



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

USAID/PHILIPPINES MINDANAO PROGRAMS EVALUATION IMPACTS ON CONFLICT AND PEACE SINCE 2000

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USAID/PHILIPPINES MINDANAO PROGRAMS EVALUATION

IMPACTS on CONFLICT and PEACE SINCE 2000



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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AMORE	Alliance of Mindanao Off Grid Renewable Energy
ARMM	Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
BDA	Bangsamoro Development Agency
BEAM	Basic Education Assistance in Mindanao
BJSS	Barangay Justice Service System
CAAs	Conflict-Affected Areas
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CLIC	Computer Linkage and Internet Connection
CMP	Conflict Management Program
COP	Chief of Party
CTO	Cognizant Technical Officer
CUES	Credit Union and Enterprise Strengthening Project
CVA	Conflict Vulnerability Assessment
DepEd	Department of Education
DoH	Department of Health
EcoGov	Philippine Environmental Governance Project
EDC	Educational Development Center
ELSA	Education and Livelihoods Skills Alliance (project under EQuALLS)
ENRICH	Enhanced and Rapid Improvement of Community Health
EQuALLS	Education Quality and Access to Learning and Livelihood Skills
FAF	Foreign Assistance Framework
FISH	Fisheries Improved for Sustainable Harvest
GEM	Growth with Equity in Mindanao
GRP	Government of the Republic of the Philippines
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HIV-AIDS	Human Immuno-virus Acute Immunity Deficiency Syndrome
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IPs	Implementing Partners
IRA	Internal Revenue Allotment
IT	Information Technology
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah
JIATF-W	Join Interagency Task Force –West (U.S. Pacific Command)
JSOTF	Joint Special Operations Task Force
IRI	International Republican Institute
LEAP	Livelihood and Emergency Assistance Program
LG	Local Governance
LGU	Local Government Unit
MAP	Mindanao Assistance Project
MABS	Mindanao Access to Banking Services
MDFI	Maguindanao Development Foundation, Inc.
M & E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEDCo	Mindanao Economic Development Council
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front

MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MSI	Management Systems International, Inc.
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NEDA	National Economic Development Authority
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NPA	New People's Army
OPAPP	Office of the Presidential Assistant on the Peace Process
OSY	Out of School Youth
RPMM	Revolutionary Workers' Party of Mindanao
SFFAII	Socskargen Fishing Federation & Allied Industries, Inc.
SO	Strategic Objective
SOW	Statement of Work
TAF	The Asia Foundation
TAG	Transparency and Accountability in Governance
UN	United Nations
UN-ACT for Peace	United Nations Action for Conflict Transformation Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
USIP	United States Institute for Peace
WB	World Bank

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For decades, recurring militarized clashes and localized violence in Mindanao have been killing people, displacing thousands of families and thwarting development of its bountiful natural and human resources; and thus keeping the island in a continuing status of neither war nor peace. USAID/Philippines has supported a wide range of development programs in Mindanao in the areas of economic growth, family health, education, environmental management, energy and local governance. Since the mid-1990s, USAID has endeavored increasingly sought through its programs not only to promote Mindanao's social and economic development but also reduce the sources of its conflicts and build conditions for peace. During that time a number of program-level evaluations have been conducted to measure achievement of the programs' respective sectoral objectives and two conflict assessments were undertaken in order to identify the leading sources of conflict in Mindanao. To take those analyses one step further, in 2008 USAID decided to take stock of the aggregated impacts of its overall package of activities in Mindanao with regard to impacts on mitigating conflict and building peace.

The evaluation was carried out in three main stages. Guided by a common set of evaluation questions, the purpose of all three stages was to ascertain how effectively USAID-supported activities as a whole had addressed the leading sources of conflicts in Mindanao and contributed toward achieving peace. Stage I was a literature review, stage II involved a household level survey, and Stage III consisted of fieldwork and interviews in Manila and Mindanao by the Evaluation Team. USAID was interested in the following key questions: (a) the appropriateness of the mix and balance of its Mindanao programs; (b) the actual impacts programs have had on conflict, peace, and local government; and (c) whether appropriate linkages and synergies have been recognized and utilized within and across USAID programs and vis-à-vis other United States Government (USG), international and national programs. In addition, the evaluation was expected to provide recommendations for productive policies and programs and effective implementation practices in order to inform current and future programs and strategies.

Mix and Balance of USAID Mindanao Programs

The mix of USAID sectoral programs in Mindanao is diverse and programs can be found working on all of the main "entry points" for conflict reduction – from deep-rooted social and economic sources of conflict, to social and governing mechanisms to promote mitigation of conflict, to addressing flashpoints (or conflict triggers). While the mix of programs across the health, education, economic and governance sectors has effectively addressed fundamental development needs, USAID/Philippines is one of the relatively few USAID missions globally that has incorporated a Strategic Objective (SO) specifically designed to address conflict.

The balance of USAID programs appears to be strongly weighted toward addressing structural issues (i.e. underlying socio-economic factors) which can underpin conflict, such as poverty and a large youth population. Quick-impact and highly visible programs, such as infrastructure development and vaccination campaigns, have built USAID's credibility in Mindanao. These activities should remain an important component of USAID's portfolio, particularly in rural and remote areas. The past decade of investment in social and economic development has successfully set the foundation for the next stage of development to occur, especially in urban areas. This approach makes sense in that attention to the fundamentals of economic growth, along with security, are essential ingredients for moving toward peace and renewed growth.

However, the evaluation suggests that there may be a disproportionate emphasis on socio-economic factors and not enough focus on improving governance and addressing the deficiencies of weak state

structures, nor on shorter-term recurring manifestations of violence that continue to block investment. Conflicts between communities, ethno-linguistic groups and political entities, as well as conflict over ideological and political aspirations cannot usually be solved through socio-economic interventions alone. In order to achieve sustainable peace, an effective mix and balance of programs in Mindanao requires attention to progress along both the political and socio-economic tracks. Therefore, USAID should now shift more of its resources toward perhaps less visible but equally important, medium-term efforts to build the supporting social and governance institutions and processes that will allow local leveraging of those earlier investments, such as by mobilizing communities more actively to counteract the influence of predominant local elites.

Another aspect of mix and balance has to do with how choices are made regarding activity priorities in particular localities. It is widely accepted in the development world that some form of meaningful consultation with communities early on in project development is essential to building trust, cultivating local ownership and ensuring sustainability. A number of USAID programs have put in place clear procedures for working with local governments and communities. For example, GEM's practice of working directly with Local Government Units (LGUs) and requiring counterpart contributions provides a useful model for consultation and sustainability. At the same time, a number of interviewees at the grassroots level commented that early consultations designed to engage communities are often lacking, which creates an appearance of menu-driven rather than needs-based project identification and donor-driven project prioritization.

Impacts on Conflict, Peace and Local Government

The data from the household survey and local interviews suggests strongly that USAID programs have enhanced the ability of many poor Mindanaoans to improve their standards of living through the provision of skills, financing, improved access to local markets, social benefits and improved natural resource management. The large volume of "hard" goods such as roads, boat landings, health services, electricity, credit, computers and educational materials as well as the development of "soft" human capital through training of teachers and health workers, life skills training, vocational training, local government strengthening and capacity building that USAID programs have provided create new opportunities for livelihoods along with the physical and human foundations for local economies to grow. Lack of opportunities makes people and young men in particular more vulnerable to recruitment into armed movements and local criminality and provides fodder for anti-government political agendas. The concentration of this assistance in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and conflict-affected areas has begun to assuage the historic Muslim sense of marginalization by a predominantly Christian nation.

While alleviating the conditions of poverty contributes to conflict mitigation by redressing a deep source of grievance as well as enabling government and social institutions to solve problems, it is generally insufficient for addressing the more dynamic ideological, institutional and political causes of conflict. To that end, USAID's support for improving local governance and strengthening LGUs along with local dispute resolution and access to justice are critical contributions to more robustly and directly addressing the other causes and consequences of violence. Programs in the health and environment sectors also have been especially creative in tapping into religious precepts to help articulate a positive local cultural vision for development. This approach toward harnessing local religious and ethical values to promote peace has the potential to counteract the influence of more radical political agendas that are currently vying for Muslim loyalties.

In addition, with USAID support, efforts have been made recently to bring clan fighting and smaller-scale communal disputes under better control thus addressing a critical trigger of local violence. Furthermore, constructive dialogue processes and mechanisms for community engagement in governance and oversight

of local government have been created in more non-traditional sectors such as the environment (e.g., participatory planning processes and fisheries management). As a result of USAID support, there has also been improvement in the effectiveness of local governments in target municipalities arising out of the professionalization of operations such as assessments and tax collection, and upgrading work standards and customer responsiveness, which reduces corruption and makes agencies more accountable to their own citizens.

At the same time, it is important to note that these good but relatively limited programs have had little impact in changing the dominant patron-client patterns and electoral violence which persist in local politics. Little evidence is found that citizens are being helped to organize to work together through government/civil society mechanisms on shared local interests, or to advocate for Mindanao's policy and other needs as a whole region. This would help to break down latent inter-group animosities. In some cases, the neglect of more participatory mechanisms in which these impacts were brought about has raised questions about their sustainability. Therefore, the evaluation advises more attention to building social, governance, and political infrastructure, such as in the ARMM or its successors. Material progress will be less sustainable without creating more capacity for authentic self-government, meaning taking charge of one's own political economic affairs.

Overall, USAID has contributed significantly to alleviating underlying socio-economic sources of conflict in Mindanao; it is now time to extend those achievements and sustain them by further promoting good governance and reinforcing local conflict regulating institutions and processes so as to roll back the development-constraining effects of recurring violence. For example, USAID could put more emphasis on empowerment and capacity building of the ARMM or its successors, ARMM communities and adjacent regions for collective self-help, development and governance, as well as strengthening of police forces.

Linkages and Synergies

More efforts to link complementary activities within the same sector, among sectors, with other development actors and among the "3Ds" (Diplomacy, Development and Defense) can create a critical mass of activities, which would then produce multiplier effects for mitigating conflict and capitalizing on peace-building momentum. At both local and higher levels, a cohesive cross-sectoral and interagency approach to addressing underlying causes of conflict is especially important to create areas that can begin to resist the return of episodes of violence. Conflict-sensitive criteria need to be used to define the kinds of information programs collect and how they are monitored and evaluated.

At the moment, there is a perception that USAID programs are decided and organized on sectoral lines and thus tend to be dispersed too thinly, lacking integration between projects that could otherwise enhance the impact of individual project benefits. For example, out of school youth programming could be linked better to market needs assessments, vocational training and apprenticeship or training programs with local private sector companies (e.g. education and economic growth linkages). In general, field level coordination of USAID-supported activities is strongest within sectors and weakest between sectors. USAID may wish to consider developing strategic clusters of multiple programs in certain pilot communities to develop best practice models for replication and dissemination of lessons learned. Between sectors, increased communication and information sharing among implementing partners (IPs), might enable USAID to help communities better understand the larger context affecting local development and the types of USAID support available in Mindanao. USAID Cognitive Technical Officers (CTOs) and activity managers must take on a stronger role in encouraging inter-program communication, networking and coordination.

Regarding USG inter-agency synergies, regular visits to Mindanao from high level officials of the USG country team have signaled the unity of USG efforts and reinforced USAID assistance efforts. Among bilateral and multilateral donors, some coordination has taken place throughout Mindanao but more direct synergies could be leveraged on issues such as effective divisions of labor and sharing of common pools. Wisely, USAID is participating with other donors in the *Framework for Peace and Development in Mindanao 2020* process and supporting MEDCo's development of a comprehensive project map.

The outward face of linkages and synergies affects public perceptions of USAID and other USG agencies working in the same geographic areas. Collaborative efforts by USAID, U.S Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense entities has brought a much-appreciated sense of security and greater confidence to some people in the conflict affected areas of Mindanao. Increased trust ratings for both USAID and the USG as a whole are evident in the survey data. However, there are also sometimes public misperceptions regarding the goals and objectives of USG interventions where mandates and activities overlap. Thus, more inter-agency discussion should be encouraged to define respective roles, responsibilities, and spheres of operation. A more unified USG strategic communication policy would help dispel occasional public confusion that arises from the presence in some locales of both development and security professionals.

Building on Foundations

USAID could continue to allocate resources primarily along sectoral lines while concentrating support heavily in broad conflict-affected areas that are defined as unstable mainly by socio-economic indicators. Alternatively, it could be even more effective in mitigating conflict and promoting stabilization by fine-tuning and calibrating its data gathering, planning, program design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation to more explicitly address conflict dynamics and governance failures. Building from the strong foundations of socio-economic development that have been laid by USAID in Mindanao over the past decade, USAID now has the opportunity to be even more deliberate and focused in addressing Mindanao's conflicts and fostering local institutions and mechanisms for peace-building, without compromising development goals.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background and aims of the report

Recurring militarized clashes and localized violence in the large southern Philippines island of Mindanao are killing people, causing major displacements, impeding development, and discouraging further investment in Mindanao's bountiful economic and human potential. USAID has supported a wide range of programs in Mindanao, most of which are directed at development objectives such as economic growth, family health, education, good governance, environmental management, and energy. Since the mid 1990s, the Mission has endeavored increasingly not only to promote Mindanao's social and economic development but also to reduce the sources of its conflicts and build conditions for peace. Violent conflict has been occurring at several levels in Mindanao, as have various peace activities, including peace negotiations with one insurgent group. A number of program-level evaluations have been conducted with regard to the achievement of the Mission's various sectoral objectives, and two conflict assessments were commissioned to identify the leading sources of the conflicts in Mindanao. In 2008, USAID sought to take stock of what its overall package of programs has accomplished as a whole in reducing the sources of Mindanao's conflicts and in building peace, so as to guide current and future USAID/Philippines strategy and programs. Given the amount of investment in Mindanao over the years, the concern lay with what has been accomplished in reducing the propensities for conflict and putting Mindanao on a path to peace, and in what respects, and how USAID's assistance programs could be improved.

In particular, the USAID Mission had four main concerns with regard to its efforts to address the conflicts: a) the appropriateness of the mix and balance of its Mindanao programs; b) the programs' impacts on conflict, peace, and local government; c) the extent they were taking advantage of linkages and synergies between them and other USG and international and national programs; and d) recommendations arising from these considerations that point to promising directions and effective practices. The Mission clarified that the study's purpose was not to summarize or evaluate all the many accomplishments and impacts of the programs in their respective sectoral terms, but rather to gauge how effectively the array of diverse activities has addressed the leading sources of the various conflicts in Mindanao and contributed as a whole toward achieving peace writ large. This report presents the findings of a multi-program evaluation that was commissioned by USAID/Philippines to focus on those concerns and was carried out by a U.S./Filipino MSI team from January 2008 to date.

B. Structure of the report

Guided by an analytical framework of questions that was designed to mine pertinent findings, this evaluation involved three stages of data collection, each of which gathered a distinct kind of data. Stage I involved a literature review of existing program documents, evaluations, and conflict assessments. Stage II involved a household level survey to assess the views of ordinary families on their household and community circumstances, on whether those had changed since the year 2000, and on the extent that USAID programs and other factors may explain these results. Stage III involved interviews in Manila and Mindanao of key informants, some of whom were implementing specific USAID programs and some of whom observed them in the context of their local communities. All of these sources of data were drawn upon to address USAID's four main concerns.

To provide a basis for assessing the array of programs that are in focus, the section that follows provides a brief overview of the main kinds of conflicts in Mindanao and their major sources. It also describes the set of programs and overall approach that was taken by USAID/Philippines in response to those factors

starting in the mid-1990s through 2007. Section III provides a more detailed explanation of the methods that were used to formulate evaluation instruments and collecting and analyzing data.

Constituting the bulk of the report, Sections IV through VI, respectively, address the evaluation's core questions, namely:

- Does USAID have the right mix and balance of programs to impact conflict and promote peace in Mindanao?
- What are the main impacts of USAID programs in reducing sources of conflict and promoting peace, including the effect of programs in strengthening the conflict management capacities of local government units (LGUs)?
- How well are linkages and synergies being utilized within USAID programming, within the USG, and with the Government of the Republic of Philippines (GRP) and other donors?

The conclusion provides a brief recap of the report's main findings, and it offers overarching recommendations. The appendices provide relevant background documents reflecting the purposes and methods of the evaluation.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE CONFLICT PROBLEM IN MINDANAO AND USAID/PHILIPPINES' RESPONSE

A. Violent conflict in Mindanao

While the sources of the armed conflict in Mindanao can be traced back at least five centuries to Spanish colonization and the integration of Mindanao into the Philippines state during the period of U.S. control, the roots of the current conflicts stem largely from the growing number of Christian settlers who have migrated into what was a predominantly Muslim Mindanao. Especially as this migration accelerated in the latter decades of the twentieth century, in part due to government policies, Muslims living on the island have felt increasingly marginalized. Modern Mindanao now has a Christian majority overall with a Muslim minority population concentrated in the central and southwestern regions. The longstanding Muslim sense of economic and political disempowerment and government led to the formation of a Moro separatist movement in the late 1960s. The movement evolved into the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and with the imposition of martial law in 1972, took the form over the succeeding two decades of a full-scale insurgency and intense fighting with government forces. In 1996, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines

THE PRIMARY AREA FOR MILITANT GROUP OPERATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES, WITH ATTACKS FROM 1998 TO 2008



(GRP) and the MNLF signed a peace agreement and the MNLF leader, Nur Misuari, was elected governor of the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).¹

Since that time, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a faction of the MNLF which broke off in 1984, has continued alternately to do battle and to try to negotiate peace with the GRP. An all-out military surge in 2000 under President Estrada failed to solve the conflict on the battlefield. In February 2006, the MILF and GRP came as close as they have ever been to concluding a comprehensive peace agreement. But following a continuing series of political disruptions and other delays,² the agreement has still not been realized. However, a ceasefire was agreed upon and consensus was reached on several issues. In mid-2008, after another agreement between the government and rebel Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) met opposition both from its supporters and from government supporters, and fighting broke out again in central Mindanao. These killed over 100 people and pushed thousands more into displacement camps, making a peace settlement with the MILF even more elusive.

The conflict dynamics have been further complicated in the past decade by the intrusion of transnational terrorist groups, such as Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), who have sought safe haven, weapons and other forms of support in the less governed areas of Mindanao.³ In addition, longstanding traditions of localized clan fighting among families regularly have flared up, and local electoral, communal, and criminal violence are frequent. Consequently, a conflict assessment conducted by USAID in 2005 identified three broad categories of conflict in contemporary Mindanao that operate on several levels and scales:

1. Ongoing insurgencies over wide areas by organized armed movements that advocate political and socio-economic agendas, to a greater or lesser degree;
2. Episodic local clashes among individuals, clans, and local ethnolinguistic groups that are fueled by social/cultural norms that emphasize honor and retribution; and
3. Violent acts by individuals, factions, clans and groups in competition over land and resources, elections, or organized crime activities.⁴

In a comparative perspective, all these forms of conflict are low-intensity, whose outbreaks into violence are intermittent but frequent. But although clashes between the government and insurgencies overall have declined somewhat over recent years, Mindanao continues in a state of neither war nor assured peace.

The sources of these multi-layered conflicts are complex, being driven by differing mixes of factors such as poverty, ideology, ineffective governance, culture, and competition for power, land, and resources. The differing levels of conflicts are also often intertwined, which make tracing their sources and dynamics quite complicated.⁵ Notably, conflicts among different clans within the Muslim population have drawn in military reactions on one side or another, thus blurring the boundaries between insurgency-related clashes and localized disputes. The sometimes indiscriminate responses and/or complicity of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and Philippine National Police (PNP) can also confuse the origin of violent attacks. Meanwhile, multiple external, as well as internal, actors have developed stakes in these

¹ The ARMM was provided for in the 1987 constitution, created in 1989 and enhanced in 1996. The New People's Army (NPA), or armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines, is also carrying out periodic attacks in several areas of Mindanao and other areas of the Philippines.

² For example, the abortive coup attempt in Manila on February 24, 2006 and the mid-term elections in 2007.

³ For a perspective on the relationship between the terrorist groups and the conflicts in Mindanao, see International Crisis Group, "Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process", 13 July 2004 and "The Philippines: Counter-Insurgency vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao", 14 May 2008.

⁴ See USAID, Addressing Violent Conflicts in Mindanao: Options for USAID Philippines, 24 October 2005.

⁵ For further elaboration see USAID's 2005 conflict assessment and Mary Judd and Salvatore Schiavo-Campo, "The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines: Roots, Costs and Potential Peace Dividend", Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction, No. 24, February 2005.

conflicts – from the powerful traditional Datus and non-Muslim local leadership to international players such as Malaysia, Libya, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) – and these parties may shift their positions and alliances. While the overall religious Christian-Muslim social cleavage overlays Mindanao’s conflicts, there are many divisions within the Filipino Muslim population along ethno-linguistic, clan and, to some extent, theological lines. An important recent factor also is the increasing factionalization within the MNLF and the MILF. Compounding solutions to these conflicts are the confusion, competition and duplication resulting from multiple and overlapping layers of government. The ARMM is torn by several contending claims on political loyalty and authority – local ethnic groups and clans, a regional Moro identity, and transnational theological persuasions.

B. USAID/Philippines’ response to conflict in Mindanao

Recognizing the serious effects of the ongoing conflicts and continuing instability in Mindanao on the Philippines’ persistently slow rates of economic growth, USAID/Philippines in the early 1990s increased its explicit focus on that area. Mindanao as a whole ranks comparatively low on many social indicators, and poverty is highest and human development indicators are among the worst in the Muslim areas.⁶ Foremost, heavy investment in major infrastructure projects was intended to help transform the enabling environment of the economically marginalized island to allow private sector-led economic growth and to promote both domestic and international trade. Following the 1996 peace agreement between the GRP and the MNLF, USAID increased its engagement in Mindanao by providing support to former MNLF combatants to transition them away from guerilla warfare and integrate them into productive economic activities. Beginning in 2000, USAID began to focus a wider range of activities on development of the severely impoverished ARMM and adjacent conflict-affected areas, all aimed at peace as well as development.

With the dramatic attacks in the US on September 11, 2001, and the advent of the U.S. Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), USAID’s role in the Philippines expanded beyond the conventional goals of development. On that basis, USAID’s programming in Mindanao was expanded and designed more explicitly to alleviate some of the sources of terrorism and violence such as the Abu-Sayyef Group, while continuing to demobilize and reintegrate the forces of the MNLF. A willing new Philippines administration under President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo also made a close USG-GRP partnership on these issues possible. According to the USAID/Philippines Strategic Plan for FY2005 - 2009, “Foreign assistance is now more carefully targeted to support global and regional objectives such as combating terrorism and promoting regional stability and security.” The goal of the new Strategy was “enhanced security and accelerated progress towards sustainable, equitable growth through improved governance, capacities and economic opportunities,” all in support of USAID/Philippines’ longer-term development objective of sustainable, equitable prosperity and peace. The Strategy pursued five program areas: (1) economic governance; (2) family planning and health; (3) environment and energy; (4) education; and (5) conflict reduction in Mindanao and other areas. Each of the Strategic Objectives (SOs) in these areas emphasized assistance in Mindanao and particularly to its conflict-affected areas.

To inform the development of the 2005-2009 strategy, USAID conducted a Conflict Vulnerability Assessment (CVA) in 2003. The CVA examined the current conflicts in Mindanao, the potential for future conflict, and the opportunities for USAID to address those challenges. Strategic Objective (SO12): Conflict Reduced in Mindanao and Other Areas Vulnerable to Violence replaced the earlier special objective for addressing conflict in Mindanao (Sp03) and intensified USAID’s focus on addressing conflict in the Philippines. The new SO was meant to address conflict more comprehensively, including in areas outside of Mindanao where poverty and social injustice provide fertile ground for organized

⁶ The ARMM has the country’s highest poverty rates (average per capita income is less than \$1 dollar/day).

violence and terrorism. USAID also extended its programs into support for peaceful resolution of disputes associated with clan conflict, land disputes and other key sources of local violence.

While the activities under SO12 sought to directly address underlying causes of conflict, those efforts were complemented and reinforced by collaboration between SO12 and other sectoral SOs to implement specific project activities in areas such as environment (SO4), health (SO3) and education (SO11). For example, under SO4 activities to help local government units and local communities improve their management of forests and coastal resources, efforts are included to mitigate conflict over natural resources and enforce environmental laws. Given the importance of good governance to the goals of peace and stability, improved governance was mainstreamed in the 2000 strategy and in the 2005 strategy as a cross-cutting theme in all sectors rather than being a stand-alone SO.

The 2005 - 2009 Strategy had also called for a more in-depth conflict assessment to identify possible additional activities, including the feasibility of expanding into CAAs outside Mindanao or in non-Muslim areas of Mindanao in which armed insurgent groups are active. Using the 2003 CVA as the point of departure, the assessment conducted in 2005 primarily sought to provide programmatic recommendations to the Mission on the basis of the three categories of conflict referenced above (i.e., political, inter-communal and clan, and criminal). This assessment resulted in a few new programs for the Mission, including fostering stakeholder support for the peace process on tracks II and III.

According to the FY2009 Strategic Plan of the U.S. Mission to the Philippines, USAID's continuing efforts in Mindanao contribute directly to the overall U.S. Government (USG) priority of defeating terrorists and fostering peace through a multifaceted strategy to eliminate terrorists; deny them sanctuary; strengthen security forces; and promote peace and development. To that end, approximately 60 percent of USAID's assistance to the Philippines is concentrated in Mindanao with particular focus on the CAAs to help demonstrate the tangible economic and social benefits of peace and security. This attention to Mindanao is meant to complement USAID/Philippines' overall focus on transforming conditions for improved prosperity, democratic governance and security.

Overall, USAID's approach has reflected the notion that the most effective way to address the insurgencies and conflicts in Mindanao was to concentrate more resources and services in its conflict-affected areas of Mindanao to help boost economic growth and reduce pressures on its natural resources. These efforts would thereby erode the bases for grievances felt by the Muslim population concerning social and economic neglect and marginalization. Programs addressed as well local deficiencies in governance such as rampant corruption, and increasingly, supported local positive cultural and social processes that engaged the participation in the implementation of specific development programs of organizations within industries and other segments of the community.

Looking ahead, USAID/Philippines will contribute to the development of a new 5-year Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) that will identify and prioritize USG foreign assistance goals for the Philippines. It will encompass U.S. Department of State and USAID foreign assistance programs and will also include a set of USG-wide activities to reflect a whole-of-government approach to foreign assistance priorities in the Philippines. Given the strong desire for collaboration between diplomacy, development and defense agencies to transform conditions in Mindanao for achieving peace and stability, the CAS provides an important opportunity for USAID/Philippines to reflect on its achievements to date as well as to identify new opportunities to play its part in mitigating conflict and promoting peace and development in Mindanao specifically and the Philippines more generally.

This evaluation thus comes at a time when USAID and other governments' donors are discussing the need for more multi-agency integrated strategies to achieve both security and development, as well as for multi-donor harmonization in order to more effectively rebuild post-conflict countries and failed states or

prevent them in the first place. Many new frameworks and tools have become available in recent years for assessing conflicts and fragile states, and for identifying pertinent program interventions, implementing appropriate forms of service delivery, and evaluating program performance in these challenging contexts. However, little evidence-based policy guidance has emerged so far from these discussions about which combinations of sectoral ingredients being listed on whole-of-government menu are most appropriate in what kinds of conflict and country settings. By evaluating the specific results for conflict mitigation and peacebuilding of the USAID programs in Mindanao, this evaluation seeks to make a start at arriving at evidence-based guidelines about what kinds and combinations of programs may tend to be most effective in what conflict contexts.

III. EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

A. Evaluating programs through a “conflict lens”

Because the aims and scope of this evaluation differ from the more usual program-level evaluation, it requires a distinct methodology and data collection strategy. As mentioned, the primary aim of the evaluation is to ascertain the impact of a range of USAID-funded programs on conflict reduction and peace in the ARMM and adjacent areas in Mindanao from 2000 - 2007, including how their balance and synergy affected those results.⁷ The evaluation also looks from a conflict perspective at the mix and balance of programs in Mindanao, and whether these programs are creating linkages that build synergy across sectors so as to have a greater impact. The basic steps in addressing those concerns are: 1) to understand the drivers of conflict and capacities for peace that are operating in the country or area of interest; and 2) to examine how the program or programs of interest may affect those drivers and capacities, positively or negatively. Because evaluations like the present one thus look at programs through a conflict lens, they are described as “conflict-sensitive” evaluations and are often termed “peace and conflict impact assessments.”

Our methodology first required a formulation of the criteria by which the programs in focus could be assessed for their impacts specifically with regard to factors that produce violent conflict and that make for peace. To assess the achievements of USAID programs systematically with regard to their relevance to conflict and peace impacts, the evaluation needed to be based on an understanding of the principal sources of the conflicts in Mindanao as well as the factors there that, if strengthened, can transform or counteract those conflict factors. This understanding supplies the criteria by which to evaluate the programs’ performance. To find such a conflict profile, the team drew primarily from the conflict assessments that the USAID/Philippines had commissioned to focus on Mindanao’s conflicts. Their purpose was to help the Mission identify and prioritize the leading causes of violence and instability so as to guide Mission strategy and implementation. But while the current study is thus grounded in those conflict assessments and other relevant studies of the sources of the conflicts and capacities for peace in Mindanao, the evaluation itself is not a conflict assessment.

Assessing programs that are expected to influence the identified factors behind the Mindanao conflicts or peace then requires the defining of specific yardsticks or benchmarks. These benchmarks allow the evaluation to measure or make evidence-based and reasoned judgments about the impacts of USAID’s programs.⁸ They constitute the standards and provide indicators by which the evaluation can determine

⁷ Although USAID is carrying out a number of projects outside of Muslim Mindanao in the CARAGA Region heavily affected by the NPA, the team was asked not to focus on that region nor NPA activities.

⁸ Also, whether or not programs can achieve those positive effects, they should at a minimum “do no harm” – that is, avoid the negative effects of worsen the causes of conflicts or undermining the forces of peace. See Anderson, 1999.

whether or not and to what degree programs have actually had impacts on the problem or phenomena that is being targeted. To provide a usable list of such evaluative criteria, organizations such as MSI, International Alert, the OECD-DAC, and USAID/CMM have developed conflict-focused analytical tools for use as evaluation instruments. Essentially, these tools are sets or frameworks of generic questions that probe into various possible effects of programs on conflict and peace. The factors that the frameworks lay out are synthesized from the many empirical studies done in recent decades on the causes of recent intra-state conflicts and of factors that tend to restrain violent conflict.

These tools can be applied to programs that intentionally adopt conflict and peace as their targets as well as to programs that pursue other aims; however, it still can be assessed in terms of their performance on conflict/peace criteria. While most of USAID/Philippines' programs are not labeled as conflict programs, most of them are believed to contribute to the goal of reducing conflict, have been advocated using that rationale, and are expected to achieve the goal in some degree. Yet, while the programs were expected to affect the sources of conflict in the course of pursuing various sectoral objectives, the evaluation issue at hand is whether there is demonstrable evidence that those impacts actually result from the programs.⁹ In short, a conflict-sensitive evaluation marries the longstanding methods of program evaluation to criteria that have to do with the impacts on the phenomena of conflict and peacebuilding.

The framework this evaluation used followed the practice of USAID/CMM's conflict framework and other such tools in classifying the impacts that the Mindanao program into four categories:

Underlying Conditions are basic social and economic factors that affect large numbers of people in a given society and tend to persist over long periods. These factors are difficult or slow to change. Although they are not sufficient in themselves to produce violent conflict, significant magnitudes can put a population under such stress that they are disposed toward undertaking violent action. This may make them receptive to incitement by conflict-provoking entrepreneurs. Thus these factors are sometimes called "motives" or "incentives" for conflict.¹⁰ In Mindanao, examples of leading underlying factors creating the risk of violent conflicts include:

- Chronic poverty and high unemployment, especially among young or working age men
- Chronically slow economic growth
- Environmental and natural resource deterioration
- Recent history of conflicts
- Demographic strains such as rapid population growth, a high proportion of youth, and immigration of groups with competing interests in Mindanao;
- A society composed of two or three major identity groups (i.e., the Christian/Muslim divide); and
- Gross inter-group material disparities.

