with other programs that deal with longer-term development needs. These include the JOBS program that addresses employment concerns and the local government program that will build the capacity of local authorities to deliver services. The beneficiaries of HTI should be priority candidates for support by these programs, creating synergies between programs and ensuring that the community cohesion and community-government link is

strengthened. This will serve to further mitigate conflict and contribute to better democratic governance.

For future OTI programming, the broad lesson learned is:

- *The value of the model.* This model is derived from basic principles of community development and from good OTI practice, but it has been effectively applied and improved in Haiti. The principal tenets of the model should inform future OTI activities: know the community and the forces that move it and move within it; focus on community needs; recognize community organizations and employ them effectively; link community and government at the levels where government acts as a service delivery agent; recognize the limitations of the mode — above all, the need at the community level for effective law enforcement to promote real security.

SECTION 1: THE OTI HAITI PROGRAM

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this evaluation is to provide the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) with an independent review of its Haiti Transition Initiative (HTI), which supported efforts to build citizen confidence and participation, develop frameworks for peaceful interaction between citizens and government, and ensure peaceful interaction among groups within Haitian society divided by political, social and economic cleavages. The evaluation was undertaken in July and August of 2006 slightly more than two years after the initiation of OTI activities in Haiti. It covers programmatic and management issues regarding the implementation of the Haiti Transition Initiative (HTI) and the impact of HTI on the possibilities for democratic development in Haiti.

BACKGROUND

COUNTRY CONTEXT AND OTI INTERVENTION

Every discussion of Haitian politics begins with a lament regarding its uniquely tragic political history, one of long periods of autocratic rule, intermittent turmoil and only recently the first glimmer of movements toward more than the formal trappings of democracy. This second OTI initiative was begun in May of 2004 as part of an effort to restore calm and ensure a transition to democracy after the end of the second government led by Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Aristide had been elected to office for the first time in 1990, pledging to rid Haiti of the class-bound rule that had characterized the country's politics since its independence. His government was opposed by most of the country's elite and armed forces. He was ousted by a military coup in September 1991. After two and a half years of economic sanctions and a threat of invasion, he was restored to power, completing his term in 1995. OTI played a role in this transition from military dictatorship to restored elected government.¹

Aristide was reelected president in 2000 and assumed office in 2001, following a period of government under the leadership of René Préval that saw considerable evidence of government corruption, election fraud and widespread human rights violations as well as high levels of partisan rancor and an executive-legislative deadlock that paralyzed most government operations. Aristide's second term was characterized by increased political violence, an economic recession and a breakdown in effective governance. In February of 2004, facing widespread rioting and a full-scale rebellion of former members of the armed forces and the police, Aristide resigned, leading to a new transitional government.

In April 2004, OTI conducted a study of conditions in Haiti to determine whether timing was ripe for an OTI intervention ("DCHA/OTI Haiti Assessment: Is it Time for OTI to Return?"). In May 2004, OTI began its Haiti Transition Initiative. By July 2006, OTI had six field offices throughout Haiti — Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien, Les Cayes, Petite-Goâve, Saint-Marc and Gonaïves — had approved nearly \$12 million in small grants for infrastructure and other community projects, and cleared 546 projects. OTI ended support for HTI on August 15, 2006, when it turned over the management of the program to the USAID/Haiti Mission.

¹ see Management Systems International, **Evaluation of the Haiti Communal Governance Program**, April 1996,

The overall objectives of the HTI program were: to enhance citizen confidence and participation in a peaceful transition; empower citizens and the Haitian government to address priority community needs; build cooperative frameworks between citizens and government entities at all levels; and promote peaceful interaction among conflicted populations.

While transition programs are often associated with elections, and an election did take place during the course of the HTI program (February 2006), the program did not directly address the election. Rather, it sought to produce conditions of social peace aimed at making the elections possible.

Within these broad objectives, the OTI program sought to achieve various intermediate objectives in the course of its operations with some of these operating simultaneously. These were:

- Supporting the interim government of Haiti;
- Working with local communities and local governments;
- Supporting the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)
- Helping to foster a stable environment for elections to take place;² and
- Supporting the newly-elected Préval Administration to help increase its legitimacy.

EVALUATION OBJECTIVES

Management Systems International (MSI) was hired to conduct an independent final evaluation of the Haiti Transition Initiative while program activities were being handed over to the USAID/Haiti Mission. The evaluation, among other tasks, examined 1) whether OTI succeeded in implementing its strategy to support peaceful transition and whether it was strategic in responding to Haiti's evolving political and security situation, 2) management issues faced by the program, and 3) the program's impact on strengthening democratic processes and enabling conflict prevention, management and resolution. MSI was also asked to document lessons learned from the HTI that can be used in other OTI country programs.

The MSI team was made up of three people, Dr. Joel M. Jutkowitz who served as team leader, Deborah R. King, Esq. and Dr. Yves F. Pierre. Dr. Pierre assisted only in the Haitian field study portion of the evaluation.

METHODOLOGY

To conduct this final evaluation, the MSI team followed a multi-pronged approach which included a desk study, interviews in Washington D.C., and interviews, site visits and focus groups conducted at HTI points of intervention throughout Haiti.

The MSI team examined documents about the Haiti Transition Initiative — including OTI documentation on design and implementation of the program; background information on Haiti; assessments conducted by USAID; and other relevant materials that provided a foundation upon which to evaluate the HTI. The team also analyzed information available in the HTI database regarding the HTI portfolio of projects in general, as well as specific grants, their implementation and outcome.

The team conducted interviews in Washington DC with OTI staff — past and present, USAID and US State Department personnel with knowledge of US programming in Haiti, the implementer's

² This was a cross-cutting theme.

(International Organization for Migration-IOM) representatives as well as other individuals knowledgeable about Haiti.

In Haiti, the MSI team conducted site visits to 30 HTI projects in Port-au-Prince, Cap Haitien, Saint Marc, and Petit Goave. The team interviewed personnel in USAID/Haiti including leadership of the Mission, team leaders of the various Strategic Objectives, the OTI Country Representative and other relevant personnel. MSI also met with representatives of the UN and its peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), staff of OTI's implementing organization IOM, community leaders and community members from neighborhoods included in the HTI's area of intervention, representatives of the Government of Haiti, local government officials with knowledge of the HTI program, and other relevant Haitians. In the sites visited, the evaluation team conducted focus groups with community members that examined their perceptions of the projects in which they participated. The findings in this report are based on all of these sources.

Annex 1 at the end of this report lists people interviewed. Annex 2 lists documents reviewed during the course of the evaluation. Annex 3 lists sites visited.

THE OTI HAITI PROGRAM

PROGRAMMATIC ISSUES

In the area of programmatic concerns, the evaluation was asked to address the following questions:

- OTI's strategy in Haiti was to support a peaceful transition by providing support to citizens and government to work together towards rebuilding stable communities. *Did OTI succeed in implementing its strategy, and in what ways could the effort be improved?*
- *What role did HTI activities play in reestablishing stability in the communities?*
- *Based on the program strategy's four elements/phases was the program strategic in responding to shifts in the transition process in terms of the evolving political and security situation inside Haiti?*
- *Did HTI activities facilitate and/or compliment the work of the other actors involved in the stabilization efforts? How?*
- *OTI coordinated its program closely with MINUSTAH. What lessons can be learned from working with the UN?*
- *What activities/initiatives that HTI undertook are most valued by the local partners (communities, governments)? Why? Are there activities that local partners recommend not be included in a future program? Why?*




Figure 1—Number of Projects by Sector of Intervention³

³ MSI based this information on categories used in the HTI database, taking into account the number of cleared and closed projects in the database on 7/18/06. This analysis includes school rehabilitation under infrastructure.

