

USAID GHANA

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1 CLOSE-OUT REPORT

I. BASIC IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

Strategic Objective: Increasing Private Sector Growth
SO Number:
Non-Project Assistance 641-0136
Project Assistance 641-0137 (TIRP)
641-0142 (ATRIP)
641-0145 (LSGA)
SO Approval Date: September 16, 1997
Performance Period: FY 1997 to FY 2005
Geographic Area: Ghana (Countrywide Program)
Initial Obligation: \$11,818,454 (FY 1997)
Last Obligation: \$ 2,761,622 (FY 2003)
Total Cost: \$76,016,100 (\$66,016,100 in project assistance and
\$10,000,000 in non-project assistance)
Estimated Host Country
Contributions:
Implementing Partners: (1) Sigma One Corporation; (2) AMEX International, Inc.;(3)
Technoserve, Ghana; (4) Care International (5) Conservation
International (6) Georgia State University; (7) Michigan State
University; (8) Nexant, LLC

II. HISTORY OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE #1 (SO 1)

USAID/Ghana's Strategic Objective 1: *Increasing Private Sector Growth*, was initiated in 1997 to support Ghana's efforts to achieve middle income status by the year 2020 and in response to the Agency's goal: *Broad-based economic growth achieved*. Initially designed to end in FY2002, the SO 1 was extended several times and eventually terminated at the end of FY 2005. Under this SO, project and non-project assistance funding was provided to implement a Trade and Investment Reform Program (TIRP) to promote improvements in private enterprise performance and the policy environment for trade and investment, building on its predecessor, Ghana Trade and Investment Program (TIP).¹

Despite the phenomenal growth in non-traditional exports (NTEs) under TIP, USAID was concerned that the rate of economic progress in Ghana was too slow. The strong record of growth since 1983 in services, mining, construction, cocoa and timber was blemished by weaker performance in food and agricultural production and manufacturing. USAID analyses in preparation for the strategy identified four interrelated constraints to attaining higher rates of economic growth: 1) many economic policies and regulations continued to constrain Ghana's competitiveness; 2) institutional mechanisms for

¹ Under TIP, USAID/Ghana's programs -- Trade and Investment Program, PL-480 and Human Resource Development Assistance -- focused on increasing Ghana's earnings from non-traditional exports (NTEs). USAID assistance under TIP contributed to improvements in trade and investment policies; infrastructure; business services; and the management, technical and marketing capabilities of private enterprises. These accomplishments resulted in a phenomenal increase in the value of NTEs -- exports excluding gold, cocoa, timber and electricity -- from \$68 million in 1992 to \$270 million in 1996.

carrying out policy change had not kept pace with the rapid progress of democratization, i.e. the private sector and civil society were not effectively integrated into the process of formulating and implementing policy reforms; 3) resource mobilization through the financial system was weak; and 4) the managerial and technical capacity of private enterprises of all sizes to produce and market their goods and services was weak. Initially, SO 1 was to focus on supporting the growth of the agricultural sector as this sector had the greatest potential for accelerated growth in the Ghanaian economy. Agricultural production, which in the mid-1990s accounted for 40 percent of GDP and 70 percent of the labor force, had failed to keep pace with population growth, with agricultural GDP having increased at a slow average rate of 2 percent per year since 1983 compared with the population growth rate over 3%. However, the mission realized that without the corresponding improvements in the enabling environment, agro-processing, marketing of inputs and products, and effective business linkages to other sectors of the economy, the impact of SO 1 would be limited. Therefore, the Mission decided to focus major attention on policy reform and financial intermediation and to build the needed linkages between agricultural and non-agricultural enterprises necessary for to foster broad-based private sector-led economic growth in Ghana.

Using a combination of project and non-project assistance, TIRP supported a number of national policy and firm level interventions that focused on two main Results Packages, or RPs (to use the USAID jargon of the day): (1) improving policy environment and financial intermediation; and (2) increasing private enterprise performance. Under the Results Package 1 (RP 1), Sigma One Corporation was awarded a five-year contract to (a) promote participatory policy change; (b) adopt and implement policy and regulatory reforms; (c) improve regulation and management of the financial system; and (d) analyze and develop improved financial instruments. A non-project assistance mechanism was utilized to encourage the Government of Ghana (GoG) to undertake reforms to complement Sigma One's policy and regulatory reform initiatives in return for budgetary support. An Inter-Ministerial Committee on Competitiveness (IMCC) was established to partner with USAID in implementing conditionalities agreed to by USAID and the GoG. A verification plan was developed to verify the achievement of policy reform benchmarks.

Under RP 2 – increased private sector performance – AMEX International, Inc and Technoserve, Ghana in conjunction with CARE International were engaged to: (a) promote sustainable increases in private enterprise production and marketing; and (b) improve services of private sector business associations. This RP was designed to address constraints to the competitiveness of the private sector in non-traditional exports including horticulture, fish and seafood, wood and natural products and handicrafts. The firms – large and small – producing and marketing these products were inefficient, lacked viable business plans and bankable financing proposals, and possessed limited knowledge and skills in product quality management, grading and standardization. To complement these efforts, a number of grants and contracts were later awarded to other local and international organizations.

Separate grants supported conservation and institutional strengthening activities in the Central Region of Ghana under Phase II of the region's Natural Resources Conservation and Historic Preservation Project.² A \$2 million endowment grant was made to the Ghana Heritage Conservation Trust (GHCT) to ensure the sustainability of investments at Kakum National Park and at three historic sites in Elmina and Cape Coast. A grant was awarded to a U.S.-based organization – Conservation International (CI) – to provide the project implementation bridge plus planning and financial management assistance to strengthen the capacity of GHCT. This grant ended on December 31, 2000. To strengthen local capacity for promoting private sector growth, separate grants were awarded to Ghanaian private sector organizations and business associations such as the Private Enterprise Foundation (PEF), Federation of Associations of Ghanaian Exporters

² Phase I of the Project had been implemented under the preceding TIP during the 1992-97 period.

(FAGE), Aid-to-Artisans/Ghana (ATAG), West African Enterprise Network (WAEN), and the Ghana Association of Jewelry Exporters (GAJE). All of these grants, plus the NPA portion of the program, were administered directly by the USAID/Ghana mission.

A third Results Package (RP 3) was later added to support the development of a more sustainable and efficient energy supply, and to improve energy demand management in promoting increased private sector competitiveness. This RP focused principally on a discreet set of activities that aimed at: (1) increasing energy supply; (2) improving regulatory reform; (3) improving demand management; and (4) improving regional economic cooperation. RP3 complemented support provided under RP1 and RP2 through reliable long-term, cost-effective supplies of energy. When coupled with more efficient consumption and utilization of that energy, it would provide the basis for Ghana's long-term competitive economic growth. Specifically, RP 3 was created to facilitate and coordinate US Government support for the development of: (1) the West Africa Gas Pipeline being sponsored by Chevron, Shell, and four West African parastatals (Nigerian Gas Company, Ghana National Petroleum Corporation, Societe Beninoise de Gaz and Societe Togolaise de Gaz); (2) a West Africa Power Pool; (3) indigenous private sector initiatives in energy supply and utilization; (4) the Ghana Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC); (5) the Ghana Energy Commission; (6) the Ghana Energy Foundation and; (7) Energy Service Companies (ESCOS).