⁹ A challenge in evaluating development programs from this perspective is that most development programs are commonly assumed to lead to peace and often claim in some general way that they do so. However, if development programs are assumed to produce peace, all program designs and decisions in these programs would be deemed appropriate and effective by definition, and there would be no need to do an evaluation using a conflict lens.

¹⁰ Such underlying, pervasive factors are also sometimes called "root causes." Although this term is frequently heard, the team does not find it useful for analytical purposes. First, it bears differing meanings with differing speakers, and thus is imprecise. Second, the term is often used to pick out one particular fundamental factor that is claimed to have the most significant causal influence in a given conflict. But as discussed above, underlying factors cannot themselves cause conflicts. Labeling a factor as "root" can oversimplify the complex processes through which various factors, both underlying and more immediate, have differing degrees of causal influence as they interact and cumulate in a causal chain that produces a violent conflict. Unless such a judgment is based on a rigorous conflict assessment in which various factors are shown to have differing weights, the claim of a "root" cause lacks an empirical base and is tendentious.

Enabling Factors are resources or processes that work upon the underlying factors to increase their negative saliency and public significance, and thus to mobilize people collectively to use or support violent ways to seek redress of their felt grievances. Some enabling factors have to do with the adverse policies and practices of formal or informal institutions. In Mindanao, these include:

- Local clan customs upholding the primacy of honor and retribution;
- Weak government that encourages rent-seeking, clientelism, and corruption, thus sapping their capacity to provide public services;
- Poorly functioning channels for expression of grievances that exclude certain groups or fail to reconcile competing interests;
- Political elite conflicts and competition within factions; and
- Ineffective security forces that cannot deter or control violence and crime without resorting to illegal methods.

Other enabling factors provide particular actors such as leaders and organizations with the organizational or other means to articulate and advance a group's interests through extreme or violent methods, such as:

- Financial and material resources, including underground economies, that make it possible to recruit followers and obtain weapons for extreme political movements;
- Ideologies that encourage a group to adopt hostile perceptions and attitudes by justifying the use of violence or armed force in view of an accepted explanation for the group's circumstances.

Capacities for Peace are societal and cultural processes or governmental mechanisms that offset the potential for violent mobilization, accommodate competing interests by addressing issues, and help to manage social tensions. These factors affect the extent to which grievances are expressed or ignored, whether conflicts between contending interests are resolved peacefully, and thus whether groups become radicalized into violent actions or channeled down constructive paths. In Mindanao, such factors include:

- Significant levels of education;
- Traditional mechanisms for adjudication of disputes;
- Cultural norms and beliefs that foster peaceful resolution of differences;
- A robust civil society with many peacebuilding initiatives, including influential religious leaders;
- Urban economic centers that encompass differing groups;
- Peace processes and negotiations; and
- Effective and accepted security measures and forces that can deter violence.

Immediate Events are specific actions or occasions that outwardly express the deeper sources of a conflict. Such moments may be hostile acts that “trigger” or ignite a crisis by escalating tensions and sparking violence. Such flashpoints are thus both a cause and an effect of violent conflicts.

In Mindanao, such threatening events include:

- Violent acts such as assassinations, kidnappings;
- Harsh responses by security forces to instability and peaceful protest;
- Frequent everyday disputes that can escalate into wider violence;
- Local and parliamentary elections;
- Disliked laws enacted and court decisions; and
- Economic shocks such as rapid price drops or cost increases.

Alternatively, these immediate factors may present time-sensitive “moments of opportunity” in which conciliatory gestures and reconciling experiences help to alleviate the sources of a conflict. For example:

- Ethnic and religious celebrations and holidays; and
- Leaders’ speeches to inspire tolerance and cooperation.

As can be seen, some of these possible effects on conflict are structural in nature and thus have an indirect connection with overt violence or use of force, some deal with more proximate processes and institutions such as government, and some directly affect violent behavior.¹¹

B. Date collection and analysis

If one way this evaluation differs from the usual type of program evaluation is the conflict lens that it fits onto the evaluation instrument, another basic difference lies in its unusually large, multi-program scope. As the intent of the evaluation was to assess the overall impact of USAID’s programs in Mindanao, the conflict lens needed to be enlarged to encompass a large number of possible impacts of diverse programs across several sectors, and thus focused at several levels of Mindanao’s society and politics, and indeed that of the Philippine nation.

To obtain evidence-based answers to the four agreed-upon core evaluation questions that were of concern to the Mission, the evaluation gathered data in three stages that were prescribed in the Scope of Work (SOW). The basic conflict-attuned framework described above was the basic touchstone that guided all the main questions that were addressed in these three stages. But each of these stages tended to involve a different type of primary or secondary data source and was focused on a different aspect or level of the overall picture.

In all three stages, sets of questions were developed that sought to capture the conflict and peace effects of programs, not simply their development objectives.

Stage I consisted of a document review of over 120 documents covering 30 projects, such as Annual Reports and program reports. Much of this secondary data came out of an extensive library of files given to MSI by USAID, as well as others MSI found through searches of databases and websites. To enable the document reviewers to cull these many documents for findings relevant to the evaluation questions, a detailed template was designed that listed a number of specific questions, all derived from the basic framework. Section I of that template sought general program data such as purpose, objectives, funding, period of performance, location and target population(s). Section II was designed to extract data about the program/project’s impact on conflict and peace (see Appendices 2 and 3 for completed examples of each section). In general, this body of documents was useful mainly for identifying the various objectives and expectations of USAID’s programs, as well as providing plentiful information about the programs’ inputs and outputs. Except for a few program evaluations, the documents provided few findings regarding directly-observed program impacts or outcomes.

¹¹ Note also that several of the conflict/peace impacts listed above overlap with typical impacts that conventional development programs seek to have. For example, conventional socio-economic development programs and more explicitly conflict-oriented programs may both seek to reduce poverty. Both kinds of programs may also chose government effectiveness as an entry point to target. However, even where a general development program aims at conflict-relevant criteria, there is no automatic guarantee that it will actually reach and influence specific conflict phenomena. For example, anti-poverty or enterprise development programs may tend to benefit some identity groups disproportionately to other groups, thus worsening inequities and their potential for conflict, rather than alleviating them. A youth program may not reach those youth who are especially prone to radicalism or anti-social behavior. Whether general development programs are in fact effective against conflict depends on specific features of program design and implementation.

Stage II encompassed a household-level survey of 1000 respondents living in urban and rural barangays throughout Mindanao (see Appendix 4). This stage was subcontracted to Social Weather Stations (SWS), an experienced survey firm with strong knowledge and survey capability in Mindanao. There were 750 respondents from areas (provinces and barangays) in which USAID has implemented programs and 250 respondents that were used as a comparison group from areas in which USAID did not have a program operating. The results of this survey revealed the perceptions of ordinary people who live at the most local jurisdictions in Philippine society regarding whether their family or community conditions regarding conflict, peace and development had changed since 2000 and what may account for those results.

It is essential to note the difference between the evaluation's household-level survey and a program beneficiary or consumer survey. This difference was carefully discussed with the Mission. The latter seeks to gauge the views of recipients or consumers of a specific program's service regarding the adequacy of that program. It thus targets known recipients of the service of interest, e.g. loan recipients from a credit facility. The former, however, does not target known recipients of specific services, but rather, interviews random households in a given local area. The aim is to obtain the local respondents' views of their own and their community's general conditions, as measured by their sense of security and access to water. The conditions probed may relate to certain services that USAID provides, but they are not necessarily products of the programs. In some of the areas of the household survey, USAID programs do operate and in some they do not. The survey was carried out in both of these settings in order to see whether respondents may attribute their circumstances to those programs or to other factors.

In other words, whereas a beneficiary survey might take an interest in people's actual experiences with specific USAID programs, a household survey does not necessarily know if a respondent is a direct recipient of such a program. The former instrument is analogous to a customer survey while the latter is analogous to a public opinion poll.

Stage III consisted of fieldwork in which a team of seven members conducted a series of interviews in Manila and Mindanao, again using a template of consistent questions derived from the evaluation framework that focused on changes and factors producing such changes (see Appendix 8, Interview Guide, for the list of questions). For the Mindanao-based interviews, the team of seven was split into two sub-teams. Team one traveled to Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Zamboanga, Basilan and Davao City. Team two traveled to General Santos, North Cotabato, South Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sharif Kabunsuan and Davao City. The travel schedules including names of key informants interviewed can be found in Appendices 5 and 6. Approximately 90 interviews were conducted (see Table 1 below). These interviews focused on key informants such as local governors, mayors and executive directors of key institutions, as well as with a number of implementers and beneficiaries, including two USAID project site visits. In contrast to the grassroots perspective of the household survey conducted at the barangay level, the interviews obtained information from governmental, NGO, or civil society professionals whose knowledge and observations were geographically broader in scope.

Table 1: Interviews Conducted in Mindanao and Manila¹²

	Local/Nat'l Government Official	USAID Staff	Project Implementer / Local NGO	Religious Leader	Institution (medical / academic)	Local Beneficiary	Military Rep.	International Donor	TOTAL
Lanao del Norte	4		2						6
Marawi / Iligan	3		1	1	1				6
Zamboanga	1		2		4	1			8
Basilan	3		4	2			1		10
GenSan				1	1	3			5
Cotobato City	5		2	1	3	3		1	15
S. Cotobato	1			1		2	1		5
N. Cotobato	1		2			1			4
Maguindanao	1					2			3
Davao City	2		3	2	1		1		9
Manila	2	6	7				1	2	18
TOTAL	23	6	23	8	10	12	4	3	89

In sum, secondary data was derived from program and project reports regarding program goals and features, and primary data was collected through the household survey and individual and group interviews regarding perceptions of programs' impacts. Compilation of the findings from these the three stages, especially II and III, provides the basis for comparing the perceptions of people placed at different levels in the Philippines and especially Mindanao, and thus to see where consistencies or divergences occur. Appendix XI provides further detail on the overall methodology and analysis of data.

The procedures at each of these stages were decided in close consultation with the USAID Mission and SWS. USAID/Philippines and MSI concurred on the projects and respective documents to be utilized in Stage I. Stage II, a 750 respondent household survey with a control group of 250 respondents, was made up of a compilation of approximately 20 demographic and 70 topical questions in which the Mission provided extensive input. Extensive interactions were used to winnow a large number of questions down to a manageable set of conflict-relevant ones that would serve the purposes of the evaluation. The formatting and specific locations in which the survey was to be conducted were also decided collaboratively among the Mission, Social Weather Stations (MSI subcontractor) and MSI. In Stage III, specific provinces were mutually agreed upon in view of the large number of USAID projects present and current security conditions. In addition, USAID played a significant role in the selection of interviewees, as well as the setting up of logistical arrangements with the Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM) office in Mindanao.

All three stages of the evaluation were focused on a set of 30 USAID projects. All but one project, Philippines TB Initiative in the Private Sector (PhilTIPS), were selected using two primary criteria: they must have received at least \$500,000 from USAID and must have had at least a 50% presence (target audience) in Mindanao. The list of agreed upon projects can be found in Appendix 9.

C. Data limitations

Despite the time and resource constraints on this evaluation, the evaluation team was satisfied with the number of projects reviewed, the number of respondents surveyed, and the number of interviews conducted. However, certain limitations precluded a more in-depth analysis of certain topics and areas.

¹² Number represents interviews conducted, not number of people interviewed. About 30% of the interviews were with two or more persons.

The team was able to speak with at least one USAID representative from each SO team. If the team had additional time, it might have been helpful to also interview the Activity Manager and/or Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO) of each project to get a project/activity perspective rather than only a sectoral perspective. SO teams were forthcoming in providing names and contacts of specific people to interview. However, in many cases it was received too late to set up meetings in Mindanao, which limited the team's ability to meet with project staff and implementers. The health sector suffered the most from this limitation as many of the projects under review had already shut down and thus access to past project staff was difficult to attain. Projects in which we were not able to meet with representatives were those that closed in 2005 -2006 that included PhilTIPS, Mindanao Assistance Project (MAP), LEAD, Credit Union and Enterprise Strengthening Project (CUES) and Promoting Democratic Governance.

Another constraint was the limited geographical reach the team could cover during the Stage III fieldwork. Due to security and time restrictions, the team had to choose areas in which GEM was able to provide the most assistance. This resulted in less outreach to the northern areas of Mindanao and the southern islands of the Sulu archipelago. Also, the need to cover a wide range of programs in many locations did not permit any in-depth analysis of how particular concentrations of multiple programs in one or two locations have interacted with differing respective socio-cultural economic, political, and conflict environments. Such a holistic view of a sample of locales could afford a fruitful angle on the role of assistance in conflict settings that cannot be gained solely through collecting information about the program activities being produced in sectoral terms in many scattered locations.

D. Team composition

The large scope of this evaluation also required several hands to apply the framework of questions. In addition to Michael Lund (team leader/conflict specialist) and Jennifer Ulman (project management/evaluation specialist), the team consisted of differing numbers of MSI staff and local experts at the three stages. MSI contracted six local experts for Stage I, the literature review, some of whom also participated in Stage III:

Social/Political Scientist:	Patricio (Jojo) Abinales
Education Specialist:	Vilma Bravo
Health Specialist:	Napoleon (Nap) Amoyen
Economic Specialist:	Beethoven (Venboy) Morales
Conflict Specialist:	Rufa Guiam
Environmental Specialist:	Anthony (Tony) La Vina

The team for the Stage III fieldwork was composed of seven members split into two sub-teams for travel through the western and central areas of Mindanao. Three local experts (Rufa, Jojo, and Vilma) were joined by Program Officer Fatima (Ima) Verzosa of USAID/Philippines and Senior Conflict Advisor Cynthia Brady of the Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) office at USAID/Washington. The sub-teams were composed as follows:

Team One	Team Two
Michael Lund (sub-team leader)	Jennifer Ulman (sub-team leader)
Patricio (Jojo) Abinales	Rufa Guiam
Ima Verzosa	Vilma Bravo
	Cynthia Brady

Important criteria for local experts' participation in Stage III included language skills (Tagalog, Visayan, and Maguindanaon) and knowledge of the areas in which each sub-team was to visit. The team found it

vital to have this cadre of local expertise on the team. It was also very helpful to have a local representative from the Mission who best understood the internal workings of each of the projects as well as overall Mission objectives. The welcomed addition of the representative from the CMM office brought not only a USAID perspective on conflict programming but a higher degree of awareness regarding relations at the inter- and intra-Agency levels.

IV. APPROPRIATENESS OF MIX AND BALANCE OF PROGRAMS

Core Evaluation Question: Does USAID have the right mix and balance of program approaches to address conflicts and promote peace in Mindanao?


The team approached this question from three basic angles that we believe are useful: 1) How the overall priorities within USAID’s whole portfolio stack up against the main sources of conflict and peace in Mindanao; 2) What processes were used to determine the particular mix of activities in particular localities on the ground; and 3) What role USAID has played within the USG effort to adopt a whole-of-government approach in the Philippines.

A. USAID’s priority entry points into conflicts and peace

One way to approach the mix and balance question is to examine the extent to which the mix of programs within the USAID portfolio has been appropriate in view of the main drivers of the conflicts in Mindanao. Was an appropriate combination of elements applied to the specific dimensions of conflict and peace in Mindanao? To examine this question, we briefly outline below the main drivers of conflict and forces for peace and then see how the programs matched up with them.¹³ In effect, what we are asking here is whether the programs were aimed in the right direction. Did they aim at the right targets? The impacts of these targets is reviewed in Section V.

Method of analysis

Before presenting the key findings and conclusion, a few words of explanation are in order. A brief look at the percentages of the budget allocated among SOs provides a useful snapshot of how USAID’s resources have been allocated among the Mission’s broadly stated goals. An average of 56% of USAID/Philippines funding was spent on Mindanao from 2001 – 2007. Viewed in terms of the broad goals expressed through SOs, these resources were distributed among five overall objectives: Family Planning and Maternal & Child Health (SO3), Economic Development and Governance (SO2), Environment and Energy (SO4), Strengthening Peace in Mindanao (SpO3 and



¹³ On matching programs to conflict and peace sources, see the CMM Conflict Assessment Framework, 2005

later SO12), and Education (SO11). To illustrate one year's allocation, the pie chart above presents the proportions allotted to the SOs in place for FY 2004. Naturally, funding of programs has increased in some areas and decreased in others. For example, Education increased from only 3% in 2003 to over 30% in 2006. Family Planning and Maternal & Child Health continues to increase while both Environment & Energy and Economic Development and Governance remained stable at an approximately 13%. The figure that greatly increased for the first three years and has been on the decline in the past three years is the Strengthening Peace in Mindanao SO. It went from 19% in 2001 to 65% in 2003 and reached a low of 25% in 2006. Given the restructuring of SOs through the new Foreign Assistance Framework (FAF), the percentage dedicated to Peace in Mindanao is configured in a different manner with projects once under the SO12 now being moved to Economic Growth Program Objectives. The Peace and Security objectives under the new FAF are a fraction of the original SO12 and can therefore not be directly compared.

These percentages, however, do not in themselves reveal how these priorities relate to dimensions of conflict and peace. Virtually all the programs under the SOs were intended at least in some general sense to address those issues, and choices were made that were influenced by assumptions about what kinds of programs are likely to make a difference. But any actual empirical connections cannot be determined at this broad level. Consequently, in order to assess how relevant the portfolio's priorities might be to conflict and peace issues in Mindanao, the team sought to find out what potential connections might exist between the programs under their various goals, on the one hand, and the factors that drive conflict and peace, on the other. One way to reveal such connections is to identify which of the sources of conflict and peace capacities each of the programs is aiming at and thus is expected to affect.

By drawing on the Mission's sub-obligation budget data, the team did some simple calculations to reveal how Mission funds have been allocated from 2001-2007 in terms of the various causes of conflict and peace. The following categories are utilized to show these effects¹⁴: a) underlying conditions b) factors that support violence c) capacities for governance and peace and d) immediate threats. Below, we briefly describe this generic structure and illustrate within it some of the leading factors that conflict assessments have identified for Mindanao's conflicts in particular.¹⁵

The next step was to see how USAID's array of programs relates to this configuration of factors. Which of these various dimensions or facets of the conflicts did the various programs address? Some meaningful way of showing the connections between programs and these factors needed to be devised. Simply using SO categories for this categorizing would not have captured enough detail about what particular programs do on the ground to be a meaningful indication of their possible implications for conflict and peace. On the other hand, trying to capture all the possible ways the programs might affect conflict and peace would be unmanageable. Consequently, we identified which programs were aimed generally at which of the four kinds of conflict or peace factors and thus where the relative emphases of the overall portfolio seems to lie.

This involved taking the programs listed under the various SOs and reclassifying them according to the four types of conflict and peace factors, as described earlier, that each program addressed. To illustrate that "coding," below are four examples from within the whole range of USAID programs and how they were placed under the four respective categories introduced earlier.

¹⁴ These categories generally parallel those in USAID/CMM's conflict assessment tool. See USAID/CMM's website: http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/ for further information on the Conflict Assessment Framework, 2005.

¹⁵ See for example, Timberman, 2003; Country Indicators for Foreign Policy: <http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/docs/CIFPII/index.htm>; University of Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict Management: <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=84003>.

Examples of USAID Programs That Illustrate Differing Entry Points for Addressing Conflict and Peace

Alleviating Underlying Conditions

Education Quality and Access for Learning and Livelihood Skills (EQuALLS) - *To address disparities in educational access and quality in selected disadvantaged areas, particularly in ARMM and other conflict-affected areas of Mindanao.*

Reducing Enabling Factors That Support Violence

Livelihood Enhancement and Peace (LEAP) - *For the peace process in Mindanao.*

Strengthening Capacities for Peace and Governance


Transparency and Accountability in Governance (TAG 2) Expansion - *Focuses on anti-corruption and public service improvements with local governments in Mindanao, particularly in the ARMM.*

Controlling Immediate Events

TAF/Conflict Management Program (CMP) - *To address distinct types of conflict affecting the Philippines.*

We then needed a simple way to measure the extent that programs addressed the various factors that are captured by these analytical categories. Rather than merely count the number of programs that fell under these headings, we used the indicator of the total expenditures of all programs that fall under each of the respective categories. The team made these calculations using the Mission’s sub-obligation budget data for Mindanao. The results of this procedure for re-sorting the programs into the four conflict-relevant categories are presented in Graph 2. It provides a broad profile of how the Mission’s budget priorities have been allocated across the main facets of conflict and peace.

Graphic 2: USAID/Philippines Budget Allocations Potential Effects on Conflict and Peace



Conclusion

The USAID portfolio covers all aspects of conflict but places a very heavy emphasis on structural factors that seek to alleviate the underlying conditions of conflict.

Key Findings

The results of the calculations shown in the graph above provide a rough gauge of how Mission funds have been allocated from 2001 to 2007 from the point of view of the differing aspects of conflict and peace provided in the previous section. The contrast between the allocations when sorted by SOs on the one hand, and by dimensions of conflict on the other, appears to be quite dramatic. Compare the proportions depicted in this graph with those in the pie chart on page 20. However, before any conclusions are drawn, crucial caveats need to be explained. First, spending is only a very crude indicator of what programs do since some types of activities are much more expensive than others (e.g., conducting workshops costs less than building bridges). Second, no one donor can be expected to cover all of these conflict factors as some may be handled by other donors or actors such as the AFP and others may lie outside the donor's mandate. Finally, the graph represents budget allocations, not actual impacts on the ground.

Nevertheless, a few observations seem warranted. The mix in the portfolio is very diversified, as USAID programs are found working on all the "entry points" – from deep-rooted social and economic causes of conflict, to mechanisms to promote mitigation of conflict, to short-term flashpoints or triggers that can do much damage to everything else, such as particular disputes. While the mix of programs across the health, education, economic governance and infrastructure programs have addressed a number of development needs, they thus also have the potential to influence several kinds of factors causing conflicts in Mindanao. How to probe further into whether that potential is being realized is taken up in the Impacts section.

USAID has done a good job of thinking through the basic needs of the area and spreading resources to an array of problem areas related to conflicts. It has also shown flexibility. The increasing shift to immediate conflict drivers is especially notable, evidently a response in part to the growing concerns over rido and other local disputes. USAID/Philippines also is one of the relatively few Missions globally that has sought to incorporate an SO specifically geared towards conflict. This may have been a response to actual trends as picked up by the SWS survey, which found that land disputes and rido/family feuding are viewed as the top two causes of conflict in the surveyed communities. Judicial and police reform were overwhelmingly identified as promising additional entry points for mitigating conflicts, or as many Mindanaoans referred to it, the problem of "peace and order." The need for both traditional (customary) and formal systems to improve overall access to justice was also noted.

Graph 2 also shows the great extent to which USAID programs continue to be strongly weighted toward the underlying socio-economic factors behind conflict. This makes good sense in view of comparative research on effective post-conflict reconstruction policies. Such research has shown that early attention to the fundamentals of economic growth, along with security, increases the likelihood of successfully preventing a return to conflict and facilitates moving forward with peace and renewed growth. Mindanao is not a post-conflict context in the usual sense, for low-level or sporadic violence still occurs. However, the context generally does permit considerable development to occur. Thus, the advice is critically important to follow in this context. The more usual donor approach tends to focus only on humanitarian assistance and then, often too early, on democracy-building. Economic issues are often sidelined to be

dealt with later.¹⁶ USAID/Philippines had the foresight to grasp the benefits of a more complete approach that includes economic growth, and it did so with vigorous programs such as GEM and EcoGov.

At the same time, conflicts between communities, ethno-religious groups, and political groups cannot be solved with socioeconomic interventions alone. Mindanao is not a classic post-conflict case because much violence and armed activity still persists. Interestingly, out of 11 obstacles to peace, “insufficient social and economic development” was ranked 6th whereas problems such as criminal syndicates and lack of fulfillment of commitments by armed groups and the GRP under the peace agreements ranked higher. An effective mix and balance of programs in Mindanao requires progress along both the development and more political tracks.

This look at budget allocations provides one angle from which to judge the adequacy of the mix and balance of USAID’s portfolio. It is beyond the scope of this analysis to analyze how much the cost factor in those programs may bias the expenditures when compared to other areas. Whether a comparison that factors in such considerations would show a more balanced picture is unclear. This would require matching the percentages against some way of weighting the current conflict factors. Yet the very high priority on structural factors does raise a question, which could be worth pursuing through more intensive inquiry.

A very different angle for approaching the mix and balance question lies closer to the ground, and has to do with how choices are made regarding activity priorities in particular localities.

B. Area-focused analysis and strategy development

Conclusion

USAID needs to consider whether USAID interventions often reflect menu-driven priorities for a given locality and/or are decided unilaterally by local leaders, and are not sufficiently tailored to community preferences and local desires to be consulted.

Key Findings

Another way to assess whether an appropriate mix and balance of programs has occurred is by asking about the procedure through which local priorities among differing projects are decided. It is widely accepted in the development world that some form of meaningful consultation with community members early on in project development is essential to building trust and cultivating local ownership. Such “social preparation” prior to and during project implementation can also serve as a means of marketing the project and gauging the level of interest and/or willingness of the community to participate and to invest in the project after the donor is gone. Ensuring that the community buys into the project goals (including understanding both the costs and benefits to the community) and feels engaged in its development increases the likelihood of community support for project planning and implementation, sustainable impact as well as a positive local perception of USAID’s role.

Before delving further into findings, it is important to summarize how social preparation is conceived. A number of phases are discussed in various literature including Preparation, Planning, Implementation, Monitoring, and Close-out. This section of the report focuses only on the first two phases.

- 1) **Preparation:** USAID and/or the IP are to work with the LGU to initiate overall sector and programs planned within. The Local Government (LG) representative elicits ideas from the community to inform donors as to the identified needs of the community. A donor

¹⁶ “A Guide to Economic Approaches in Post-Conflict Countries.” USAID/EGAT, October 2007.

- representative works with the LGU to ensure understanding of community priorities and later presents ideas of possible projects and their parameters or limitations. Commitment from the community is then needed to participate in further project planning.
- 2) **Planning:** A participatory yet structured approach that allows for community decision-making processes. Areas of concern at this phase include available resources (employable skills, water, electricity, infrastructure, transport, etc.) that can be committed to the project as well as leadership within the community to take on particular tasks prior to implementation. Another concern for the donor/IP at this phase is the provision for any necessary skills-building of local citizens to be able to take on these tasks.

A number of USAID programs have put in place clear procedures for generally working with local communities. For example, GEM notes the following as its normal practice: 1) Provincial and municipal governments make requests for certain projects to be carried out in specific barangays; 2) USAID-GEM sends staff members to the identified barangays to try to confirm that the projects are needed, will be welcomed by the barangay residents and are environmentally/technically feasible; 3) If positive reports come back, USAID-GEM and the relevant municipal governments negotiate and sign agreements regarding contributions to the project, and long term use and maintenance of the project; and 4) The project is undertaken and, when completed, turned over to the municipality. These processes are generally in line with the suggested social preparation definition provided earlier and should be commended.

As with any evaluation, negative consequences or experiences may be among the first comments shared with interviewers. However, at least five professionals in varying sectors – education, health and local governance – noted the importance of identifying the needs of the affected communities prior to implementation to ensure that interventions have maximum impact and are sustainable. The implication here was that such measures were not always undertaken. The top four sectors that the SWS survey respondents ranked as the highest needs of the community are livelihoods, education, health and infrastructure. Of the 48% of respondents aware of any USAID project, the top five ranked most beneficial were: Education Quality and Access to Learning and Livelihood Skills - Education and Livelihood Skills Alliance (EQuALLS-ELSA) (8.7%), LEAD (6.7%), ASCEND-EQuALLS (5.8%), AMORE (5.6%), Livelihood and Emergency Assistance Program (LEAP) (4.9%) and EQuALLS-Creative Associates (4.9%). Although this data certainly coincides with the sectors in which USAID is currently working, respondents from Stage III interviews noted, “The tendency of donors to not ask us what we need” remains; implying that the implementation approach matters at least as much as the output of a project.

At least three governmental representatives in Maguindanao, Gensan and Cotabato noted that although they were happy to receive USAID-funded projects, they resented not having been included in the decision-making process to determine which projects were to be implemented and where. Instead, they felt they had been *told* about the projects that were to be implemented in their communities. Although this could be attributed to miscommunication rather than intention, it is important to note this perception in the community. Similarly, a number of people in General Santos City noted what they considered to be an imbalance between infrastructure projects and projects that focus on capacity building and management of donor projects. In addition, two interviewees from the mayor’s office in Gensan and another in Cotabato City noted the lack of phase-out procedures and lack of organizational structures to ensure sustainability. The projects in which these interviewees – in some cases project staff and in other cases local implementing NGOs – referred to include the HIV/AIDS programs in Gensan, a small infrastructure (bridge) project in Gensan and one of the EQuALLS PPA projects near Cotabato City.

In a related reaction, one local Mayor shared his great appreciation for a new road built by GEM that now allows people easy access to markets to sell their goods, particularly the fish market. But he also noted a bit of frustration in that as the road was expanded to over four times its original size, nearby coconut trees

had to be removed. These trees were a source of livelihood for their owners and the mayor had to negotiate a fee to serve as compensation for their loss. Although this may not be a particularly unusual scenario, had proper social preparation been done in the community at the project's early stages, there may have been opportunities to provide more creative forms of compensation which would take care not to reinforce any unhealthy patron-client relations or elite capture. For example, given the improved access to urban areas, people could be taught new skills and trades (e.g., fishing or local crop growing) that will encourage their respect for and utilization of the new road and thereby also provide incentives for the community to maintain the road over time.

In sum, consultation with community members early on in project development is being voiced as essential to building trust and alleviating perceptions of menu-driven donor implementation. Social preparation prior to and during project implementation can serve as a means of marketing the project and gauging the level of interest and/or willingness of the community to participate and to invest in the project after the donor is gone. Ensuring that the community buys into the project goals (including understanding both the costs and benefits to the community) and feels engaged in its development increases the likelihood of community support for project planning and implementation, sustainable impact and a positive local perception of USAID's involvement.

To be sure, hands-on training for local people in skills such as conflict analysis and problem-solving, planning, community mobilization and monitoring are likely to be needed in the community to ensure that the investment in social preparation approaches are maximized. In addition, donor openness in terms of defining project goals and identifying how the community can help achieve those goals as well as rigorously ensuring transparency and accountability of project funds and expenditures are extremely important to building and maintaining trust in the project and in overall USAID programming.

The next angle pursued here regarding mix and balance has to do with USAID's public role in relation to other USG agencies.

C. Balance among the 3Ds

Conclusion

Collaboration of efforts by USAID, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Department of State (DOS) has brought a sense of security and greater confidence to people throughout the island. Increased trust ratings of both USAID and USG as a whole are evident in the survey data. However, as misperceptions of responsibilities among the 3Ds arise, the USG needs to consider if a more deliberate and appropriate division of labor among the three agencies is needed.

Key Findings

The USG's diplomacy, development and defense (3D) transformational strategy continues to influence GRP and USG initiatives to reinforce peace and stability objectives in Mindanao. The Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) representatives, for example, clearly appreciate the value of development activities and see their small infrastructure projects as a means to undermine support and recruitment into insurgency and terrorism by providing benefits to otherwise vulnerable populations. JSOTF notes that its core mandate is to put a GRP/AFP face on every intervention and to improve GRP's credibility with the local populace. This approach makes good development and defense sense. As well, diplomacy efforts such as the U.S. Embassy's support of library facilities in Zamboanga, Jolo and Tawi-Tawi were used to reach out to students and local citizens to increase their understanding of and appreciation for U.S. efforts. Other diplomatic efforts such as the U.S. Pacific Command's Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-W), which provides maritime interdiction training and coordination with Philippines law enforcement

partners, military and civilian law enforcement professionals, was not mentioned during our interviews. But reports note its successes including the newly sponsored position of Senior Law Enforcement Advisor. The U.S. Navy Mercy Ship Hospital that provides medical assistance to hard-to-reach areas of the island coordinated with international and local health NGOs, as well as JSOTF. This initiative has brought great appreciation among the public.