Public & Utilities Infrastructure Projects




Figure 2--Number of Infrastructure Activities Compared with Number of Other Activities at Time of Program Evaluation by Geographic location (HTI field offices)

Evaluation Response to Questions: This report will first provide a brief description of the types of activities in which HTI engaged and then discuss the model employed for their implementation, its operational principles and impact. Based on that understanding, we believe that it is possible to provide specific responses to these questions.

At the time of the evaluation, HTI had undertaken a total of 546 grants. The overall objective of all of the grants, whatever their specific purpose, was to strengthen community cohesion, reduce community tensions and build a basis for a peaceful transition. The majority of the grants supported community-based infrastructure projects that provided short-term employment⁴ and met community defined needs. (See Figure 1) Grants also supported events designed to promote community involvement and provide opportunities for youth to engage in constructive activities including sports tournaments, cultural activities and summer camps. The balance between these two types of grants varied by location as Figure 2 indicates.

While the specific content of grants varied in accordance with needs and conditions in each of the sites, there were certain general categories and themes across sites. Infrastructure grants included support for repairing and rehabilitating streets, providing drainage canals and reinforcement to stream beds to prevent flooding, soil erosion prevention activities (retaining walls and reforestation), rehabilitating schools, building water fountains and cisterns and building playgrounds and athletic facilities (basketball courts, soccer fields). Grants provided for the creation or rehabilitation of community spaces where people could come together for recreation, for artistic events, and to enhance the camaraderie among a community. Grants also supported activities to generate opportunities for youth to engage in sports through a program

⁴ A total of 615,753 person days of labor were generated through August of 2006 with 247,099 generated in Port-au-Prince. All of these person days represented short term work for the individuals involved.

designated Play for Peace and to occupy their time during the summer through a series of summer camps. Playing fields were used as ‘sites for détente’ across communities--their purpose was to strengthen community bonds and to provide a venue for peaceful interaction between communities.

As will be discussed further below, the communities chose the type of project undertaken, selecting at times projects which improved community facilities such as basketball courts and soccer fields. They chose these community facilities projects because, as community members in Bel Air, Petit Goave and Saint Martin indicated to the evaluators, the projects enhanced the quality of community life and increased community cohesion. HTI supported these types of grants because they contributed to community cohesion and provided productive forms of interaction for youth within and across communities. The evaluators were told by HTI beneficiaries in places like Bel Air and Saint Marc of the community pride that was generated by participation in sports tournaments with other communities.

The grants, especially those directed at generating infrastructure and labor opportunities, were also intended, at least in the early stages of HTI, to demonstrate that the interim government was concerned about the communities. HTI programs inside Port-au-Prince addressed slightly different conditions than those outside the capital. In Port-au-Prince, OTI worked in communities where conflict was on-going. For the most part, programming outside of Port-au-Prince aimed at conflict prevention and intervened in communities which previously had been hotbeds of political conflict to limit the potential for flare ups.

The HTI Model

The core of the approach to implementing the OTI program was the model for working at the community level that was developed by the OTI/IOM team. This model, not explicitly stated in any design documents, but developed in practice was based on four key principles:

- Base actions on an in-depth knowledge of the communities;
- Empower communities by ensuring community involvement and ownership and by promoting communities as agents for problem solving;
- Empower local and national governments by involving local authorities and national service delivery agencies in implementing projects;
- Generate meaningful cooperation with other donors and international actors.

In-Depth Knowledge of the Communities: The OTI-IOM team was able to generate an in-depth understanding of each of the communities in which it worked. Part of that ability came from the composition of the IOM teams in each of the communities. Although the head of each site was an international employee, the rest of the staff was drawn from the locality or had extensive knowledge of the locality. That knowledge went well beyond simple demographics. The IOM teams know the history, the social and political forces and the patterns of appropriate inter-action with the communities where they are working. They also understand the strengths and limitations of local governments and of the representatives of the various national service agencies that provide water, public works, and electricity to the communities. The IOM teams were able to put this knowledge to work in identifying appropriate community groups with which to work, facilitating selection of projects and in building relationships between communities and government agencies.

Empowering Communities: In all of the sites, HTI personnel worked to identify and empower community organizations and community groups in all aspects of project implementation. Communities determined their own priorities.

During interviews with the evaluation team, community leaders and members in one Bel Air site indicated how important they felt the basketball court they created was to their community. They believed it offered an opportunity to incorporate youth in meaningful activities and brought together several generations who worked to construct and maintain the facility. (See box regarding the project).⁵

Communities managed the implementation of projects, including such crucial decisions as whom to hire and for what length of time community members would be employed in carrying out the project. In the Fort National community of Bel Air (Port-au-Prince), a local community group recruited an out of work construction foreman from the community to organize the building of a local basketball court. This not only provided gainful employment for this and other community members, but gave the community a sense of responsibility for the quality of the work undertaken. This sense of community ownership was visible in project after project in all of the sites visited by the evaluation team.

When in project in Cité Soleil⁶ was threatened by robbery of materials and concerns for the safety of contractors, the HTI team gave the community involved the responsibility for ensuring the security of materials and persons. The community accepted that responsibility, effectively protecting their project from thievery and gang violence by developing a system of escorts that met contractors at the entrance to Cité Soleil and took them to the project site. In a similar case in Martissant, when paving bricks were stolen by a youth from a neighboring community during a street paving project, the members of the community carrying out the project negotiated the return of reusable bricks.⁷

Finally, in the projects that involved service delivery such as management of water cisterns and fountains in Port-au-Prince and in other locations,⁸ the HTI program empowered communities to manage these facilities once they were complete. (See discussion below on impact)

REHABILITATED BASKETBALL COURT IS A SLAM DUNK FOR BEL AIR

The communities of Fort National and Macira in Port-au-Prince's Bel Air neighborhood previously suffered from gang violence. Over time and, many would say, thanks to OTI's interventions in the area, these neighborhoods have begun to stabilize. In order to restore the feeling of community and reinforce the stability, OTI supported the construction of a public basketball court where neighbors could congregate and/or play basketball without fear of violence. From the beginning, cooperation among community members and between them and the government existed. Civic groups approached community elders (who are traditionally the decision makers in Haitian society) to propose the project. With elder approval, the community made a request to the Ministry of Youth and Sport. The Ministry of Youth and Sport concurred and forwarded the request on to OTI for funding. In the end, the community built their basketball court, the government was seen as responsive to their constituents' request, and community members built and took responsibility for maintenance of the court. One elderly neighbor who lives directly beside the court even felt the need to beautify the outside of her apartment to match the beauty of the new court. The community takes extreme pride in their work and their public space.

⁵ This discussion and the description in the text box were drawn from a meeting held by the evaluation team with leaders, elders and members of the community involved in the project.

⁶ Project IOMPAP003.

⁷ Project IOMPAP008.

⁸ There were around 58 projects that involved development of water systems including the establishment of public fountains where communities could secure running water.

Empowering Local and National Governments: The original intention of the HTI program was to assist the national government to enhance its standing with the communities in which HTI worked. In the broadest sense, this proved a difficult task. The interim government was not very effective and did not respond in an agile manner to the opportunities afforded by HTI. However, if one looks over the length of the program, it is clear that HTI was able to assist in building bridges at the local level between the communities and local governments and between the communities and the national service delivery agencies in many of the sites where the program operated. This was clearly the case in places such as Saint Marc, Petit Goave and the town of Milot outside of Cap Haitien where local officials recognize the degree to which they have been able to effectively cooperate with their citizens to undertake a variety of community priority projects. In meetings with local and national officials in Saint Marc and Petit Goave, the evaluation team was given detailed descriptions of the extent of cooperation between HTI and government. In the case of Saint Marc, the representative of the national agricultural agency (*Bureau Agricole Communal – BAC*) pointed out the importance to their soil conservation program of the support they had received from HTI in building retaining walls above the town. In Petit Goave, at a meeting with the Mayor, Deputy Mayor and local representatives of the various national service agencies, the evaluators again heard about the cooperation between HTI and government, at the same time that at least one representative expressed his desire for more resources directed at his particular program. The Mayor of Milot proudly showed the evaluation team around his town hall, rehabilitated with support from HTI.⁹ As he pointed out, this was a source of pride not only for local officials, but for the entire town—a symbol of the value of local government made possible by the HTI project.