USAID/Ghana and the Ministry of Finance of the GoG had prime responsibility for program management, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. An important feature of TIRP was the establishment of an inter-ministerial committee to coordinate policy initiatives affecting a variety of GoG Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) involved in policy the TIRP policy agenda – the IMCC, whose responsibilities specifically included:

- Assuring effective program coordination and implementation,
- Developing and implementing plans for broad participation in the formulation of improved economic policies,
- Recommending additional policy and regulatory changes under the purview of the Committee's members, and
- Monitoring and reporting of program performance.

SO1/TIRP was designed to end in September 2002. However, the SOAG was amended to extend the performance period through September 2005, while the new SO6 – Private Sector Competitiveness Program (PSCP) – was being developed. PSCP was initiated in FY2004 to further develop Ghana's export economy, building on the accomplishments of TIRP but with an intensified on private sector competitiveness in world export markets, including both regional and overseas markets.

III. CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

The SO1 Strategic Framework had the following original Intermediate Results:

- IR 1.1: Increased Productive Capacity of Private Enterprises
- IR 1.2: More Efficient and Lower Cost Marketing Systems
- IR 1.3: More Sustainable Energy Supply and Demand Management
- IR 1.4: Improved Policy and Regulatory Environment
- IR 1.5: Improved Financial Intermediation
- IR 1.6: Increased Management Capacity of Production and Marketing Enterprises
- IR 1.7: Increased Use of Improved Technologies
- IR 1.8: Increased Access to Market Information

As the Mission's involvement in the energy sector increased, the following Intermediate Results were later added to the SO1 Strategic Framework:

- IR 1.9: Increased Regional Cooperation
- IR 1.10: Improved Energy Demand Management Capacity
- IR 1.11: Improved Energy Policy and Regulatory Reform

However, this long list of IRs became too cumbersome to deal with directly, so early in the SO 1 development process they were grouped into two (and later three) Results Packages which allowed for a more simplified framework that was easier to communicate to audiences both in Ghana and in AID/W

IV. TOTAL SO 1 COSTS

The planned total life-of-program funding was \$50,000,000 (\$40,000,000 in Project Assistance and \$10,000,000 in Non Project Assistance). The planned GoG contribution was initially estimated at the equivalent of \$16,667,000 toward meeting the objectives of SO1/TIRP. This contribution was to include expenditures for the salaries of GoG personnel during program implementation, as well as such in-kind contributions as office space. However, it was later determined that the requirement for a 25% GoG contribution to total program costs is relevant only to that portion of the SO1 program that provided direct benefits to the GoG, and only a few SO1 activities did so. They included the contract with Sigma One, a few SOILs for direct support to the GOG, and one-third of the Cooperative Agreement with Georgia State University, for a total of approximately \$14 million on direct Project Assistance to the GoG. This would have required a GoG contribution of less than \$5,000,000. For its part, the Non Project Assistance, although providing direct support to the GoG, has a separate provision for GoG contribution, in the form of a deposit into USAID's Operating Expense Trust Fund in the amount of 10% of the value of the NPA grant; in the case of SO1 an amount equal to \$1 million.

The first year of program funding consisted of an FY 1997 obligation of \$11,818,454 (\$5,000,000 in NPA and \$6,818,454 in PA). The Grantee contribution for FY 1997 was the equivalent of \$3,940,000. By the end of the strategy (September 30, 2005) total disbursements amounted to \$75,197,901 (\$65,197,901 in PA and \$10,000,000 in NPA). The total GoG contribution through September 30, 2005 is estimated to have been at least \$6,000,000. The end-of-strategy pipeline was \$318,199.

The overall break down of USAID contributions is the following:

Total SO1 Costs	Original Obligation (FY 1997)	Total Obligation As of 9/30/05	Total Disbursed As of 9/30/05	Total Undisbursed As of 9/30/05
Project Assistance				
TIRP	\$40,000,000	\$61,677,204	\$61,359,005	\$ 318,199
ATRIP		\$ 3,838,896	\$ 3,838,896	\$ --
LSGA		\$ 500,000	\$ 500,000	\$ --
Non-Project Assistance	\$10,000,000	\$10,000,000	\$10,000,000	\$ --
TOTAL SO1 COSTS	\$50,000,000	\$76,016,100	\$75,697,901	\$ 318,199

V. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE PARTNERS AND ACTIVITIES

As indicated in Section I of this report, the three main implementing partners at the inception of SO1/TIRP were: Sigma One Corporation; AMEX International, Inc; and TechnoServe Ghana. Grants and contracts were also awarded to several other private and public organizations to complement the work of the three main implementing partners. These included: CARE International, working as a sub-grantee to Technoserve, Private Enterprise Foundation (PEF), Federation of Associations of Ghanaian Exporters (FAGE), West African Enterprise Network (WAEN), Aid-to-Artisans, Ghana (ATAG), Ghana Associations of Jewelry Exporters (GAJE), Conservation International, Georgia State University; Michigan State University; USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, Nexant/Bechtel – WAGP, Winrock International, American Chamber of Commerce, EnterpriseWorks, Fidelity Investments Ltd, Geekcorps, Ghana Cooperative Susu Collectors Association, Global Technology Network, International Fertilizer Development Center, and Nature Conservation Research Center

Sigma One Corporation: Sigma One Corporation implemented RP1: Improved Policy Reform and Financial Intermediation, the policy component of TIRP. Sigma One focused on helping Ghana develop and analyze national policy initiatives that aimed at moving Ghana to a higher level of economic performance. It also specifically supported GoG efforts to remove policy impediments to increased trade, investment and macroeconomic stability. Sigma One received a cost reimbursable contract of \$12,203,567 over a seven-year period to implement RP 1 activities that resulted in significant improvements to the policy change process.

AMEX International, Inc: AMEX was the primary implementer of RP2: Increased Private Enterprise Performance (IPEP), the enterprise support component of TIRP. AMEX worked with small and medium sized businesses in Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo, Central, Eastern, Western, Northern, Upper East and Greater Accra regions. AMEX provided technical assistance in the areas of production planning and management, product development, quality assurance, market development and research, business plan development and improved access to finance, through a combination of training and hands on assistance provided by staff and consultants. Through IPEP, AMEX technical assistance helped to build business linkages, increased business access to finance, increased management and marketing capacity of assisted-firms, and increased the use of improved production technologies. During the performance period from 1998 to 2004, AMEX received cost-reimbursable contract awards in the amount of \$9,934,130 for the core program. The contractor received additional resources amounting to about \$250,000 to promote improvements in the quality of agricultural exports under the ATRIP Grades and Standards program.