Such efforts seem to be getting noticed. There is great appreciation and support for USAID assistance among key informants interviewed in Stage III, and many noted the importance of something tangible to address their community’s needs. In addition, 70% of the population surveyed noted they are aware of some type of USAID programming. This means that 700 out of 1000 total respondents in five provinces had heard of USAID in their community or surrounding area. Of those, 56% noted an increase in their trust of the Agency since 2000. This is a noticeable increase in awareness when compared to figures of past surveys conducted in Mindanao (see below). It should be noted that these were nationwide surveys, while the data for Mindanao was separated for various regions in the compiled data. The fairly small increase from 2001 to 2008 may be due to multiple factors: a) the 2001 survey was geared towards respondents age 18 and over whereas the current survey targeted heads of household (presumably an older population) and b) the 2001 survey asked the question of awareness in the present whereas the 2008 survey is made up of time-series data that shows their increase in awareness.

Awareness of USAID among Mindanaoans¹⁷	
1999 survey	36%
2001 survey	67%
2008 survey	70%

Although this survey cannot be directly compared to other such country surveys, it does seem that a little less than 50% awareness of USAID programs in developing countries with USAID programs is standard. Although questions were worded slightly differently and number of survey respondents differed for exemplars¹⁸ provided here, the figures do provide a sense of the usual level of USAID awareness. In Egypt, 55% of the population surveyed was aware of foreign aid, yet 64% had not heard of any projects sponsored by USAID specifically. In Indonesia, 62% were aware of the U.S. providing aid to the country; 68% had seen the USAID logo (higher percentages in Banda Aceh than other areas); yet only 9% registered awareness when asked if they had heard of USAID. Keeping in mind that these are national figures in a particular region in which the Mission chose to focus (i.e. Mindanao) is also an important caveat.

USAID is well recognized in Mindanao as a result of its programs and their level of local visibility. EQuALLS and GEM programs appear to have the highest visibility among USAID programs, primarily due to good marketing. The survey used shuffle cards that contained the name and logo of specific USAID programs and asked the survey respondents to identify programs of which they were aware. Of the 700 respondents who were aware, the top five projects cited were: EQuALLS – (ELSA and Creative Associates), LEAP, GEM, and MAP. These figures correlate with findings in Stage III, in that interviewees were very aware of EQuALLS and the LEAP project especially, and this was primarily due to good branding and marketing. For EQuALLS, the backpacks with logos made them famous and for LEAP, familiarity was due to media coverage by local stations and the catchy slogan “Arms to Farms.” A majority of Stage III interviewees noted familiarity with GEM and attributed their awareness to the presence of the unique blue signs at all project sites.

¹⁷ Data for years 1999 and 2001 are from nationwide surveys and data from 2008 was a Mindanao specific survey. All surveys were conducted by Social Weather Stations based in Manila.

¹⁸ Examples of survey figures provided are taken from the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) surveys in which USAID sponsored. Figures are based on surveys conducted in 2006.

It is worth noting that the high visibility has led to some confusion with GEM, which is often believed to be one and the same as USAID. This confusion is also likely due to the program's strong connections with local and regional governments as well as broad geographic coverage. The confusion might be alleviated and overall recognition of USAID's support might be further heightened if USAID had a consistent physical presence in Mindanao, which would represent the whole portfolio of programs and would take on essential administrative/logistical, representation and liaison responsibilities for USAID locally.

Survey results also find that the trust rating of USAID is slightly higher than that of the USG as a whole, however, an increase in trust for USG in the last eight years increased by 43%. Trust in the USG is higher in USAID project sites than in non-USAID project sites. Particularly significant is the fact that in the provinces of Maguindanao/Sharif Kabunsuan and Basilan, trust ratings more than doubled among populations who were from a USAID project site. If we look at declines in trust, survey respondents noted a decrease in trust by 20% for USG, but only by 8% for USAID. These are not alarming figures, but certainly something to keep in mind for future public relations activities. More conscious coordination across these efforts will lead to improved coherence and ultimately improved trust for all USG efforts.

If the respective roles, responsibilities and goals of different agencies are not clearly communicated, local populations can end up confused as to who is (and should be) ultimately responsible for their safety versus development of their community. The primary defense initiative that the evaluation team interviewed, JSOTF, provides a combination of both defense and development support that seems to unintentionally confuse local populations. Beneficiaries and local implementing partners reported uncertainty about U.S. military doing what they perceived as USAID programs. For example, projects run by JSOTF include water and sanitation, small infrastructure projects such as building of schools, rural health clinics and small access roads. These would traditionally be considered development programs, but in this case are being implemented by the U.S. military. One religious leader noted Military assistance in the Balikatan as a "humanitarian approach...whereby people see military personnel without their guns doing good development work...people (and perhaps the military) will think that they (e.g., JSOTF) can better intervene on civilian affairs." But as there is a public perception that the U.S. military is only in places where combat operations are needed (e.g., Sulu) the presence of military in non-combat areas (e.g., Cotabato) leads to suspicion of USG objectives. A related stereotype that seems to exist is that wherever U.S. troops are present, terrorist activity must also be present; thus causing a defensive reaction by communities who do not wish to be associated with conflict. Although other defense initiatives exist among the U.S. military, the evaluation team did not have access to those engaged in these efforts, which are primarily focused on counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency in Mindanao.

Recommendations

Shifting more resources to social and governance mobilization processes

While quick-impact and visible programs, such as infrastructure development, should remain an important component of USAID's portfolio in relatively untouched rural areas, enough resources have now been invested to provide the foundation for the next stage of development to occur in the more urban areas. USAID's credibility is high with respect to being a provider of quick-impact benefits and as a result it can now afford to shift more of its resources toward efforts that will help build local capacities to leverage those earlier investments and allow the GRP and Mindanaoans increasingly to take responsibility for their own development agenda.

To address causes of conflict and instability, USAID should continue funding a mix of health, education, environment and economic growth programs but should consider more robust attention to problems of governance, justice and security so as to build up the “soft” infrastructure needed for sustained development and stability. To have a more direct impact on the open peace and conflict issues that have risen to the surface in Mindanao, the USAID program portfolio should consider investing more in programs that target the institutional enablers of conflict more directly, that mitigate the political economies that reinforce local capture of economic surpluses and that strengthen local dispute resolution mechanisms and improve local security. In particular, it should look into (1) building deeper capacity among a small number of local non-governmental organization (NGOs) to complement investments in local government capacity-building, (2) supporting police reform and improving community-police relations and (3) developing bridging mechanisms to connect the informal and formal justice systems. USAID needs to increase capacity building, which often can be done through the design of the implementation approach in any sector. For example, as will be reiterated in Section 7, USAID should explore additional ways to engage Muslim, Christian and Lumad leaders through multi-party dialogue and activities around environmental governance and natural resource management.¹⁹ As an example of the proposed shift in emphasis, increased attention could be given to developing the capacities of local political and community leaders to resolve disputes and to expand trusting relationships between local government and their communities.

Sensitize programming to conflict and peace criteria

It is recommended that the Mission (Program Office, SO Team Leaders and Project CTOs and Activity Managers) receive basic conflict training (such as USAID’s Conflict 101 or 102) and/or conflict sensitive service delivery training that includes modules such as: Do No Harm²⁰ (Local Capacities for Peace), conflict early warning, matching of conflict indicators to program indicators, and contingency planning. Given the Mission’s focus on economic governance, the EGAT post-conflict course should also be considered. If a training-of-trainers session were held, a few select USAID staff could hold working sessions with their implementing partners to pass on the knowledge to ensure conflict sensitivity be incorporated into IP work plans, monitoring plans and other core planning documents.

Foster more community consultation

USAID and IPs should conduct social preparation in communities prior to design and implementation of projects. The conduct of an initial assessment would ensure that donors and IPs consider the needs of the community. Early explanations of program objectives and plans to communities may increase receptivity and value and would increase local understanding of the resources that are available (and still needed) for the project benefits to be maximized and for the community to be able to sustain the project over time. This preparatory work could also help ensure knowledge is transferred concerning any prior donor implementation in that community which would allow the IP to build on and learn from those investments.

Develop a more deliberate and sensitive USG-wide strategy for communicating to the public

USAID should continue its efforts to brand and market its own programs, more or less aggressively depending on the returns on investment USAID is looking for with a particular program, and further encourage their IPs to incorporate “visibility factors” into their implementation approaches. Increased visibility for individual programs would also be helpful to other donors who would see the programs

¹⁹ For example, establishing mechanisms and facilitating opportunities to promote dialogue and communication between parties in conflict can be built into most programs as an underlying objective.

²⁰ Andersen, 1999.

being funded by USAID and might thus improve the likelihood that they will reach out to USAID to coordinate efforts once they become aware of the programs.²¹ In addition, however, it is critical that USAID engage with other USG agencies internally to discuss and define roles and responsibilities as clearly as possible, especially in overlapping sectors such as development. Public outreach and information campaigns should seek to present the whole USG portfolio, where applicable, to ensure transparency and to avoid confusion about USG goals and roles. It is also crucial to formulate a U.S. culturally-sensitive “strategic communication”²² message that does not lay into suspicions expressed by opinion leaders that USG activities in Mindanao are motivated merely by various geo-political motives such as counter-terrorism, positioning to ensure corporate interests in local resources, wishing to counteract Chinese influence in the region, and so on.

V. IMPACTS ON CONFLICTS, PEACE AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE

Core Evaluation Question: How effective were the range of USAID programs in actually reducing the main identified sources of Mindanao’s conflicts and in strengthening the means to prevent or manage them peacefully, including local governance?

A. Focus and method

This section goes beyond whether the programs aimed in the right directions, as in Section IV, to see how well USAID programs actually hit their targets. Given the priority focuses we have seen in the USAID portfolio of programs, what concrete evidence is there that those various programs significantly affected the main drivers and types of conflicts and forces promoting peace in Mindanao? This section also asks: Which levels and types of Mindanao’s conflicts were most affected? How direct or indirect were the programs’ impacts? How sustainable are the impacts? Did the array of programs adopted miss important entry points? Did they have any significant unintended negative impacts?

Varieties of Evidence: Each of the conclusions in this section draws on available evidence to help verify whether USAID programs that are dedicated to broad objectives such as “governing justly and democratically” and “investing in people” are also reducing major sources of conflict in Mindanao or bolstering its capacities of peace. Certain constraints on data collection limit the ability of the evaluation to definitively and comprehensively ascertain these kind of impacts.

First, most of the programs examined were not designed to measure specific peace and conflict impacts, and it is difficult to gather hard evidence for such impacts retrospectively. The available mission-wide and program-level documents, evaluations and assessments tend to focus on particular programs’ outputs, such as numbers of books distributed or numbers of barangays served. Much less frequently do they provide evidence on impacts, such as infant mortality rates reduced or new minority business incomes

²¹ A few suggestions to increase visibility are to: 1) establish a USAID office or representative in Mindanao to be the ‘local face of USAID’ (e.g. representative to engage with local leaders, liaise with local government officials, organize logistics for USG visitors, conduct project oversight, monitoring and evaluation across sectors); 2) Create new and strengthen existing media materials and public relations activities to focus on USAID’s overall program portfolio (e.g. an interactive Mindanao-based site linked from USAID/Philippines and IP websites); and 3) Put more resources into monitoring and evaluation of projects and publicize results, at a minimum within the implementing partner community. The combination of these three efforts will provide a more complete picture of development assistance as well as promote a wider range of awareness of USAID investments across Mindanao.

²² Halloran, 2007.

raised. USAID program documents such as Annual Reports provide voluminous information about the year-by-year expansion of USAID assistance programs in the main sectors in which they work. These impressive achievements are described in terms of indicators such as aid monies spent, laws advocated, organizations created, rural bank units trained, and agricultural exports increased. However, this type of program output data does not constitute by itself measures of the impacts of those activities on the problems the programs seek to alleviate, such as rural livelihoods, disease incidence reduced, and so on. There is also little relevant baseline data.

Even more crucially for the particular focuses of this evaluation, such information provides only indirect, inferential, or circumstantial evidence of the progress being made in reducing the kinds of conflict drivers listed in the framework. As shown by the framework presented earlier, those conflict or peace impact measures are concerned with such results as whether the perceived pattern of maldistribution of government services among identity groups is being changed, whether the social interaction of such groups is increasing within the supported economic enterprises such as in their value chains, whether entrenched elite and family networks who monopolize local community decision-making are being outflanked, whether the number of killings between communal or clan groups is being reduced, and whether public support for reaching a peace agreement is being strengthened. Historically, few development programs have sought to collect the pertinent indicators, such as for example, the ratio of Muslims to Christians that an immunization project serves or the ethnic or religious affiliations of the program partners' staffs. A few programs do aim directly at reducing the open manifestations of conflicts, such as open local disputes and rido, and thus attempt to measure their performance in those terms. One of the few clear quantitative indicators that is directly consonant with an impact on conflict is the numbers of MNLF former soldiers provided with the means to pursue alternative livelihoods. But most programs approach conflict and peace only implicitly through activities that have and measure other aims.

Another challenge is the sheer quantity of programs involved, the duration of their overall implementation (eight years of program operation), and the many differing settings in which the programs work. In view of this evaluation's large scope, it is not possible to comprehensively summarize all impacts that might have led to conflict impacts, nor did the aim of the evaluation call for such an immense task.

Despite these challenges, the evaluation can go beyond intentions, beliefs, and expectations about what the programs have achieved in an effort to identify programs' impacts objectively. It does this through drawing on and triangulating from three kinds of data. Though not empirical evidence and technically the weakest form of evidence, the reports reviewed in Stage I can reveal design and implementation features that conflict-sensitized analysts can plausibly infer have the potential to achieve meaningful impacts on conflict or peace. In the absence of conflict-focused data, this descriptive information is useful to illustrate what are reasonable inferences. Conflict-relevant details are revealed, for example, by the particular target populations and geographic areas that the programs serve and the types of services they provide to influence individual or collective behavior. Concluding that such features have had significant conflict/peace impacts still requires tracing a plausible causal path through which the programs can be assumed to have modified conflict or peace factors. Because USAID has provided such a wide variety of programs whose products at the delivery end differ from project to project, below we can only selectively highlight some of the major causal mechanisms through which program outputs and outcomes may be reasonably assumed to be leveraging the leading sources of conflict and peace.

The pitfall of such inferences lies in assuming that what even sound policy theory predicts is actually happening on the ground. In Stage III, the interviews provide the views of governmental, academic, and clerical and program professionals, and thus rely on their observations and judgments on the role of programs within the wider setting of their communities. This also helps to scale up the inquiry from the level of particular program impacts to the aggregated effects of sets of program in a wider arena. At the same time, these views each tend to reflect the professional and organizational roles and occupations of a

particular person (e.g., planner, spiritual leader, professor, etc.), who may not necessarily be aware of many programs or important details.

The most comprehensive of the data sources available is the SWS survey in Stage II. It yields views of 1,000 household heads about socio-economic and conflict trends as they see them and the status of problems that USAID programs are addressing. Recall that their responses do not constitute the opinions about specific programs of direct beneficiaries who have been served by them. What the responses provide is a valuable ground-level perspective on what changes may have occurred and that may have resulted from the programs or from other factors within or affecting a given barangay. Such grassroots opinions have advantages over the stances given by professionals and political and civil society leaders in the interviews of Stage III. At the same time, the weight of these opinions in local and national life is not self-evident and should not be overestimated. In poor, rural, and relatively anomic settings out of which these views come from, the behavior of people is heavily influenced by local elites, whose networks wield a great deal of social power. Consequently, the common person's views do not necessarily shape the direction of the public affairs in local communities.

The following pages triangulate from these three angles to capture an overall picture. Findings are cited selectively to illustrate the conclusions reached.²³

B. Impacts on underlying conditions that increase the risk of conflicts

Conclusion

USAID programs have directly improved the ability of many poor Mindanaoans to upgrade their standards of living by receiving critically needed community infrastructure to expand local economies, occupational skills and financing to improve their livelihoods, and social benefits that make them more productive.

Key Findings

Chronic poverty is widely viewed as an indirect cause of conflict. Programs that improve the standards of living of poor people are widely thought to mitigate potential conflicts by reducing the sources of possible grievances against a government or other groups. One way this effect may come about is through improving the material circumstances of ordinary people by making them more healthy and skilled, and thus undercut potential motivations to carry out armed activity or support it in various ways.

USAID's program documents provide plentiful information about results such as the numbers of farmers and fishermen and exported products that the production inputs and technical assistance of its economic support programs have provided in many barangays. It is plausibly argued that such benefits have eroded significantly the economic basis for anti-government political grievances. The absence of such basic means leaves male breadwinners, who are the main agents of violence, with meager livelihoods and thus vulnerable to alternative violent ways to provide for their families. For some, these needs can warrant the taking up of arms.

Strong evidence from the interviews corroborated such inferences. Indeed, the single observation expressed by the largest number of respondents at several levels in Mindanao was that (in various words) USAID programs such as GEM-2, AMORE, and CUES have clearly contributed to "peace and order."

²³ This evaluation was aimed at gauging the cumulated impact of USAIDs programs, not those of individual programs. Therefore, this section is organized in terms of the possible types of impacts, rather than by sector or individual programs.

This happened by making newly available basic resources – such as roads, electricity, working capital, and credit that are critical for improving their livelihoods and for expanding their local economies – to large numbers of poor Mindanaoans. Many observers are convinced that the resources that GEM-1, GEM-2 and other economic development projects have provided have allowed thousands to pursue new opportunities for peaceful and legal forms of commerce.

Roads, bridges, landings, and other small-scale infrastructures are especially significant assets for remote, mountainous and land-locked communities. They provide prerequisites for expanding beyond subsistence farming, local markets and consumption through lowering the transport and overhead costs of bringing products for sale to town centers. These facilities and rural programs such as AMORE and in agro-forestry have helped to increase the incomes and numbers of farmers, thus reducing the fodder for rebellion in unstable areas such as central Mindanao. There and in western Mindanao, new maritime facilities also have dramatically expanded the numbers who make a living through fishing. For some, increased access to working capital through rural banks, for example, has made it possible to become entrepreneurs as middlemen. Local economies are diversifying, and the multiplier effects are engaging local chambers of commerce and business associations such as Socksargen Federation of Fishing & Allied Industries, Inc. (SFAII).

At the barangay and municipal level, many interviewees believed that small-scale Barangay Investment Projects (BIP) type infrastructure and other economic projects have helped boost overall economic expansion. Near Upi, for example, GEM built a bridge connecting a mountainous barangay to the town center, and the town activated a Business Development Center through various livelihood projects provided by USAID. In larger urban areas such as Zamboanga City and Cotabato City, and as reflected by Lanao del Norte's governor, officials clearly acknowledged the value of Regional Investment Project (RIP) type projects. Although constructed with USAID support some years ago, large-scale facilities around General Santos City, such as the airport and boat landing, have generated employment and are credited with enabling Gensan to become a major regional export and business hub that invites investment.

In addition to such “hard” goods to expand economic opportunities, the potential for chronic poverty to provide reasons for taking up arms is also reduced by experiencing the “soft” human resources that USAID has also provided. It is reasonable to infer, for example, that the ENRICH health projects that have extended to many barangays more health testing and services, medicines, and better sanitation also improve living standards. Workers are more productive when fewer days are lost due to malaria, pneumonia, TB, and HIV/AIDS, and income is boosted as a result of reduced health costs.

Education and skills training have the potential to play a similar role. Education programs illustrate how the same general goals may lead to impacts on conflict in the short or long terms, depending on program design. The impact of the EQuALLS program's upgrading teacher competencies in the ARMM's formal school system to teach English and math is likely a more indirect impact on conflict, acting as an investment in the future. On the other hand, the occupational skills that EQuALLS and the ALS program provide for out-of-school adolescents, Computer Linkage and Internet Connection (CLIC's) provision of computers and job skills that are quickly applicable, and the livelihood training for IDP families that includes ways to protect their teens from MILF recruiters, will act more definitely to channel recipients away from more imminent conflict or criminal behavior. Under CLIC, more than 600,000 young people in the conflict affected areas are more employable as a result of becoming computer and internet literate, and the program's impact is likely to grow over the next few years. A new Job Enabling English Proficiency (JEEP) Program is intended to enhance employability in tourism, merchant marine, and nursing, of virtually all graduates of 15-20 of the larger colleges and universities in Mindanao. How many would otherwise find their way into armed movements, and which and where, is impossible to measure, however.

Data gained from the SWS survey supports these inferences. In the eyes of its respondents, all the basic economic and social conditions mentioned above that affect a household's economic opportunities are perceived to have improved over the eight years that this study covers. In all the following economic and social program areas, one half or more household heads saw economic and social improvements since 2000 than thought they had deteriorated: access of their own families to water service (57%), to electricity service (58%), to communications infrastructure (56%) and roads, bridges and similar transport infrastructure in the community (56%), as well as improved health condition of family members and opportunities to have formal education. Also, almost half (47%) of household heads said opportunities for their family members to have employment or a means of livelihood improved compared to before 2000, while 22% said they deteriorated, and 30% said they had not changed.

The greatest amount of improvement in these underlying conditions from the year 2000 can be shown by using "net improvement score". This represents the percent of respondents who believe there has been improvement minus the percent who believe there has been no improvement, or that things have stayed the same. The highest net improvements were seen in health condition of own family members (47%), opportunities of own family members to have formal education (44%), access of own family to water services (42%), access of own family to electricity service (42%), and communications infrastructure in own community (41%).

Oddly, it is unclear from the survey how much these benefits are actually translating into improved household gains. When asked whether their family's *livelihood* is better now than it was before 2000, only 23% said yes, while 54% said it was better before, and 23% said it was the same. While the survey found wide belief that families have better access to water, electricity, and communications infrastructure, health, and education, it found less support for the notion that family livelihoods, employment, or a family's access to formal credit sources had increased. It is true that general indicators of the level of poverty in Mindanao over these years have not improved. This seemingly contradictory view could be a function of recent economic conditions such as prices or simply interpretation of the meaning of livelihoods. One possible explanation is that while various inputs that provide new economic opportunities have been put in place, other factors have come into play that have kept these benefits from actually enhancing many households' specific livelihoods, offsetting their advantages.

At the same time, however, when it comes to the next five years, more respondents were optimistic about their family's livelihood than pessimistic. Forty-six percent expected their livelihood to improve, while 27% said it would deteriorate, and 25% expected no change. The outlooks varied considerably between, for example, North Cotabato and Basilan. Although opinions were affected somewhat by whether the respondent lived in a USAID or non-USAID project site, once again the overall results hardly differed between USAID and non-USAID project sites.

The survey also asked the respondents what factors they believed best explain the differences in circumstances that they perceived between 2000 and the present. A substantial percentage (46%) credit international assistance programs for contributing to the difference. Other explanations include

Conclusion

USAID programs have also helped to ease competition and potentially violent conflict over natural resources, mainly at the local level, by both reducing stress on the environment through better practices and seeking to slow the rate of population growth.

Key Findings

People's standards of living can also be boosted if there is less of a demographic burden on the use of the resources on which they depend for a living. One prong of recent USAID efforts seeks to improve that ratio by increasing the product yield from the same land, waters, or other natural resources. This involves encouraging better husbanding of those resources and avoiding their deterioration through means such as deforestation or depletion of fish stocks. Increasing the productivity of existing physical and human resources reduces the pressure on local scarce needs that otherwise might occasion inter-familial and intra- and inter-communal competition and thus provoke disputes. As one interviewee remarked, "When people are hungry, they are pushed to petty transgressions like stealing a neighbor's chickens and eggs or cattle rustling."

How "expanding the pie" of resources can act as conflict avoidance is illustrated in the following example: Adding a new road used for commerce helped to keep an inter-personal altercation from escalating into an inter-communal clash. In Iligan City, a lethal confrontation on the street between a Maranao and a Christian led Maranaos to block a road used by both groups through the predominantly Muslim barangay of Mandalug, which is on the outskirts of the city. For years, there have been tensions between Maranaos and other groups settling in the barangay, which is 60% Muslim and 40% Christian. Maranao politicians running for provincial positions often make promises to the Maranao majority that they will legislate a separation of the barangay from the city. Although the road blockage could have led to a larger confrontation, something more violent was avoided by GEM-2 having established an alternative route the Christians could use. The road enlarged the choices available to the estranged communities by simply allowing them to go their separate ways.

More explicit efforts to stimulate responsibility for natural resources are most dramatically illustrated by the support by EcoGov for the production of the book, *Al Khalifa*. The book cites Quranic verses that uphold the values of stewardship toward the environment, thus providing a religious warrant for protecting the community's natural resources that is locally influential. The Mufti of Basilan and the Imam in Cotabato City have used *Al Khalifa* in the sermons they give to promote the environment and family planning, and they both noted very receptive audiences. Other local Imams were supportive of the project upon learning what the Quran actually says about the environment and realizing there is more in the Holy Book than the 5 Pillars of Islam. "The Moro wars left an entire generation of ignorant Muslims," one Imam commented.

The other prong in reducing strain on natural resources is to reduce the population using them. If family planning eventuates in fewer mouths to feed, the population demand on resources is obviously affected, as is the family income. ENRICH has worked for the acceptance of family planning through a variety of means. Catholic Church doctrine has resisted such efforts, however. In Muslim areas, there are abiding conservative values against controlling births, fed by political arguments that family planning is a tool to pacify a minority. But extensive efforts to work with Muslim religious leaders eventually persuaded them to issue a fatwah to encourage parents to limit their family's size. Face to face dissemination of the message reached an estimated 1,061 Muslim religious leaders and 2,351 Muslim residents. A radio campaign reached 55% of the population in 11 areas in the ARMM that were studied.

The SWS household survey also suggests that such programs may be having some influence. Sixty-two percent agreed that "Compared to before year 2000, more couples are using family planning methods." Fifty-four percent of household heads say their own family efforts to limit family size had increased since 2000, while only 10% said they declined and 25% said they had not changed. Efforts to limit own family size by using family planning methods posted a 44% net improvement, while the practices of people in own community to conserve the environment scored 43%.

The environment and energy sectors also noticed an impact on reducing the strain on resources. Forty-six percent of those asked said that the condition of the forests, coastal areas, rivers, and water has improved compared to before 2000. Almost three-fifths (58%) said the practices of people in their community to conserve the environment improved compared to before year 2000, while only 15% said they deteriorated, and 26% said they have not changed.

Conclusion

USAID's concentration of assistance in the ARMM and conflict-affected areas has begun to displace the Muslim legacy of being in conflict with and marginalized by a predominantly Christian nation with signs of hope.

Key Findings

Though poverty is a deep source of potential conflict, alleviating poverty is insufficient by itself to alleviate the potential for conflict, for some ways of creating wealth can worsen conflict. Economic growth reduces or increases the potential for social conflict, depending on how its gains are appropriated.²⁴ The issues of *political* marginalization and inequity have arisen largely with regard to the conflict involving the Moros identity group and their putative armed causes.²⁵ Program documents do not routinely present or track whether and the extent to which disparities in life chances and opportunities among Muslims and Christians in particular catchment areas are being narrowed. But the decision to concentrate aid in Mindanao and especially the ARMM and adjacent areas (see map on the following page) has undoubtedly helped to reduce the sense of alienation felt by many Muslims and thus compensated for the Philippine government's seeming inability to do this. The Mission indicates, for example, that almost 75% of all its infrastructure projects have been constructed in Muslim-majority barangays, and more than 70% of the 600,000 youth benefiting from CLIC are Muslim.

Locally, the wide visibility of new physical infrastructure such as roads and bridges in particular can affect a community's psychology by instilling more confidence. Paraphrasing the sentiment, "Someone is finally paying attention to us. There is hope." The effects of tangible or "hard" projects are perhaps most appreciated in the poor, rural barangays that start with so little, for additions are highly conspicuous. Physical structures are objectively verifiable indicators to a village that has been isolated due to geographical distance and armed conflict that they are potentially part of a wider society. An interview also brought out that providing a community wider access to water in areas where Muslims predominate especially helps to level the playing field, because water is essential for ablution before praying. Because control of the land is such an important part of the Moros political agenda, it also seems significant that 44% percent said the right of their family to own or till agricultural lands improved compared to before year 2000, while only 19% said it deteriorated, and 32% said it has not changed.


²⁴ A common assumption is that reducing poverty and boosting economic growth reduces conflict *ipso facto*. However, USAID/CMM documents recognize that conflict arises not simply from poverty and stagnant growth, but also from inequality, lack of access to basic services, and competition for remaining limited opportunities, including control of what the state holds (CMM website). Whether growth reduces conflict may depend on the stage of economic development (Mejia, 2004). As the size of the economic pie in an area increases, the chances of conflict may actually increase, for new opportunities open up for appropriating the gains, and conflict between differing interests becomes more likely, especially where conditions that reinforce inequities persist ("The rich get richer, the poor get poorer"). As an economy continues to grow, however, the productivity gains can begin to outweigh the incentives from unproductive activities, thus reducing propensities for conflict. This is more likely where property rights exist and income is equitably distributed.

²⁵ Two meanings of "marginalized group" need to be distinguished. On the one hand, members of an aggrieved ethnic, regional, or other community may be a party to a conflict and thus comprise a political identity that has become mobilized to some extent (e.g., many "Moros" in Mindanao). On the other hand, demographic categories may be poor and neglected but have no politically salient identity (e.g., women, youth, non-politicized minorities). The former are the most direct way to mitigate the conflict. They relate to the issue in many conflict environments of "horizontal equity" such as between ethnic, regional or other identity groups, whereas the other notion concerns "vertical equity."

Another way such facilities can affect a sense of group rivalry is to stimulate new links between local ethnic and religious communities in relationships of interdependency. The installation of Level III water facilities (faucets in houses) in Muslim areas in a city where the City Water District did not have any coverage paved the way for linking formerly un-served or underserved communities to local utilities agencies (e.g., the water district). The presence of USAID/GEM in these areas convinced the local water district to invest in water delivery system to Muslim areas in the city where there used to be no water connection at all.

At the same time, careful attention needs to be paid to not exacerbating tensions between beneficiary and non-beneficiary populations – three examples were noted during the interviews, including one from GEM, one from EcoGov, and another from EQuALLS. The survey also suggested the potentially divisive impact of aid in divided societies. Sizeable numbers of people from the main religious groups of Mindanao felt the other group was receiving more assistance than their own group. In the view of Christians, USAID programming is geared towards Muslims. Although Muslims acknowledge that there are a number of programs being implemented in predominantly Muslim areas, they feel they do not have equal opportunities for jobs that are created by development programs. About 40% percent of both Christians and Muslims in Mindanao feel that the other group has acquired more economic opportunities.

To bridge these perceived disparities, Muslim business, education, and religious leaders noted the importance of focusing not only on Christian and Muslim relations separately, but also on more integrated programming that would call not only for interfaith dialogue efforts and solidarity groups but also inter-ethnic and inter-religious economic interest groups. A second remedy is to look to local leaders to defend these allocations, if not actually participate in them, a further argument for working through local entities. For example, when the UN ACT for Peace Project became a project for all communities in Mindanao and Palawan that were in need of assistance, this opening up of the project did not sit well with the MNLF hierarchy. However, the clamor was mitigated by the then ARMM Regional Governor Hussein, also a member of the MNLF, who took pains to explain to his group that development in Mindanao should not be focused only on the MNLF since there are other communities also in need of development assistance.



C. Impacts on enabling factors that support violent activity

Conclusions

Most notably, USAID programs helped implement the 1996 peace agreement effectively by integrating large numbers of MNLF combatants into productive employment, and they have created attractive peaceful alternatives to the pool of potential recruits to armed movements.

Key Findings

The most emblematic of USAID's accomplishments has been the "Arms to Farms" support activities of first, ELAP and SWIFT under LEAP, and then GEM, through providing economic supports such as farming tools to demobilized MNLF soldiers. In Cotabato, for example, mention was made that MNLF members in the city received assistance in 2005 through LEAP's provision of direct production materials. In the survey, 42% believed that former Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) combatants have found new livelihoods. Although many MNLF former combatants still proudly carry their arms, live together in areas of MNLF control that are regarded as their camps, and even clash occasionally with government forces, the evidence suggests those programs have succeeded in discouraging the past combatants covered under the peace agreement from re-entering a life of combat.