The Town Hall of Milot

Generating Cooperation with Other Donors/International Actors: A feature evident in various sites throughout the HTI program was a close coordination and cooperation with other donors including MINUSTAH's civilian and military organizations.¹⁰ The HTI program worked with a variety of other donors and cooperating agencies, including those of the Haitian national government. In accordance with records in the grants database, the total of contributions from other donors was \$1,646,395. In addition,

⁹ While the grant was only for \$9000, and did not pay for completely rehabilitating the building, the symbolic value of the grant as reported to the evaluators by the Mayor was far greater than its size.

¹⁰ According to information in the HTI database at the time of the evaluation, MINUSTAH provided security and/or other resources to at least 209 HTI activities.

grantees contributed \$1,430,774. The donors noted were: The World Bank; the Inter-American Foundation, the United Nations Development Program, MINUSTAH, the World Food Program, UNICEF, the Canadian International Development Agency, OXFAM Great Britain, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Union for Durable Agricultural Development, the Foundation Paul-Gerrin-Lajoie, the Salvation Army, the Government of Brazil and the Institute for Advanced Political and Social Studies. The database also indicated support coming from the following agencies of the Haitian government: the Ministry of Culture and Communications, the Ministry of Public Works, the Agricultural Bureau, the Port-au-Prince Metropolitan Water Authority (CAMEP) and the Secretary of State for Youth and Sport.

A high ranking official of MINUSTAH's office of civil-military relations characterized the importance of HTI to the military as 'having made the military look good' by including them in implementing public works projects.¹¹ In Cap Haitien, HTI working with OXFAM and various elements of the UN organized a drainage ditch scheme, dividing responsibilities for funding among donors. In Port-au-Prince, HTI coordinated street improvements with MINUSTAH's military requirements and secured MINUSTAH military engineering assistance with construction. It was this linking of HTI assistance to support from MINUSTAH that made the military look good by revealing them as contributors to development.¹²

Operating Principles of the Model: The model was put into practice through a series of actions drawn from its basic tenets. Critical, as has already been mentioned, was the use of Haitian personnel with in-depth knowledge of the communities whose judgment was respected up IOM's chain of command. These skilled personnel were able to establish a dialogue at the community level that became the starting point for HTI intervention. The community dialogue was fostered by identifying and recognizing the value added of existing community organizations and their leadership, many of them representing several generations of community activists whose prior efforts had been frustrated by the levels of conflict in their communities. In effect, HTI served as a catalyst that allowed communities to activate their organizations and make them effective participants in a process of conflict mitigation and prevention. This involved a careful management task for the HTI local teams since it was sometimes the case that community organizations had long established rivalries with their neighbors. This was certainly the case in Cap Haitien where HTI had chosen one group over another to manage a project in a slum area along the river because the group chosen was willing to step forward and act and the other was not. The rivalry remained, but it was now a managed dialogue over the success of the project.

An important part of the process, as already noted, was getting communities to define their priorities. The HTI team in each locality did not come, as very often is the case in development programming, with a set menu of activities it was seeking to promote. It did have certain rules regarding what it could not do (for example, build entirely new schools or build public latrines),¹³ but it left definition of needs to the communities and the prioritization of projects to a process of interaction between the communities and the local authorities.

HTI operations were characterized by providing a rapid and effective response to priorities. Community leaders at all sites visited commented that prior to the HTI program, they had often gone to local and national authorities seeking solutions to their needs, whether that be a drainage ditch or a new roof for their school. Government officials had been slow to respond and most often had failed to provide the needed resources. But that was clearly not the case, they commented, with HTI.

¹¹ Evaluation team interview with the MINUSTAH Deputy Commander for Civil-Military Cooperation (U-9).

¹² See details below.

¹³ OTI considered building new schools a high risk activity since there was no guarantee that the government would staff a new school. OTI avoided public latrines after it became evident that communities would not maintain them.

A critical factor in ensuring HTI's rapid response was the manner in which it made decisions regarding grants. At the local level and all the way up the chain to the OTI representative and the program manager in Washington, there was a system in place to ensure rapid review of all grants. Equally important, once review was completed, the HTI local team moved swiftly to initiate implementation.

Also important was HTI's decision to build a critical mass of activity within target communities as opposed to touching a larger number of neighborhoods but with fewer activities in each. By conducting multiple activities throughout target communities, HTI was able to penetrate more deeply into the community structure than a single project alone would have allowed. Through this concentration of activities, HTI was able to have a larger impact and promote greater momentum towards stability within these communities.

The HTI teams also developed management approaches that embody the principles of bringing together communities and government authorities. In Petit Goave, for example, HTI facilitated a dialogue and the development of a long term oversight group for HTI activities that included local authorities, community representatives and representatives of the national service agencies working in the community. A similar arrangement was established in Saint Marc which assisted in the process of coordinating activities. These management efforts improved the dialogue between communities and their governments, enhanced the visibility of the role of government and also ensured that the voices of the communities were heard by authorities in the context of positive actions to promote local improvements.

Problems Encountered: HTI encountered a variety of problems in its implementation of the model as evident from the database and from discussions the evaluation team had with HTI staff.

These problems can be divided into two categories, broad issues of reoccurring violence and operational difficulties. The issue of reoccurring violence, as we will discuss further below, requires effective law enforcement, a variable that falls outside the control of HTI. By design, the program worked in very difficult neighborhoods in Port-au-Prince in other sites. The evaluation team was able to directly observe and was informed by community members of the reductions in conflict in the Bel Air neighborhood of Port-au-Prince,¹⁴ but at the time of the evaluation violent conflict erupted in Martissant, another large neighborhood of Port-au-Prince. That violence temporarily limited access by HTI personnel to Martissant, although as the leaders of Martissant neighborhoods pointed out to the evaluation team in a discussion session that the team held with them, the violence was in fact confined to a small portion of Martissant. The evaluators have been informed that since the evaluation, MINUSTAH has reestablished control over Martissant, allowing HTI to continue its work.

Cité Soleil was another area within Port-au-Prince where the HTI program operated over the course of the two plus years of its existence (91 projects). Cité Soleil was a center of pro-Lavalas sentiment as well as a center of gang operations. While the evaluation team did not visit Cité Soleil because of security considerations, interviews with community leaders held by the evaluation team suggested that the projects undertaken by HTI were highly valued by those community leaders. However, as with the case of Martissant, HTI could not guarantee social peace without the presence of government or international law enforcement action to neutralize the gangs. In fact, in at least one case, violence led to the cancellation of a project early on in the HTI program. Recent efforts by the Préval government and by MINUSTAH to increase law enforcement and reduce gang activity have, the evaluators have been informed, served to increase security in that area of Port-au-Prince.

¹⁴ The level of community peace in Bel Air is such that community pressures can be exerted to remove unwanted elements in some cases. In late September 2006, in Bel Air one of the most wanted criminals turned himself over to MINUSTAH after the community mobilized against him and told him that he had no other choice if he wanted to live (report received from HTI staff).

As one would expect, there were a number of operational problems that confronted HTI in the course of the two years.¹⁵ These problems included failure to receive required materials on time, the quality of work by contractors, and the failure of government agencies to provide their counterpart work. There were also issues surrounding the management of community workers. For example, there were several cases where too many community members sought employment on a project or where disputes arose over the allocation of jobs to community members. There were also a variety of security issues—among them, theft of materials and gangs who threatened project implementation. Several projects faced problems caused by the weather, for example flooding that prevented construction. In at least one instance, a project was stymied by political interference, a city official sought to protect the commercial interest of a friend who owned a discothèque by halting the completion of a youth center that would compete for the same public.