Technoserve, Ghana: TechnoServe provided complementary support to IPEP by helping entrepreneurial men and women in poor rural areas of the developing world to build businesses that create income, opportunity, and economic growth for their families, their communities and their countries. By providing technical and organizational training and assistance, TechnoServe helped create and strengthen small-scale rural agribusinesses and build the capacity of local support institutions. Technoserve emphasizes a rural participatory approach to demonstrate local commitment, improve self-reliance, and to achieve more sustainable impact. Under SO1/IPEP, Technoserve provided technical assistance to farmer groups and small agribusinesses to improve the production and marketing of non-traditional agricultural exports. Technoserve assistance helped to bring thousands of NTAE farmers into the formal marketing chain, linking them to input supplies and larger export businesses. Farmers were assisted to form various producer and marketing associations to promote improvements in production, quality management and marketing. Over the performance from 1998 to 2004, Technoserve received grants amounting to \$5,688,327.

Private Enterprise Foundation (PEF): PEF is an apex organization of private sector associations established with USAID/Ghana support under the Ghana Trade and Investment Program (TIP). The member associations are the Federation of Associations of Ghanaian Exporters (FAGE), the Ghana National Chamber of Commerce and Industry (GNCCI), the Ghana Association of Bankers (GAB), the Ghana Chamber of Mines (GCM), the Association of Ghana Industries (AGI), and the Ghana Employers' Association (GEA). Between November 1999 and November 2002, PEF received grants from USAID amounting to \$500,000 to conduct impact studies, carry out policy analyses, engage in consensus building and advocacy work, and to promote business development in the SME sector. This support also enabled PEF to increase its visibility through its analysis of the Government's annual budget impact on private enterprise activity. With USAID backing, PEF conducted a series of workshops and training courses targeted at SMEs in all regional centers.

Aid to Artisans Ghana (ATAG): Aid to Artisans Ghana, the local affiliate of Aid to Artisans of the US, is a Ghanaian non-governmental and non-profit foundation dedicated to providing assistance to artisans and promoting trade in artisanal products. It received a three-year grant of \$1.2 million in support of the Artisanal Export Program for Ghana II for the period October 1999 to December 2002. The grant was to provide resources to support activities aimed at increasing exports and employment in the Ghanaian handicraft sector and improving standards of living for producers, exporters, and their families. The specific objectives of the project were to increase exports, develop new products, train crafts people, and create market linkages between Ghanaian exporters and foreign importers.

Federation of the Associations of Ghanaian Exporters (FAGE): The Federation of the Associations of Ghanaian Exporters (FAGE), an umbrella organization of the nontraditional export product associations, received a grant of \$351,000 from USAID in August 1999. The grant was intended to provide financial resources to enable FAGE to carry out its Program to Enhance Export Performance through the provision of Association Services (PEEPAS). During implementation (August 1999 to July 2002), PEEPAS focused on building the capacity of FAGE and member associations in association management services, advocacy, and market and trade information services. With TIRP support, FAGE improved its advocacy role as a result of its participation in policy making forums. It also significantly expanded its market and trade information. Customized market research, including country specific analyses, covered the supply situation in specific markets including profiles of competing top suppliers of more than one hundred publications.

College of Jewelry: The College of Jewelry was established by members of the Ghana Federation of Jewelry Exporters to train middle level jewelry producers so the industry could respond to market demand. The college received a USAID grant under TIRP of \$300,000 in February 2000. The college received a second TIRP grant of \$290,000 in FY 2004 to help the college develop a new curriculum, purchase additional training equipment and to support student production and sale of jewelry to generate income for the college. The college is operational and has already matriculated 148 students. The initial 40 graduates are being integrated into the jewelry industry in Ghana. While students pay academic fees (at the time cedis 800,000, or about \$100), the college faces a challenge in reaching sustainability. In addition to its fully equipped physical plant, the college has a complement of 25 full-time employees, including five academic staff and fourteen technical personnel. Research by the Lapidary Research Department has identified sources in Ghana for nine semi-precious gemstones, including garnet, amethyst, and zircon. The college has been accredited by the National Accreditation Board to offer the Higher National Diploma in Jewelry, and Jewelers of America has granted approval for the college to administer its JA Certification Examinations. Also, the Ghana Chamber of Mines has admitted the college to its Associate Institution Category. The college has established a Production Unit and is participating in exhibitions such as the West African Mining Exhibition and Conference held recently in Accra.

Georgia State University: Under a TIRP Cooperative Agreement awarded December 2002, GSU received an amount of \$3,049,000 to implement, over a 21-month period, the Tourism Capacity Development Initiative (TCDI) that sought to contribute to tourism-led private sector economic growth in Ghana. This goal was to be achieved by improving the capacity, quality and performance of the tourism industry, and ultimately the tourism experience in Ghana. Project resources were invested to accomplish five principal objectives: (1) market Ghana's tourism attractions; (2) expand human resource development; (3) enhance the policy and regulatory environment; (4) build capacity for all aspects of the tourism/hospitality industry; and (5) provide leadership to put in place a comprehensive and effective Tourism Management Information System that supports planning and decision making. In addition, the project promoted public/private sector cooperation in the interest of developing Ghana's tourism sector.

Michigan State University: The Partnership for Food Industry Development-Fruits and Vegetables (PFID-F&V) was a leader-with-associates cooperative agreement with Michigan State University (MSU) to identify fresh produce markets for developing countries. Under the cooperative agreement, MSU received an amount of \$2,044,340 in October 2002 to implement this activity over a 30-month period. This activity focused primarily on products grown by small farmers and processed by small firms to raise incomes; promote private sector links between developing country suppliers and buyers; improve produce safety and quality systems and improve supply chains. MSU worked in partnership with Royal Ahold, AMEX International, Technoserve, Care International and others to link Ghanaian producers with global distributors. The core competencies of this initiative was in the areas of training in food processing, process and product development, quality management, food safety, food laws; packaging; supply chain analysis; market information and global links with retailers.

Nexant, LLC: The Nexant Corporation contract provided technical assistance and training for the development of the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) Project. Total SO 1 support amounted to \$5,599,856 over the performance period from September 30, 1999 to December 31, 2004. WAGP was designed to build a 650km, \$500 million pipeline that will transport the methane component of Nigerian gas currently flared in the Niger Delta to Benin, Togo and Ghana. This will allow substitution for crude oil burned in these countries with cleaner and cheaper gas, hence improving the overall balance of greenhouse gases and facilitating growth in the purchasing countries through access to a cheaper and more sustainable supply of energy. The assistance has enhanced the countries' understanding of the major technical issues, economic impact and terms and conditions of the pipeline's International Project Agreement (IPA) and International Treaty. Also, it has resulted in the harmonization of their legal and regulatory frameworks in negotiating an Agreement with the private sector developer and to enable them to administer a cross-border gas pipeline. This activity supported the achievement of SO 1/IR 1.3: More Sustainable Energy Supply and Demand Management.