The survey data also suggest progress by the wider array of livelihood, social programs, and training and educational opportunities, as described in the previous section, in dissuading *prospective* recruits to armed movements. For many potential recruits, the opportunity costs of joining a rebel cause have been raised. Virtually half of the survey respondents said that the youth in their barangay are less susceptible to

influence by groups that use violence to achieve political agendas. The reservoir of working age potential soldiers seems to be shrinking, although it still may exist.

The material gains at the individual and community level may also be cumulating in such a way as to also reduce the amount of *general* public moral and political support for armed or militant movements, for these gains help to undercut some of the movements' social and political grievances. In the survey, 41% of the surveyed households thought that the people in their barangay are now less inclined to provide money, food, or shelter in support of the armed groups fighting the government or to join political rallies or legal organizations sympathetic to those groups. About the same percentage felt that the people in their barangay are less inclined to support the armed groups that are fighting the armed forces of the Philippines by joining political rallies or legal organizations sympathetic to those groups. At the same time, however, both Moro armed movements obtained moderate increases in trust ratings compared to before year 2000, with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) rating slightly higher than the Moro National Liberation Front or MNLF (42% compared to 38%). So what remains unclear is whether the respondents were endorsing the movements' armed activities, peaceful political activity, or both.

One obviously violent group has clearly lost support. The Abu-Sayyaf registered a huge decline in terms of public trust compared to before year 2000, as a full 55% expressed *decreased* trust in them. Indeed, the Abu-Sayyaf was the only entity rated in the entire survey that received a decline in terms of public trust. Only 11% said their trust in the Abu-Sayyaf increased since 2000, and 23% said it has not changed. This may be a response to their tactics as much as to people's outlooks.

Conclusion

A few USAID programs may be starting to reach out to the alienated mind-set of Muslims through helping to articulate positive religious values and ethical norms that promote peaceful politics, and through these means, to be engendering greater trust also among Christians and Muslims.

Key Findings

Addressing economic factors and distributional or other policy issues are still not sufficient alone for achieving peace, as such efforts do not always affect the conflicts' ideological, institutional, and political sources. The "Moros struggle" is to a great extent an identity conflict that cannot be completely reduced to getting out of poverty. As seen earlier, many USAID programs have mainly targeted the tangible factors or conditions in the economy or society that increase the chances of violence, such as new roads to enable farmers to offer their goods to a wider market and new job skills. Infrastructure and other programs delivering hard goods or services do help to influence attitudes. As one respondent pointed out, when new lights were put into a barangay, people could mingle more at night, thus increasing trust. However, program impacts also need to directly address "hearts and minds," that is the cognitive and emotional level of values and beliefs shared within the communities that are direct or indirect parties to conflicts – the "emotional economies" in a conflict.²⁶ The latter factors are not always changed by the former: objective improvements may not lead automatically to changes in attitudes, and attitudes may become more positive even though objective factors are unchanged. Thus, objective conditions and subjective consciousness both need to be addressed. Emphasis on material factors alone fails to acknowledge that conflicts are not simply due to the lack of resources but also to the lack of codes for living that are accepted as legitimate and lack of rule-governed, legitimate processes for allocating resources and making public decisions. Programs can engage the "battle of ideas" by seeking to shape the dominant evolving public narrative that expresses the outlook of ordinary people and their most influential leaders about the situation of their community. As one respondent expressed, assistance will

²⁶ Goodhand and Sedra (2006).

not be appreciated if it appears that it is trying to “buy off” the followers of a political cause, rather than show respect for their legitimacy. A number of polemical editorial pieces put out on the web cast the US’s development efforts in Mindanao as simply concerned with U.S. geo-political and corporate interests in the region, not those of Mindanao or the Moros people.²⁷

This kind of cynicism is belied to some extent by a few USAID programs that are beginning to tap into some of the local cultural frameworks and institutions that are formulating a positive vision for development. A prime example regarding the Muslim community is the support for the articulation and spreading of positive beneficial Islamic norms for family and community life through the fatwah described earlier. Similarly, tapping into tenets of Islam regarding protection of the environment gives people a practical meaning for peace in Mindanao and a concrete way to achieve it. Such efforts speak to the need for identity and self-governance that is felt especially by the “Moro nation” in Mindanao. Though a dispersed and ethnically fragmented community, this notion still refers to a meaningful identity group, operative especially at the political level. A positive form of this ethno-national ideology has the potential to fill the vacuum of ideas that has attracted the radical political agendas that are currently vying for Muslim loyalties from largely outside the country. In the survey, 42% of the respondents agreed that, compared to before year 2000, “Minority groups in this barangay are less inclined to think that using armed force is an effective way to achieve satisfaction of their grievances.” Only 25% believed that since 2000, Muslims in their community are increasingly influenced by the views of the Abu Sayyaf rather than more moderate interpretations of Islam.

Such efforts tap into value systems that are widely shared and often most articulated by religious leaders. Survey respondents across four of the five provinces noted at least a 70% increase in trust of their respective religious leaders. As expected, the predominantly Christian communities had 70%+ trust in the Church and predominantly Muslim provinces had 70%+ trust increase in their Imams. On average, the Muslim majority provinces had about 20 - 30% trust increase in Christian leaders. Christian majority provinces had a wider range of 13-57% trust in Imams. However, “within-group” cultural initiatives that thus work through spiritual leaders are not anti-thetical to fostering greater tolerance between groups and may even be needed for the latter to emerge. Because it sought to get the religious leaders of both Christian and Muslim faith to accept modern family planning methods, the family planning campaign was able to broker the Bishop-Ulama Conference, where the religious leaders issued a joint statement on responsible parenthood. Increasingly positive views are reflected in each group’s view of the other. About 56% of the surveyed population agreed that compared to year 2000, relations between differing ethnic communities have improved, and about 62% noted an improvement between differing religious groups.

D. Impacts on capacities for peace, including local government and women’s empowerment

Conclusion

USAID has had some impacts in making local governments more effective, especially at the municipal level, by professionalizing operations such as assessments and tax collection, work standards, and customer responsiveness. It has also begun to use program resources to engage key segments of the Moros community particularly women to become politically active such as through public advocacy in community affairs.

Key Findings

Poverty may create conditions that are ripe for conflict not simply through providing the general population with grounds for upheaval but also through the limitations poverty imposes on the ability of

²⁷ E.g., Padilla, 2004; Cruz, 2006.

governments and social institutions to address a society's problems and manage its disputes peacefully. Moreover, even where poverty is prevalent, disputes can be managed through existing institutions, and where wealth exists, politics can still cause conflicts. Whereas economic assistance affects most directly the circumstances of large numbers of individual households, the net progress a society makes is also greatly determined by the overall processes and policies of governmental and social institutions that shape its collective life, for good or ill.

One of the most important approaches that can be taken to managing conflicts is fostering effective representative, executive, and judicial agencies within the formal, official local government units (LGUs), for they can channel the clashing interests and resulting disputes that inevitably arise in a society into non-violent processes for regulating conflicts. In traditional societies, they can help to increasingly reinforce the principle of government by laws, not men. In Mindanao, the highly corrupt, ineffective and unresponsive public services that are often dominated by local powerbrokers are a critical ground reality that has added to the perception that its people are marginalized by the Philippines government. Thus, achieving transparent and accountable local governance has to be part and parcel of a strategy for conflict reduction and peacebuilding.

The mayors, city administrators, and planners of medium and large-sized cities whom we interviewed were all pleased with the results that the GEM, ENRICH, EQUaLLS, CLIC, and other USAID projects around their cities had achieved in expanding services to their constituents. The USAID practice of generally working through local governments – rather than going straight to NGOs and people's organizations as donors sometimes do in other countries – was also appreciated as more appropriate and seen as ensuring implementation success, for cities like Lamitan in Basilan have subsequently taken over the programs themselves.

Most pertinent to promoting effective government are the efforts under TAG to streamline certain line functions in order to increase the efficiency of revenue collection, reduce corruption, and orient operations more accountably to their own citizens. In Gensan, TAG assistance helped shorten procedures like business licensing and procurement. In Iligan, centralization of jeepney terminal fees improved city revenue collection, allowing the city to trim the bureaucracy, whereas previously the terminals were dispersed. Funding under this program also allowed the city to complement Cagayan de Oro City as a passport facilitating center in northern Mindanao, saving applicants transport cost. The tax-mapping of Zamboanga City residents and businesses is reducing overlap of titles and finding out which titles are still with owners or mortgaged to the bank or which have been changed due to death of the original owner. The goal is to determine appropriate tax values of homes and institutions, many of which are under-assessed. Although the evaluation was not asked to look at GEM 3, GEM 3 will mount a program to help 10-20 of the key provinces and municipalities to dramatically increase the amount of land and business tax revenue they currently collect. Also, human capital development aimed at improving, professionalizing, and making more efficient public service in city government offices is part of the orientation of many incoming staff. Regular seminars are conducted the whole year round covering ethics to law, and with the help of TAG, the LGU implemented the Public Service Efficiency and Accountability Program.

By addressing corruption, adding and streamlining services, and inculcating a more customer-focused service culture, these measures have apparently increased both the effectiveness and legitimacy of LGUs, at least at the municipal and provincial levels. The household survey reflects increased trust in local governments and especially their mayors. Indeed, while there is a significant amount of trust for governors and mayors since 2000, only about 40% of those surveyed said that their trust of the GRP has increased since then.

Some of the highest increases in the survey are seen in people's rating of local government and administration. Seventy-four percent expressed increased trust in the mayor of their municipality/city. Regarding the governor of their province, 67% expressed increased trust. Three-fifths (63%) said the administration of their municipal/city government of its services improved compared to before year 2000, while only 10% saying it deteriorated, and 25% regarding it unchanged. Similarly, three-fifths (57%) said the administration of their provincial government of its services improved compared to before year 2000, while only 15% said it deteriorated, and 26% said it has not changed. There is also evidence of greater responsiveness to citizens. Half believed that local politicians respond more to the needs of people regardless of who the people voted for, and 44% thought that local government is more participatory by involving people more in important decision-making processes, such as electing public officials and influencing the uses of the internal revenue allocation. In addition, 53% agreed that the government's policies enable more indigenous peoples to participate in public decisions and development projects. Meanwhile, two-fifths or 43% say fair treatment by the court of people with cases in their community had improved compared to YR2000, 18% said it had deteriorated and 36% saw no change.

The greatest net improvements over those years were seen in terms of settlement by the barangay justice system of disputes in one's own community (+53%), the administration by municipal/city government of its services (+53%), and the administration by provincial government of its services (43%).

Some attention is also being given indirectly to enabling citizen action and community mobilization to work through the mandated government civil society mechanisms such as citizens' councils and non-official committees to focus on common local interests. To pick an example, when distributed to youth, Imams, women groups, and LGUs, the book *Al Khalifa* was used as a tool for discussing practical problems of the environment and showing how environmental problems affect their daily lives. The meetings helped organize local stakeholders around particular projects and hold project recipients accountable. From there, it has been relatively easier to get participants to understand the technical side of environmental management.

Such civil society activities can create local watchdog capabilities, help to break down latent inter-group animosities, and form the local basis for scaling up to interest groups that advocate for Mindanao's policy and other needs as a whole region. Compared to before year 2000, 52% agreed that the people in their barangay feel that they are more able to participate in the important decision-making processes that affect their lives and community affairs.

Finally, it is widely recognized in the development and peacebuilding literature that empowering women in traditional and semi-traditional societies can pay high dividends in addressing problems such as local conflicts and neglected community needs. As reflected in the FY2006 Annual Report, USAID's main approach to gender is to integrate these concerns in programs that increase incomes, provide access to health services, provide job skills training, and allow ordinary women to participate in addressing issues that directly affect them.²⁸ Forty-six percent of SWS respondents agreed that "Compared to before YR2000, employment opportunities for women in this area have increased."

With regard to conflict impacts in particular, the most effective ways to engage women go beyond engaging them in implementing specific projects and have to do with mobilizing their collective strength by taking advantage of their particular stature in the community and working ideally across conflict lines to form lobbies for peaceful approaches to issues and needed legislation and policies. This approach is

²⁸ A gender committee composed of representatives of SO teams was organized to develop a *Gender Plan of Action* for FY 2005. As noted in the FY2006 Annual Report, gender equality concerns are also addressed by USAID through inclusion of men in family planning and attending to high drop out rate of boys from 4th-6th grades.

reflected in some of USAID's programs. According to the FY2005 Annual Report, Muslim women's dialogue and advocacy for peace and development became an important development focus in FY2004 and is spreading in Mindanao. The effort began with USAID/Philippines' sponsorship of eight Mindanao women leaders to the Global Summit of Women held in Morocco in June 2003. This was followed by a conference on the Role of Muslim Women in Peacebuilding and Development attended by 800 Muslim women in July 2004. These initiatives resulted in the development of local Muslim women's Peace and Development Council in Mindanao, seeking and advocating peace and development.

E. Impacts on immediate events

Conclusion

Meaningful efforts are also being made to bring clan (rido) fighting and smaller-scale intra-communal disputes under more control.

Key Findings

Infrastructure programs can play a role even in limiting the violent manifestations of conflicts such as crime or armed combat. In a brief meeting, JSOTF was asked whether providing a new road, for example, might in theory offer a path to insurgents as much as to a government army patrol and thus increase the opportunities for armed conflict. In his extensive experience, he has found that what actually happens on balance is that opening up of remote areas tends to drive insurgents back further into the hinterlands. Another informant argued a point supported by common experience that crime is discouraged in areas that are better lit at night. There is no silver bullet for mitigating conflict, but infrastructure such as roads and electricity comes pretty close, at least in remote areas with difficult terrains that are subject to armed or illicit activity and have rudimentary facilities.

The problem of rido, however, arises even where there are abundant resources. Poverty is not particularly the problem. The barangay of Combo in Zamboanga del Sur, for example, has abundant natural resources. Yet development has been blocked for the past eleven years because four local leaders have been locked in conflict over political and family differences. The obstacle has to do with unhealthy processes and customs. So when the local government, with help from the EcoGov Project, began to implement a coastal management plan, the technical working group realized that any community effort would be futile unless the warring clans were reconciled. Consequently, the mayor initiated peacemaking initiatives that engaged the leaders in dialogues and led to signing a local peace accord (see picture). In short, the barangay is building not simply structures but relationships based on common interests.



To encourage and support more such mediations, RIDO, Inc. (through USAID's support of TAF) and other NGOs are providing training and encouragement to local council of elders and other local leaders. They have documented a number of successful cases of managing rido disputes, as well as failures in such areas as Matanog, Shariff Kabunsuan, Patikul, Sulu, Pikit, North Cotabato, and Datu Piang, Maguindanao. Note that these efforts seek to leverage the influence of religious leaders and home-grown traditional mechanisms to mediate disputes. The Quran is often invoked to cement the reconciliation process by including verses on the environment. Religious norms present a "moral force" against rido,

for it becomes defined as an obstacle to preserving vital resources for the community. Extensive efforts also have been carried out through the barangay justice system to take on informally many common family relationship disputes, such as those surrounding elopements and those that in some cases, as illustrated earlier, could escalate into larger-scale confrontations or killing.

The fruits of this work are being noticed. In the interviews, mayors, religious leaders, and implementers of other sectoral projects and business leaders alike noted the positive impact of TAF's work to address open disputes through the Barangay Justice Service System (BJSS) and Conflict Management Program (CMP) projects. Although mainly focused on small-scale inter-familial and commercial disputes, BJSS has the potential for breeding young men and women leaders who can help to open up local politics.

The SWS survey found considerable support for the notion that various forms of armed conflict and localized violence are down. Sixty-two percent of the survey respondents believed that since 2000, more *rido* or family feuds were settled through dialogue or other peaceful dispute resolution processes than by violence. In addition, 57% agreed that more local disputes over land and natural resources are settled through dialogue or other peaceful dispute resolution processes than by violence, and 51% agreed that local people are less inclined to use violence to resolve their disagreements with others. Half of the respondents also believed that the people in their barangay have received fairer treatment from courts. Fifty-four percent of households said that policy protection has improved compared to year 2000, while 13% report it has deteriorated and 32% reported no change. While not all of this improvement arises from USAID projects, when interviewees in Stage III were asked about projects with which they were familiar and thought of as having the most impact on conflict in Mindanao, BJSS and CMP were the two most recognized projects.

F. Other Supportive Factors

Across the provinces, significant differences emerged regarding the perceptions of local conditions. For example, improvements in efforts to limit family size were highest in North Cotabato, followed by South Cotabato, Maguindanao/Shariff Kabunsuan, Basilan, and Lanao del Sur. To take another example, in all but Basilan province, the surveyed noted a positive increase in employment opportunities for women, while in Basilan, a significant 47% disagreed with the statement. Communities also differ with regard to which of the USAID programs they deem most helpful. As noted in the Mix and Balance section, of the 48% aware of any USAID program, the top four programs they consider beneficial to *their own family* are: EQuALLS (both ELSA and ASCEND were noted) LEAD, AMORE, and LEAP. The top five programs they consider beneficial to *their own community* include, GEM, EQuALLS (ELSA and ASCEND both mentioned again), MAP and LEAD.

The survey also noted that the positive responses in USAID project sites were often not markedly higher than in non-USAID project sites. Notwithstanding that USAID is the most active donor in Mindanao, the survey reveals a number of instances when positive results do not differ significantly between those sites where USAID projects have operated and those sites where they do not. This may reflect the fact that many other factors besides those projects may be contributing to the improvement of conditions. These may be as varied as the work of the GRP, other donors programs, and remittances. Significant although not surprising, is the fact that the respondents' knowledge of USAID programs is higher in USAID than non-USAID project sites (57% vs. 42%). This may reflect the fact that visible manifestations of programs such as signage are likely to register with people. Similarly, the trust ratings of USG and USAID in USAID project areas increased by +6%..

The lack of such differences is not surprising, however. As noted above, the survey was not ascertaining direct impacts of given program activities or services on targeted beneficiaries, but rather their combined impacts on the wider conflict/peace environments of localities. Naturally, many factors besides USAID

programs are likely to have produced those kinds of bigger results.²⁹ Thus, it is not a criticism if USAID alone does not account for differences among impacts in different areas. Just as program planning needs a logframe to uncover assumptions before launching a program, post hoc evaluation needs to note factors other than the program in focus that help to account for the program's impacts. These factors are useful for subsequent planning, as they define parameters within which new efforts are likely to be feasible and flourish. Also, USAID can consider reinforcing aspects of a supportive environment.

Some portion of the positive impacts observed arose from crucial contextual factors besides USAID's programs. It was often acknowledged by respondents that the progress made by relatively successful communities (such as Lamitan in Basilan, which came under a famous siege a few years ago) has had a lot to do with the nearby presence of security forces, especially the Philippine marines, who are accepted as well by many Muslims, and police and civilian volunteer units that protect the city. The fact that Lamitan is roughly 60% Christian and 40% Muslim and there are many mixed marriages also helps to explain its unusual stability. More widely, the dramatic decline in armed clashes in Mindanao in recent years has to be attributed also to the ceasefire with the MILF and the presence of the international monitoring teams, as well as the local Bantay Ceasefire program arranged between the Catholic bishops, people's organizations, the military and the MILF. There is also wide sentiment that despite occasional clashes, the solution, at least to the conflicts with the MNLF and MILF, cannot be military.

Another crucial factor – alluded to above and corroborated in other research on local ethnic conflicts (e.g., Horowitz, Varshney) – is the special importance of local leaders and elites in societies that are traditional or semi-traditional. In Mindanao, we noted the key role of certain moderate mayors and governors as well as some civil society leaders. These individuals often have taken many initiatives on their own, perhaps drawing on donors' support. In Upi, for example, the mayor and the local government unit earned distinction for setting up a Mayor's Council to unite its diverse peoples. Composed of two representatives from the Elders of each group, Christian settlers, and indigenous Teduray and the Maguindanaon Muslims, the Council is a special body that tackles conflict management and conflict resolution using indigenous means of settling and dealing with conflict. The mayor has linked with donor agencies to put up other mechanisms for citizen participation as well, like DXUP, the Community Radio Station. In his first term, he pushed for the paving of the municipal road using local development funds, without any assistance from external donors. According to observers, the leadership style of the mayor – transparent, credible, consultative, and participatory – has had a huge impact on local governance. Leadership by example makes subordinates readily accept requirements for transparency and accountability.

These progressive leaders often come from established families. Iligan City's equally progressive mayor is a longtime local government official who comes from a local wealthy family. In part due to his status and wealth, he is looked upon to settle rido and in fact, has settled ten in the last four years. The mayor has also publicly discouraged the use of the word "Moro," which he regards as a slur word directed by the Christian majority at Muslims. He is apparently effective in part because he is respected and can use some of his own finances as blood money to rectify an imbalance and to show that he has a stake in the peace pact between warring clans. To formalize the settlements, he holds a ceremony in his office to render it a formal legitimacy. He also maintains contacts with the Muslim barangay officials in his area and hired a security consultant to help handle these disputes.

Another example of a progressive scion is Lanao's young governor. A Muslim, his family has run the province for sixty years, ever since his father was governor, and his mother preceded him in office. Local

²⁹ Statistical research that looks for correlations among relevant security, socio-economic, political, and program quantitative indicators in a sample of locales might be able to identify patterns in the differing kinds and magnitudes of conflicts that are characteristic of differing community settings and associated with differing packages of programs.

Lanao politics will likely continue to be dominated for some time by these Dimaporos, and another family, the Quibranzas. Notwithstanding the dynasty, however, the province is a melting pot with 60% non-Muslims and 40% Muslims that began to attain peace by the mid 1990s after a long decade of fighting. The governor's stated aim now is to fight poverty and turn the province into a zone of peace, for it is already hosting national events.

The role of other donors was also mentioned for their support of similar projects that have helped preserve and enhance the peace and compensate for the limited resources that the national government can extend. Cotoabato collaborated with various agencies as well as with USAID. Another example is the set of projects in Lamitan supported by the Japanese (JBIC and JICA), Australia (AusAid), CIDA, Belgium, OIC countries, and foreign NGOs like Global Improvement for Tomorrow.

The survey asked which of the following economic, international or other non-USAID factors had contributed to achieving more peace in Mindanao, with the following results: remittances from overseas Filipinos that are helping their family (69%); international economic and social assistance that improved people's standard of living (64%); more effective government armed forces (59%); progress in negotiations between armed groups and government (58%); more attention of the national government to the needs of Muslims in Mindanao (57%). Slightly less emphasized was improved security due to U.S. military activities (48%) and people being tired of suffering caused by armed conflicts (40%).

G. Sustainability

The processes through which some of these program impacts were brought about raised some questions about the ultimate sustainability of the observed impacts. The picture we gathered is ambiguous. On the one hand, the teams heard mentions of ways that recipients of aid were undertaking follow-through on projects. The presence of a USAID/GEM project often encourages constituents in an area to put in their own counterpart investments. In Zamboanga City, completed projects have been turned over and managed well by city government. Small budgets do not cover a variety of fees (venue, supplies, materials, food) that cannot be subsidized solely by an LGU, and the involvement of USAID and the Asia Foundation has been critical not only in compensating for this shortfall but sustaining the project. On the other hand, the teams heard several concerns about the sustainability of program impacts. A city mayor, for instance, noted that the enterprise development among the city farmers has not been sustained, generation of employment through the infrastructure projects was short-lived, and projects like backyard gardening have not been sustained as well.

One familiar worry was whether withdrawal of support would effectively end a program. Some LGUs have been hampered by their inability to come up with counterpart funds. A mayor noted that it is unfortunate that a low-profile and successful family planning program was stopped in 2007, for rising births will aggravate poverty in cities as soon as two to three years. Because of the decentralization of national government responsibilities to LGUs, the latter must now shoulder programs like family planning, but they are often not ready to do so because of lack of resources.

Another critique was the lack of provision made for buy-in by recipients or served communities. Upi has a long rainy season, and torrential rains can flood roads. If barangay roads are built without safeguards for such intensive water flow, they soon become impassable without regular maintenance, requiring community efforts in dredging and construction of canals for diverting overflowing water. In Gensan, USAID projects are said to have put a "lopsided" emphasis on infrastructure and not on skills trainings, and thus have not built in capability building for maintenance of infrastructure projects and or making people more skilled at organization and management of projects.

A third concern was that whatever advances were made often depended on the incumbency of dedicated elected officials whose terms will soon end, thus losing the political support behind a program. The incumbency of progressive local officials like the mayor of Lamitan in Basilan is tenuous. His decision to quit politics after his present term and return to the family business raises a sustainability question mark. If no one in his family can take over and no clear heir is apparent among his supporters, no one may be able to resist the encroachment of the less progressive families in the island. Even in Zamboanga, regime change after elections was worrisome to the respondents as it might make the sustainability of the USAID initiatives uncertain.

A related problem is that the skills imparted to training participants are lost when their careers move on. The efficient management of the new Iligan terminal may be lost as the successors may not be as effective or well-trained. Many city employees trained under TAG have only temporary (“casual”) appointments. When their contracts are over and they leave, the projects may die.

H. Gaps

Conclusion

There has been insufficient attention specifically to transforming the local political economies and violent cultures that shape the politics surrounding LGUs and the institutions of the ARMM.

Key Findings

Important as they are, good governance projects focus mainly on internal technical administrative procedures such as switching from an assessment system handled manually by tax assessors that allowed bribes, or shifting from the handwritten mode of checking attendance of employees to an electronic system using finger scanning. However, this supply-side approach within mainly the executive agencies has had relatively little impact in changing the dominant local political cultures that operate in many cities and towns through the influence of personal and family rule and patronage and are enforced through private armies, especially in the Muslim areas in the ARMM. Meanwhile, city councils and other citizen representative bodies, political parties, and electoral procedures are being given relatively less attention. Simply because local officials follow formally-democratic procedures such as elections even with high turnouts does not mean that processes for representing the various interests in such communities are sufficiently broad-based and participatory and producing effective leaders. To thus assume that many LGUs adequately represent the people in their areas and consultation mainly with officials is sufficient, does not take into account the ingrained local political economies whereby established elites such as powerful families have tended to dominate local politics through allocating patronage and other means to influence public decision-making.³⁰

It is legendary in the Philippines that local elections are often dominated by “guns, goons, and gold” in which vote-buying and intimidation are pervasive. While such colorful imagery lends itself to journalistic hyperbole, and some believe the influence of violence in electoral politics is declining (Linantud), others point to police statistics and other estimates of the deaths during the 2004 and 2007 elections still numbering in the hundreds (Penetrante). This is on form of the third type of violence that was noted in the USAID conflict assessments. The mix of a gun culture, ready access to small arms and light weapons, vigilantism, killings among political rivals, the creation of security vacuums by the withdrawal of government security forces from large areas, and the maintenance of private security armies by warlord-like local dynastic figures lead some to characterize the Philippines as a virtual but unrecognized failed state with a flourishing yet oligarchic democracy.

³⁰ See for example, Linantud, 1998.

The influence of money and threats of violence during elections thwarts the functioning of true democracy for it narrows political competition to a few families, discourages competency in public life, limits public debate, garners local natural resources for private gain, skews public policies toward private interests, and reinforces social divisions that keep inter-communal reconciliation from ever beginning. In the SWS survey, 80% of the respondents considered criminal syndicates to be the greatest obstacles in achieving more peace in Mindanao, ranking ahead of non-fulfillment of commitments by government or by the armed groups under peace agreement, insufficient social and economic development, and continued public support of the armed insurgencies.

Similarly, respondents during Stage III noted their lack of confidence in the ARMM in that it has failed to provide good governance or deliver the promise of real autonomy. As one government official noted, “Those now in power in the ARMM were rebels who were never taught administration.” Other reasons given for disillusionment with the ARMM are its financial dependency on the government in Manila, the political control that national leaders exert over local politicians, and its takeover by influential local families.³¹ Another comment from a USAID implementing partner noted that the ARMM is a very centralized bureaucracy that has not been able to effectively and accountably delegate resources to LG officials. Since there is no system of oversight for financial transfers, much of the funding (e.g., IRA) simply goes missing. In the survey, only 29% agreed to the idea that government officials in Mindanao are less corrupt than in 2000, while 37% disagreed and 31% were undecided.

Development projects are understandably reluctant to have programs implemented through what are known as corrupt institutions. Yet these realities at the local level suggest that more effort needs to be paid to understanding these local dynamics so as to devise prudent and effective ways to bring political rivalries and election violence of Mindanao under control. Otherwise, little development progress can be made. This, in the Mindanao case, in conjunction with building up more professional local policy forces, a “demand side” approach also seems to be needed to make the local government entities more dynamic, participatory, and accountable to their respective communities, such as through both civil society mobilization and the building of authentic political parties to gradually replace the personalistic machines that often now stand for elections. Also, although provincial and local LGUs are often less effective in the ARMM than in the larger predominantly Christian cities, the ARMM or its successors will continue to be symbolic political entities that are deemed more or less legitimate standard bearers by the Bangsamoro peoples and thus ways to work from within to improve them seem to be warranted..

I. Unplanned negative impacts

Conclusion

Certain features of recent programs may be unnecessarily reinforcing stereotypes and local practices.

Key Findings

Recent conflict-oriented development and humanitarian research suggests that programs need to take special precautions to “do no harm” by inadvertently exacerbating conflicts or their sources. One possible negative impact on Mindanao’s image was frequently mentioned.³² In several of the coastal cities visited, all of which were predominantly Christian in population, the teams picked up overtones of an attitude of “we versus them.” Many respondents expressed serious concern that all of Mindanao was unfairly perceived as everywhere unstable, due to its occasional violent incidents, and that this overly negative portrayal was blocking outside investment. This view and local pride that “we are peaceful,” but exported

³¹ Bacani (2005).

³² Anderson, 1999.

conflicts and other problems from the more unstable areas are burdening us, is exacerbating an underlying animosity between the coastal and hinterland areas. Smaller-city leaders are also resentful over Manila favoring “more peaceful” cities like Davao as centers of island-wide development plans. A related feeling was the perception that conflict areas are “rewarded” while more peaceful prospering ones are being slighted. This mentality, while not producing violence in itself will, if left unaddressed, continue to block Mindanao-wide efforts toward development and deepen its inter-communal and regional disparities.

This situation is brought about in part by the drain on the resources of provinces and cities that feel the fall-out from war or problems of peace and order in adjoining provinces and cities. The fact that Lanao del Norte is not part of ARMM has boosted the province’s profile. Yet being on the outskirts of the ARMM has unwittingly associated it with the instabilities of ARMM, and being a “Mindanao” province is also a problem. In Iligan City, an industrial city that needs reviving and is pushing for job fairs and seeking to attract foreign investors such as Korean companies, there may be a lingering anti-Muslim bias perhaps among many of its Christian majority that “they” are now using “our” medicines and doctors for “their” needs. The city’s public hospital staff and resources are being affected by the coming of refugees from these troubled areas. Peace and order problems in adjoining Lanao del Sur and Marawi are putting a drain on the city’s resources. The hospital budget is based on the needs of the city, but with the problems in the adjoining province, it is no longer sufficient to cover effective patient care. This is over and above the fact that the better-off families of Lanao del Sur also go to Iligan City for treatment. As a result, the professionalism of its staff – some of whom were in the seminars on improving public service – is being burdened. This problem can likewise affect the revenue improvement program of the city as LGU may be forced to shift monies from other agencies to sustain agencies like hospitals.

Similarly, in Zamboanga City, which is 90% Christian and 10% Muslim, overt Christian-Muslim conflict is not a major problem: the conflict is “out there” (i.e., in Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi). This includes banta, the local version of rido. To make sure that conflict in these islands are not brought to Zamboanga, the mayor has strictly enforced a two-bodyguard policy for mayors from the islands (the majority of whom have homes in the city) through Task Force Zamboanga.