As the database indicated, these operational difficulties were overcome by a combination of HTI project team action in dealing with government agencies or contractors, community involvement in protecting materials and allocating available jobs to community members or rethinking by the community, government and HTI of means to implement a project. There were few instances, according to the database and evaluation team observation of projects that had to be cancelled or significantly postponed because of these operational difficulties.

Solving these problems, it should be noted, often demonstrated the capacity of the communities to manage these development activities by allocating labor and ensuring security. In one case in Saint Marc, the Steno Vincent Lycée reconstruction, the municipal government and the school demonstrated their commitment to the project by providing additional funds to compensate for monies misspent by a contractor.

Despite these problems, the overall impression that comes from visiting the sites, entering into dialogue with community leaders and community members, and examining available documentation is that the HTI program was able to overcome operational difficulties and function effectively.

Impacts Achieved

The HTI model focuses on establishing the peace within communities over the short-term. Conflicts remain within the communities where HTI has worked. These arise for a variety of reasons. There are still neighborhoods with historic rivalries that seek advantage for themselves. There are still communities with competing political positions, pro and anti Lavalas. There are still criminal gangs operating in Cité Soleil, Martissant and in Bel Air. There is still competition for scarce resources in a country and in municipalities that are run-down and lacking many aspects of basic infrastructure. But, the HTI model has been able to achieve various specific and significant impacts over the two years of its operation. These include:

- **Communities have learned to manage conflict within institutionalized arrangements:**

The HTI program added value in the areas it has worked by generating a greater sense of community and a set of informal arrangements to promote community as opposed to individual interests.

¹⁵ A review of the database by the evaluation team indicated approximately 6-7% of the projects had these types of difficulties.

Below: Public Park in Bel Air Decorated by Local Artist



One can see this sense of community on a small-scale when one looks at the common area created in the Fort National section of Bel Air, decorated by an artist member of the community who saw what was being done to better the community and added his artwork to the wall of the project as his contribution.

On a larger scale, participants in the OTI-funded soil conservation (anti-erosion) project in Petit Goave demonstrated the true meaning of community spirit and “saw the forest through the trees.”¹⁶ In a city where violent, politically-motivated confrontations are known to take place, participants from the community of Baylod worked together to plant citrus seedlings on private properties.¹⁷ This project, which was designed to reduce erosion where dangerous mudslides threaten the main road, promoted communication and collaboration between the community and the local branch of the Agricultural Bureau as well as created temporary jobs for nearly 100 laborers. The trees are cared for by the property

owners, who have sole entitlement to sell and retain the profits from fruit generated on their property. When asked why only a few individuals should profit from the fruits when many community members worked together to plant the trees, people responded that they all benefited. They pointed out that the trees prevented deadly mudslides. In addition, they explained, with more fruit being produced in their community, prices would drop and everyone would benefit.

- **Communities and local governments have opened up dialogues:**

In Saint Marc, despite the longstanding community distrust of the government, the people and the Municipality opened a fruitful dialogue to resolve issues surrounding the use of OTI-donated television sets. To assist the local government in providing tangible signs of responsiveness, and at the same time foster a peaceful environment in the volatile Portail Montrouis, La Scierie, and Portail Guepes neighborhoods, OTI donated three televisions to the Municipality so that these communities could watch the 2006 World Cup games. The cooperation between the parties was formalized in a Commitment Protocol. However, the community feared that the Mayor would appropriate the television sets. At the same time, the Mayor worried that the public would not return the televisions after watching the soccer matches. To resolve their concerns, the two sides opened a dialogue. Through discussions, they arrived at a solution and revised their Commitment Protocol accordingly. They agreed that the communities could keep the television sets so long as they were used only for public purposes.

Dialogue between the municipality and the community helped to establish the parameters of a project to rehabilitate a public square in Cité Soleil (IOMPAP003) to provide a place for youth to play soccer. Community members and representatives of the municipality, along with HTI staff collaborated in implementing the project which assisted in keeping this sector of Cité Soleil relatively calm during the violence denominated Operation Baghdad in late 2004.

¹⁶ Comments from a discussion between community members and the evaluation team.

¹⁷ Cost of the project was \$20,186.

- **Communities, local governments and national service agencies have established working relationships even in the absence of government resources:**

In Saint Marc, in Petit Goave, and as has already been mentioned, in the town of Milot, the evaluation team was able to witness a high degree of cooperation between local governments, national service agencies and communities. Similar cooperation between specific agencies such as CAMEP, the metropolitan water agency, and communities in Port-au-Prince also has taken place. This cooperation as already noted covers planning and prioritization of projects, their implementation and their maintenance. This cooperation takes advantage of the existence of legal frameworks for community management of water projects, putting those frameworks into practice.

For example, the community of La Scierie is one of the most troubled areas of Saint Marc. Its members were victimized by a massacre in 2004. In a dual purpose attempt to quell community frustration over the lack of potable water, thereby contributing to stabilization of the community, and to build trust between the community and the government, OTI supported the construction of a water cistern to service the neighborhood. The Government and community members came together to solve La Scierie's potable water problem. A local community member, and victim of the violence, donated land for the construction, local laborers built the edifice and the regional water authority (SNEP) committed to training community leaders in water management and selling them discounted water to fill the structure when rainfall alone would not suffice.

The project was not without its difficulties. In the course of the project, work was stopped to deal with the lack of commitment of the workers. The municipality intervened and, together with contractor, developed a detailed work plan that became the basis for completing the project. Upon its completion,¹⁸ the community will manage the cistern and sell the water, using profits for upkeep and maintenance. According to the cistern's manager, the water will be sold at approximately half the current going price.

- **Effective cooperation has taken place between HTI and other donor programs and with MINUSTAH's military:**

As already noted in describing the model, HTI received significant support and cooperation for its efforts from other international donors, both public and private. HTI is viewed as an asset by the military arm of MINUSTAH. This cooperation has served to increase the impact of HTI efforts at the same time that it has assisted to improve the image of MINUSTAH's security apparatus. It also has cooperated closely with other donor programs in implementing elements of its own program.

Dialogue between MINUSTAH and the community in Petit Goave began because of HTI intervention. Prior to HTI presence, the MINUSTAH general in charge of Petit Goave had not met with the Mayor. After the HTI program facilitated the establishment of a link between local authorities and the MINUSTAH military command their connection grew. For example, there had been protests by the Eveille party during summer 2006 against City Hall because of alleged mismanagement on the part of the Deputy Mayor.

Drawing on the HTI connection, MINUSTAH helped cultivate a dialogue between the political party and city hall to resolve their differences. Another example of HTI-MINUSTAH-community relationships was demonstrated by a soccer game organized between youth and public officers from City Hall, the police, the national electric authority and the ministry of public works. MINUSTAH participated in the soccer match by providing security and distributing water throughout the game. Also, the head of MINUSTAH presented a speech at the end of the game in Creole. (He was Sri Lankan and up until that time had not spoken in public.). This game reflected cooperation and relationship building between the community, public officials and MINUSTAH.

¹⁸ At the time of the evaluation site visit, the cistern was in the final stages of construction.

In Cap Haitien, HTI worked with the World Food Program and OXFAM/Great Britain to finance a drainage canal system. One element of this effort was a project in one of the most violence prone neighborhoods of that city (Barriere Bouteille). This project received a total of \$62,500 from these other donor sources, effectively the bulk of the cost of the project (80%). This was but one of four projects in Cap Haitien as of June 2006 that involved collaboration between this group of donors.

- **Community organizations have been revitalized and made more effective agents of development:**



Above: Community Members in Rehabilitated Bas Bel Air School Room

As already noted, community organizations existed in many of the sites where HTI has worked. It was not possible in the short amount of time that the team spent in each site to examine in detail the structure of community organizations and community leadership or the specific role of community leaders. What was evident based on discussions with representatives of the organizations visited on the ground and also in discussions with groups made up of representatives of organizations in Cité Soleil and Martissant, two areas the team was unable to visit because of security considerations, is that the organizations involved in HTI had received considerable benefits from that involvement.