The remaining Project Assistance under SO1, of some \$18 million, was used for Program Support and a number of other smaller activities, including SOILs to fund the logistics costs of the annual National Economic Dialogue and the start-up costs of the Secretariat to oversee implementation of the Financial Sector Strategic Plan.

VI. IMPACT OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE ACTIVITIES

SO 1 TIRP activities accomplished very significant results at the Results Package level as the performance data tables in Annex A of this close out report indicate. Most performance indicator targets were met or exceeded.

Improved Policy Reform and Financial Intermediation: In general, accomplishments were quite good in relation to the achievement of performance milestones. A number of key policy reforms can be directly attributed to TIRP interventions. These include parliamentary passage of the Labor Act of 2003 which created the National Labor Commission to resolve labor disputes independent from the Ministry of Manpower and the Tripartite Committee to debate and agree on key labor policy issues such as the minimum wage; improvements in revenue collection and projections that contributed to an increase in tax revenues from around 17% of GDP in the mid-1990s to 22% in 2004 (against an average in the region of 12%); development of a new tariff system that reduced the number of tariff bands to three (5%, 10% and 20%) and significantly reduced the average tariff; and Cabinet approval of a Financial Sector Strategic Plan and six-year implementation program to completely reform Ghana's financial sector, which so far includes the creation of several new financial instruments. According to an internal Sigma One evaluation, Ghana made significant progress in economic reform in exactly the areas where Sigma One invested its efforts. Success in establishing an independent Bank of Ghana (BoG) and a Monetary Policy Committee, modeled on

the US Open Market Committee, combined with a brilliant USAID-funded Ghanaian advisor to the Governor of the BoG, have certainly been among the main reasons for greatly improve monetary policy since the late 1990s. For example, inflation dropped from over 40% in 2000 to 12% by December 2004; the GoG achieved its goal of reducing domestic debt stock to around 12% of GDP and succeeded in introducing new long-term bonds which helped restructure existing debt, thereby lowering annual debt amortization; spreads between deposit and lending rates have fallen as interest rates on Treasury Bills have fallen from over 50% at the turn of the century to the mid-20s now; lending to the private sector has increased by an average of 10% per year in real terms since 2001; and expenditure controls have been improved, with a budget deficit in 2004 of 3.2% of GDP, only slightly higher than the target rate of 3.1%, which was an admirable accomplishment for an election year.

Increased Management Capacity of Production and Marketing Enterprises: The nature of the assistance provided under the program was mainly technical assistance and training. This came in the form of preparation of business plans, training in production and product quality improvement, marketing, access to export markets, operational and management improvements, and strengthening of business associations, among others. Assisted firms experienced large improvements in production and marketing but access to new or less costly capital remains a serious problem.

The impact of SO1 activities on business associations has been very significant. The private sector took the lead in promoting non-traditional exports and encouraging specific sub-sectors (e.g. wood products, horticulture, garments, handicrafts), the development of viable private sector associations and organizations will require continued support. With TIRP support, the private horticulture sector in Ghana, led by pineapple producers, made advances in status and capability. It now has the potential, and the opportunity, to build a more broad-based and profitable industry. USAID support to FAGE strengthened the technical and analytical capacity of the organization and helped establish FAGE as a legitimate representative of the non-traditional export sector. In this regard, USAID partly achieved its objective of having at least one private sector business organization effectively supporting and articulating the interest of firms involved with exports. While ATAG is not a business association *per se*, it has become, thanks to the USAID grant, an effective provider of business advisory and support services to the handicraft sub-sector.

VII. SUSTAINABILITY OF SO1 ACTIVITIES

The 2003 TIRP final evaluation arrived at the following conclusions regarding the sustainability of SO 1 activities:

The major concern regarding Results Package 1 is whether the public-private institutions and innovations that have been put in place were sustainable. For example, IMCC was considered not sustainable as it lacked the required unqualified support of the GoG. Although the National Economic Forum appeared to have more support from the new Government, it was not clear whether it was the best way of involving the private sector given the number of alternative channels, such as the Ministry for Private Sector Development, the Foreign Investment Advisory Service and the Ghana Investor Advisory Council.

Some of the policy and regulatory reforms appear to be sustainable, especially where government has assumed full ownership. Examples include the reforms in trade policy, customs duties, revenue forecasting, investment policies of Ghana's national social security system (SSNIT), and labor legislation. It also seems likely that significant reforms have been undertaken in the areas of monetary policy and financial intermediation as a result of the shift towards supporting reform from

inside the public institutions involved (e.g., Bank of Ghana) and by developing broad consensus among the principal stakeholders involved (e.g., Financial Sector Consultative Committee). There is however concern regarding the sustainability of the National Economic Dialogue (NED) process.

Some important reforms, such as the Labor Act of 2003, have been passed into law but not fully implemented. Significant funding for implementation of the law will be required to make this TIRP intervention sustainable. Sigma One initiated work to operationalize the National Labor Commission, but follow up efforts are needed under the new strategy (SO6). [Note: Follow-up support to the NLC has already begun under the new strategy SO6, and future support to strengthen the Tripartite Committee is planned.]

It is uncertain at this juncture whether the TIRP achievements affecting those beneficiaries who were the recipients of technical assistance under the IPEP and MDA components, namely large and small/micro scale producers, have been sufficiently institutionalized so that they will be sustainable now that TIRP is completed. There appears to be a very large and continuing demand, from existing and newer exporters and producers, for the technical services provided by AMEX, Technoserve, and CARE. These organizations have obviously been filling an otherwise unmet need. But the range of their clientele has been limited, and the goal of achieving a broader impact via linkage effects appears to have been abandoned. Many of the TIRP initiatives in support of non-traditional exports, including those in the areas of technology transfer and market development, will only be sustainable and reach a broader audience after TIRP if business associations such as Horticulture Association of Ghana (HAG), Seafreight Pineapple Exports of Ghana (SPEG), Vegetable Exporters Association of Ghana (VEPEAG), and their affiliated associations are able to step in and fill this void. But these associations are currently very weak and will continue to require support for some time. [Note: SO6 has continued to provide the needed support to these associations.]

The most valid indicator of the sustainability of private sector initiatives in TIRP would be the growing capability of industry associations to assume service responsibilities for the horticulture, wood, and garment/textile industries – sub-sectors in which TIRP has concentrated. However, the evaluation did not find evidence that the technical assistance activities being carried out by AMEX, Technoserve, and CARE for the benefit of non-traditional exporters have been taken over by any of these business associations. Continuing support will help business associations mature into a position of leadership that will enable them to carry forward most of the private sector TIRP initiatives.

VIII. SUMMARY AND USEFULNESS OF PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

In this section, performance indicators are presented in relation to the November 4, 2004 Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP), the latest version of the SO1 PMP, that provides the final set of indicators used to track progress toward the achievement of Intermediate Results and the Strategic Objective. Annex A provides details of SO1 performance indicators including indicator definitions, baseline, indicator target and actual results over the life of the SO.