Cotabato City, too, has difficulties marketing itself as an investment destination due to its alleged notoriety as a place where there is always disturbance in peace and order. Changes have been brought about by the aggressive moves of the LGU in pushing for agricultural development and in partnering with international donor agencies for its development projects. Yet some media campaigns reinforce the perception that Cotabato City is not safe, as suggested by an ad involving a Call for Peace. The city leadership and management have tried to erase the prevailing perception among outsiders that Cotabato city is not safe for outsiders, especially investors: that there is always “trouble” in Cotabato City. Officials talked to the UN ACT for Peace about the ad so it could be pulled or replaced with something that depicts a more balanced picture, rather than focus on Cotabato City as site of bombings and other criminal activities. They believe the city’s negative publicity has led to the loss of several business opportunities and paved the way for the growth of other areas like Davao and General Santos and stunting the economic growth of the city.

Granted violent incidents are reported weekly from Mindanao by national and international media, with datelines naming the nearest big city. Still, insofar as USAID’s discourse and publications – such as references to the CAAs around the ARMM – reinforce the simplistic view that virtually all of Mindanao is constantly in the grip of strife, they may unnecessarily contribute in some measure to these divisions. Describing certain areas of Mindanao as “conflict-affected” may be a useful criterion for deciding what kind of special attention may be needed for them (especially if actually based on continuous monitoring of conflict incidents and employing several gradations in risk factors). However, that differentiation can

be done internally and still provide guidance for conflict-sensitive programming, but without labeling such areas in public documents and discussion in ways that may further stigmatize them.³³

J. Recommendations

Arising from this picture is a number of suggestions for expanding the positive impacts noted above, filling gaps, avoiding the negatives, and ensuring impact sustainability.

One theme that arose in many interviews was that more emphasis should be placed on support for building individual and group skills and strengthening the organizational and political capacities of localities and of cross-sectoral consultative processes and mechanisms. According to this view, because actors at several levels are better able to undertake the solution to problems on their own, relatively less emphasis should be put on delivering various sectorally-defined material and technical products. The implementation of USAID's programs has generally been conducted by supplying materials and services to designated demographic categories such as families and occupational groups (e.g., farmers, fishermen, civil servants) rather than seeking to encourage and prepare groups within communities to act as collective agents of change. Thus, implementation has been organized largely on a functional rather than geographic basis. But "hard" projects like infrastructure will be less meaningful without corresponding "soft" components like capacity building for self-determination, meaning not independence or secession but managing one's own public affairs. In short, USAID needs to put more emphasis on empowerment of the ARMM communities and adjacent region for collective self-help, development, and governance. The following outlines several possible inter-related thrusts.

Extend the basic services further into unreached areas

Several observers had the impression that the kind of basic infrastructure projects such as farm-to-market roads, rural electrification, and health support (e.g., doctors to the barangays) should be extended even more widely and deeply into remote, rural barangays. These are often underserved and vulnerable to conflict or other peace and order problems such as interior barangays that serve as exit points for criminal elements. The projects should be LGU-centered and focused on interior areas, as the development of these areas will slowly undermine MILF influence and also sustain stability in the coastal areas. Apparently, USAID is planning to construct an additional 1,000 or so infrastructure projects over the next few years in conflict affected barangays, but considers it is reaching virtually all areas possible. However, if the limits seen arise from prohibitive security environments, site selection and deployment might be done in closer collaboration with security forces to pick unstable areas where they are able to provide a security umbrella. Such efforts may require formulating joint strategies with military forces to first establish sufficient security, as well as with other donors and the GRP to provide a wide package of initial development projects (and see the section on linkages and synergy). Different areas have rather different degrees of stability, security, and rule of law based on a number of factors. Together, such joint efforts could enlarge the frontiers of the stable areas in which progress could be hastened.

Foster greater cohesion among the Bangsamoro professional elite

When not looking through a conflict lens, donors can miss the importance of building social cohesion and focus on socio-economic interventions without incorporating dialogue and peacebuilding into their strategy. It is not a contradiction to also advise that inquiry should be made into the value of supporting low-key intra-Bangsamoro dialogue and other activities to decrease internal divisions. Donor treatment of MILF and MNLF separately at the national level leads to a notable increase in rivalry, perceptions of favoritism, competition and conflict between the insurgent groups. If there is a peace agreement with the

³³ A few mentions were also made that donor funds are abused by recipients, especially LGU officials, such as their tendency to personalize equipment like transport that are earmarked for project use, especially in Muslim areas.

MILF, personal interests in power and competition over the island's rich potential natural resources – often cloaked in religious differences – will become even more salient as are political and ethnic divisions within the Muslim population itself.

One “track two” non-official dialogue project that sought to directly engage in the peace process between MILF and the GRP is the Philippines Facilitation Project implemented by USIP and funded by the DOS. This project lasted four years (2003 - 2007) and is generally viewed as a good effort, yet unsuccessful. Establishing the needed trust and communication channels was difficult to attain given USIP's lack of presence in Mindanao. Furthermore, the Malaysians who had been working on MILF - GRP relations over the last several years were disgruntled by U.S. engagement.

“USAID should look for opportunities to support the Bangsamoro Development Agency and explore supporting university or NGO-based efforts to analyze and promote solutions to some of the key underlying challenges in Mindanao.” (Timberman, 2003)

However, such “track two” efforts may be productive if done at a somewhat lower-profile level. There are serious divisions within the Bangsamoro community that express themselves in the peace process as well as through election-related violence. If the trend toward internal factionalization and divisions within the Bangsamoro community continues, those fault lines are likely to exacerbate internal conflict over resources and power, if and when there is a peace agreement between the GRP and the MILF. Given recent news coverage of further divides among MILF factions based in Eastern and Western Mindanao, it may be no surprise that trust ratings of MILF have decreased in the West and increased in the East. Donor support for any future MILF activities or MILF affiliated organizations will need to be mindful of this increasing divide. The MILF faction that is heading the peace agreement with GRP and seeking a broader Bangsamoro Judicial Entity (BJE) in the Western areas of Mindanao is said to be from the Maguindanaoan and Iranon tribes. There are already signs of territorial divides, which has been a long lasting cause of conflict in Mindanao, so finding topics of mutual concern within the context of a more unified Bangsamoro identity may lessen further divisions. Working with local institutions that are familiar with these sources of conflict will provide credibility within the community and encourage a model of social responsibility. Strong relationships are necessary for building peace. If isolation, polarization, and factionalization are broken down, progress will be enabled among these key groups.

Trust ratings of the MILF and MNLF remain low with approximately 60% of the population noting that their trust for these groups has either decreased or not changed over the last 7.5 years. It should be noted, however, that Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao/Shariff Kabunsuan have increased their trust of MILF by about 75% and of MNLF by about 65% (the groups were surveyed in separate questions). These high percentages are related to the fact that these two provinces have higher populations (majority) of Muslims; however, Basilan remains untrusting of these groups. Part of this lack of trust can be associated with the split with the MILF that is becoming more and more troublesome throughout the island. Other MILF leaders note this sect to be an attempt to further divide not only a common Moro identity, but also relations generally between Christians and Muslims.

One way of possibly accomplishing an effort to strengthen Bangsamoro institutions and NGOs would be direct funding of activities through the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) created by the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of June 22, 2001. Depending on BDA's current skill-set, assistance for institutional development and staff capacity building should be considered, while being cognizant of the potential pitfalls of the BDA as an institution over the medium to long-term. The Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) derives its authority and legitimacy from the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001. It is mandated to determine, lead and manage relief, rehabilitation and development

programs in the conflict-affected areas in Mindanao.³⁴ Its goals include: improve the socio-economic condition of Bangsamoro communities; advocate for ecological balance and regeneration of the environment particularly in CAAs; improve health conditions of Bangsamoro people; and strengthen the capability of BDA as an organization. With 35 staff members and 1,700 trained volunteers, this organization seems equipped to serve as a USAID implementer for common Bangsamoro initiatives.³⁵

Muslim business, education and religious leaders noted the importance of focusing not only on Christian and Muslim relations separately but also on more integrated programming that would call for interfaith communication, dialogue and solidarity.

Cultivate progressive leaders at the middle level

Similarly, USAID programs should devise ways to identify and cultivate individual progressive and moderate young men and women leaders and expose them to other examples of progressive governance in poor developing countries. A useful focus would be governance in other Muslim and other autonomous areas, such as Kosovo and Abkhazia, including studying the sobering case of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza. This leadership program should mix Muslims and Christians from throughout Mindanao, and those from established families with those from poor households. As 2009 regional and 2010 national elections are on the forefront, the time is ripe to create a cadre of new political leaders. The prestige of being selected for such special training sabbaticals will legitimate those values but also create peer pressure for their follow-through in their political careers.

Foster intra-regional collaboration and national advocacy

USAID support should build out from efforts existing in major city hubs in the more coastal areas to forge more political and inter-communal ties between Muslim and Christian areas. Fostering linkages between municipalities and subsidizing overburdened public services can reduce tensions. USAID support can bring together Mindanao's mayors, governors and parliamentarians to become united advocates on behalf of the island's interests as a whole vis-à-vis the divisive influence of national politics and policies. One respondent ventured the idea of promoting a Mindanao political party. Mayoral efforts to attract investments could be supported through frequent meetings with national business associations, Filipino and foreign, like the American Chamber of Commerce.

Support professionalization of police and law enforcement

Special attention is needed to establish the means to enforce a rule of law to gain better control over destabilizing communal violence and criminality, for they can be flashpoints for wider conflicts and block development. Even where ethnic or other identity groups have achieved increased mutual contact with each other such as in the economic marketplace, when it comes to the political agendas and positions that their leaders espouse and any crises and tensions that may occur at the political and military level, the inter-personal contacts that are established give way to those wider political loyalties.³⁶ Thus, this suggests that progress at the grassroots level is not sufficient for building a sustainable peace until political agreements are reached at the leadership level. Also, institutions must function according to laws to enforce accountable behavior. There is a popular desire for more effective law enforcement, which suggests building upon the existing pilot project on community policing to tackle the difficult job of transforming local police into an effective professional body, including their counterpart community-based bodies. There was support for the idea that local police are better able to protect ones' family

³⁴ For more information on the BDA, see their homepage: <http://bdamindanao.page.tl/Home.htm>

³⁵ It should also be noted that at least two interviewees who thought highly of certain personalities within the BDA noted the need for further capacity building in order for them to manage medium or large scale projects.

³⁶ Forbes, 1997.

members from crimes, but the interviews turned up several mentions of their weaknesses and tendency to act mainly as bodyguards for local officials.

Community policing could be instituted so city constituents can actively participate in activities that contribute to ensuring their security on a community-wide basis. This can be done through a series of public awareness campaigns about community policing concepts and strategies. Interviewees also emphasized the need for an effective judicial system to deal with local criminality and for assistance in reconciling and synthesizing the confused authority spread across the current traditional, Sharia, and state court judicial mechanisms.

In addition, three recommendations are suggested below to enhance sustainability of programs and thus local ownership. In view of the variety of programs and settings, this broadly-focused evaluation looks for answers to the challenge of sustainability in general principles regarding the most effective processes and organization of activities, rather than in specific devices attached to single programs. The same variety confronts efforts to point to “best practices”. Although these notions often imply specific features of particular programs, this evaluation argues that the basic way to ensure that worthwhile activities continue and grow is to design programs so they are “rooted” deeply in existing political and economic incentive structures and that resonate with influential cultural norms; thus they appeal to the self-interest of leaders or entrepreneurs, such as politicians, and to the self-concepts of socially-significant communities, such as ethnic groups.

Capacitate locally driven processes that link citizen mobilization with LGUs

To ensure greater sustainability for efforts to institutionalize more effective and responsive LGUs, more opportunities should be sought out to pull together and organize various groups of ordinary citizens in given localities around this and other common interests and joint problem-solving mechanisms from barangay assemblies up to municipal consultations and regional cooperation. Greater participation by varied sectors in local governance and consultation with wider groups of stakeholders could be achieved through utilizing the LGU vehicle of local special bodies and the passage of local ordinances institutionalizing people’s participation. For example, the Mayor’s Council concept might be replicated at the barangay level to draft a community social protection or a conflict management or prevention initiative.

Beginning with agenda formation and project identification, community interest and potential commitment must be taken into consideration, so that local resources can contribute to project implementation. The choice of appropriate projects should not be limited to a menu or to a donor’s interests and mandates. Beneficiary communities must take a driver’s seat in the choice of projects and in the modalities of planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. Before project conceptualization, a resource and capacities assessment of beneficiary communities has to be done as a basis for determining local counterpart or contribution. This may then require training in the skills of organizing, assessment, planning, and management that will delay project execution. But in the long run, it will increase sustainability by eliciting a broader range of local supports. In this way, ownership of projects is enhanced, thereby increasing the success of project implementation.

Support and work through culturally-sensitive and locally-rooted civil society institutions

Traditional forms of social capital have served as a mitigant to conflict in Mindanao. In the Philippines, cultural/ethnic intermixing has often promoted peace rather than caused conflict. But a defining feature of Mindanao’s CAAs has been the failure of many local institutions to resolve disputes and animosities among the island’s multiple political factions and ethno-religious groups. Given this, the Mission program should be broadened by seeking to engender a more unified civil society through developing and

nurturing social processes and political institutions that help to mitigate conflicts and address local problems within and among groups. Enhanced support for local NGOs could help to build the local capacities for peace and good governance and could be achieved through an implementation approach in any and/or all sectors that draw in both NGOs and LGUs as participants and implementing partners.³⁷

Relatively more emphasis also now needs to be given to working through and with ARMM or post-ARMM and local political and administrative institutions for effective self-governance and conflict management – including both informal cultural processes such as councils of elders and the more formal state structures. The aim should be to increase their ability to serve local populations more broadly and thus accountably, so they are less subject to local elite capture, patronage, vote-buying in elections, corruption, clan fighting, and criminal activity.

In this connection, USAID should apply more widely the idea of using Islamic and Christian principles to promote peace and development. In particular, more opportunities need to be sought out for utilizing these local Islamic moral and cultural norms as the mediums through which local youth and women's groups, such as Bangsamoro women, and other recipient institutions such as NGOs and LGUs can spearhead advocacy work and thus elicit popular responses to the technical goals of development programs. Using culturally appropriate means of implementing activities and delivering assistance and culturally-sensitive organization and management capacity building for beneficiaries can legitimize such goals and engender a sense of responsibility and ownership of projects. One example of how this could be accomplished is an environmental advocacy project that encompasses cultural and value dimensions from both the Islamic and Christian perspectives. As a start, Christian leaders could be supported to develop a similar and yet complimentary document to that of the Al-Khalifa developed by Muslim leaders under the EcoGov project. An inter-faith group of religious leaders could bring together mixed populations throughout Mindanao to sensitize constituents to the importance of environmental stewardship and to promote a sense of common responsibility for their communities.

The cultural entry point offers a promising starting point for energizing the untapped potential dynamism of collective action at the community level and thus an antidote to the characteristically elite-dominated governance. At present, 130 LGUs have demanded that the Islam-based ECO-GOV program be implemented in their areas. The cause creates an incentive for interest-based rather than the personalistic politics of patronage. Some LGU officials who supported ECO-GOV implementation have won elections on the basis of an environmental platform. In one area, a working arrangement is in place for mayors' offices to link up with community-appointed leaders to form working groups on the environment. Community mobilization has also quietly and subtly undermined bad leadership at the community level.

In particular, women's groups have taken the initiative to introduce environmental activities and found strong support from self-help associations in communities, especially in ARMM hinterlands. Wives of the royal datus and sultans have become active environmental advocates. Muslim women were found to have been successful entrepreneurs with assistance from some programs, yet underutilized in others. Great successes have been published about women entrepreneurs through the MABS program in which both Christian and Muslim females received micro loans to start or in some cases continue their small business. BJSS representatives interviewed regarded women as good problem solvers and noted the positive impact they could have in resolving community issues – especially those related to domestic violence/marital problems, drug use and youth violence. These concerns are affiliated with the third category of conflict in Mindanao noted in Section I (criminality/violence at the local, individual level). These DG-focused projects also noted the need for leadership of livelihood improvement programs

³⁷ The UNDP-initiated concerted NGO and governmental Social Cohesion program initiated in the highly polarized society of Guyana in 2003 helped make the 2006 elections the first peaceful ones in the country's post-independence history (Lund and Myers, 2007)

specifically geared towards women. Although there are successes noted within a number of USAID projects,³⁸ women continue to feel marginalized, especially in LG programs and to a lesser extent, environment programs. Two group interviews with Muslim women noted that donor assistance that is run through local government often does not reach marginalized groups such as Muslim women and said, “Assistance through the government agencies is cursed.”

Another sector where cross-fertilization could occur among groups is education. As rates of education among youth remain fairly stagnant, the time is ripe for comprehensive education programs to more fully engage youth and adults on the importance of education for future peace and development in Mindanao. Youth peace camps from various ethno-linguistic groups have made contributions in a number of very polarized conflict environments (Israel-Palestine, Cyprus, India-Pakistan and Northern Ireland). These venues could be based on something neutral such as English language training with topics such as cultural heritage, communication skills, and the common future they share in Mindanao could be interwoven into their discussions.

Entice private sector actors to undertake selected functions

Another key to sustainability is to find ways in which the delivery of services can be done for profit, and thus to “hand off” certain public functions to private sector actors, as long as safeguard are established that guarantee quality and equitable distribution of the benefits. Successful linkages with private sector actors are discussed further below.

VI. LINKAGES AND SYNERGIES

Core Evaluation Question, part I: What linkages and synergies are found or are lacking within USAID programming?

Engaging in a concerted effort to interlink programs both within the same sector and between other sectors is pertinent to creating a critical mass of activities to address conflicts effectively and to create a sense of programmatic coherence for beneficiary populations. This more holistic cross-sectoral approach to addressing underlying sources and consequences of conflict is especially important in an environment such as Mindanao where episodes of violent conflict at the individual, community and political levels recur and overlap. As various types of conflict continue to disrupt Mindanao’s path toward development the time is ripe for donors, implementers, and affected communities to think about more concerted programming through all development sectors that can produce a multiplier effect for building peace.

A. Linking education and livelihoods

Conclusions

Education, as some would say, is the key to success. Whether it is formal or informal, children and youth throughout Mindanao have been the target population through a number of education programs funded over the last several years. With over 50% of the population under the age of 25, a concerted effort to integrate older youth and young adults from formal and technical education programs into the workforce is needed. A lack of such efforts may cause further deterioration of economic growth and is likely to force men and women of this generation into illegal or violent activities in order to make ends meet. With the increase of uneducated and unemployed youth, the risks for such tumult are amplified in the near future.

³⁸ Examples of these successes can be found at: http://philippines.usaid.gov/conflict_success.php.

As conveyed in the story under recommendations, in as little as three months of training a lifetime of bad choices can be turned into a new constructive path in life.

Targeting as well as site selection should include consideration of conflict drivers³⁹ and the youth who are most at risk for violence. Incorporating civic responsibility and volunteerism activities in conjunction with other sectoral projects (e.g., health or NRM) will further enhance the appeal of local businesses to take the risk in hiring what they may consider or who actually were “street kids.”

Key Findings

The EQuALLS project during Phase 1 was more focused on supply packages for schools and teachers rather than student training, but now Phase 2 is more focused on improving access to education based on DepEd standards, including in *madari*⁴⁰ where possible. Madari often enroll the poorest and most marginalized children who remain the target population of EQuALLS, so working with these particular schools is an effective way to reach those populations and to provide broad-based benefits as well as explicit problem-solving and peacebuilding skills to otherwise marginalized and vulnerable youth in areas affected by conflict.

We found mixed reviews as to how engaged the private sector became involved in reaching out to these youth as well as to the various cultural groups and rural communities for employment. However, positive results were found in relation to the fishing industry. At least three respondents during Stage III noted that SFAII and President Teng of the TSP Marine Industries specifically are respected companies/individuals who were effectively reaching out to squatters (migrants typically from rural areas in other provinces who come to the city looking for work) as well as ex-combatants (in Rajah Muda) and youth in vocational education programs (EQuALLS 1 was noted). On the other hand, a couple of local NGOs and beneficiaries noted that although they see an increase in business development, it is mostly in the big cities and they think they do not have an equal chance of obtaining such jobs given their lack of skills or need to commute. One government official in Cotabato City noted the need for factory/industry type jobs as unemployment continued to rise in their province. Although the EQuALLS-ASCEND project was particularly successful in working through the Mindanao Business Council to link OSY training and apprenticeships with the private sector, education representatives from the EQuALLS 1 and 2 programs noted the lack of cooperation with industrial corporations and said it would be useful for this to be made a required component of the program.

With the focus on implementation through DepEd (EQuALLS 2) rather than local NGOs (EQuALLS 1) standards are more likely to be followed, especially in rural areas. There is concern, however, as to how much power and control should be under DepEd auspices. Under the EQuALLS –TUDLO project implemented by the U.S. Peace Corps, quarterly reports note that although MOUs exist with DepEd, their active participation is often lacking especially with regard to support from the heads of schools. The EQuALLS-DIWA project also found weak participation of DepEd, which was reported partly due to the frequent movement of personnel and lack of ownership of this particular project.

³⁹ Conflict drivers as noted in Section 2 of this report include, but are not limited to injustice and poverty, political and clan rivalries, and competition for land and resources.

⁴⁰ Madari are schools run by Islamic principles and teachings (madari is plural, madrasa is singular)

B. Urban-rural inter-communal linkages

Conclusions

Utilizing previous recommendations of social preparation along with appropriate geographic clustering and integration of programs will promote a sense of ownership of projects within a community among and between LGUs, citizens of the barangays and the IP/USAID as well as make possible increased economic interdependency and trust across communities.

Key Findings

USAID is praised by some (relatively rare among donors) outreach to rural communities and yet there is also a generalized perception that USAID programs are dispersed too thinly and thus lack integration and coordination between projects that could otherwise enhance the impact of project benefits. GEM implementers said that their reduced geographic targets were not decided around trying to deepen benefits to hubs or “centers” but rather decided primarily based on identified sectoral need and security considerations. In reviewing design and implementation documents of EQuALLS and GEM, however, there seems to be a more concerted effort in the new phases of the programs to narrow their respective geographic targets and deepen the benefits, at least within their own sectors. Meetings with EQuALLS representatives (USAID and IPs) confirmed that this change to a more geographic orientation, rather than pursuing simply a discrete program or sectoral imperative was in fact an aim of the EQuALLS 2 program to increase impact.

Most donors pay attention to poverty alleviation to build peace but miss out on the issue of social cohesion and the need to heal rifts between communities and individuals which have been caused by many years of war.

– Local religious leader

This process of geographic concentration can be applied as well to sets of complementary programs, both in a local area and between local areas. Fruitful inter-communal linkages of urban and rural areas can be initiated by starting in remote rural areas. A staged process can be undertaken in conjunction with security forces that is likened to the “Clear, Hold, and Build” sequence that is undertaken by the military in counter-insurgency strategies (Patricio Abinales). First, remote areas need to be identified that have potentially exportable products and yet still present threats to project workers’ security. These areas first need to be made secure through the actions of GRP security forces. Early stages of development programming would likely comprise provision of basic infrastructure, such as roads and electrification, and building of the capacities of local inhabitants to grow more crops for marketable purposes. The subsequent steps entail expanding the capacity of transport, middlemen and trade relationships. Consequently, there is no necessary disjuncture between the need to develop centers of growth in urban coastal areas and the need to expand programming into more remote rural areas. Both can be done simultaneously through the identification of new or strengthening of old economic value chains that link agrarian areas to larger markets.

While similar activities are already being promoted in Mindanao such as through strengthening of BSOs, what must be central to such value chains from a conflict mitigation perspective is that the linkages thus forged are deliberately designed to establish ties of economic interdependency between differing identify groups, such as between the two religious persuasions, warring ethnic groups or clans. Specific tools for designing such conflict-sensitive value chains, as regarding infrastructure projects and forestry harvesting are available from USAID and other sources (e.g., Gundiz and Klein; Massett, Long and Crum).

This has management and operational implications. Currently the hub of USAID growth in Mindanao is generally perceived by IP’s and some SO team leaders to be through the GEM program, rather than through USAID as the whole funding institution behind all sector projects. The linkages of urban and rural

areas around product value chains for stability and growth should be a unified effort directed centrally by the Mission. Projects such as GEM that have wide geographical coverage throughout the island can still help spread a sense of cohesion among other sectoral projects. Leading from this internal sense of collaboration provides a parallel form of organization for the joint processes of assessment and strategy development that we are proposing at the community level.

C. Integration of conflict sensitive programming across all sectors

Conclusions

As noted in the earlier section on Mix and Balance, USAID is having an impact on peace throughout the many sectors in which it is working. In the case of programs such as the Alternative Learning System (ALS) that reached out-of-school youth, or the livelihoods training conducted for displaced persons under MAP, which also kept displaced youth from MNLF or MILF recruiters, the impacts were largely tangential to the central purpose of a program yet they were consciously regarded as conflict and peace impacts. In the latter programs, the impacts occurred through ancillary activities in programs or flowed simply from a program's own course of implementation, such as when FISH found it needed and could mediate local fishermen's disputes. In short, some programs are doing a lot of conflict mitigation without calling it such, while others are calling it such, but not doing it much. More fully integrating conflict reduction and peacebuilding components into all USAID programs represents a more focused and holistic approach to achieving peace through development. In programs such as GEM, the positive impacts were central to the programs, but not explicitly pursued as conflict and peace impacts.

Key Findings

One of the main USAID-funded projects considered highly successful is TAF's Conflict Management Program. It was said by TAF staff and LGU representatives that one reason for its success is due to the LGU support. It was also noted that USAID could go one step further to not only get LGU's buy-in but also their engagement in the process. The team found a couple of places where this had occurred, but perhaps part of the program could work with specific LG programs such as TAG to ensure public accountability of any LGU funds spent on blood money.

Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Improving Livelihoods ~ Success Story

TSAP's program goal was to fund viable family planning and health-related activities, which will help the ARMM and local governments improve their health status in a sustainable manner.

Eco-Gov's program goal was to strengthen the capacities of LGUs and local institutions to improve management of forests, coastal-marine and water resources, and promote integrated solid waste management systems through effective environmental governance.

Both of these goals were achieved through religious initiatives. For TSAP it was a fatwa for family planning and for Eco-Gov it was the Al-Khalifa for appreciation of environmental concerns. Prominent Muslim leaders believed in each of these initiatives and held subsequent meetings and conferences with local Imams and higher religious officials to gain further buy-in. Through extensive communication and marketing on local radio stations, hand-outs, public meetings and more, these two pioneering schema provided local citizens with the foundation to improve their overall livelihoods. A decrease in family size, an increase in the longevity of food sources and an increase in availability of food at affordable prices, will inevitably lead to overall improved health practices, deeper appreciation for natural resources and by and large a revitalized economy that increases household incomes per generations to come.

TSAP representatives noted the importance of engaging youth in programs to keep them from being recruited in local violent activities. TSAP sought out young gang members to serve as health mediators during their program and noted that a few of the youth are now working full-time in the health sector in both public and private institutions.⁴¹ This means of integration of conflict sensitive programming was inadvertently done, but could have a huge impact on these individual's lives.

D. Engaging local, national, and regional government

Conclusions

Effective programs can be undermined when all levels of government do not have access to the same information about donor funding and inputs. Internal lack of communication within government entities at various levels will lead to distrust and insufficient knowledge regarding development programs.

Key Findings

Dissipation of resources and political rivalries between the multiple and overlapping levels of government: the ARMM, local and provincial governments, and the national government leads to a lack of sharing of information. As documented in the survey, people have stronger trust and support for their local officials than of their regional and national offices. This would make sense given the fact that one of the main reasons for establishing LGUs is to expedite service delivery. The evaluation team also found that although ARMM officials were aware of a number of USAID programs, they lacked any reporting or monitoring information from their LGUs. Other than mainstream knowledge of the program's success, they were unable to provide detailed feedback as to the outcomes of projects being implemented in ARMM provinces. This may be due to the MNLF becoming more and more factionalized and thus losing control of the ARMM government.

E. Internal networking

Conclusions

USAID CTOs and activity managers must take on a stronger role in encouraging inter-program networking, linkages and synergies within and between sectors. Through increased communication and information sharing among IPs, USAID will be better placed to help communities better understand the big picture of development and the types of USAID support available in Mindanao. Ultimately, this should result in improved networking for the benefit of communities as well as increased public recognition of the range of USAID supports.

Key Findings

Field-level coordination is generally weaker between programs and stronger within sectors. Yet, we found many programs desire stronger collaboration to maximize impact and leverage the benefits of other activities. IPs in various sectors mentioned the specific desire to further collaborate with GEM. Unfortunately, GEM is generally viewed as having a "go it alone" attitude and as not reciprocating outreach from other sectoral program staff, never mind proactively looking for opportunities to leverage the benefits of GEM to increase the impact of other programs or vice versa. However, one good example of cross-networking is between the GEM and ECOGOV programs in which ECOGOV advises GEM on the environmental consequences of many of their infrastructure projects. It was noted by USAID/Philippines/OEE that there is room for expansion regarding advice on larger construction projects such as bridges.

⁴¹ Clear records of youth post project were not systematically kept; however, this was noted by a staff member of TSAP who remains working with youth in the health sector.

Core Evaluation Question, Part II: What linkages and synergies are found or are lacking with other USG agencies and other donors?

F. Sharing of information and resources

Conclusions

Initiating an open system for sharing and contributing documents, sharing resources to the extent possible, and updates on current flashpoints (conflict updates) with USG and other donors will enhance development cooperation generally and approaches to working in conflict environments specifically. Increased communication about approaches, strategies, and project implementation in conflict affected areas will allow for better social preparation prior to entering a community as well as building awareness of any mitigating or triggering factors that could prevent or lead to future violence.

Key Findings

Existing institutional mechanisms to foster coordination among the USG agencies are well received (e.g. embedding DoD reps in USAID, Team Mindanao, etc.). A number of specific examples of coordination exist, especially between USAID and JSOTF. These include: 1) JSOTF is currently working with SHEILD on the USS Mercy Ship visit; 2) JSOTF met with two USAID project teams as a result of USAID/DDM's invitation for a meeting; and 3) Map-sharing with GEM representatives. According to JSOTF representatives, they have not always been provided with USAID strategy and planning documents regularly so they are unaware of USAID's particular development hypothesis and implementation strategy in Mindanao and cannot best plan how to integrate or complement USAID interventions with their own.

Visits from Ambassadors, Mission Directors and Deputy Mission Directors to Mindanao signal the unity of USG efforts and reinforce USAID assistance efforts. The Ambassador's frequent visits to launch USAID projects send a strong signal as to unity of USG purpose between the State Department and USAID. Military informants and government informants as well as local businessmen noted the positive effects such USG visits have on building and maintaining relations with various constituencies across Mindanao. Furthermore, direct U.S. Embassy engagement with MILF is widely received to have positively impacted peace process dynamics. However, there were at least two mentions of the need for better information sharing across USG entities to avoid any confusion between those entities and/or with the public during high-level visits. For example when the Ambassador visits Zamboanga it would be helpful for JSOTF to be aware of such visits. It was also requested that any post-visit reports be shared with selected USG counterparts.

G. Donor synergies

Conclusions

Beyond established routines procedures with the GRP in reviewing and approving program plans, USAID has undertaken various forms of collaboration with other bilateral and multilateral donors such as through providing financial and technical support to MEDCO and specific projects of other foreign donors such as AusAID and the UN. However, there remains at least a perception that USAID prefers to embark predominantly on its own agenda and that deeper forms of collaboration would be fruitful.

Key Findings

USAID is heavily engaged in discussions with its Philippine and other donor counterparts in deciding on projects and coordinating their various activities. Thus MEDCO is the formal GRP counterpart for all

USAID Programs such as GEM, MABS, CUES, TAG, and BJSS that fall under the Mindanao Peace and Development Agreement (MPAD). Through chairing the Steering Committee for the MPAD, and the various Management Committees (ManComs) for different programs, MEDCO provides oversight and policy direction for all aspects of the programs, concurs with annual workplans, participates in development of procurement documents (scopes of work, etc.) and participates in selection of contractors and grantees. These committees normally are convened on a monthly or bi-monthly basis.

On its part, GEM supports MEDCO in multi-donor dialogues like the Mindanao Working Group, a sub group of the Philippine Development Forum. Limited financial and focused technical assistance has been provided to MEDCO as the Secretariat of the Mindanao Working Group in discharging its responsibilities. Assistance ranges from preparation/review of technical papers presented for discussion, presentation materials and kits provided for during meetings, discussion with relevant government agencies and donor institutions to push for specific priority agenda for Mindanao. USAID provided \$40,000 for the MEDCO coordinated planning process known as 2020.