In recent years, little community revitalization had been done by these community organizations prior to the HTI intervention. This in large measure was the case because community groups could not generate the resources needed to carry out projects. Time after time the evaluators were told that when a group came up with a project, they would go to the authorities to ask for assistance, but none was forthcoming. The process was more than unproductive. Frequently, there was no response whatsoever—frustrating the aspirations of the community, undermining the credibility of the organizations and equally undermining any faith in the authorities. HTI through its timely and responsive interventions, supporting community needs and involving as much as possible authorities from local and national government, has revitalized many community organizations.

From Generation to Generation (Based on evaluation team discussion with the community)

Adult community members from Bas Bel Air in Port-au-Prince once attended this school in which they now sit. During more violent times, the school was burned down and community members wouldn't leave their houses unless it was necessary, even to visit relatives just across the neighborhood. With OTI's intervention, community members rehabilitated the school so that their children could attend. Community members shared that as a result of the project, violence in the area subsided. Gangs stayed away from the school because of the children present. And, consequently, community members felt comfortable to leave their houses and visit family living in the community. Community members, even after the work has finished and their children are in school, remain committed to the school. When the government is unable to or late in paying teachers, the population comes together to provide partial remuneration.

These organizations now know that they can provide effective solutions to community concerns. They know they can manage development projects. And, community members can turn to these organizations as vehicles for development.

Moreover, in both Port-au-Prince and in other sites, the communities have acquired the capacity to sustain certain community improvements. These include the cisterns and fountains mentioned earlier such as the one in Saint Marc. In the case of Bel Air's Fort National area, the evaluation team asked community groups how they would be maintain the improvements that had been made in public areas and in the local schools. The community leaders responded that they would look for support from their local communities, but that they also would use the fees that they make from the management of water fountains as a source of revenues to reinvest in maintenance. As in the case of Saint Marc, the leaders indicated that the cost to the community of the water from these fountains was considerably lower than from previous sources, allowing them to add a small amount to raise funds for project upkeep.

There are also several instances in Port-au-Prince of community management of electrical connections. The community electricity fee collection system, which is based on the CAMEP water management system, is most effective in Village de Dieu where HTI has successfully implemented several projects with this existing structure. These efforts to manage public services through locally elected committees trained by Electricite d'Haiti (Ed'H) have been effective in IOMPAP010 "Wharf Jeremie Public Lighting" in Cité Soleil and IOMPAP "Electrification of Martissant #3". These communities have set up a local office to manage the electrical system and pay Ed'H based on one meter that controls electricity use by the entire community. The local committee bills each household based on the number of light bulbs, televisions and appliances of each user. When any one of the households does not pay, the community committee disconnects the user. This mechanism constitutes a resource for the community as well as for reducing the amount of illegal tapping into of electrical lines.

- **Project benefits reach beyond the immediate neighborhood of implementation:**



Above: The retaining walls in the hills above Saint Marc.

While the focus of HTI activities has in general been at the individual community level, within a neighborhood of Port-au-Prince or within a municipality outside the capital, the benefits have extended beyond those individual neighborhoods. The most obvious form of that extension has been the overall reduction of violent conflict, visible within Bel Air in Port-au-Prince and in the HTI sites outside the capital such as Saint Marc.¹⁹ For example, while meeting in a rehabilitated school in Bas Bel Air, the community members pointed out to the evaluation team how the rehabilitation had made the corner where their school was located a safer place to walk because the gangs no longer hung out there. In the Delmas #2 section of Bel Air, community members indicated to the team that women could now go out late at night, something that was not possible before the community came together to rehabilitate a street and a nearby marketplace.

¹⁹ Observation made by the MINUSTAH representative in Saint Marc.

There are also instances where a single project has a clear benefit beyond a single community. For example, the building of retaining walls to prevent soil erosion in Saint Marc serves to protect the entire center of the town and the development of a series of inter-connecting drainage canals in that same municipality benefits more than just the immediate area where each section of the canal is located.²⁰ Each piece of the canal system is a community project, but the HTI team has developed and is overseeing implementation of a design that will create an interconnecting system.

There are various other examples as well. At the Steno Vincent school in Saint Marc, people worked together to rehabilitate classrooms, a multi-sport arena, and a cultural center with funding from OTI.²¹ This project created temporary jobs, gave laborers a source of income, and importantly, brought people together to cooperate towards a common objective (rehabilitation of the facilities) and provides people from the immediate and surrounding communities a reason to come together in the future (to use the facilities that they have rehabilitated). Beyond that, the project improved the learning environment for over 2000 students from multiple neighborhoods in Saint Marc—who previously had to sit on the ground because classroom furnishings were inadequate. It has also created a public forum for community members from throughout Saint Marc to hold meetings, lectures, debates, theater productions and other similar activities.

In order to remove idle children from the streets and keep them busy during their summer vacation, OTI, the State Secretary for Youth, Sport and Civic Education (SEJSEC), and the Mayor collaborated to bring the children of Petit Goave a summer camp program in July-August 2006.²² Art serves as an important social glue for members of the Petit Goave community. For 16 days throughout the summer, 300 children received instruction on and materials to make paper maché masks and wall-hangings, paper flowers and other crafts. The program offered was so popular that according to the HTI staff several hundred additional children participated in the summer camp at their own expense — bringing their own food and materials.

Limitations of the model: In presenting the model and its impact, it is important to remember that the model has limitations — arising in part from its focus and in part from contextual conditions. The model is a short-term instrument for establishing a basis for community conflict mitigation and prevention. Therefore there is a need for follow-up with longer term actions to maintain the momentum achieved. In that regard, the community leaders including those from Cité Soleil that met with the evaluators understood the need for follow-on activities and were interested and willing to participate in ensuring that these activities took place. In other terms, HTI has opened possibilities for long-term development, but was not itself a mechanism for that long term development.

The model also represents two legs of what its implementers have described as a three-legged stool. Those two legs are community involvement and donor assistance. The third and vital leg that has been present in some cases, but not all, is effective law enforcement. The revitalized communities have enhanced security in their communities by generating areas where gangs no longer are free to operate because of community pressure and community cohesion. HTI projects can assist in the role of security forces such as those of MINUSTAH by facilitating access through road improvement or increasing the lighting of public spaces. But, they cannot substitute for effective action by law enforcement as the violence in Martissant in July 2006 demonstrated. Violence arose there because of gang incursion into a neighborhood, not because of intra- or inter-community strife. When MINUSTAH was able to restore order in the affected section of Martissant in September 2006, HTI was able to resume its activities in that neighborhood.

²⁰ The retaining walls cover the principal hill behind the center of the town. The plan for the canals developed by the local IOM engineer also covers the length of the town.

²¹ Total cost of the multiple projects was \$89,685.

²² The estimated cost of the project was \$15,568. The same program was also undertaken in 2005.

Effective implementation of the HTI model over time requires development of effective community-level law enforcement. This means strengthening the ability of the Haitian National Police to operate at the community level. While such an effort can take advantage of the increased cohesion that HTI generates, that community cohesion is no substitute for effective law enforcement.

Overall Significance of the Model: The key to understanding the relationship between the model and the successes achieved by the HTI project is that the model represents a process for conflict management, mitigation and prevention. It is not what is built, but the impact of activities on the community cohesion, community problem-solving capacity and the strengthening of community organizations. The greatest impact the model has had has been in revitalizing community organizations, making them more effective tools for development with enhanced capabilities to sustain those community development activities after HTI. The model also links communities and their governments, building a broader instrument for conflict prevention and mitigation. This will be a significant building block toward a more cohesive Haitian democratic state.