Following is the list of the IRs and Performance Indicators used for monitoring SO 1 performance.

- SO1: Increased Private Sector Growth
 - Indicator 1: Value of Selected NTEs
 - Indicator 2: Value of Total NTEs
 - Indicator 3: Number of visitors to Kakum National Park and the Cape Coast and Elmina Castles

- Indicator 4: Revenue generated by visitors to Kakum National Park and Cape Coast and Elmina Castles
- IR 1.2: More Efficient and Lower Cost Marketing Systems
Indicator: Increased value of exports of USAID assisted enterprises
- IR 1.4: Improved Policy and Regulatory Environment
Indicator: Milestones for the participatory development and implementation of a policy change framework
- IR 1.5: Improved Financial Intermediation
Indicator: Number of financial institutions providing credit to USAID/Ghana-assisted Micro-enterprises
- IR 1.6: Increased Management Capacity of Production and Marketing Enterprises
Indicator: Percentage of USAID-assisted enterprises adopting recommended management and marketing practices
- IR 1.9: Increased Regional Cooperation
Indicator 1: West Africa Gas Pipeline (WAGP) Intergovernmental Agreement Signed
Indicator 2: WAGP Concession Agreement signed
Indicator 3: WAGP Heads of State Agreement signed
- IR 1.10: Improved Energy Demand Management Capacity
Indicator 1: Energy efficiency labels and standards issued
Indicator 2: Number of operational Energy Services Companies (ESCOS)
- IR 1.11: Improved Energy Policy and Regulatory Reform
Indicator 1: Rate-setting model developed and adopted
Indicator 2: Long term energy strategy for Ghana developed
Indicator 3: Energy sector strategy developed

In March 2004, several of the original indicators were dropped for various reasons, including difficulty in obtaining reliable baseline and performance data, and redundancy. Indicators for IRs 1.3, 1.7 and 1.8 were affected by this revision. The tracking of the affected IRs was henceforth discontinued. See Annex A for a discussion of these changes.

IX. LESSONS LEARNED

Promote Participatory Policy Change Approach: One of the most important lessons learned by the experience of TIRP under this activity was that it is very important that both the government and the private sector in Ghana have full ownership of the mechanisms in place for participatory policy change. The North Carolina conference, the National Economic Forum (NEF) and the first National Economic Dialogue (NED) were owned by the Ghanaians. The NED process seems to have lost momentum now and there is concern whether the GoG continues to own it at this time. The IMCC concept failed because it was a creation of TIRP and not the creation of Ghanaians. So far, all other attempts at creating a formal inter-ministerial coordination mechanism for economic policy reform have also failed, but the need for such a mechanism remains.

Ensure Adoption and Implementation of Policy and Regulatory Reforms: Policy reform is a process that requires sustained follow-up and building of capacity for implementation and should

not be imposed from outside. There must be local ownership of the policy reform process. Policy reform can be accelerated if reform process is supported from within. This means identifying, in collaboration with Government, the need for expertise, and then assuring that this expertise is made available in a way that best enables the Government to exercise ownership. USAID and its implementing partners role in policy reform must be low key and behind-the-scenes, with the Ghanaians taking the lead in policy discussions. Sigma One provided background policy papers and resource persons at the policy dialogue and forum they facilitated.

Support Improvements in Regulation and Management of the Financial System:

Macroeconomic stability and capacity building in financial regulation, management, and supervision are necessary conditions for the successful implementation of regulatory and policy reforms. After 5 years of patient consensus building with wide range of financial sector and GoG persons, the Financial Sector Strategic Plan (FINSSP) was approved by Cabinet and implementation was initiated.

Conduct Analysis and Support Development of Improved Financial Instruments: The experience with SSNIT is a prime example of the effectiveness of combining an initial exploratory study with subsequent follow-up and capacity building for implementation. Prior to this effort, SSNIT had paid very little attention to the quality of its investment portfolio and to the possibility of becoming a source of long-term capital for the Ghanaian economy. As a result, SSNIT was in danger of collapse because of some very bad investments, at the same time that its asset portfolio was too concentrated at the short end in Treasury securities. Once its capacity to analyze its portfolio had improved, SSNIT was able both to reduce risk and to extend the maturity of some of its asset holdings.

Non-Project Assistance Component was effective: Non-Project Assistance appears to be a reasonably effective way of influencing policy. The major challenge facing USAID in its next strategy is how to integrate this form of assistance with the general trend towards direct budget support and joint multi-donor/GoG agreement on the conditions required for this support given USAID's current reticence to use NPA.

Promote Sustainable Increases in Private Enterprises Production and Marketing: Effective coordination between TIRP and other organizations concerned with exports would have increased the effectiveness of the program. This coordination was lacking in the TIRP.

If the private sector is to take the lead in promoting nontraditional exports and encouraging sub-sectors more generally, this will require the development of viable private sector associations and organizations. As an example, the private horticulture sector in Ghana, led by pineapple producers, has begun to make advances in status and capability. It now has the potential, and the opportunity, to build a broad-based and profitable industry.

Project design called for the use of local expertise in the provision of technical assistance in order to develop a trained cadre of local experts and consultants. One of the more important benefits of TIRP has been the outstanding success of AMEX, Technoserve, and CARE in recruiting and employing local personnel for their technical teams. Beginning with the sub-sector studies of fish, furniture, garments/textiles, and pineapples, through assistance to individual enterprises, Ghanaian expertise has been used very effectively.

Small-scale growers can be successfully integrated into the export marketing system. In fact, involving small and medium-scale growers in the export sub-sector is more than just another option. It is essential if Ghanaian industry is to reach its full export potential.

Long-term capital investment financing remains illusive to many current and future non-traditional exporters, and considerable work is needed to improve the capacity of Ghana's banking community to facilitate export financing. Experience has shown that the lack of funds for loans to TIRP clients has been frustrating and disappointing. At times, quick loans focused on specific problems would have made life easier for all involved and resulted in some real business being done

Improve Services of Private Sector Business Associations: Based on PEF budgetary reviews and other impact studies published from time to time, as well as its record of facilitating policy review forums, it appears that USAID's financial support strengthened the technical and analytical capacity of the Private Enterprise Foundation. One element of the PEF vision for the future is to achieve sustainability of the organization. PEF believes that its sustainability would be promoted best if future grants were provided in the form of an endowment that would provide the basis for the development of medium to long-term plans to address all elements of its organizational vision.

USAID support to FAGE appears to have strengthened the technical and analytical capacity of the organization and helped establish FAGE as a legitimate representative of the interest of the non-traditional export sector. In this regard, USAID partly achieved its objective of having at least one private sector business organization effectively supporting and articulating the interest of firms involved with exports. Furthermore, the FAGE experience suggests that stronger business associations can indeed improve private sector access to markets and technology.