USAID has also provided support to specific projects of other donors. As part of GEM-2's support to the ARMM Regional Government, USAID participated in the formulation of the concept for the UN Act for Peace Project and helped secure NEDA Investment Coordinating Council approval for the project. The project followed on the UN Multi Donor Programme, which was originally designed to provide support to the former MNLF combatants and their communities after the signing of the 1996 GRP MNLF Final Peace Agreement. While Phases 1 and 2 were focused only on the MNLF, in Phase 3, the communities adjoining MNLF communities were also targeted for assistance. USAID also collaborated through GEM with the Local Government Support Program for ARMM of CIDA, the Basic Education Assistance for Mindanao of AusAID, the Mindanao Rural Development Project funded by World Bank, and the ARMM Social Fund Project. As mentioned in the USAID FY05 Annual Report, USAID also collaborates in some way with ADB and WB on policy reform on energy, basic grains, bank and non-bank financial regulation, and expenditure management.

The heavy investment of USAID in Mindanao is widely appreciated and considered beneficial by other donors. However, USAID is still perceived as having a “go it alone” attitude and not collaborating sufficiently with other donors who might be involved in similar sectors. A recent notable investment that USAID made in conjunction with other donors is that of the World Bank Trust Fund for Mindanao. Interviews with donors as well as a couple of IPs stressed the importance of this strategic decision and urged more of this kind of collaboration by the U.S. Similarly, EQuALLS 2 has begun talking to AusAID representatives about their respective projects in the education sector. Interviewees relayed that much of the discussion thus far has been about concern of overlap and ensuring clear separation of activities so communities better understand the differences in each donor’s implementation goals. While this is a helpful start, it should be expanded to address the stated concern behind this core evaluation question of developing linkages and synergies with donors that deliberately and effectively address leading sources of conflict or peace capacities.

“Education is seen to be the greatest neutralizer and can cut across many sectors.”

– MEDCO

EQuALLS works on both curriculum content (math and English) and teaching strategies. Other projects such as Basic Education Assistance in Mindanao (BEAM) funded by AusAID are focused on other components such as increasing access to education and providing project management and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) skills for DepEd personnel. Regarding how these efforts can be more complementary and where geographically, joining efforts to strengthen their overall development impact as well as their aggregated impact on peacebuilding would be

useful. BEAM’s tagline “Strengthening Basic Education for Peace and Development” gives the impression that the program is already planning their project objectives utilizing a conflict lens. If so, this

may provide a starting point for communication with the USAID Education sector on how to become more conflict sensitive in an operational way (e.g. using particular indicators for conflict and peace). Although the team was unable to meet with CIDA and JICA representatives, it was also noted by IPs that USAID should seek to further collaborate on LG issues with these donors.

Possibly the type of collaboration that would have the greatest impact on conflict and peace factors would be engagement with other donors and local representatives in joint analysis within specific geographically defined communities of their respective conflict environments and in the hammering out of concerted strategies that elicit broad local participation and thus create bulwarks against recurrent episodes of violence or armed clashes. For such deeper collaboration, the UN-ACT for Peace suggests a number of lessons learned that may be helpful for future USAID programming: 1) Their approach to selection of target locations is to look at whether or not other donors have or will be able to come in with complementary programming; 2) Cell phones and text messaging have become important channels for quick communication, especially in rural areas, to promote information sharing and security concerns; and 3) The program measure the promotion of peace based on the following indicators: capacity to manage social conflict, social cohesion, provision of basic services, economic development, human rights protection, and good governance.

H. Linkages with private sector actors

Conclusions

Numerous efforts have been made by USAID programs also to partner with private sector actors and leverage their activities for increased development impact. These too need to incorporate more specific conflict and peace indicators in order to demonstrate and increase their value in those terms.

Key Findings

USAID's annual reports provide considerable evidence that it has been actively seeking to generate additional economic and social resources and services through setting up partnerships with corporations, producer business associations, and other private sector for-profit and non-profit actors. For example, AMORE 2 involved the Mirant Corporation, a US Independent power producer in the Philippines. Under the GDA, this effort attracted other partners such as Shell Solar and Philippine National Oil Company. In Education, the ELSA program implemented by the International Youth Foundation had five other foundations/organizations sign a Public Private Alliance (PPA) that controlled approximately \$1.27 million. "The alliance helped create and expand school and community-based learning and employment opportunities by upgrading school infrastructure, mobilizing parent-teacher-community associations, strengthening alternative learning systems, and providing opportunities for positive youth leadership engagement...through partnership with the Mindanao Business Council, Save the Children Federation, local Chambers of Commerce, private businesses and the GRP's Technical Education and Skills Development Authority, USAID was able to train out-of-school youth for self employment or jobs in the areas of food processing, small engine repair, cell phone repair and agro-industry." (FY2005 Annual Report). As a result, private sector employment for both males and females achieved growth rates at 1.2% and 1.3% respectively while total employment grew by 1.5%.

Possibly the most vigorous effort of USAID to stimulate private sector activity is occurring in health care delivery. In 2005, the share of the private sector in the provision of family planning supplies and services reportedly increased from 33.1% in 2004 to 35.6% (Annual Report, FY06). Current GRP policy particularly encourages collaboration between government agencies and the private sector in the management and control of TB. Thus, PhilTIPS was designed to help the Philippine government in groundbreaking efforts to synchronize public and private approaches to TB diagnosis and treatment. The principal objectives of PhilTIPS are to: create an enabling environment for the private sector to fully

engage in TB control; expand quality short-course services (DOTS)⁴² services in the private sector, and build the capacity of private providers to deliver quality DOTS services, and motivate health-seeking behavior of those experiencing symptoms and of providers to adopt DOTS. The initiative examined TB service delivery in the private sector and expanded, both strategically and tactically, the role played by the private sector in TB control. After four years, PhilTIPS has left a large and growing cadre of trained professionals who continue to expand therapies, DOTS, and outreach to the most vulnerable TB patients, such as children and those with drug resistant TB. The program reported 70% case detection rate and 85% treatment success rate.

The PhilTIPS Final Report refers to numerous obviously significant PhilTIPS accomplishments (e.g., Chapter Six, pages 47 – 52). The cumulative impact of these multiple activities on alleviating the grievances motivating insurgent and other conflicts, such as upgrading skills of Muslim professionals that lead to employment, could be considerable. Yet they are unknowable. For what is again not revealed by this kind of program information is the specific implications of the program for key conflict drivers and peace capacities. One such indicator, for example, would be the identities of the benefiting private purveyors, new professional staffs, as well as patients who are benefiting from these advancements -- that is, categories defined in terms of actors such as Muslims and Christians who are the direct or indirect constituencies in Mindanao's various local, clan and armed conflicts. A key element in creating the urban-rural and inter-communal linkages of economic interdependency that are advised above would be various expanded private sector actors such as producers associations.

I. Recommendations

Increase conflict-sensitive linkages between education and health and the private sector for continued service and livelihood opportunities

USAID programs should increase the emphasis on linkages between local corporations, livelihoods and education programs. Older youth and adults in vocational education programs that have acquired basic work skills should be connected with possible opportunities from corporate sponsors throughout Mindanao. EQuALLS - Out of School Youth (OSY) training should be linked to GEM's economic development component where public-private partnerships and other means of corporate sponsorship are available. Specific attention needs to be given to equal distribution and/or access to such employment and training across cultural/religious groups. A recommendation from a key informant of a Mindanao-based business association was to start an enterprise development program that would include training for marginalized groups in skills such

Marcellin Foundation, Inc. Success Story

Ismael was in jail for two years and then came to Marcellin Foundation's youth center on a release program. He was not interested in academics and was used to being the breadwinner at home (his mom had died, his father had left and he lived with his grandfather) – he felt responsible for providing for his family, even if it meant stealing. He was trained in small-engine repair for three months where he discovered he was quite gifted and was offered a small-engine repair teaching position at a local school. Due to his embarrassment at not having formal education he felt unconfident to teach others. Ismael left the school but his tools were given to his grandfather in his stead. When the justice program checked in on him, since he wasn't showing up for school, they found him at home working on small-engine and motorcycle repair. Even though he ran away from the program to pursue a livelihood he was already transformed into a productive and non-violent member of society so the judge dismissed his case on the recommendation of the Center. Today he is free and is earning money legally for his family.

USAID funded the Foundation's technical training component of this project.

⁴² DOTS is considered an effective and efficient strategy for diagnosing and treating TB endorsed by WHO and adopted by the Department of Health of the GRP.

as project management, bookkeeping and recording, financial management and marketing rather than the more traditional skills like mechanics and basket weaving. Skills training needs to be coordinated with the needs of local businesses and market needs assessments to increase the likelihood for future opportunities of those trained.

To ensure sustainability of such programs buy-in from DepEd is crucial. Although the evaluation team did not have time to review the actual wording of MOUs between IPs and DepEd, a review should be conducted to ensure that specific roles and expectations (leadership, funding, etc.) are a part of the agreement. Furthermore, if an MOU does not already exist directly with USAID's Office of Education, perhaps this would be a way to enhance ownership of such programs. In an assessment of the EQuALLS-DIWA program, a recommendation for the private sector, e.g. Notre Dame of Marbel (respected leader in primary and secondary education) was made. The Madrasa representative in the government of the ARMM noted this as a good idea as this included continued accreditation of Madari through DepEd.

Efforts should also be made to replicate the successful experience of PhilTIPS in other service areas.

Establish “centers” of stability and growth that are linked to rural areas

USAID should consider developing centers of growth and strategically clustering multiple programs from different sectors around those areas (e.g. pilot communities). Within these centers of growth, USAID should focus on building linkages between the different levels of society – individual, community, provincial, and national – to maximize the impact on peacebuilding. In addition, forging economic links with rural areas through conflict-sensitive value chains can help bridge communal divides.

Integrate conflict sensitive approaches to implementation

USAID should more fully integrate conflict reduction and peacebuilding projects across all programs throughout Mindanao. A few suggestions of how this could be done include 1) Engage LGU representatives, teachers, religious leaders and health professionals in alternative dispute resolution, mediation and general problem-solving training to address community issues such as drugs, theft, gangs and *rido*; and 2) Develop mechanisms for non-violent dispute resolution and channels for communication through sectoral interventions (e.g. developing participatory land-use planning processes in the NRM sector) to increase access to justice at the formal and non-formal level; 3) Support good governance by working with LGUs and NGOs to ensure transparency and accountability of project funds; and 4) Increase public access to reliable and accurate information by training local journalists to cover violent incidents (the issue and its resolution) in a just and fair manner. It is critical to recognize and use all available entry points to address the three levels of conflict (political, communal, and criminal) through different sectoral programs and to do so in an intentional, synergistic and coherent way that leverages the benefits of each intervention

Ensure engagement with local, national and regional governments are made prior to and throughout project implementation

USAID should provide all funding and project information to NEDA, MEDCo and other relevant officials at the regional and local level. All new programs should properly introduce their projects to relevant local, provincial, and regional officials upon arrival to alleviate any unnecessary suspicion or confusion as to the project's focus. There should also be a focus on institutional development and establishment of permanent mechanisms to ensure continuity and coherence in development planning across all levels of government. One specific recommendation from an LGU representative and an ARMM government official is to harmonize USAID activities with GRP procurement processes. It was also noted by MEDCo that AusAID processes are easier for them to follow. It would be interesting to see how AusAID and other donor procurement processes work with general GRP requirements and vice versa.

USAID needs to increase internal networking among program and project staff

Leadership on intra and inter-program collaboration must come from USAID CTOs and activity managers first. As a start, USAID staff should convene regular COP and activity manager meetings across sectors. This would encourage all implementers to be familiar with USAID's basic portfolio in Mindanao as well as to share information derived from monitoring efforts across projects. Such meetings would potentially reveal ways in which synergies can be construed between projects. A good model to be replicated in the field is the NRM sector meeting in which program staff convenes periodically over coffee to discuss their programs and potential synergies.

Share strategies and key reporting across all USG Agencies to increase synergy across programs

USG should share monitoring and policy information as well as develop or tap into common project databases. Some suggestions include:

- Tap into JSOTF's Human Terrain Mapping Surveys and/or mapping expertise that could perhaps be cross-fertilized across USAID programs for general development purposes as well as a conflict mapping exercise that links all USG project locations with particular areas of concern.
- Find ways for USG agencies to collaborate at the community level (e.g. USG support of Mindanao Week of Peace)
- Share USG planning and policy documents among and between all USG Agencies and IPs where appropriate.
- Social preparation of specific areas should be a priority before USG enters an area (as noted in Section 4) and outcomes of initial assessments should be shared with other USG counterparts to avoid confusion among USG entities and other donors as to the purpose, objectives and target audience of the given program.

Increase sharing of program information and strategy with other donors

USAID should participate with other donors in the Framework for Peace and Development in Mindanao 2020 process and support MEDCo's development of a comprehensive project map. A first step in becoming involved in this process could be a seat at the upcoming round tables to discuss MEDCo's Development Framework where they seek to think about future programming through utilization of a peace lens. This framework is an output of MEDCo's Training on Developing and Mainstreaming Peacebuilding and Development Frameworks managed by Uniquist and funded by AusAID and will feed into the Mindanao 2020 process. USAID needs to coordinate such an effort with other donors to ensure this effort does not compete with NEDA's new effort on instituting mapping software.

USAID could go through a similar exercise internally (think through programs utilizing a peace lens) to more fully synergize programming with that of MEDCo and AusAID. Once this has been done, a next step would be to share strategic objective (SO) results frameworks and core program objectives with other donors working on conflict and peacebuilding in Mindanao such as CIDA, JICA and UNDP. As synergies are established among donors simultaneous focus to both the sector/project in which donors wish to collaborate as well as an approach that promotes peace and security must be considered.

VII. CONCLUSION AND BROADER SUGGESTIONS

Conclusion

This report and the accompanying detailed survey provide encouraging evidence that considerable – and largely unheralded – progress has been made to bring the conflicts in Mindanao under more peaceful control. All of the program areas tested in the SWS survey received a positive net improvement score and none a net deterioration. This is consistent with the view often heard that despite the continuing occasional clashes, the solution to the conflicts with the MNLF and MILF cannot be a military one. The reasons range from the presence of an increasingly effective AFP, especially the Philippine marines, to the growing dynamic cities with mixed populations. It is also clear that the breadth and depth of USAID’s programs in Mindanao has been one of the most important contributing factors behind this progress. The large number of vigorous activities it has carried out have measurably eroded the underlying causes of the conflicts and influenced their more manifest and political dynamics. As a result, USAID programs have become widely known over the years and are greatly appreciated by many ordinary Mindanaoans and professionals.

But several factors could cause this momentum toward peace and development to stall or even to reverse. For one thing, survey results indicate that only two of the five provinces feel their family’s livelihood is better today compared to the year 2000. Out of the total number surveyed 230 people said their livelihoods have remained the same, 540 said their lives were better before and 230 said their lives have improved. On the positive side, approximately half of the total number of respondents (1000) said they are optimistic that their livelihoods will increase in the next five years. Yet Mindanao’s ability to finally achieve sustained development progress in the future is still essentially being held hostage by small-armed groups who can carry out acts of violence with impunity, both those within the major armed movements as well as outside them. They thereby have the continuing ability to act as “spoilers” and exert veto-power over any further progress.

Suggestions

USAID has made a conscious effort to impact the conflict in Mindanao through its programming. Without calling it such, in effect, these USAID efforts have affected important sources of conflict and ingredients of peace. It now has the opportunity to be even more deliberate and focused in addressing Mindanao’s conflict and capacities for peace – and without compromising its more general development goals. It could continue to allocate resources along sectoral lines while concentrating them heavily in “CAAs” that are defined in broad terms as unstable mainly by socio-economic indicators. Or it could do even better by calibrating its data-gathering, planning, program design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation more specifically to conflict and state building criteria and by differentiating in a more fine-grained way among differing kinds of conflict-affected locales within the CAAs.

An overarching way to achieve both more conflict-appropriate appropriate “mix and balance” and more effective “impacts” on conflict comes from one of the key recommendations above regarding “linkages”: USAID should integrate conflict reduction and peacebuilding criteria into all its programs throughout Mindanao by doing cross-sectoral and multi-agency training at the barangay, municipality, and higher levels where practicable that would lead to consultations about customized strategies. It could do this by taking fuller advantage of the latest tools and experience in doing development in other post-conflict and fragile state environments. “Conflict-sensitive” development planning and service delivery are somewhat new concepts in development circles, the essence of which is the notion that all sectoral programs need to design and plan through a “conflict lens” -- or more recently but compatibly, a “fragile state” lens.⁴³ Such

⁴³ Versteegen, 2005.

concepts were new to most SO program staff and IPs with whom the evaluation team met but once introduced, they overwhelmingly acknowledged the importance of the concept.

Various ways have been sketched by recommendations in the preceding sections through which more cross-area, multi-sectoral, joint consultations could be organized at the local, provincial and regional level. USAID can extend its achievements and sustain them by capturing the kinds of lessons from its experience that this report has sought to capture. These could be applied in future programming in a deeper way through more intensive cross-program discussion and cross-mission communication than appears to occur. Among other management steps this might entail, USAID should consider setting up a satellite office in Mindanao, similar to the Ugandan model with an office in the North, so as to foster more cross-program assessment and programming that is attuned to local conditions and actors.

Outside its usual domain, USAID also needs to engage with those US agencies that are closely engaged at the political level with the GRP and are directly concerned with the peace negotiations process. Because of the continuing ability of people at various levels in the MILF movement to carry out attacks and to gain adherents to the movement's political agenda, it is hard to imagine the obstacles to development being removed and much progress being made without a peace agreement that neutralizes the influence of that cause. Doing more development cannot substitute for reaching such an agreement at the political level.

In addition, in view of the disappointing record of the ARMM and yet local desire for good governance there, the USAID Mission should engage with other USG agencies to influence not only the pace but the content of the peace negotiations. The object should be not only to reach a political agreement and permanent ceasefire through the usual negotiations methods among political actors. The bargaining needs to be approached not simply as a matter of making deals that exchange political quid pro quos. For reaching an agreement should not occur at the price of possibly just setting up a Gaza-like scenario in which a second weak "Palestinian Authority"-type governance arrangement (e.g., the envisioned BJE) takes the place of the current one (the ARMM). Any agreement need to write in specific accountability standards for effective government and the local rule of law, whose provisions might be supported through USAID and implemented step by step through legitimate local partners who are accountable to citizen bodies. The considerable interest and resources of the several development donors could be used to underwrite such a thrust. In this connection, moreover, USAID can exert influence on those discussions in a key policy area by drawing on its experience in other resource-rich countries. It can ensure that adequate regulatory mechanisms are put in place for the management of the exploitation of Mindanao's valuable but untapped natural resources, not simply at the local community level, but at higher policy and political levels. In short, the diplomatic process could benefit from the lessons of development that USAID can provide from its experience in Mindanao and other conflict-affected settings.

APPENDIX I:

STATEMENT OF WORK

The contractor shall undertake the following specific tasks during the assignment period, working with the Strategic Objective Teams, the Program Office and the Director's Office, as appropriate:

1. Under Stage 1, review and analyze project documents, such as completed evaluations, assessments, sectoral studies (including by other donors and multi-lateral institutions), contractors' reports, project-related documents, Mission performance reports and relevant background materials of USAID programs and projects in Mindanao, including GDA and centrally-funded activities that were implemented in Mindanao from FY 2000-2007. The Mission will seek to gather all available project documents and make them available at the USAID/Philippines/Program Office. However, for documents that have been forwarded to USAID/W Library or CDIE, particularly the evaluation and assessment report and studies of earlier projects, the Contractor shall be expected to gather them in the US, prior to coming to Manila. The results of Stage 1(Document Review) will inform the survey design and implementation.

2. Under Stage 2, conduct a beneficiary impact assessment survey. The illustrative tasks of the survey contractor are as follows:

- 2.1. Develop a survey strategy to include at least five provinces in Mindanao, giving priority to those where USAID has the most project sites, such as the provinces of Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Sharif Kabunsuan, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, Lanao del Sur, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-tawi, among others. The survey should cover not less than 1,000 respondents of which 250 shall comprise a control group, with appropriate balance of men and women. The contractor shall determine the representative sample size of respondents per province.
- 2.2. Develop a survey instrument that is appropriate to the level of program beneficiaries with reference to the evaluation questions in Article X. Data collection must be sex-disaggregated. The results of this survey shall serve as an input to Stage 3 (Fieldwork and Report Preparation). As such, it is imperative that the survey is completed prior to the start of Stage 3.
- 2.3. Upon the completion of the survey strategy and draft survey questions, present the strategy and questions to USAID for approval prior to conducting the survey.
- 2.4. Conduct the survey.
- 2.5. Compile and analyze the survey data in a survey report that responds to the evaluation questions. Upon completion of the survey report, the Contractor shall present its findings to USAID.

3. Under Stage 3, based on the results of the documents reviewed in Stage 1, beneficiary survey in Stage 2, and taking into account the program/project results as reported in the Mission's performance monitoring/indicators system, the contractor shall:

- 3.1. Develop an in-depth evaluation methodology which may include case studies, and the design of appropriate instruments that are responsive to the illustrative evaluation questions and the Evaluation Considerations.
 - 3.2. Conduct field work and key informant interviews with representative groups of stakeholders (project contractors, grantees, implementing partners in government, civil society, private business sector, beneficiary groups, women's organizations, local leaders, USAID officers and staff, U.S. Embassy Country Team officers, other donors and organizations working in Mindanao). Validate results of document reviews, beneficiary surveys and key informant interviews through focus group discussions at the local and national levels, as appropriate.
4. Based on the results of the above tasks, the contractor shall:
- 4.1. Analyze and synthesize review findings and field data in order to describe, quantify and assess the impacts of USAID's programs on target beneficiaries, and assess the effectiveness and efficiency of USAID approaches and implementing mechanisms, in response to the illustrative questions and considering the impact indicators.
 - 4.2. Using USAID performance indicators, the contractor shall closely examine the reported actual quantitative and qualitative results as reported in USAID's Annual Reports. These results maybe described through case studies and success stories, as appropriate.
 - 4.3. Identify and analyze points for synergy and collaboration from the programmatic (within and across sectors), geographic (common project areas) and operational perspective (implementation monitoring, field visits and reporting), and collaborative efforts with other donors, focusing on what has worked, what could be done better; what is unique in our programs, e.g., multi-sectoral approach; USG assistance leveraging of private sector and complementing/influencing other donors; lessons learned on operating in an insecure environment; and working with the U.S. military, i.e., evaluating coordination, not their programs per se.
 - 4.4. Examine USAID's approaches in achieving sustainability of development results. Describe sustainability mechanisms and best practices which contributed to success and how these could be replicated. Also describe the factors that hindered the sustainability of results.
 - 4.5. Based on stakeholder inputs, provide an analysis of the current Mindanao portfolio on whether or not there is an appropriate mix or balance of approaches, with reference to Illustrative Evaluation Questions.
 - 4.6. Describe USAID's comparative advantage compared with other donors working in Mindanao. Develop recommendations on how USAID can do better, other roles that USAID can play, and how best to utilize its comparative advantage.
 - 4.7. Provide an assessment of whether or not USAID's Mindanao programs are operating effectively in a conflict-affected environment and whether the programs are positively influencing conflict dynamics in Mindanao.
 - 4.8. Focus on the lessons to be learned from USAID's Mindanao Program, and recommend how synergy and development results can be better sustained, how to improve USAID's portfolio in terms of the right mix and balance of programs, how best to utilize the USG/USAID/s comparative advantage in promoting peace and security, reducing poverty, increasing economic productivity, strengthening governance and stability, and how to increase women, particularly, Muslim women's participation in development programs and projects, as well as access to opportunities and resources.

APPENDIX 2:

DOCUMENT REVIEW: PROJECT OVERVIEW, TEMPLATE I: EXAMPLE

Project Start/End dates: 10/1/2002 – 9/30/2006

Document Title: Section C: Description/Specifications/Statement of Work: Strengthening Private Sector Participation in the Tuberculosis Control Program of the Philippines

Program or projects the document examines: Private Sector Participation in the Tuberculosis Control Program of the Philippines (PhilTIPS)

What SO does the project pertain to? SO 12: Conflict

Who is the primary implementing partner? What other partners or resource groups are involved?

Primary: Chemonics International

Brief Project Description

1. What is the overall goal of the project?

To reduce the prevalence of tuberculosis in the Philippines. Specifically, USAID/Philippines' programs aims to increase the successful diagnosis and treatment of TB patients by achieving a cure rate of at least 85% using DOTS through commercial private sector services.

2. Why was the project undertaken? What was the reasoning behind it?

Studies in the Philippines estimate that about 60 percent of total expenditures for health occur in the private sector and that 50 percent, or half of these costs, are borne by patients themselves.

Among patients who are TB symptomatic, many do not use DOH services. According to the 1997 National Prevalence Survey, approximately 50 percent of those who are symptomatic never sought services. According to the survey, private clinics have 50,000 to 60,000 TB cases under treatment. Thus, most patients seek treatment through the private sector, not the public sector.

3. What are the project's main objectives?

- a. Baseline TB cure rate data and a scale of measurement indicators of achievement of Contract objectives.
- b. A comprehensive packet of policies, guidelines and regulations developed and instituted at the national and local levels to promote implementation of TB DOTS treatment by private providers.
- c. Best strategies identified through operations research to improve and expand TB DOTS implementation in the private sector.
- d. Private sector TB DOTS service models implemented in specific areas, to demonstrate potential for replication.
- e. Best TB DOTS approaches/service models are implemented in at least 25 strategic urban cities/large municipalities nationwide.

- f. Teaching and training of TB DOTS conducted in medical professional schools and behavior change campaigns implemented to improve the health seeking behavior of the public.
- g. Appropriate guidelines and regulations are developed to promote necessary reimbursement program among private health groups.

4. What specific activities fall under the project’s objectives? What kinds of services does it provide?

- a. Conduct a comprehensive review and assessment of the national TB control program policies, guidelines and regulations that will lead to the participation and contributions of private practitioners to the local program to control TB.
- b. Design and conduct operations research to deepen understanding of the supply of and demand for TB services delivered through the private sector.
- c. 2 – 5 private sector service delivery models rapidly developed, implemented and assessed.
- d. Replicate the best approaches/models for service delivery in at least 25 urban cities/large municipalities.
- e. Review medical curricula and potential syllabi to strengthen the teaching of TB DOTS to medical doctors, nurses, and other medical professionals.
- f. Support key stakeholders as they seek to expand the amount of time and the quality of education for DOTS TB treatment.
- g. Offering Continuing Medical Education on DOTS. Accreditation shall be revised to require competency in DOTS for certification.
- h. Work with local medical leaders and LGUs to help them understand the importance of controlling TB and how to do it.
- i. Provide technical support to private health financing groups to assist them to link provider performance with reimbursement.
- j. Assist private financing groups to develop strategies to assure provider compliance with the DOTS program.

5. For whom are these activities provided? Who are the explicitly targeted beneficiaries/entities?

These services are provided for member of the population with TB as well as health service providers.

6. Which Muslim or other identity (ethnic/religious/regional) populations are served?

Muslims, Christians, and Indigenous populations are all served by this project.

7. Where does it operate in Mindanao (province, cities, and communities)? Provide percentage of focus on each area if available.

This document does not specify which municipalities it operates in.

8. What levels of funding support it (amounts by years, total funding to date)? Provide percentage of funding to each of the project components if available.

Total Funding: \$11,868,600

9. Are there any explicit conflict mitigation/peacebuilding expectations or components built into the project? Please describe.

No.

APPENDIX 3:

DOCUMENT REVIEW, TEMPLATE II EXAMPLE

Date: March 13, 2008

Document title and date: In lieu of a final report and evaluation report, the review of EQuALLS PPA-ASCEND is taken from the following documents:

Document Title	Period Covered	Prepared by:	Reference Code cited in Review Template
Quarterly Performance Report	1Oct-31Dec 2004	Save the Children (SC)	QPR-1
Quarterly Performance Report	1Jan-31Mar 2005	SC	QPR 2
Quarterly Performance Report	1Apr-30Jun 2005	SC	QPR 3
Quarterly Performance Report	1Jul-30Sept 2005	SC	QPR 4
Quarterly Performance Report	1Oct-31Dec 2005	SC	QPR 5
Quarterly Performance Report	1Jan-31March 2006	SC	QPR 6
Quarterly Performance Report	1 Apr – 30 Jun 2006	SC	QPR 7
Quarterly Performance Report	1 Jul – 30 Sept 2006	SC	QPR 8
Work Plan & Budget	1Oct 2005-31Dec 2006	OIC, Phil Field Office, SC	WP & B

Strategic Objective (SO): 11

Period of Time Documents Cover: 1 Oct 2004 – 30 Sept 2006

Program or projects the document examines: EQuALLS PPA- ASCEND Mindanao (Assistance for the Comprehensive Educational Development of Mindanao, led by Save the Children)

II. Program Impacts: What findings and evidence are presented in the document regarding the following impacts? Some of the below questions may not be relevant to your particular document or project; please place N/A (not applicable) for irrelevant questions.

A. Impacts on underlying conflict factors? Widespread social and economic conditions affecting standards of living that lead to competing interests, inequities, and potential grievances, and thus increase a society's vulnerability to conflict. Or changes in these conditions that can alleviate such pressure and grievances. Such conditions may change slowly over time.