Programmatic Questions

- *Did OTI succeed in implementing its strategy, and in what ways could the effort be improved?*
- *What role did HTI activities play in reestablishing stability in the communities?*
- *Based on the program strategy's four elements/phases was the program strategic in responding to shifts in the transition process in terms of the evolving political and security situation inside Haiti?*
- *Did HTI activities facilitate and/or compliment the work of the other actors involved in the stabilization efforts? How?*
- *OTI coordinated its program closely with MINUSTAH. What lessons can be learned from working with the UN?*
- *What activities/initiatives that HTI undertook are most valued by the local partners (communities, governments)? Why? Are there activities that local partners recommend not be included in a future program? Why?*

Implementing the Strategy and Re-establishing Stability: HTI's strategy was to support a peaceful transition by providing support to citizens and government to work together towards rebuilding stable communities. That strategy as we have described above was implemented through a model that ensured community and government involvement, that generated a menu of needs based on community concerns, and that helped to revitalize community organizations, promoting reduced levels of conflict and developing channels for conflict mitigation. Whether it was through rehabilitating a school, building a playground, conducting tournaments or holding summer camps, the HTI program provided the basis for reestablishing a sense of community and thereby helping to stabilize communities. When the evaluators asked the representative of MINUSTAH for Saint Marc to comment on the effectiveness of HTI in promoting stabilization, he said 'Compare Saint Marc, where HTI has worked, with Gonaives where they have not worked. Saint Marc is peaceful and Gonaives is not.'

The overall success of the OTI strategy suggests that any improvements amount to fine-tuning. The evaluators did not find fundamental flaws in the implementation and would not therefore suggest any changes beyond the need to engage in fine-tuning. For example, the program made a rule not to fund public latrines, but apparently in some cases this has been interpreted as not allowing the project to support building bathrooms in rehabilitated schools. This misinterpretation of the rule should be corrected in the follow-on program.

We would recommend that more attention be paid to explaining the model and to publicizing the results to two target audiences: other development professionals in Haiti who would benefit from understanding

the way in which the HTI model has operated, and to the public at large, focusing on the achievements of the communities and governments in producing positive results. Some work has been done in this area, but more is possible. Early on there was a concern that too much publicity would attract the attention of the gangs and make implementation more difficult. This point has passed and greater publicity would serve to enhance the impact of the model.

Strategic Agility: The two years plus of the program saw considerable shifts in the political scene and in the related conditions under which HTI worked. After the resignation of Aristide, the interim government was to be an instrument for the establishment of a democratically elected government. That process proved a difficult and protracted one, finally culminating in the election of René Préval. The interim government was a difficult partner for HTI—not delivering on many of the promised services. In addition, the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process, disarming former Haitian Army and gang members proved to be far more complex than originally imagined. In fact, the process has not gone forward to any great extent.

OTI, however, was able to develop relationships with local governments and local representatives of national service agencies that proved effective after the program shifted its focus from working with the interim government at the national level. It was able to continue these relationships after the Préval government took office, maintaining the coordination it had achieved with Haitian government agencies.

OTI did take into account these conditions in its strategy, working more with the local governments, bringing in MINUSTAH, and effectively using funds destined for DDR to enhance its work at the community level. It has expanded its work to additional communities and has been able to achieve results in the areas where it has worked. Thus, it is clear that HTI made several major shifts in strategy that benefited the program by increasing its coverage and improving its impact.

Complementing Other Actors/Work with MINUSTAH: As has already been noted, the HTI program worked closely with other donors, with MINUSTAH's military and with local government and national service agencies. HTI added to the value of its contribution through this close coordination. The program was able to draw in significant additional resources from international agencies such as MINUSTAH, the World Food Program, UNICEF, the Canadian International Development Agency and a variety of private donors such as OXFAM/Great Britain, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Union for Durable Agricultural Development, the Foundation Paul-Gerrin-Lajoie and the Salvation Army. It also was able to coordinate its actions with those of local governments and national service delivery agencies in areas of water and sanitation, public works, the environment and electricity.

This latter was not always a perfect match. There are instances, for example outside Milot, where HTI supported building a power transformer, but the national electrical agency did not deliver the power. But, generally, judging from the sites visited and the statements by government officials in Petit Goave, Saint Marc, Milot and Port-au-Prince, this coordination produced positive results.

As has already been noted, the coordination with MINUSTAH achieved mutually beneficial results, enhancing the effectiveness of the military while improving their public image. Several lessons can be drawn from the experience. When the UN represents the peace-keeping and law enforcement authority in a country as effectively has been the case for the two years of the HTI, close coordination with the UN's peace-keeping arm (the MINUSTAH military) is needed, both to ensure the presence of the law-enforcement component of the model and to enhance the effectiveness of that law enforcement component. MINUSTAH military involvement in a site such as Martissant or Cité Soleil permits HTI to work in those communities. HTI's use of the MINUSTAH military to assist in projects improves the military's image. HTI support of projects that provide better roads and lighting for a community facilitates the law enforcement role of the UN.

Coordination with UN development programs can enhance the implementation of an OTI project as was the case in Cap Haitiien where a UN agency was able to add significantly to the resources available to the HTI program.

Valued Activities: It is hard to define what activities were most valued by the various communities, in part because of the methodology employed by HTI: communities expressed their needs and HTI responded to those needs. Rather, it is clear that what was most valued by the communities was this very responsiveness of HTI to community needs in a rapid and effective manner. In a similar vein, what was most appreciated by local authorities and local representatives of national service agencies was the respect that HTI paid to their concerns and to their role as government authorities. The evaluation team did not receive suggestions from local partners about activities that ought to be excluded from future programs of this nature. Most of the concerns expressed about the prioritization of activities centered on the competing priorities of specific agencies. For example, the BAC representative in Petit Goave indicated to the team that it took some time for his concern with soil erosion to be considered a priority by HTI and the other agencies and community representatives.

Elections: The evaluation team believes that given focus on elections of other donors and given the importance of limiting social unrest to promoting a peaceful transition, OTI made more effective use of its resources by not engaging in projects specifically geared toward the February 2006 elections.

MANAGEMENT ISSUES

The evaluation was asked to address three management questions:

- *What management issues did OTI face in implementing the program? How were these handled?*
- *Were OTI's views of the issues and the way they were handled that same as the USAID's Mission's views?*
- *What lessons can be drawn from the management of these issues?*

The principal management issue that can be gleaned in retrospect was the relationship between OTI and the USAID Mission. Stated in the simplest terms, there was a limited understanding on the part of elements of the USAID Mission of what the HTI project was intended to do and the limitations on what it could be expected to accomplish. The origin of this issue would appear to relate to another management issue facing OTI throughout the course of HTI—the inability to keep a single OTI representative on the ground throughout the length of the project. OTI faced difficulties beyond its control, because of the need to evacuate non-essential US personnel, the status of Haiti as a non-dependent post, and the related inability to secure a representative who could stay the course.

The Mission was short-staffed as a consequence of the evacuations and the frequent changes in OTI Representatives did not permit sufficient interchange to smooth over whatever issues may have arisen.

There were some differences between Mission views and those of HTI's OTI management on the role of the OTI program. It may not have been clear within the Mission at certain points in time that the role of the OTI program was to lay the foundation for management of conflict at the community level, not to provide a long-term solution. With Mission assumption of responsibility for the program and Mission linking of the HTI program to longer term Mission activities, this issue has been resolved.

In summary, at the end of the OTI project, whatever issues existed have been overcome. There are important lessons to be learned from the HTI experience which will benefit the Mission's management of follow-on activities and it would appear that the means are in place to transfer those lessons.

LESSONS LEARNED

Lessons learned from the HTI program can be divided into two sets. There are lessons learned that will be of value to the USAID Haiti Mission as it moves forward in implementing the continuance of HTI and related programs. There is a broad lesson that can be drawn regarding future OTI programs in similar contexts.