While ATAG is not a business association, it has become, thanks to the USAID grant, an effective provider of business advisory and support services to the handicraft sub-sector. Considering the effectiveness of its marketing support (trade fair attendance), product development (design support), and training activities (workshops), ATAG has demonstrated that organizations other than associations can also develop the capacity to improve private sector.

Maintain Flexibility in NPA Implementation: One of the most successful aspects of the TIRP was the operational flexibility afforded to the institutional contractors in the policy reform arena and the high degree of coordination and communication that occurred between the contractors and USAID. The extensive use of local experts and the practice of embedding them into GoG ministries, departments and agencies was highly beneficial and cost-effective. It is important to promote host country ownership of the policy reform agenda. Therefore, contractors must play a low profile role in the policy change process in order to be effective and to increase the chances of sustainability.

X. RELATED STUDIES AND ASSESSMENTS

Adu, Gustav, Emmanuel Akoto, Olaf Kula and Tom Bonney (1998). "Sub-Sector Study on Furniture in Ghana," AMEX International/CARE/TechnoServ, Inc., Accra: October.

Azu, John Nene-Osom, Charles Ofori-Addo and Nargah Akumiah (1998). "Sub-Sector Study on Pineapples," AMEX/TechnoServ Ghana, Accra: December.

CARE International (1999). "Vegetable Sub-Sector Study," Accra: July.

Dembowski, Donald, Kwesi Agbley, Leila Calnan and Micheal Fox (2001): "Final Evaluation – Natural Resource Conservation and Historic Preservation Project". Accra: June 15

Eshun, Sam G., G. Deku, Adjei Ntow and John Addaguay (1998). "Proposed Farmer Ownership Model for Ghana Fresh Pineapple Production and Export," Accra: July 7.

Otoo-Kwadey, Grace and Matthew Armah Akoto (1999). "Sub-Sector Study on Garments/Textiles in Ghana," AMEX International, Inc., Accra: May.

Price Waterhouse Associates (1997). "USAID: Trade and Investment Reform Institutional Analysis," Accra: July 8.

Sigma One Corporation (2000, 2002,). Review of Progress Toward Milestones Accomplishment and Achievement of TIRP Results. Years Two, Three, and Four. July 2000, May 2002, October 2002.

Sigma One Corporation (2004). Evaluation of Progress Toward Milestones and Results- Final Report. Year Five, November 2004

Stryker, Dirck, James Purcell, Charles Jebuni, Tawiah Akyea and Kofi Kwakye, (2003). "Ghana Trade and Investment Reform Program (TIRP) Project Final Evaluation Report, AEP-I-818-00-00024-00, March.

USAID/Ghana (1998-2005). Results Review and Resource Request (R4) and Annual Reports

USAID/Ghana (1998-2005) SO-1: Increased Private Sector Growth, Semi-Annual Portfolio Reviews.

XI. CLOSE-OUT REPORTING INSTRUMENTS

Not applicable

XII. HUMAN RESOURCE CONTACTS

Jerry Manarolla, Director, USAID/ACCRA/TAPS
Email: jmanarolla@usaid.gov
Tel: +233-21-228440. Ext. 205

Fenton Sands, AID Representative, USAID/Guyana
Email: fsands@usaid.gov
Tel:

Cleveland Thomas, USAID/WARP, Accra-Ghana
Email: cthomas@usaid.gov
Tel:

Adeline Ofori-Bah, Program Specialist, USAID/ACCRA/TAPS
Email: aofori-bah@usaid.gov
Tel: +233-21-228440, Ext. 215

Kwabena Appenteng, Private Sector Specialist, USAID/ACCRA/TAPS
Email: kappenteng@usaid.gov
Tel: +233-21-228440, Ext. 216

ANNEX A SO1 PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

Performance Indicator Tables

A complete set of performance data tables for SO-1 follows. These tables are intended to provide essential information regarding performance indicators and their definitions, data sources, method and frequency of data collection, plans for data quality assessments, if any, and data analysis and reporting when and by whom.

Revision of Indicators – March 2004

In the course of cleaning up the PMP for SO1 the SO team decided to include ‘*Value of Total Non-Traditional Exports*’ in the PMP as an additional SO indicator. Thirteen (13) of the IR indicators were deleted for the reasons outlined below:

I. SO 1. Increased Private Sector Growth

New Indicator:

Value of Total Non-Traditional Exports - This indicator has been incorporated in the PMP because it has been reported annually.

II. IR 1.1 Increased Production Capacity of Private Enterprise

Deleted Indicator(s):

- (a) Percentage of USAID assisted firms increasing values of production by at least 6% annually.
- (b) Value of production per full time equivalent employee of USAID assisted firms

Reasons for deletion are:

- No baseline data;
- The major contractor AMEX never reported on this indicator because their performance based contract did not require them to do so. The contractor would not compromise on that even when the SO team suggested the need to provide annual data. Data reported by TNS was not representative enough.

III. IR 1.2 : More Efficient and Lower Cost Marketing Systems

Deleted Indicator:

- (a) Percentage of USAID assisted enterprises reporting annual sales increases of at least 25%
- Reasons for deletion: Same as the reason given above. AMEX never recorded data on domestic sales.

IV. IR 1.4 Improved Policy and Regulatory Environment

Deleted Indicators

- (a) The elimination of export loans
- (b) Improved policies for exportation of wood products

- (c) Streamlining procedures for the importation of agricultural and industrial input

Reasons for deletion:

These three indicators form part of the NPA benchmarks and have been captured under the NPA indicator. The results occur only once and thus, cannot be reported yearly.

V. IR 1.5 Improved Financial Intermediation

Deleted Indicators:

- (a) Amount of credit and pre-financing leveraged from financial institutions providing credit to USAID assisted enterprises.
(b) Percentage of enterprise citing self financing as principal source of funds for expansion

Reasons for deletion:

- Difficulty in obtaining reliable data because the stated data sources are formal sector financial institutions but these institutions do not have specific needs for data on clients that are USAID assisted enterprises and hence, could not provide the required disaggregate data.
- AMEX never reported on these indicators since they were not included in their performance indicators.
- TNS reported on only micro and small enterprises.

VI. IR 1.7 Increased Use of Improved Technologies

Deleted Indicators:

- (a) Percentage of USAID-assisted enterprises adopting recommended technological improvements;
(b) Percentage of USAID-assisted enterprises utilizing recommended sustainable resource management practices; and
(c) Percentage of USAID-assisted agricultural enterprises utilizing integrated pest management practices.

Reasons for deletion:

- The precise definition (a) is the number of enterprises out of all enterprises assisted by USAID that adopt and apply technological improvements recommended to them by USAID cooperating agencies and that for (b) is the number of enterprises out of all USAID assisted enterprises that adopt sustainable resources management practices. However, not all assisted firms received technology or NRM based assistance. Assistance to enterprises varies and depends on the type of services demanded. It is possible to have this measure showing a downward trend even when all enterprises to whom improved technology was recommended would have applied them.