Question A1: What increases in health or education services to Muslim populations have occurred (e.g. no. of clinics, schools, medical personal added, percentage changes in distribution to that population compared to others, etc.)? And how did they occur through the project?	Time period of impacts	Doc & Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Yes or No)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1. 132 primary schs received integrated lesson plans (LP) in English, Science, Math, (ESM) based on DepED-approved textbooks The Lesson Plans were developed after documenting 78 hours of classroom video, undergoing pilot testing in schools and review by experts. The figure (132) represents 113% increase from the original target of 62 schools 1,500 boxes of books were given by Brothers Brother Foundation and distributed to project schools. (QPR 4, p.5)	Oct '04– Dec '05	QPR2, pp. 5-6; WP & B, p.6; QPR4, p.3; QPR 8, p.2	2	Y, teachers who used the LPs reported improved learning process, see p.3-6 of QPR4

2. 6 Madrasah schools have been assisted in adopting the RBEC (Revised Basic Education Curriculum) starting with Gr 1 through teacher training. This will facilitate entry of students to regular public schools once they leave the madrasah. 250 copies of Gr1 books in Arabic were provided by DepED to the 6 schools. In the absence of other books, the Gr 2 students also use them.	Oct '04– Jun 2006	QPR7, p. 5-6 QPR7, p.12	2	Y, see item on performance indicators of the Madrasahs
3. ASCEND assisted 419 learners who wanted to re-enter formal education. Of this number, only 6 or 1.43% managed to pass the Accreditation & Equivalency(A & E) test of DepED. Three were for elementary level and the other three were for secondary level. The high school A&E passers were given scholarships for post-secondary education through efforts of ASCEND. The second group of registrants for the next A & E test is 1,092. To improve success rate, the Instructional Managers were trained and review materials for Grade 6 and Fourth Year levels.	Oct '04– Sept '06	QPR7, p.12	2	N, but a study will be made of the age-appropriateness of the learning modules, QPR7, p.12.
5. Deworming was conducted for 28,106 students by Save the Children thru its School Health & Nutrition program (extended service). It was complemented by health education sessions for school personnel and parents on basic health and sanitation practices.	SY2005- 2006	QPR8 P.16	2	Y, the study referred to in QPR8, p.16, discussed the relationship between performance & drop-out.
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Question A2: What increases in health or education indicators in the Muslim populations have occurred (e.g., infant mortality rates, life expectancy)? And how did they occur through the project?	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1. Assessment of student performance in all grade levels and districts covered by ASCEND showed an increase of 25.24 percentage points over the diagnostic test average given at the start of school year. When the schools' performance scores in the National Achievement Test (NAT) in SY2005 were compared with their NAT test scores in SY2004, increments were much smaller and not significant.	SY2004 – SY2005.	QPR7, p. 3-4	2	
2.Enrollment comparison (SY2005 vs. SY2004) in the ASCEND districts showed a 13% reduction.. Transition rate of the ASCEND schools for the same period was 77.76%, low when compared with the national average of 97%. The highest transition was from Gr 5 to Gr 6 (84.5%) and the lowest is the transition rate from Gr 1 to Gr 2 (63.4%) The repeater/drop-out rates are at an ave. of 22.24%, with the repeater/drop-out rate of Gr. 1 at a high of 36.6% Note: the indicators of the ASCEND schools should also be compared with the Division's or district's indicators for better comparability (benchmarking the proj. schools against the group of schools to which they belong).	SY2004 – SY2005.	QPR7, p5	2	
3. Prior to the development of the Integrated Lesson Plans, ASCEND trained 107 mentors through the Training the Trainers workshop. In turn, 794 classroom teachers were trained in the Integrated Investigation methods of teaching E,S,M.	SY2004 – SY2005.	QPR4, p.2	2	
4. 170 parents, community leaders, and 43 PTCAs (3 of which were madrasah PTCAs) participated in community mobilization and parental involvement in improving basic education. PTCAs have helped build Learning Resource Centers which were refurbished by ASCEND and given reading kits.	SY2004 – SY2005.	QPR4, p.2	2	

6. . Data from the six Madrasah schools showed that of the 193 Gr 1 students, only 137 enrolled in Gr 2, a transition rate of 71%, which is not too far below the transition rate of the regular public schools.. There was a failure rate of 15.54% and a drop-out rate of 9.32%. These rates are better than those of the public schools gr 1 – gr.2. (see item 2 above)	SY 2005-2006	QPR7, p. 5-6	2	N
7. 33 Asatidz (teachers of the regular curriculum in the Madrasahs) were given enrichment training in the ASCEND-developed approach to teaching Eng, Sci and Math. 63.64% were males and 36.36% were females.	April 2006	QPR7, p.8	2	

Question A3: What increases in livelihood-supporting and income generation opportunities for Muslim populations have occurred (e.g., no. of youth employed, new jobs, loans, training, new businesses, management positions; relative to other groups)? And how did they occur through the project?	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.The Skills Training and Industry Immersion (STII) has 800 enrolled as of the 8 th quarter, 795 have graduated. Of this, 77% are males and 23% are females. The number employed is 418 or 52.58%. Of those employed, 83% are males and 17% are females.	2004-Sept. 2006	QPR8, p.16	2	
2. TESDA, the agency that certifies trade skills tested 64 graduates of STII and 36% were certified. This improves employability.	2005-2006	QPR8, p.12	2	
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Question A4: What increases in infrastructure have occurred for Muslim communities (e.g., water, roads, electricity, housing etc.)? And how did they occur through the project? N/A	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Question A5: What impacts have project activities had on population size, and thus pressures on resources (e.g. birth rates, etc.) And how did they occur through the project? N/A	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Question A6: What impacts have project activities had on increasing utilization of or access to livelihood enhancing natural resources? And how did they occur through the project? N/A	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Question A7: What increases in regular social interactions, communications, or interdependencies among differing ethnic communities, thus reducing the influence of social fault lines? And how did they occur through the project? N/A	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)

Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

B. Impacts on aggravating (proximate) factors? This includes financing arms, recruits, leadership, organization, technology, or other resources that enable actors to mobilize group action that is hostile or violent; ideologies and belief systems that shape whether grievances are expressed in violent and coercive ways; governing institutions, political processes, policymaking, and other mechanisms that provide channels for addressing problems and for reaching accommodations of competing interests through peaceful means or government policies that address problems. These proximate factors in conflict tend to be more malleable. N/A

Question B1: What impacts have been realized in disarming and demobilizing armed groups? And how did they occur through the project?	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Question B2: What impacts have project activities had in bolstering the influence of legislatures and in electing Muslim representatives to provincial or national assemblies, or being appointed to administrative and other government offices? And how did they occur through the project?	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Question B3: What impacts have been realized in making provincial and local government administration more inclusive and equitable in serving publics? And how did they occur through the project?	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Question B4: What impacts have been realized in making provincial and local government administration more inclusive and equitable in serving publics? And how did they occur through the project?	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Question B5: What increases in formal judicial bodies and services for Muslim populations have occurred (e.g., no of courts, legal aid; relative changes, etc.)? And how did they occur through the project?	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Question B6: What impacts have been realized on the effectiveness and evenhandedness of the practices and procedures of police and security forces? And how did they occur through the project?	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Question B7: What impacts have activities had on strengthening informal/traditional forms of representation or dispute resolution? On other informal forms of exchange, mutual accommodation of differing groups' interests? And how did they occur through the project?	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Question B8: Has the project helped or hindered participation in democratic political processes or in relationships between civil society and various levels of government? And how did they occur through the project?	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Question B9: Have project activities increased the ability of poorer groups to own, control and manage land or other useful natural resources? And how did they occur through the project?	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Question B10: Have project activities been inclusive of men and women leaders and rank and file from all affected ethnic communities in its own decision-making and administration? And how did they occur through the project?	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Question B11: Have activities encouraged the constructive engagement of third parties toward the conflict, such as other governments or international bodies, and to discourage partisan/divisive forms of engagement?	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Question B12: Have activities affected individuals' or community's sense of security; positively or negatively?	Time period of	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
--	-----------------------	------------------	--	------------------------------------

	impacts			
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Question B13: Have project activities influenced widespread public views, attitudes, and norms regarding the utility or legitimacy of using armed force or violence to pursue one's interests? And how did they occur through the program?	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Question B14: Has the program helped or hindered key individuals or groups to respond to specific opportunities for conflict mitigation or peacebuilding across the conflict lines? And how did they occur through the program?	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Question B15: Has the program inadvertently contributed to supporting war economies, underground criminal activities, or dependence on military-related employment? And how did they occur through the program (e.g., benefit leakage, corruption, etc.)? And how did they occur through the program?	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Question B16: What declines or lack of improvement has occurred in the above factors?	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Other relevant questions or observations:	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

C. Impacts on precipitating/triggering factors? This includes specific short-term acts, public speech, behavior or events that raise tensions and evoke/provoke hostility and prompt violent actions or escalate violence, such as unilaterally provocative actions or gestures of powerful leaders. Alternatively, conciliatory actions can put brakes on hostile behavior. These factors are easier to influence change. *N/A*

Question C1: Have activities contributed directly to defusing specific inter-group tensions and disputes, and influenced whether specific issues or disputes that arise and cause tension are addressed in a peaceful manner? How?	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Question C2: Have project activities contributed to the peaceful management of potentially divisive events such as elections group celebrations? How?	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Question C3: Have project activities contributed directly to stopping violent behavior or coercive acts? How?	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Question C4: What declines or lack of improvement has occurred in the above factors? How?	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Other relevant questions:	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

D. Impacts on specific actors, stakeholders, and issues in dispute: The more that conflicts come out in the open and take violent forms, the more their violent or peaceful direction are determined by the viewpoints and actions of the principal parties in the conflict (and other influential internal or external stakeholders) with regard to the leading disputes (controversies, etc.) that have become politicized. These actors may shift their approach to the conflict from belligerent to peaceful, and back again. This requires evaluating not only programs' impacts on the underlying and other causes of the conflict and the capacities of peace above, but also the programs' impacts on these shifting conflict dynamics. N/A

Question D1: Have project activities influenced the views, attitudes, positions, interests, doctrines, political agendas and programs, and goals of the key parties to a conflict?	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Question D2: Have project activities influenced the key parties' <i>pattern of</i> hostile or conciliatory behavior toward the conflict or peace process?	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Question D3: Have project activities influenced the <i>tone and content of the political discourse</i> regarding the conflict?	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Question D4: What declines or lack of improvement has occurred in the above factors?	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

III (E). Program Implementation and Sustainability?

Question E1: What evidence is provided of how <i>efficiently</i> and <i>effectively</i> the activities were managed and administered? (e.g. avoiding delayed start-up and services, corruption, etc)	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1. Start-up was very efficiently managed. By the end of the first quarter, all partners have been sub-contracted, and their complementary roles identified.	QPR1		2	Y
2.				

<p>If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.</p> <p>Based on my personal knowledge, Save the Children has a history of involvement in similar activities in the targeted areas and so, it has built its credibility with local groups and had no initial issues about cultural differences. ASCEND's Program Director is, himself very familiar with the process of working with DepED and its field offices, and with project work. ASCEND was also able to build on what has gone on, and having identified early on the key players in the area, used their expertise to finalize the ASCEND plan. The partners identified were few and except for PREL, all have offices in Mindanao. Communication with partners was never identified as a problem in any of the QPRs.</p>	
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Question E2: What data is provided about how <i>sustainable</i> the impacts of the project may be?	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1. ASCEND's program with the formal school and Madrasah worked with the governmental authorities – those who have the authority to support the continuance of the activities started by ASCEND. In the non-formal system, the same was true. Further, through the Mindanao Business Council, ASCEND was able to link training and apprenticeship. Social mobilization of the community and parents was also done. However, based on the MOU forged with the Local Government leaders, (see QPR4, Appendix A) ASCEND was not successful in getting the mayors to be more transparent about the use of the Special Education Fund, the contribution of real property taxpayers which goes to the coffers of the local governments.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

Question E3: What data is provided about how well the program was <i>coordinated</i> with other programs for maximum outputs and impacts?	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1. In all the QPRs, ASCEND consistently described undertaking activities in cooperation with the appropriate bodies.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

IV. Other Relevant Questions (about Impacts or Implementation):

Beyond the categories above, reviewers may derive other observations that are relevant to the evaluation's concerns but that are not anticipated in this framework. The following table can be copied and used for those.

Other Observations	Time period of impacts	Page nos.	Quality of evidence (0, 1 or 2)	Cause & Effect (Y or N)
Findings and evidence in the document				
1.				
2.				
If yes, please note what the correlation is and where it can be found in the document.				

APPENDIX 4:
SURVEY INSTRUMENT

NAME OF RESPONDENT _____
NUMBER/STREET _____
BARANGAY _____ MUNICIPALITY _____ PROVINCE _____ REGION _____

FIELD CONTROL		DP CONTROL	
FI Name/Code : _____	Date: _____	Edited by Name/Code : _____	Date: _____
FA Name/Code : _____		Coded by Name/Code : _____	Date: _____
Start-off by Name/Code : _____	Date: _____	Encoded by Name/Code : _____	Date: _____
Observed by Name/Code : _____	Date: _____	Checked by Name/Code : _____	Date: _____
Spotchecked by Name/Code : _____	Date: _____		
Backchecked by Name/Code : _____	Date: _____		
Edited by Name/Code : _____	Date: _____		

2000 CENSUS		ASCERTAINED	
H01/H02	LOCALE: CLASSIFICATION	H03	PROVINCE:
Urban	1	North Cotabato	1
Rural	2	South Cotabato	2
		Basilan	3
		Lanao del Sur	4
		Maguindanao/Shariff	5
		Kabunsuan	

<p>H04 CLASS OF DWELLING</p> <p>A1 B2 C3 D D1 (owns lot)4 D2 (not own lot)5 E6</p>	<p>H08 MARITAL STATUS OF HHH</p> <p>Alin po kayo dito? Which of these are you? (SHOWCARD) WALANG ASAWA O KINAKASAMA (No spouse / no partner) HINDI NAG- ASAWA KAILANMAN 11 (Never married) BALO (Widowed/Widower) 12 HIWALAY/DIBORSYADO 13 (Separated/divorced) MAY ASAWA (Married) UNANG ASAWA (First marriage) 21 DATING BALO (Formerly widow/widower) 22 DATING HIWALAY/DIBORSYADO 23 (Formerly separated/divorced) MAY KINAKASAMA (With partner) UNANG KINAKASAMA (1st live in partner) 31 DATING BALO (Formerly widow/widower) 32 DATING HIWALAY/DIBORSYADO 33 (Formerly separated/divorced)</p>	<p>H11 RELIGION AT PRESENT OF HHH</p> <p>Ano po ang relihiyon ninyo sa kasalukuyan? What is your religion at present?</p> <p>ROMAN CATHOLIC 01 IGLESIA NI CRISTO 02 AGLIPAYAN 03 PROTESTANT 04 ISLAM 05 Other religion, specify _____ [] Other Christian, specify _____ [] None 90 Refused 99</p>
<p>H05 AGE GROUP OF HHH</p> <p>18-1901 45-4907 20-2402 50-5408 25-2903 55-5909 30-3404 60-7010 35-3905 71-7511 40-4406 76 & OVER12</p> <p>Actual _____</p>	<p>H09 LANGUAGE USED IN THE HOME</p> <p>Ano po ang pangunahing lenggwahe na ginagamit ninyo dito sa inyong bahay? What is the primary language you use at home?</p> <p>FILIPINO 84 CEBUANO 23 MARANAW 15 TAUSUG 54 MAGUINDANAON 71 CHAVACANO 33 ILUKO 37 HILIGAYNON 31 WARAY 95 Others: 199 None 90</p>	<p>H12 HOUSEHOLD FACILITIES/AMENITIES</p> <p>Running water/Piped water into the home Billed 11 Not Billed 12 Toilet (shared) 20 Toilet (own) Flush toilet 31 "De buhos" 32 Others (Specify) _____</p> <p>Electricity Billed 41 Not Billed 42 Telephone (Get company name) Landline PLDT 51 Bayan Tel 52 Globelines 53 Digitel 54 Islacom 55 Other, specify _____ 56 Cellular Globe 61 Smart 62 Piltel 63 Islacom 64 Extelcom 65 Sun Cellular 66 Other, specify _____ 67 Radio 70 Television With Cable 81 Without Cable 82 Personal Computer With Internet 83 Without Internet 84 Email Address 85 4 - wheeled motor vehicle 91 3 - wheeled motor vehicle 92 2 - wheeled motor vehicle 93 Motorboat/banca 94</p>
<p>H06 GENDER OF HHH</p> <p>Male1 Female2</p> <p>H07 EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF HHH</p> <p>Ano po ang pinakamataas na antas ang natapos ninyo sa inyong pag-aaral? What is your highest educational attainment? (SHOWCARD)</p> <p>WALANG PORMAL NA EDUKASYON 01 (No formal education) NAKAPAG-ELEMENTARYA 02 (Some elementary) _____ TAPOS NG ELEMENTARYA 03 (Completed elementary) NAKAPAG-HIGH SCHOOL 04 (Some high school) _____ TAPOS NG HIGH SCHOOL 05 (Completed high school) NAKAPAG-VOCATIONAL 06 (Some vocational) _____ TAPOS NG VOCATIONAL 07 (Completed vocational) NAKAPAG-KOLEHIYO 08 (Some college) _____ TAPOS NG KOLEHIYO 09 (Completed college) MAS MATAAS PA SA KOLEHIYO 10 (Post college) _____</p>	<p>H10 YEARS OF RESIDENCE IN BARANGAY: Ilang taon na po kayong nakatira sa barangay na ito? How many years have you been a resident of this barangay?</p> <p>Actual number of years: _____</p> <p>IF 2 YEARS OR LOWER: Saan po kayo pinakahuling nakatira dati at gaano katagal kayong tumira doon? Where did you last live previously and for how long?</p> <p>Barangay: _____ Municipality/City: _____ Province: _____ Actual Number of Years: _____</p>	
<p style="text-align: center;">SIGNATURE OF HHH</p>		

<p>H13 WORK STATUS (HHH) Kayo po ba ay may trabaho sa kasalukuyan, walang trabaho ngayon pero mayroon dati, o hindi pa nagtrabaho kahit minsan? <i>Are you working at present, not working at present but used to work, or have never worked?</i></p> <p>MAY TRABAHO SA KASALUKUYAN 1 CONTINUE <i>(Working, includes unpaid family worker)</i> WALANG TRABAHO NGAYON, MAYROON DATI 2 <i>(Not working now but worked before)</i> HINDI PA NAGTRABAHO KAHIT 3 MINSAN <i>(Have never worked)</i></p> <hr/> <p>H14 IF WORKING: Ano po ang inyong pangunahing trabaho o hanapbuhay? <i>What is your primary work/livelihood? (ONE ANSWER ONLY)</i></p> <p>VERBATIM: _____ (ENCODE VERBATIM ANSWERS) (POSITION/DESIGNATION/EMPLOYER)</p> <p>Hired Workers (excl. unpaid family workers)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Professional/Technical 11 - Managers 12 - Community Workers (Brgy.Chairman/Kagawad/Tanod) 13 - Clerical/Administrative/Sales (office workers) 14 - Non- agricultural skilled (non-office workers) 15 - Non- agricultural unskilled (laborers) 16 - Agricultural (include fishing, forestry) 17 <p>Employers and Self-Employed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Agricultural operators (include fishing and forestry) 21 - Non- agricultural entrepreneurs 22 <p>Purely Property Owners (income mainly from rentals)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rentals from agricultural properties 31 - Rentals from non- agricultural properties 32 - Others (specify) () <p>Unpaid Family worker 40</p>	<p>R15 TYPE OF SHOWCARD USED</p> <p>Positive 1 Negative 2</p> <hr/> <p>H16 LANGUAGES INTVW CONDUCTED</p> <table style="width:100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="width:80%;"></th> <th style="text-align: right; border-bottom: 1px solid black;">LANG INTVW CONDUCTED</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>Filipino</td><td style="text-align: right;">1</td></tr> <tr><td>Hiligaynon.....</td><td style="text-align: right;">2</td></tr> <tr><td>Cebuano</td><td style="text-align: right;">3</td></tr> <tr><td>Maranao.....</td><td style="text-align: right;">4</td></tr> <tr><td>Maguindanaon.....</td><td style="text-align: right;">5</td></tr> <tr><td>Tausug.....</td><td style="text-align: right;">6</td></tr> </tbody> </table> <hr/> <p>H17 INTPR HH KNOCKED</p> <p>Total # of HH knocked _____</p> <p>REASONS:</p> <table style="width:100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tbody> <tr><td>01 _____</td><td>06 _____</td></tr> <tr><td>02 _____</td><td>07 _____</td></tr> <tr><td>03 _____</td><td>08 _____</td></tr> <tr><td>04 _____</td><td>09 _____</td></tr> <tr><td>05 _____</td><td>10 _____</td></tr> </tbody> </table>		LANG INTVW CONDUCTED	Filipino	1	Hiligaynon.....	2	Cebuano	3	Maranao.....	4	Maguindanaon.....	5	Tausug.....	6	01 _____	06 _____	02 _____	07 _____	03 _____	08 _____	04 _____	09 _____	05 _____	10 _____
	LANG INTVW CONDUCTED																								
Filipino	1																								
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Maguindanaon.....	5																								
Tausug.....	6																								
01 _____	06 _____																								
02 _____	07 _____																								
03 _____	08 _____																								
04 _____	09 _____																								
05 _____	10 _____																								

FOR CODER: Refer to Census of Household Members

<p>H18 HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE</p> <p>No family</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> One person <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Single person (male) 11 Single person (female) 12 Two or more persons 13 (independent members) <p>One family, no others (nuclear)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Couple, no children 21 Couple, with 1-2 children 22 Couple, with 3 or more children 23 Lone parent, male, with children 24 Lone parent, female, with children 25 <p>One family, + others (non-nuclear)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Couple, no children + 31 Couple, with 1-2 children + 32 Couple, with 3 or more children + 33 Lone parent, male, with children + 34 Lone parent, female, with children + 35 <p>Two or more families 40</p>	<p>H19 HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION (Minors defined as less than 18 years old)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Single 01 One adult/one minor 02 One adult/two minors 03 One adult/three or more minors 04 Two adults 05 Two adult/one minor 06 Two adult/two minors 07 Two adult/three or more minors 08 Three adults 09 Three adults with minors 10 Four adults 11 Four adults with minors 12 Others (specify # of adults & minors) () <p>H20 Actual count _____</p> <p>H21 Actual count under 18 _____</p>
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H22. Maaari po bang malaman ang mga pangalan ng lahat ng miyembro ng pamilya ninyo na permanenteng nakatira dito ngayon, mula sa pinakamatanda hanggang sa pinakabata? *May I please have the names of all members of your family who are currently residing permanently here, starting from the oldest down to the youngest?*

H23. Ano po ang relasyon ni (name) sa HHH? *How is (name) related to HHH?*

IF NOT OBVIOUS, VERIFY SEX OF EACH FAMILY MEMBER. FOR EACH FAMILY MEMBER, ASK H24

H24. Ilang taon na po si (name)? *How old is (name)?*

H25. Ilan po ang inyong kasambahay, transients o boarders, kung mayroon man? _____
How many servants, transients or boarders, if any do you have?

	NAME	H23. Rel to HHH	GENDER		H24. AGE
			M	F	
1			1	2	
2			1	2	
3			1	2	
4			1	2	
5			1	2	
6			1	2	
7			1	2	
8			1	2	
9			1	2	
10			1	2	
11			1	2	
12			1	2	

	NAME	H23. Rel to HHH	GENDER		H24. AGE
			M	F	
1			1	2	
2			1	2	
3			1	2	
4			1	2	
5			1	2	
6			1	2	
7			1	2	
8			1	2	
9			1	2	
10			1	2	
11			1	2	
12			1	2	

LEGEND:

GENDER:	H23. RELATIONSHIP TO HOUSEHOLD HEAD (The respondent is the _____ of the Household Head):		
M – Male	01 – Namumuno ng pamilya (Household Head)	06 – Kapatid (Sibling)	11 – Lolo/Lola (Grandparent)
F – Female	02 – Asawa (Spouse)	07 – Pamangkin (Nephew/Niece)	12 – Manugang (Son-in-law/Daughter-in-law)
	03 – Kinakasama (Live-in partner)	08 – Tiyo/Tiya (Uncle/Aunt)	13 – Bayaw/Hipag (Brother/Sister-in-law)
	04 – Anak (Offspring)	09 – Pinsan (Cousin)	14 – Biyanan (Father/Mother-in-law)
	05 – Magulang (Parent)	10 – Apo (Grandchildren)	15 – Iba pa (Others)

	NAME	H23. Rel to HHH	GENDER		H24. AGE
			M	F	
1			1	2	
2			1	2	
3			1	2	
4			1	2	
5			1	2	
6			1	2	
7			1	2	
8			1	2	
9			1	2	
10			1	2	
11			1	2	
12			1	2	

	NAME	H23. Rel to HHH	GENDER		H24. AGE
			M	F	
1			1	2	
2			1	2	
3			1	2	
4			1	2	
5			1	2	
6			1	2	
7			1	2	
8			1	2	
9			1	2	
10			1	2	
11			1	2	
12			1	2	

LEGEND:

GENDER:	H23. RELATIONSHIP TO HOUSEHOLD HEAD (The respondent is the _____ of the Household Head):		
M – Male	01 – Namumuno ng pamilya (Household Head)	06 – Kapatid (Sibling)	11 – Lolo/Lola (Grandparent)
F – Female	02 – Asawa (Spouse)	07 – Pamangkin (Nephew/Niece)	12 – Manugang (Son-in-law/Daughter-in-law)
	03 – Kinakasama (Live-in partner)	08 – Tiyo/Tiya (Uncle/Aunt)	13 – Bayaw/Hipag (Brother/Sister-in-law)
	04 – Anak (Offspring)	09 – Pinsan (Cousin)	14 – Biyanan (Father/Mother-in-law)
	05 – Magulang (Parent)	10 – Apo (Grandchildren)	15 – Iba pa (Others)

**NOTE TO FI: PLEASE GIVE ONE SWS INTERVIEW CARD
TO RESPONDENT ONLY AFTER EACH INTERVIEW**

MARAMING SALAMAT PO – THANK YOU VERY MUCH!

TALK TO HOUSEHOLD HEAD

INTRODUCTION: Magandang umaga/hapon/gabi po. Ako po ay si _____ na taga-Social Weather Stations. Nagsasagawa po kami ng pag-aaral tungkol sa kapakanan at seguridad ng mga tao sa Mindanao. Ang inyong pagsali sa pag-aaral na ito ay ganap na boluntaryo. Lahat ng impormasyong inyong ibabahagi sa akin ay lubos na kompidensiyal. Ang ibig sabihin po nito ay walang impormasyon o sagot na maiuugnay sa inyong pangalan. Nais lang po naming aralin kung ano ang nararamdaman ng mga tao sa iba't-ibang bagay. Nais ko rin pong linawin na wala pong tama o maling sagot. Mayroon po ba kayong katanungan tungkol sa pag-aaral na ito? Maaari na po ba tayong mag-umpisa?

Good morning/afternoon/evening. I am _____ from Social Weather Stations. We are conducting a study of the well-being and security of people in Mindanao. Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. All information you share with me is completely confidential. This means that there will be no way any information or answers you give me can be associated with your name. We are just trying to learn how people feel about various things. I also want to make it clear that there are no right or wrong answers. Do you have any question regarding the survey? Can we now start the interview?

A. TREND IN FAMILY'S LIVELIHOOD

1. Kung ikukumpara ang kabuhayan ng inyong pamilya sa kasalukuyan sa **bago ang taong 2000**, masasabi ba ninyo na ang kabuhayan ng inyong pamilya ay ... **(READ OUT)**?

Comparing your family's livelihood these days to how it was before year 2000, would you say that your family's livelihood is ... (READ OUT)?

TALAGANG MABUTI NGAYON (<i>Much better now</i>)	1
MEDYO MABUTI NGAYON (<i>Somewhat better now</i>)	2
KAPAREHO NG DATI (<i>Same as before</i>).....	3
MEDYO MABUTI NOONG BAGO ANG TAONG 2000 (<i>Somewhat better before year 2000</i>)	4
TALAGANG MABUTI NOONG BAGO ANG TAONG 2000 (<i>Much better before year 2000</i>)	5

2. Sa inyong opinyon, ano ang mangyayari sa kabuhayan ng inyong pamilya sa **susunod na 5 taon**? Masasabi ba ninyo na ang kabuhayan ng inyong pamilya ay malamang na... **(READ OUT)**?

In your opinion, what will happen to your family's means of livelihood in the coming 5 years? Would you say that your family's livelihood will probably... (READ OUT)?

TALAGANG BUBUTI (<i>Improve much</i>)	1
MEDYO BUBUTI (<i>Improve somewhat</i>)	2
HINDI MAGBABAGO (<i>Not change</i>)	3
MEDYO SASAMA (<i>Deteriorate somewhat</i>)	4
TALAGANG SASAMA (<i>Deteriorate much</i>).....	5

B. TREND IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL WELL-BEING

3-18. KUMPARA SA **BAGO ANG TAONG 2000**, ANO SA PALAGAY NINYONG ANG NANGYARI SA KALIDAD NG PANG-EKONOMIYA AT PANLIPUNANG KAPAKANAN NG INYONG PAMILYA O KOMUNIDAD? SA INYONG PALAGAY, ANG IBA'T-IBANG KONDISYON NA AKING ISASALARAWAN BA AY **TALAGANG BUMUTI, MEDYO BUMUTI, HINDI NAGBAGO, MEDYO SUMAMA O TALAGANG SUMAMA?** PAKISAGOT PO ANG MGA ITO SA PAMAMAGITAN NG PAGLALAGAY NG BAWAT KARD SA NAAANGKOP NA LUGAR SA RATING BOARD NA ITO.

*Compared to **before year 2000**, what do you think has happened to the quality of the economic and social well-being of your household or community? Do you think the various conditions that I will describe have **IMPROVED MUCH, IMPROVED SOMEWHAT, NOT CHANGED, DETERIORATED SOMEWHAT, OR DETERIORATED MUCH?** You may indicate your answers by placing each card on the appropriate box on this rating board.*

(SHUFFLE CARDS – RATING BOARD 1)		MB	HN	MS	TS	HA	R	
3.	MGA OPORTUNIDAD NG MGA MIYEMBRO NG INYONG PAMILYA NA MAGKAROON NG PORMAL NA EDUKASYON <i>(Opportunities of your family members to have formal education)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
4.	KONDISYON NG KALUSUGAN NG MGA MIYEMBRO NG INYONG PAMILYA <i>(Health condition of your family members)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
5.	PAGSUSUMIKAP NG INYONG PAMILYA NA LIMITAHAN ANG LAKI NG PAMILYA SA PAMAMAGITAN NG PAGGAMIT NG PAMAMARAAN NG PAGPAPLANO NG PAMILYA O FAMILY PLANNING <i>(Efforts by your family to limit family size by using family planning methods)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
6.	MGA OPORTUNIDAD NG MGA MIYEMBRO NG INYONG PAMILYA NA MAGKAROON NG TRABAHO O PINAGKAKAKITAAN <i>(Opportunities of your family members to have employment or means of livelihood)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
7.	MGA GAWAIN NG TAO SA INYONG KOMUNIDAD UPANG MAPANGALAGAAN ANG KAPALIGIRAN <i>(Practices of people in your community to conserve the environment)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
8.	MGA OPORTUNIDAD NG MGA MIYEMBRO NG INYONG PAMILYA NA MAKAUTANG NG PERA SA MGA PORMAL NA INSTITUSYONG NAGPAPAUTANG <i>(Opportunities of your family members to borrow money from formal lending institutions)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
9.	KARAPATAN NG MIYEMBRO NG INYONG PAMILYA NA MAG-MAY-ARI O MAGBUNGKAL NG MGA LUPANG PANG-AGRIKULTURA <i>(Right of your family members to own or till agricultural lands)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
10.	KAKAYAHAN NG PULIS SA INYONG LUGAR NA PROTEKTAHAN ANG MGA MIYEMBRO NG INYONG PAMILYA SA MGA KRIMEN <i>(Ability of the police in your place to protect members of your family from crimes)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
11.	PATAS NA PAGTRATO NG KORTE SA MGA TAONG MAY KASO SA INYONG KOMUNIDAD <i>(Fair treatment by the court of people with cases in your community)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
12.	PANGANGASIWA NG GOBYERNO NG INYONG <u>PROBINSYA</u> SA MGA SERBISYO NITO <i>(Administration by the government of your <u>province</u> of its services)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
13.	PANGANGASIWA NG GOBYERNO NG INYONG <u>MUNISIPYO O LUNGSOD</u> SA MGA SERBISYO NITO <i>(Administration by the government of your <u>municipality or city</u> of its services)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9

<u>(SHUFFLE CARDS – RATING BOARD 1)</u>		<u>MB</u>	<u>HN</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>TS</u>	<u>HA</u>	<u>R</u>	
14.	PAGSASAAYOS NG BARANGAY JUSTICE SYSTEM SA MGA HIDWAAN SA INYONG KOMUNIDAD <i>(Settlement by the barangay justice system of disputes in your community)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
15.	MGA KALSADA, TULAY AT HALINTULAD NA IMPRASTRATURA NG TRANSPORTASYON SA INYONG KOMUNIDAD <i>(Roads, bridges and similar transport infrastructure in your community)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
16.	PAGKAKARON NG INYONG PAMILYA NG SERBISYO NG <u>TUBIG</u> <i>(Access of your family to <u>water</u> services)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
17.	PAGKAKARON NG INYONG PAMILYA NG SERBISYO NG <u>KURYENTE</u> <i>(Access of your family to <u>electricity</u> service)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
18.	IMPRASTRATURA NG KOMUNIKASYON—TELEPONO, CELLPHONE, INTERNET SA INYONG KOMUNIDAD <i>(Communications infrastructure – landlines, mobile phones, internet in your community)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9

C. AGREEMENT/DISAGREEMENT ON ISSUES

- 19 - 40. NGAYON PO, MAYROON AKO RITONG MGA STATEMENTS O PANGUNGUSAP NA MAAARING MAGLARAWAN SA NARARAMDAMAN O NAIISIP NG MGA TAO NGAYON SA MINDANAO. PAKISABI PO KUNG KAYO AY SUMASANG-AYON O HINDI SUMASANG-AYON SA MGA STATEMENTS O PANGUNGUSAP NA ITO. PAKILAGAY LANG PO ANG KARD NA MAY PANGUNGUSAP SA NAAANGKOP NA LUGAR SA RATING BOARD NA ITO. (LUBOS NA SUMASANG-AYON, MEDYO SUMASANG-AYON, HINDI TIYAK KUNG SUMASANG-AYON O HINDI SUMASANG-AYON, MEDYO HINDI SUMASANG-AYON, O LUBOS NA HINDI SUMASANG-AYON)
- I have here some statements which may reflect how people feel or think about certain matters at present in Mindanao. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with these statements. You may indicate your answers by placing the card with the statement in the appropriate place on this rating board. (STRONGLY AGREE, SOMEWHAT AGREE, UNDECIDED IF AGREE OR DISAGREE, SOMEWHAT DISAGREE, OR STRONGLY DISAGREE)*