For USAID/Haiti, there are two important lessons:

- ***Importance of a conflict lens in programming and implementing assistance:*** The HTI program is a conflict prevention and mitigation effort. The choice of target communities and the shifts in strategy all respond to this overarching objective. It is not a long-term development program. Thus, the actual projects are less important than the impact these projects have on building community cohesion, increasing community capacity, building links between citizens and their governments, and demonstrating that positive change is possible. The Mission should continue to look at the HTI activity as a conflict management tool.
- ***Importance of linking short term/long term interventions using similar implementation criteria:*** HTI has been an effective program, but it is not an end in and of itself. Communities and authorities recognize that it is a short-term solution for what are deep-seated and long-term problems. In order to take advantage of the momentum gained by HTI, the Mission needs to link this short-term program with other programs that deal with longer-term development needs. These include the JOBS program working on employment concerns and the local government program that will build the capacity of local authorities to deliver services. The beneficiaries of HTI should be priority candidates for support by these programs, creating synergies between programs and ensuring that the community cohesion and community-government link is strengthened. This will serve to further mitigate conflict and contribute to better democratic governance.

For future OTI programming, the broad lesson learned is:

- ***The value of the model.*** This model is derived from basic principles of community development and from good OTI practice, but it has been effectively applied and improved through the Haitian case. The principal tenets of the model should inform future OTI activities: know the community and the forces that move it and move within it; focus on community needs; recognize community organizations and employ them effectively; link community and government at the levels where government acts as a service delivery agent; recognize the limitations of the model—above all, the need at the community level for effective law enforcement to promote real security.

SECTION 2: OTI'S MISSION STATEMENT AND THE HAITI PROGRAM

- *Did the program support U.S. foreign policy objectives? If yes, did it accomplish this by helping local partners advance peace and democracy?*
- *Did OTI work on the ground to provide fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key political transition and stabilization needs?*

- *Did the program adapt, as necessary, to ongoing political developments/milestones relevant to the premises of the OTI program in Haiti? Put another way, did OTI's program seize critical windows of opportunity?*
- *Did the program, within 18 months of startup, have a clear strategy and plan for continuation of activities/actors relevant to the specific objectives of the OTI program in Haiti?*
- *Does the evaluation find significant impact in strengthening democratic processes and/or increasing momentum for peaceful resolution of conflict?*

Faced with a crisis of governance that saw the breakdown of law and order and the expansion of violence at the national and community level, US foreign policy in Haiti was centered on reducing conflict, enhancing the ability of government to function and ensuring a transition to an elected government that would be able to carry out effective governance. The overall objectives of the HTI program were: to enhance citizen confidence and participation in a peaceful transition; empower citizens and the Haitian government to address priority community needs; build cooperative frameworks between citizens and government entities at all levels; and promote peaceful interaction among conflicted populations.

The OTI program clearly supported US foreign policy objectives by targeting communities with a history of conflict, generating greater community cohesion and establishing links to local governments that served as a means of both legitimating those governments and addressing community needs rapidly and effectively. The two principal local partners of the HTI program were the communities and their organizations and the government authorities working at the local level. Both appeared to be strengthened by HTI as actors in a democratic process of governance within the context of conflict that has been mitigated and channeled.

Throughout the length of the program, OTI did adapt its efforts to changing circumstances: moving to work with local governments and communities more closely when it was clear that working from the top down with the interim government would not result in effective action; involving other donors and MINUSTAH in its efforts; and expanding its coverage to include more areas of potential conflict; and using funding to support broader efforts at community development when it was clear that this was a better use of funding than support for DDR. In demonstrating this flexibility in programming, the OTI program seized critical windows of opportunity, using all of its available resources to expand the activities that can be demonstrated to have been the most effective.

The OTI program developed a clear strategy for transferring the program, its model of action and its management style to USAID/Haiti which has in fact picked up the program, the program implementer and is open to the lessons learned in implementing HTI. Although OTI discussed handover with the Mission earlier, actual preparations for the transfer began in late January 2006. The Mission has extended the program. There is every likelihood it will maintain its effectiveness.

HTI has been a clear success in achieving its objectives of promoting greater citizen confidence in a peaceful transition; in strengthening the capacity of citizens through their community organizations and their own efforts to limit conflict and build community cohesion. It has also been successful in improving relations between communities and their government, above all local governments in sites outside Port-au-Prince where those governments are closer to the communities. HTI has served to mitigate and channel conflict into more peaceful means of resolution. It requires support in these efforts from an effective law enforcement counterpart, above all in the communities it has worked in Port-au-Prince. Nevertheless, it has demonstrated that it can be highly effective in conflict mitigation even with only limited law enforcement support.

In short, the model used by HTI has demonstrated its efficacy as a tool for supporting a peaceful transition to democratic governance.

ANNEX I: LIST OF INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED

USAID

OTI (Washington DC)

Jeanne Briggs, Head of Program Office
Katherine Donohue, Program Manager
Rob Jenkins, Acting Director
Don Krumm, Senior Field Advisor
Russell Porter, LAC Team Leader
John Rigby, OTI Senior Advisor
Fritz Weden, Acting Deputy Director

OTI (Haiti)

Lauren Barbour, OTI Country Representative at time of evaluation
Merrie Archer, Former OTI Country Representative (currently S/CRS Haiti Specialist at the Department of State)

USAID/Haiti

David Delgado, Program Counselor (CTO-Designate for HTI)
Lawrence Hardy, Deputy Mission Director
Hervé L. Jean-Charles, Education Program Advisor
Grace Lang, Education Officer
Florence Liautaud, Information Specialist
Karen Poe, Senior Program Advisor
Bill Riley, Head, Justice Democracy and Governance Program

CMM (Washington DC)

Katie Hamlin

LAC Bureau (Washington DC)

Rosalie Fanale, Senior Advisor on the Haiti Desk

D/G Office (Washington DC)

Alex Berg, Democracy Officer

Department of State

Washington DC

Bob Brown, INL Senior Advisor

Brian Nichols, WHA/CAR Director

Haiti

John Mariz, Political Section Chief, US Embassy

International Organization for Migration

Phone Interviews

Philippe Branchat, Former IOM Chief of Party for the Haiti Transition Initiative

Stephanie Broughton, Former Haiti Transition Initiative Program Officer

Washington DC

Stephen Lennon, Senior Officer, Emergency & Post Conflict Community Stabilization Unit

Haiti

Maureen Achieng, Chief of Mission

Gabrielle Goodfellow, Program Support Officer

Simon P. Alain Handy, Chief of Party

Matthew Huber, Project Officer for Port-au-Prince

Local Port-Au-Prince Staff

Cecilia Corneo, Project Office for Saint Marc

Local Saint Marc Staff

Bakary Sidibé, Project Officer for Cap Haitien

Local Cap Haitien Staff

Alfredo Lo Cicero, Project Office for Petit Goave

Local Petit Goave Staff

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

Olivier Cavey, Head of Civil Affairs (Saint Marc)

Paola Fabbri, MINUSTAH (Saint Marc)

Desmond Molloy, DDR Section Chief (Port-Au-Prince)

Colonel Perera, Civil-Military Cooperation (U-9)

Representatives, MINUSTAH (Cap Haitien)

Government of Haiti

Secretary for Youth and Sport (SEJSEC)

Ronald Auguste, Representative

Ministry of Public Works (TPTC)

Raymond Iygen, Representative

Cité Soleil City Hall

Pierre Jean Claire, Social Affairs Cité Soliel

CAMEP (Centrale Autonome Metropolitaine d'Eau Potable)—Port-au-Prince Water Authority