A better measure would be one which compares the number of firms using recommended practices to the number of enterprise that were introduces to those recommended practices. Unfortunately, it is not possible to derive data for this measure because enterprise specific database kept by our contractors and grantees over the years have limited information. AMEX in particular, has never conducted a survey to provide some reliable estimates and is not willing to so because it did not form part of their contract.

- AMEX does not have reliable data to use for reporting (c).

Intermediate Result 1.8: Increased Access to Market Information

Deleted Indicators:

- (a) Percentage of USAID-assisted enterprises using market information from business associations or other private sector providers
- (b) Number of subscribers of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in Ghana

Reasons for deletion:

The measures for the both indicators of the IR were never reported.

VII. IR 1.11: Improved Energy Policy and Regulatory Reform in Ghana

New Indicator:

Energy Sector Reform Strategy developed.

SO 1 Performance Indicator Data Tables

SO 1: Increased Private Sector Growth

INDICATOR: Value of Selected Non-Traditional Exports

DEFINITION: The sum value of selected non-traditional exports. The sub-sectors include afro-centric garments, handicraft, selected fresh and dried vegetables, selected fresh fruits, medicinal plants/essential oils, and nut and nut products.

UNIT OF MEASURE: US\$ millions by calendar year

BASELINE: US\$ 43.5 million (1998)

PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

1999		2000		2001		2002		2003		2004	
Target	Actual										
53.1	45.6	64	36.2	49	48.4	51	49.7	54	49.75	57	176

SO 1: Increased Private Sector Growth

INDICATOR: Value of Total Non-Traditional Exports

DEFINITION: The sum value of total non-traditional exports. This includes exports except mineral ores, timber, cocoa beans and electric power.

UNIT OF MEASURE: US\$ millions by calendar year

BASELINE: US\$ 401.7 million (1998)

PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

1999		2000		2001		2002		2003		2004	
Target	Actual										
410	404.4	420	400.7	450	459.6	500	504.3	550	588.9	600	705.4

SO 1: Increased Private Sector Growth

INDICATOR: Number of visitors to Kakum National Park, and to the Cape Coast and Elmina Castles

DEFINITION: Number of Ghanaian and non-Ghanaian visitors to USAID-assisted national heritage sites

UNIT OF MEASURE: Number of visitors in thousands by calendar year

BASELINE: 44,150 visitors (1997)

PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

1998		1999		2000		2001		2002		2003		2004	
Target	Actual												
90	131	144	171.3	158	177.7	174	194	190	153	204	300.8	216	159.7

SO 1: Increased Private Sector Growth**INDICATOR:** Revenue generated by visitors to Kakum National Park, and to the Cape Coast and Elmina Castles**DEFINITION:** Revenue generated from Ghanaian and non-Ghanaian visitors to USAID-assisted national heritage sites**UNIT OF MEASURE:** Revenue in US\$ (in thousands by calendar year)**BASELINE:** US\$189,600 (1997)**PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE**

1998		1999		2000		2001		2002		2003		2004	
Target	Actual												
136	249	254	271.5	274	486.8	450	604	650	639	800	710	900	892.6

IR 1.2: More Efficient and Lower Cost Marketing Systems**INDICATOR:** Increased Value of exports of USAID/Ghana assisted**DEFINITION:** Increase in the value of exports over the baseline for enterprise receiving technical assistance from USAID by year.**UNIT OF MEASURE:** US\$ Value in thousands**BASELINE:** US\$ 80,000 (1998)**PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE**

1999		2000		2001		2002		2003		2004	
Target	Actual										
9600	6428	14800	18622	20500	37068	25000	44676	30000	55360	65000	84335

IR 1.4: Improved Policy and Regulatory Environment**INDICATOR:** Milestones for the participatory development and implementation of a policy change framework**DEFINITION:** The major components for implementing the improved policy and regulatory environment framework contain the necessary milestones, which must be achieved in order for the result to be achieved. The indicator includes data on whether or not NPA conditionalities have been met**UNIT OF MEASURE:** Policy Milestones**BASELINE:** 0 (1997)**PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE**

1998		1999		2000		2001		2002		2003		2004	
Target	Actual												
4	-	4	4	12	9	12	11	12	12	16	13	16	15

IR 1.5: Improved Financial Intermediation
INDICATOR: Number of financial institutions providing credit to USAID/Ghana-assisted micro-enterprises
DEFINITION: The Number of formal-sector financial institutions providing credit to USAID/Ghana-assisted micro-enterprises
UNIT OF MEASURE: Cumulative Number of Financial Institutions
BASELINE: 2 (1998)

PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

1999		2000		2001		2002		2003		2004	
Target	Actual										
4	10	6	13	12	16	18	19	24	32	34	35

IR 1.5: Improved Financial Intermediation
INDICATOR: Percentage of domestic credit of the banking system provided to the private sector
DEFINITION: Relative share of bank credit provided to the private sector vis-à-vis that provided to the public
UNIT OF MEASURE: Percentage of total domestic credit - by calendar year
BASELINE: 38.5 (1998)

PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

1999		2000		2001		2002		2003		2004	
Target	Actual										
40	38.8	41	35.2	42	36.6	43	46.1	44	51.7	45	49.2

IR 1.6: Increased Management capacity of Production and Marketing enterprises
INDICATOR: Percentage of USAID-assisted enterprises adopting recommended management and marketing practices
DEFINITION: Number of enterprises out of all enterprises assisted by USAID that adopt and apply improved management and marketing practices recommended to them by USAID cooperating agencies
UNIT OF MEASURE: Percentage of all USAID-assisted enterprises
BASELINE: 38.5 (1998)

PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

1998		1999		2000		2001		2002		2003		2004	
Target	Actual												
37	94	28	33	21	19	20	16	22	18	21	55	33	86

IR 1.9: Increased Regional Cooperation**INDICATOR:** West Africa Gas Pipeline (WAGP) Intergovernmental Agreement signed**DEFINITION:** WAGP Intra-government agreement is an agreement on policy harmonization among the four country participants in the WAGP (Nigeria, Benin, Togo & Ghana)**UNIT OF MEASURE:** Yes/No, date**BASELINE:** No (1999)**PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE**

2000		2001		2002		2003		2004	
Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual
Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes Jan 2003	--	--

IR 1.9: Increased Regional Cooperation**INDICATOR:** WAGP Concession Agreement signed**DEFINITION:** The WAGP Concession Agreement sets out the ownership, development and operational terms and conditions for the WAGP between governments and participating energy companies**UNIT OF MEASURE:** Yes/No, date**BASELINE:** No (1999)**PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE**

2000		2001		2002		2003		2004	
Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual
Yes	(draft Term Sheet)	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes May 2003	--	--

IR 1.9: Increased Regional Cooperation**INDICATOR:** WAGP Heads of States Agreement signed**DEFINITION:** West Africa Gas Pipeline Heads of States Agreement document (approving the WAGP development plan) signed by member states (Nigeria, Benin, Togo & Ghana)**UNIT OF MEASURE:** Yes/No, date**BASELINE:** No (1999)**PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE**