Fanel Chermeil, Representative

Municipality of Saint Marc

Barnel Archedoux, Administrator of the Municipality

Thompson Charlienord, Interim Mayor

Ministry Representatives from Saint Marc

Representative, Ministry of Education

Representative, Ministry of Agriculture

Municipality of Cap Haitien

Aspile Florant, Mayor of Cap Haitien

Municipality of Milot

Rosny Lubin, Mayor of Milot

Ministry Representatives from Cap Haitien

Representative, TPTC (Public Works)

Department Delegation of the North

Georgemain Prophete, Delegate

Municipality of Petit Goave

Emmanuel Lendor, Mayor

Montigene Sencere, Deputy Mayor

Ministry of Public Works (Petit Goave)

Lucas Loubert, Director of TPTC, Petit Goave

Agriculture Authorities (Bureau Agricole Communal – BAC)

Perluste Reynold, Director of BAC

Social Appeasement Program (PAS)

Ariel Azael

International Crisis Group

Mark Schneider, Senior Vice President & Specialist Advisor on Latin America

ANNEX II: LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

1. Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, OTI, Haiti Assessment: Is It Time for OTI to Return? April 2004
2. OTI Haiti Strategy Document, May 2005
3. Cooperative Agreement Number DOT-A-00-04-00024-00
4. Anti-Gang Neighborhood Stabilization: An HTI-MINUSTAH Success Story
5. HTI Information and Impact System
6. IOM Haiti Transition Initiative Interim Report
7. Current and Proposed Focus Areas of the HTI
8. Memorandum of Distribution: Modification 02, Dec. 20, 2004
9. Memorandum of Distribution: Modification 03, May 31, 2005
10. Haiti After the Elections: Challenges for Préval's First 100 Days, International Crisis Group
11. OTI Field Operations Resource Materials: Procedures & Best Practices in Priority Areas. Version 1.0, October 2005
12. Information Memorandum: Operational Milestones for the transfer of Management of the HTI Program from the OTI to USAID/HAITI
13. OTI Field Operations Resource Materials: Procedures & Best Practices in Priority Areas. Version 1.0, October 2005
14. USAID/Office of Transition Initiatives Annual Report, FY2006.
15. OTI Field Operations Resource Materials: Procedures & Best Practices in Priority Areas. Version 1.0, October 2005
16. Strategic Planning & Program Performance: Resource Materials & Minimum Standards for Maximizing Political Transition Results. Version 1.0, October 2005.
17. OTI Summary of Program Activities, June 22, 2006.
18. Congressional Language Transition Initiatives, FY 2006
19. Criteria for Engagement
20. The First Ten Years: An Assessment of the Office of Transition Initiatives, Robert I. Rotberg, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
21. On the Heels of Disaster, Jason Peckenpaugh, Government Executive Magazine, January 2004
22. Excerpt from "Texas State Auditor's Report to the Legislative Audit Committee FY 2005" over SIU
23. USAID/OTI Haiti Field Reports
 - a. January – March 2006
 - b. December 2005
 - c. November 2005
 - d. October 2005
 - e. August 2005

- f. July 2005
 - g. June 2005
 - h. May 2005
 - i. April 2005
 - j. March 2005
 - k. February 2005
 - l. January 2005
 - m. December 2004
 - n. November 2004
 - o. October 2004
 - p. September 2004
 - q. August 2004
24. USAID/OTI Hot Topics
 - a. November 2005 (building peace)
 - b. November 2005 (responding to devastation)
 - c. May 2005 (from dirt road to disarmament)
 25. USAID/OTI Haiti Fact Sheet
 26. USAID/OTI Haiti: Bel Air Projects Proposed for Evaluation
 27. USAID/OTI Haiti: CAP Projects Proposed for Evaluation
 28. USAID/OTI Haiti: Cité Soleil Projects Proposed for Evaluation
 29. USAID/OTI Haiti: Grant Descriptions – Cap Haitien
 30. USAID/OTI Haiti: Grant Descriptions – Port-au-Prince
 31. USAID/OTI Haiti: Grant Descriptions – Saint Marc
 32. USAID Haiti Conflict Assessment. June 2006.
 33. Final Evaluation: Martissant/Grand Ravine Projects, Romulus Road Rehabilitation.
 34. Final Evaluation: Cité l’Eternel Initiatives, Marche Poisson Basketball Terrain d’Entente
 35. Final Evaluation: Cité l’Eternel Initiatives, Rehabilitation of Marche Poisson Public Market
 36. Final Evaluation: Martissant/Grand Ravine Projects, Repair of Six Stairways in Fifth Avenue Bolosse
 37. Final Evaluation: Martissant/Grand Ravine Projects, Rehabilitation of Emerante Papailler National School
 38. Final Evaluation: La Saline, La Saline Multisport Terrain d’Entente
 39. Final Evaluation: Re-Commencement of HTI Cité Soleil Interventions, Linthau 1 Kiosk Terrain d’Entente
 40. Final Evaluation: The Martissant Initiative, Paving Rue des Arts in Cité Plastique (Martissant)
 41. Final Evaluation: The Martissant Initiative, Ti Bois Kiosk Terrain d’Entente
 42. Final Evaluation: The Martissant Initiative, Paving of Rue Trevil (Martissant)
 43. Final Evaluation: The Martissant Initiative, Paving Rue Jules (Martissant)
 44. Final Evaluation: La Saline, La Saline Public Park Terrain d’Entente
 45. Delmas #2 – St. Martin, Paving of Corrido Pidou 1 & 2 in Delmas #6 – Bel Air
 46. Final Evaluation: Tokio, Bel Air, Tokio Multisport Terrain d’Entente
 47. USAID/OTI Haiti: Martissant Projects Proposed for Evaluation
 48. USAID/OTI Haiti: Projects Proposed for Evaluation

ANNEX III: LIST OF PROJECT SITES VISITED BY THE MSI TEAM

CAP HAITIEN

Milot

IOMCAP031

Barrière-Battant Public Street Lighting

IOMCAP029

Milot City Hall Rehabilitation

Cap Haïtien

Viewed individual project sites including a Terrain d'Entente, road rehabilitation, and canalization. Held focus group with representatives from:

IOMCAP – 039, 015

GIDEP - Groupe d'Initiative pour le Developpement de Sainte Philoméme

IOMCAP035

BLEE (Base Legal Entierement Equitable); and
JUT (Jehovah Union Toussaint)

IOMCAP – 026, 039

Comité Rue 24 D; and
Comité Quartier de Calvaire Sainte Thérèse

IOMCAP051

Comité civile de protection de la Violette

PETITE GOAVE

IOMPGV001

Caiman River bridge construction

IOMPGV021

Parc Forbin terrain d'entente rehabilitation

IOMPGV012
Nan Pesen drainage canal rehabilitation

IOMPGV065
Reinforcing the Curtis River Banks at L'Acul

IOMPGV033
Fort Liberte School rehabilitation

IOMPGV054
Baylod soil conservation

IOMPGV074
Summer Camp Cultural Issue

PORT AU PRINCE

Bas Bel Air

IOMPAP190
Reconstruction of Jean Francois Couvain National School

Ft. National – Macira

IOMPAP - 100, 104, 105
Small public parks/sitting areas

IOMPAP098
St. Michel Community School

IOMPAP233
Community basketball court and security wall

Delmas #2

IOMPAP135
Paving Rue Mariela

IOMPAP237
Rehabilitation of St Martin Marketplace

SAINT MARC

Portail Montrouis

IOMSTM 020

Municipal vocational training school

IOMSTM039

Portail Montrouis basketball terrain d'entente

La Scierie

IOMSTM054

Grande Rivière river bank protection

IOMSTM047

Rehabilitation of Sous Canal Road

IOMSTM049

Morne Calvaire rainwater collector and filter

Portail Guepes

IOMSTM 013

Repair of Lycée Steno Vincent

IOMSTM035

Rehabilitation of the Lycée Steno Vincent Municipal Cultural Center

IOMSTM037

Lycée Steno Vincent Courtyard Terrain d' Entente