2000		2001		2002		2003		2004	
Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual
Yes	Yes Feb 2000	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

IR 1.10: Improved Energy Demand Management Capacity in Ghana
INDICATOR: Energy efficiency labels & standards issued
DEFINITION: Labels and standards developed and issued by Ghana Government
UNIT OF MEASURE: Cumulative Number of labels & standards
BASELINE: (1999)

PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

1999		2000		2001		2002		2003		2004	
Target	Actual										
—	—	3	—	6	1	9	1	9	3	45	

IR 1.10: Improved Energy Demand Management Capacity in Ghana
INDICATOR: Number of operational Energy Service Companies (ESCOs)
DEFINITION: Number of private-sector power providers and distributors operating in Ghana
UNIT OF MEASURE: Cumulative number of operational ESCOs
BASELINE: (1999)

PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

1999		2000		2001		2002		2003		2004	
Target	Actual										
—	2	5	—	7	25	35	—	100			

IR 1.11: Improved Energy Policy and Regulatory Reform in Ghana
INDICATOR: Rate-setting model developed and adopted
DEFINITION: A utility rate model developed and adopted by the Ghana Government (Utilities Commission)
UNIT OF MEASURE: Yes/No, date
BASELINE: No (1999)

PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

1999		2000		2001		2002		2003		2004	
Target	Actual										
		Yes	Yes								

IR 1.11: Improved Energy Policy and Regulatory Reform in Ghana
INDICATOR: Long-term energy strategy for Ghana developed
DEFINITION: Long-term energy supply and demand management strategy developed
UNIT OF MEASURE: Yes/No, date
BASELINE: No (1999)

PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

1999		2000		2001		2002		2003		2004	
Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual
		Yes	Yes	Yes, Final	-	Yes, Final	Yes Final				

IR 1.11: Improved Energy Policy and Regulatory Reform in Ghana
INDICATOR: Energy Sector Reform Strategy developed
DEFINITION: Long-term energy supply and demand management strategy developed
UNIT OF MEASURE: Yes/No, date
BASELINE: No (1999)

PERFORMANCE DATA TABLE

1999		2000		2001		2002		2003		2004	
Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual
						Yes, Final	Yes Final				

ANNEX C

SO: 1 TIRP
Pipeline by Subobligation (Instrument level)
July 14, 2005

Name of Organization	Award Type	Contract/Grant Number	End Date	Total Obligation Amount
ACTION FOR ENTERPRISE-GRANT	Grant	641-G-00-04-00086	03/31/2004	20,000
Africa Growth & Opportunity Act (CEPS)	Soil	SOIL 641-0137.27	07/31/2003	105,110
Aid to Artisans/Ghana	Co-operative Agreement	CA-641-A-00-03-00094 CA--00-99-00475	06/30/2004	1,704,339
American Chamber of Commerce	Grant	GR-641-G-00-03-00238	09/30/2004	59,168
Amex International	Contract	CO-641-C-00-98-00236 641-C-00-98-00089 CO-641-0463-C-00-4003 CO-HNE-0000-I-00-6032	12/31/2003	10,881,518
CHEMONICS International	Contract	CO-PCE-I-00-99-0003	07/23/2002	39,534
College of Jewellery	Grant	GR-641-G-00-03-00091	09/30/2004	589,500
Conservation International	Cooperative Agreement	641-G-00-98-00047 GR-641-G-00-98-00242	06/30/2001	2,867,087
Department of Treasury	IAA	IAA-641-0137-P-02-0311	03/31/2005	470,885
Development Alternatives	Contract	CO-PCE-I-818-99-00002	02/08/2003	303,492
Development Associates	Contract	OUT-AEP-I-803-00-00023	06/16/2001	128,421
Eco-fest Foundation	Grant	GR-641-G-00-03-00030	01/07/2003	13,850
Enterprise Works	Cooperative Agreement	CA-641-A-00-02-00105	12/31/2004	1,693,603

Name of Organization	Award Type	Contract/Grant Number	End Date	Total Obligation Amount
FAGE	Cooperative Agreement	CA-641-A-00-03-00111 641-CA-00-99-00325	09/30/2004	731,139
Fidelity Investors Advisors	Grant	GR-641-G-00-02-00004	11/14/2002	49,250
Support to FINSSIP Secretariat.	Soil	SOIL 641-0137.25	09/30/2004	65,553
Georgia State University	Cooperative Agreement	CA-641-A-00-03-00022	09/30/2004	2,893,864
GH COOP SUSU COLLECTORS ASSOC	Grant	641-G-00-04-00087 GR-641-G-00-02-00074	04/25/2004	111,699
Ghana Atomic Energy Commission	Soil	SOIL 641-0137.30	09/30/2004	188,013
GLOBAL TRADE & TECH - GRANT	Grant	641-G-00-04-00179	09/30/2004	59,998.00
I ESC/Geekcorps	Grant	GR-641-G-00-02-00033	09/30/2004	1,025,000
International Fertilizer Devt. Center	Grant	GR-641-G-00-02-00222 GR-641-G-00-01-00276	09/23/2004	906,712
Management Systems International	Contract	CO-AEP-I -818-00-00024	03/14/2003	97,294
Marquette University	Grant	GR-641-G-00-98-00247	06/30/2000	41,818
Michigan State University	Cooperative Agreement	CA-641-A-00-03-00003	09/30/2004	2,044,340
MWH Consulting	Contract	CO-LAG-I -805-98-00002	01/21/2003	104,273
Nature Conservation Research Center	Cooperative Agreement	CA-641-A-00-02-00054	04/30/2004	784,863
Nexant/Bechtel	Contract	CO-LAG-I -00-98-00006 EPP-I -00-03-00007	03/31/2005	4,939,806
Private Enterprise Foundation	Cooperative Agreement	GR-641-G-00-00-00029	09/30/2004	1,081,403

Name of Organization	Award Type	Contract/Grant Number	End Date	Total Obligation Amount
Sigma One	Contract	CO-641-C-00-97-00124 CO-641-C-00-98-00229	31/07/2005	13,003,567
Sea-Freight Pineapple Exporters Association of Ghana	Grant	GR-641-G-00-03-00157	06/09/2004	175,000
Support For Economic dialogue - 2002 - 2004	Soil	SOIL 641-0137.22 SOIL 641-0137.29 SOIL 641-0137.41	06/15/2004	74,231
Technoserve	Cooperative Agreement	CA-641-CA-00-98-00241	06/30/2004	5,943,150
UNDP	PASA	641-PA-00-03-00284	07/01/2004	1,000,000
USDA PASA (CCARD) ^{note 1}	PASA	641-P-00-00-00242	03/31/2005	299,976
USDA - PASA (Dept of Agric)	PASA	CA-641-A-00-02-00061	06/12/2004	643,433
Winrock International	Cooperative Agreement	CA-641-A-00-02-00061	01/31/2004	998,897