<u>(SHUFFLE CARDS – RATING BOARD 2)</u>		<u>LS</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>HT S/HS</u>	<u>MHS</u>	<u>LHS</u>	<u>HSK</u>	<u>R</u>
19.	KUMPARA SA BAGO ANG TAONG 2000, ANG MGA TAO SA BARANGAY NA ITO AY NAKATATANGGAP NG MAS PATAS NA PAGTRATO MULA SA KORTE. <i>(Compared to before year 2000, people in this barangay receive fairer treatment from courts.)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
20.	ANG MGA POLISIYA NG GOBYERNO AY NAGPAPAHINTULOT SA MARAMING MGA KATUTUBO NA MAKASALI SA MGA PAMPUBLIKONG DESISYON AT MGA PROYEKTONG PANG-KAUNLARAN. <i>(The government's policies enable more indigenous peoples to participate in public decisions and development projects.)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
21.	NABAWASAN ANG PAGKILING NG MGA TAO SA BARANGAY NA ITO NA GUMAMIT NG KARAHASAN UPANG MARESOLBA ANG KANILANG MGA HINDI PAGKAKAUNAWAAN SA IBA. <i>(People in this barangay are less inclined to use violence to resolve their disagreements with others.)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
22.	NABAWASAN ANG PAGKILING NG MGA GRUPONG MINORYA SA BARANGAY NA ITO NA MAG-ISIP NA ANG PAGGAMIT NG SANDATAHANG LAKAS AY ISANG EPEKTIBONG PAMAMARAAN UPANG MAKAMIT ANG KASAGUTAN SA KANILANG MGA HINANAING. <i>(Minority groups in this barangay are less inclined to think that using armed force is an effective way to achieve satisfaction of their grievances.)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9

(SHUFFLE CARDS – RATING BOARD 2)		LS	MS	HT S/HS	MHS	LHS	HSK	R
23.	MARAMING LOKAL NA ALITAN SA LUPA AT MGA LIKAS NA YAMAN ANG NAAYOS SA PAMAMAGITAN NG PAG-UUSAP O IBA PANG MATIWASAY NA PROSESO NG PAGRESOLBA NG MGA ALITAN KAYSA SA KARAHASAN. <i>(More local disputes over land and natural resources are settled through dialogue or other peaceful dispute resolution processes than by violence.)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
24.	MARAMING RIDO O PAG-AAWAY-AWAY NG MGA PAMILYA ANG NAAYOS SA PAMAMAGITAN NG PAG-UUSAP O IBA PANG MATIWASAY NA PROSESO NG PAGRESOLBA NG MGA ALITAN KAYSA SA KARAHASAN. <i>(More rido or family feud are settled through dialogue or other peaceful dispute resolution processes than by violence.)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
25.	ANG MGA MUSLIM SA MINDANAO AY NAKATANGGAP NG MAS MARAMING OPORTUNIDAD NA PANG-EKONOMIYA. <i>(Muslims in Mindanao have acquired more economic opportunities.)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
26.	ANG MGA KRISTIYANO SA MINDANAO AY NAKATANGGAP NG MAS MARAMING OPORTUNIDAD NA PANG-EKONOMIYA. <i>(Christians in Mindanao have acquired more economic opportunities.)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
27.	KUMPARA SA BAGO ANG TAONG 2000, ANG MGA LOKAL NA PULITIKO AY MAS TUMUTUGON SA MGA PANGANGAILANGAN NG MGA MAMAMAYAN KAHIT SINO PA MAN ANG IBINOTO NG MGA ITO. <i>(Compared to before year 2000, local politicians respond more to the needs of people regardless of who the people voted for.)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
28.	KUMPARA SA BAGO ANG TAONG 2000, ANG MGA OPORTUNIDAD SA PANG-EMPLEYO PARA SA MGA KABABAIHAN SA LUGAR NA ITO AY MAS DUMAMI. <i>(Compared to before year 2000, employment opportunities for women in this area have increased.)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
29.	KUMPARA SA BAGO ANG TAONG 2000, ANG MGA DATING MANDIRIGMANG MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF) AY NAKAKITA NG BAGONG KABUHAYAN. <i>(Compared to before year 2000, former Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) combatants have found new livelihoods.)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
30.	KUMPARA SA BAGO ANG TAONG 2000, ANG RELASYON SA PAGITAN NG MGA MAGKAKAIBANG KATUTUBONG KOMUNIDAD AY BUMUTI. <i>(Compared to before year 2000, the relations between differing ethnic communities have improved.)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
31.	KUMPARA SA BAGO ANG TAONG 2000, ANG MGA KABATAAN SA AKING BARANGAY AY MAS MAHIRAP MAIMPLUWENSIYAHAN NG MGA GRUPO NA GUMAGAMIT NG KARAHASAN UPANG MAKAMIT ANG MGA PULITIKAL NA HANGARIN. <i>(Compared to before year 2000, youth in my barangay are less susceptible to influence by groups that use violence to achieve political agendas.)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
32.	KUMPARA SA BAGO ANG TAONG 2000, NABAWASAN ANG PAGKILING NG MGA TAO SA AKING BARANGAY NA MAGBIGAY NG PERA, PAGKAIN O TIRAHAN BILANG SUPORTA SA MGA ARMADONG GRUPO NA LUMALABAN SA SANDATAHANG LAKAS NG GOBYERNO. <i>(Compared to before year 2000, people in my barangay are less inclined to provide money, food, or shelter in support of the armed groups that are fighting the armed forces of the government.)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9

(SHUFFLE CARDS – RATING BOARD 2)		LS	MS	HT S/HS	MHS	LHS	HSK	R
33.	KUMPARA SA BAGO ANG TAONG 2000, NABAWASAN ANG PAGKILING NG MGA TAO SA AKING BARANGAY NA SUPORTAHAN ANG MGA ARMADONG GRUPO NA LUMALABAN SA SANDATAHANG LAKAS NG PILIPINAS SA PAMAMAGITAN NG PAGSALI SA MGA PULITIKAL NA RALLY O MGA LEGAL NA ORGANISASYON NA NAKIKISIMPATIYA SA MGA GRUPONG ITO. <i>(Compared to before year 2000, people in my barangay are less inclined to support the armed groups that are fighting the armed forces of the Philippines by joining political rallies or legal organizations sympathetic to those groups.)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
34.	KUMPARA SA BAGO ANG TAONG 2000, ANG MGA MUSLIM SA AKING KOMUNIDAD AY MAS LALONG NAIIMPLUWENSIYAHAN NG MGA PANANAW NG ABU SAYYAF KAYSA SA MAS BANAYAD NA PAGPAPAKAHULUGAN NG ISLAM. <i>(Compared to before year 2000, Muslims in my community are increasingly influenced by the views of the Abu Sayyaf rather than more moderate interpretations of Islam.)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
35.	KUMPARA SA BAGO ANG TAONG 2000, ANG RELASYON SA PAGITAN NG MGA MAGKAKAIBANG GRUPO NG RELIHIYON AY BUMUTI. <i>(Compared to before year 2000, the relations between differing religious groups have improved.)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
36.	KUMPARA SA BAGO ANG TAONG 2000, MARAMING MAG-ASAWA ANG GUMAGAMIT NG MGA PAMAMARAAN SA PAGPAPLANO NG PAMILYA. <i>(Compared to before year 2000, more couples are using family planning methods.)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
37.	KUMPARA SA BAGO ANG TAONG 2000, ANG KONDISYON NG KAPALIGIRAN (MGA KAGUBATAN, BAYBAYING-DAGAT, ILOG, TUBIG) AY BUMUTI. <i>(Compared to before year 2000, the condition of the environment (forests, coastal areas, rivers, water) has improved.)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
38.	KUMPARA SA BAGO ANG TAONG 2000, ANG MGA OPISYAL NG GOBYERNO SA MINDANAO AY HINDI GAANONG KORUPT. <i>(Compared to before year 2000, government officials in Mindanao are less corrupt.)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
39.	KUMPARA SA BAGO ANG TAONG 2000, ANG LOKAL NA GOBYERNO AY MAS NAKIKILAHOK SA PAMAMAGITAN NG HIGIT NA PAGSALI NG MGA TAO SA MAHAHALAGANG PROSESO NG PAGDEDESISYON, TULAD NG PAGBOTO SA MGA PAMPUBLIKONG OPISYAL AT PAG-IMPLUWENSIYA SA PAGGAMIT NG NAKOKOLEKTANG BUWIS. <i>(Compared to before year 2000, the local government is more participatory by involving people more in important decision-making processes, such as electing public officials and influencing the uses of the internal revenue allocation.)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
40.	KUMPARA SA BAGO ANG TAONG 2000, ANG MGA TAO SA AKING BARANGAY AY NAKAKARAMDAM NA SILA AY MAS MAY KAKAYAHAN NA MAKILAHOK SA MGA IMPORTANTENG PROSESO SA PAGGAWA NG DESISYON NA NAKAKAAPEKTO SA KANILANG PAMUMUHAY AT GAWAING PANG-KOMUNIDAD. <i>(Compared to before year 2000, people in my barangay feel that they are more able to participate in the important decision-making processes that affect their lives and community affairs.)</i>	1	2	3	4	5	8	9

D. TREND IN TRUST RATING OF PERSONS/INSTITUTIONS

41-
52.

KUMPARA SA BAGO ANG TAONG 2000, MAAARI PO BANG SABIHIN NINYO KUNG ANG PAGTITIWALA NINYO SA MGA SUMUSUNOD AY TALAGANG LUMAKI, MEDYO LUMAKI, HINDI NAGBAGO, MEDYO LUMIIT, TALAGANG LUMIIT, O WALA PA KAYONG NARINIG O NABASA KAHIT NA KAILAN TUNGKOL SA (PERSONALIDAD/ INSTITUSYON)? PAKISABI ANG SAGOT NINYO SA PAMAMAGITAN NG PAGLAGAY NG MGA KARD SA NAAANGKOP NA LUGAR SA RATING BOARD NA ITO.

Compared to before year 2000, please indicate if your trust/faith for each of the following has INCREASED MUCH, INCREASED SOMEWHAT, NOT CHANGED, DECREASED SOMEWHAT, DECREASED MUCH, or YOU HAVE NOT HEARD OR READ ANYTHING ABOUT (PERSON/INSTITUTION) ever? You may indicate your answers by placing each card on the appropriate box on this rating board.

	(SHUFFLE CARDS AND RATING BOARD 3)	TL	ML	HN	MT	TT	HA	R	Hindi Kilala
41.	GOBYERNONG NASYONAL (National government)	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	6
42.	GOBERNADOR NG INYONG PROBINSYA (Governor of your province)	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	6
43.	MAYOR NG INYONG MUNISIPYO/LUNGSOD (Mayor of your municipality/city)	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	6
44.	GOBYERNO NG AUTONOMOUS REGION OF MUSLIM MINDANAO O ARMM (Government of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao or ARMM)	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	6
45.	SANDATAHANG LAKAS NG PILIPINAS (Armed Forces of the Philippines or AFP)	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	6
46.	MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT (MILF)	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	6
47.	MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF)	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	6
48.	GOBYERNO NG ESTADOS UNIDOS (US Government)	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	6
49.	UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID)	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	6
50.	KRISTİYANO/KATOLIKONG SIMBAHAN (Christian/Catholic church)	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	6
51.	IMAM	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	6
52.	ABU-SAYYAF	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	6

E. PEACE IN MINDANAO

53-
61.

SA INYONG PALAGAY, GAANO ANG NAGING KONTRIBUSYON NG BAWAT ISA SA MGA SUMUSUNOD UPANG MAKAMIT ANG HIGIT NA KAPAYAPAAN SA MINDANAO? ITO PO BA AY...**TALAGANG MALAKING KONTRIBUSYON, MEDYO MALAKING KONTRIBUSYON, KAUNTING KONTRIBUSYON O WALANG KONTRIBUSYON?** PAKISABI ANG SAGOT NINYO SA PAMAMAGITAN NG PAGLAGAY NG MGA KARD SA NAAANGKOP NA LUGAR SA RATING BOARD NA ITO.

*In your view, how much has each of the following contributed toward achieving more peace in Mindanao? Is it... **A GREAT DEAL OF CONTRIBUTION, SOME CONTRIBUTION, A LITTLE CONTRIBUTION** or **NO CONTRIBUTION**? You may indicate your answers by placing each card on the appropriate box on this rating board.*

(SHUFFLE CARDS AND RATING BOARD 4)		TMK	MMK	KK	WK	HA	R
53.	INTERNASYUNAL NA PANG-EKONOMIYA AT PANLIPUNANG TULONG NA NAGPABUTI SA PAMANTAYAN NG PAMUMUHAY NG MGA TAO <i>(International economic and social assistance that improved people's standard of living)</i>	1	2	3	4	8	9
54.	HIGIT NA KAKAYAHAN NG MGA TAO NA MAIPARINIG ANG KANILANG BOSES SA LARANGAN NG PULITIKA <i>(Increased capability of the people to have their voice heard in the political arena)</i>	1	2	3	4	8	9
55.	PAGKAPAGOD NG MGA TAO SA PAGHIHIRAP NA DULOT NG MGA ARMADONG ALITAN <i>(People being tired of suffering caused by armed conflicts)</i>	1	2	3	4	8	9
56.	MAS EPEKTIBONG SANDATAHANG LAKAS NG GOBYERNO <i>(More effective government armed forces)</i>	1	2	3	4	8	9
57.	PAGBUTI NG SEGURIDAD DAHIL SA GAWAING MILITAR NG ESTADOS UNIDOS <i>(Improved security due to U.S. military activities)</i>	1	2	3	4	8	9
58.	MAS MARAMI ANG GINAGAWA UPANG MARESOLBA ANG MGA ALITAN SA LOKAL NA LABEL <i>(More is being done to resolve conflicts at the local level)</i>	1	2	3	4	8	9
59.	PAG-USAD NG MGA NEGOSASYON SA PAGITAN NG MGA ARMADONG GRUPO AT NG GOBYERNO <i>(Progress in negotiations between armed groups and government)</i>	1	2	3	4	8	9
60.	HIGIT NA ATENSIYON NG NASYONAL NA GOBYERNO SA MGA PANGANGAILANGAN NG MGA MUSLIM SA MINDANAO <i>(More attention of the national government to the needs of Muslims in Mindanao.)</i>	1	2	3	4	8	9
61.	PERANG PADALA MULA SA PILIPINONG NASA IBANG BANSA NA NAKAKATULONG SA KANILANG PAMILYA <i>(Remittances from overseas Filipinos that are helping their family)</i>	1	2	3	4	8	9

62-
72.

AT SA INYONG PALAGAY, GAANO ANG SAGABAL NG BAWAT ISA SA MGA SUMUSUNOD UPANG MAKAMIT ANG HIGIT NA KAPAYAPAAN SA MINDANAO? ITO PO BA AY...**TALAGANG MALAKING SAGABAL, MEDYO MALAKING SAGABAL, KAUNTING SAGABAL O WALANG SAGABAL?** PAKISABI ANG SAGOT NINYO SA PAMAMAGITAN NG PAGLAGAY NG MGA KARD SA NAAANGKOP NA LUGAR SA RATING BOARD NA ITO.

And in your view, how much of an obstacle is each of the following in achieving more peace in Mindanao? Is it... A GREAT DEAL OF OBSTACLE, SOME OBSTACLE, A LITTLE OBSTACLE or NOT AN OBSTACLE? You may indicate your answers by placing each card on the appropriate box on this rating board.

(SHUFFLE CARDS AND RATING BOARD 5)		TMS	MMS	KS	WS	HA	R
62.	PATULOY NA SUPORTA NG PUBLIKO SA MGA ARMADONG GRUPO <i>(Continued support by the public in the armed groups)</i>	1	2	3	4	8	9
63.	HINDI PAGTUPAD NG MGA ARMADONG GRUPO SA KANILANG MGA PANGAKO SA ILALIM NG MGA KASUNDUANG PANGKAPAYAPAAN <i>(Non-fulfillment of commitments by the armed groups under the peace agreements)</i>	1	2	3	4	8	9
64.	HINDI PAGTUPAD NG GOBYERNO SA KANILANG MGA PANGAKO SA ILALIM NG MGA KASUNDUANG PANGKAPAYAPAAN <i>(Non-fulfillment of commitments by government under the peace agreements)</i>	1	2	3	4	8	9
65.	HINDI SAPAT NA PANLIPUNAN AT PANG-EKONOMIYANG KAUNLARAN <i>(Insufficient social and economic development)</i>	1	2	3	4	8	9
66.	KAKULANGAN NG SAPAT NA KAPARAANAN NG MGA GRUPONG MINORYA SA PAGGAWA NG DESISYON <i>(Lack of sufficient access of minority groups in decision-making)</i>	1	2	3	4	8	9
67.	PAGDARAMDAM SA KOMUNIDAD NA DULOT NG MGA MILITAR NA PAGKILOS NG SANDATAHANG LAKAS NG GOBYERNO <i>(Resentment in the community brought about by military activities of the government armed forces)</i>	1	2	3	4	8	9
68.	MGA LOKAL NA ANGKAN NG PULITIKO <i>(Local political clans)</i>	1	2	3	4	8	9
69.	KRIMINAL NA SINDIKATO <i>(Criminal syndicates)</i>	1	2	3	4	8	9
70.	MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT O MILF <i>(Moro Islamic Liberation Front or MILF)</i>	1	2	3	4	8	9
71.	MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT O MNLF <i>(Moro National Liberation Front or MNLF)</i>	1	2	3	4	8	9
72.	COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES – NEW PEOPLE’S ARMY O CPP-NPA <i>(Communist Party of the Philippines – New People’s Army or CPP-NPA)</i>	1	2	3	4	8	9

F. EVALUATION OF USAID PROGRAMS

73. Alam po ba ninyo o may narinig o nabasa na kayo kahit na kalian tungkol sa UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT o USAID? **KUNG OO:** Pakisabi po kung ano ang inyong nalalaman tungkol sa USAID? (MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED)

*Are you aware or have you ever heard or read anything about UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT or USAID? **IF YES:** What do you know about USAID? (MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED)*

ALAM ANG USAID (*Aware of USAID*).....1

VERBATIM :

HINDI ALAM ANG USAID (*Not aware of USAID*).....2

74. Maaari po ba kayong magbigay ng mga proyekto ng USAID na alam ninyo o kilala ninyo mula sa listahang ito? (SHOW LIST OF USAID PROJECTS WITH LOGO)

Can you identify the USAID projects that you know or are aware of from this list? (SHOW LIST OF USAID PROJECTS WITH LOGO)

75. Sa inyong palagay, alin sa mga sumusunod na programa ang naging kapaki-pakinabang sa inyong pamilya? Maaari po bang ipaliwanag ninyo kung bakit?

In your opinion, which programs have been beneficial to your family in particular? Please explain why.

76. Maging ano pa man ang naging epekto ng programa sa inyong pamilya, sa inyong palagay, alin sa mga sumusunod na programa ang naging kapaki-pakinabang sa inyong komunidad? Maaari po bang ipaliwanag ninyo kung bakit?

Regardless of how your own family was affected by the programs, in your opinion, which ones have been beneficial to your community? Please explain why.

77. Sa inyong palagay, alin sa mga sumusunod na programa ang hindi naging kapaki-pakinabang sa inyong pamilya? Maaari po bang ipaliwanag ninyo kung bakit?

In your opinion, which of these programs have not been beneficial to your family? Please explain why.

78. Maging ano pa man ang naging epekto ng programa sa inyong pamilya, sa inyong palagay, alin sa mga sumusunod na programa ang hindi naging kapaki-pakinabang sa inyong komunidad? Maaari po bang ipaliwanag ninyo kung bakit?

Regardless of how your own family was affected by the programs, in your opinion, which of these programs have not been beneficial to your community? Please explain why.

NOTE: For illustration purpose only. Font size and format adjusted to accommodate open-end responses

ACRONYM	PROJECT NAME	Q74. Awaneness	Q75. Beneficial to family	Q75a. Reason why beneficial to family	Q76. Beneficial to community	Q76a. Reason why beneficial to community	Q77. Not beneficial to family	Q77a. Reason why not beneficial to family	Q78. Not beneficial to community	Q78a. Reason why not beneficial to community
AMORE	Alliance for Mindanao Off Grid Renewable Energy 2	01	01		01		01		01	
ASCEND Mindanao - EQUALLS	Assistance for the Comprehensive Educational Development of Mindanao	02	02		02		02		02	
Creative Associates - EQUALLS	Education Quality and Access for Learning and Livelihood Skills 1 - Basic Education and Policy Support	03	03		03		03		03	
BJSS	Barangay Justice Service System	04	04		04		04		04	
CMP	Conflict Management in the Philippines	05	05		05		05		05	
CUES	Credit Union Empowerment and Strengthening	06	06		06		06		06	
DIWA - EQUALLS	Dayawang Igaw sa Wastong Agkawat ("Cooperative Leap for Proper Intelligence)	07	07		07		07		07	
DPR	DPR Project: Disaster Preparedness and Response to Conflict-Affected Areas in Mindanao	08	08		08		08		08	
EcoGov	Environmental Governance Project 1 & 2	09	09		09		09		09	
EJP	Environmental Justice Project	10	10		10		10		10	
ELSA - EQUALLS	Education and Livelihood Skills Alliance	11	11		11		11		11	
EnRICH ARMM	EnRICH/Enriching Partnership for Peace through Health in ARMM	12	12		12		12		12	
EnRICH Basilan	EnRICH / Family Planning and Community Empowerment Project in Basilan	13	13		13		13		13	
FISH	Fisheries Improved for Sustainable Harvest Project	14	14		14		14		14	
GEM	Growth with Equity in Mindanao I & II	15	15		15		15		15	
HI	Handicap Intl., Wheelchairs Project	16	16		16		16		16	
IELTLM - EQUALLS	Improving English Language Teaching and Learning in Mindanao	17	17		17		17		17	
LEAD	Local Enhancement and Development for Health Project	18	18		18		18		18	
LEAP	Livelihood Enhancement and Peace Program	19	19		19		19		19	
MABS	Microenterprise Access to Banking Services in Mindanao	20	20		20		20		20	
MAP	Mindanao Assistance Project: Mindanao Water/Sanitation 1 - Basic Livelihood Assistance to IDPs	21	21		21		21		21	
PDG-Police	NDI Community Policing Project/ Promoting Democratic Governance of the Police	22	22		22		22		22	
PhilTIPS	Philippines TB Initiative in the Private Sector	23	23		23		23		23	
TAG	Transparent and Accountable Governance 2	24	24		24		24		24	
TEAM Mindanao - EQUALLS	Television Education for the Advancement of Muslim Mindanao	25	25		25		25		25	
TSAP	The Social Acceptance of Family Planning Project	26	26		26		26		26	
TUDLO Mindanao - EQUALLS	Educ Assistance Program for Mindanao	27	27		27		27		27	
	NONE	--	96		96		96		96	
	DONT KNOW	97	97		97		97		97	
	REFUSED	98	98		98		98		98	
	WALANG KILALA (Not aware)	99	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

79. Sa inyong opinyon, alin sa mga sumusunod na uri ng mga proyekto ang kailangan ng inyong komunidad? Pumili lamang po kayo ng 5 proyekto at pakiranggo ang mga napili ninyo. (SHUFFLE CARDS)

In your opinion, which of the following types of projects does your community need? Please choose 5 projects and rank your choices. (SHUFFLE CARDS)

RANK TOP FIVE:

- _____ IMPRASTRATURA: MGA DAAN, TULAY, PANTALAN, POST-HARVEST FACILITIES, IBA PA
(Infrastructure: roads, bridges, port landings, post-harvest facilities, others)
- _____ MGA PROYEKTONG TUMUTULONG SA MGA NEGOSASYONG PANGKAPAYAPAAAN
(Projects assisting in peace negotiations)
- _____ KAPAYAPAAAN AT KAAAYUSAN (PAGBAWAS SA MGA HINDI PAGKAKASUNDO)
(Peace and order (conflict reduction))
- _____ PANGKABUHAYAN *(Livelihood)*
- _____ KAPALIGIRAN (GUBAT, BAYBAYIN, PALAISDAAN, BASURA) *(Environment (forest, coastal, fishery, waste))*
- _____ PAMAMAHALA (PAGPAPAUNLAD NG PAMAHALAAN) *(Governance (Government improvement))*
- _____ KALUSUGAN *(Health)*
- _____ EDUKASYON *(Education)*
- _____ TUBIG *(Water)*
- _____ KURYENTE *(Electricity)*
- _____ IBA PANG PROYEKTO, PAKITUKOY *(Other projects, specify)* _____

G. ARMED CONFLICT

80. Anu-ano ang mga tatlong pangunahing dahilan ng mga hindi pagkakasundo sa inyong lugar? Pumili lamang po kayo ng 3 sagot at pakiranggo ang mga napili ninyo. (SHUFFLE CARDS)

What are the top three causes of conflict in your area? Please choose 3 answers and rank your choices. (SHUFFLE CARDS)

- _____ RIDO O PAG-AAWAY-AWAY NG MGA PAMILYA *(Rido or family feud)*
- _____ PAG-AAWAY-AWAY SA LUPA *(Land disputes)*
- _____ PAGKUKUMPITENSIYA SA MGA LIKAS NA YAMAN *(Competition over natural resources)*
- _____ RELIHIYON/IDEYOLOHIYA *(Religious/ideology)*
- _____ IBA PA , PAKITUKOY *(Others, specify)* _____

81. Anu-ano ang mga naging resulta ng mga pag-aaway-away/hindi pagkakasundo sa Mindanao sa inyo at sa inyong pamilya? (MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED)

What have been the consequences of the armed conflict in Mindanao to you and your family? (MULTIPLE RESPONSES ALLOWED)

		Pakitukoy ang pinaka-huling taon <i>(Specify most recent year)</i>
MAYROON SA PAMILYA ANG NASUGATAN (HINDI NAMATAY) <i>(Someone in family was wounded (not killed))</i>	1	
MAYROON SA PAMILYA ANG NAMATAY <i>(Someone in family was killed)</i>	2	
NAWALA ANG MGA ARI-ARIAN <i>(Property was lost)</i>	3	
ANG MGA ARI-ARIAN AY NASIRA <i>(Property was damaged)</i>	4	
ANG PAMILYA AY KINAILANGANG IWANAN ANG KANILANG TAHANAN AT LUMIPAT SA IBANG LUGAR <i>(Family had to leave home and be relocated)</i>	5	
ANG PAMILYA AY NAWALAN NG KABUHAYAN <i>(Family lost livelihood)</i>	6	
ANG MGA BATA AY HINDI NA NAKAPAG-ARAL <i>(Children out of school)</i>	7	
IBA PANG EPEKTO, PAKITUKOY <i>(Other effects, specify):</i> _____	()	
WALA <i>(None)</i>	95	-----

END OF HHH
QUESTIONNAIRE

MARAMING-SALAMAT PO! --
THANK YOU VERY MUCH
(GO TO SOCIO DEMO)

APPENDIX 5: TEAM ONE TRAVEL AND INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Re travel & GEM, coordinate with Malou (0917.700.3915 /082.225.1470 / Quek (Rebecca Matias) 082.234.7720/0918.979.0529

Team One: Michael Lund, Jojo Abinales, and Ima Verzosa (Plus one security detail from GEM)						
Thursday 8 May	Friday 9 May	Saturday 10 May	Sunday 11 May	Monday 12 May	Tuesday 13 May	Wednesday 14 May
<p>10 AM: Fly Manila - Cagayan de Oro city; drive to Lanao del Norte</p> <p>Cheradel Suites Iligan City Tel: (063) 223-8118 Rate: PhP 1290 (w/o breakfast)</p>	<p>Interviews in Lanao del Norte</p> <p>Cheradel Suites Iligan City Tel: (063) 223-8118 Rate: PhP 1290 (w/o breakfast)</p>	<p>Interviews in Marawi City</p> <p>Hotel Guillermo Pagadian City Tel: (062) 214.1479 Rate: PhP 1,100 (w/ breakfast)</p>	<p>Depart AM - drive to Zamboanga City; stop along way; arrive Sunday PM</p> <p>Garden Orchid Hotel Zamboanga City T: 062.991.0031 Rate: PhP 1,800 (w/o breakfast)</p>	<p>Arrive in Zamboanga; Conduct Interviews</p> <p>Garden Orchid Hotel Zamboanga City T: 062.991.0031 Rate: PhP 1,800 (w/o breakfast)</p>	<p>Interviews in Zamboanga</p> <p>Garden Orchid Hotel Zamboanga City T: 062.991.0031 Rate: PhP 1,800 (w/o breakfast)</p>	<p>Interviews in Basilan (ferry @ 6:45 am); return to Zamboanga at 1:45 pm</p> <p>Garden Orchid Hotel Zamboanga City Tel: (062)991-0031 Rate: PhP 1,800 (w/o breakfast)</p>
Thursday 15 May	Friday 16 May	Saturday 17 May	Sunday 18 May	Mon - Wed 19 – 21 May	Thursday 22 May	Friday 23 May
<p>6:45 AM - Depart by ferry to Basilan; Depart 1:45pm by ferry to Zamboanga City</p> <p>Garden Orchid Hotel T: 062 991 0031 Rate: PhP 1,800 (w/o breakfast)</p>	<p>Depart for Davao city at 7:40am, Arrive 8:35am</p> <p>Marco Polo Hotel Davao City T: (082) 221-0888 Php 2,700 (w/o bkfast)</p>	<p>Interviews in Davao with Team 2</p> <p>Marco Polo Hotel Davao City T: (082) 221-0888 Php 2,700 (w/o bkfast)</p>	<p><i>Spend day in Davao City for team debrief</i></p> <p><i>Return to Manila from Davao 7 PM</i></p> <p>Marco Polo Hotel Davao City T: (082) 221-0888 Php 2,700 (w/o bkfast)</p>	<p>Prep for Mission debrief</p>	<p>Mission Debrief from Team</p>	<p><i>Depart Manila</i></p>

Rufa Guiam: 091.891.80460; Vilma Bravo: 0916.490.2152; Michael Lund: 0929.279.8308; Jojo Abinales:0927.616.1431

IMA Verzosa: 0917.830.3434/ 0917-843-4070; Aaron Stern: 0917.846.2028; Cynthia Brady:09178434092

GEM/Noel Ruiz: 0917-705-5487; GEM Bebot: 0918.804.1063; MSI Jennifer Ulman: 0929.332.8626

Team One Interviews

Thursday 8 May Lanau del Norte	Friday 9 May Lanau del Norte	Saturday 10 May Iligan/Marawi City	Sunday 11 May	Monday 12 May Zamboanga	Tuesday 13 May Zamboanga	Wednesday 14 May Basilan	
Arrive Cagayan del Oro 11:40am	7:30 – 8:00am	8am – 9am	Travel to Zamboanga	7:30 – 8:00am	8:30am – 10am	Take ferry at: 6:30am, Arriving Isabela City @ 7:15 am, then drive to Lamitan City Hall (1 hour away)	
Travel by car to Iligan City	Travel from Iligan to Linamon	CMP interviewee: Hamidullah Atar, 09186236493 Rido, Inc. at Cheradel Suites		8am – 9:30am	EQuALLS Ina Domingo Garden Orchid Hotel	9am - 10am	City Administrator Danny Alvaro
2pm – 4pm	8am – 9:30am	9 – 9:45 am		Travel to Marawi, with Hamidullah	9:30am – 10:00am		10:30-12:00
	9:30-11:00 am	10 am – 11 am		Interview with the Council of Elders – Marawi Resort Hotel	Travel to City Hall		Rima Hassan, Autonomous Basilan Islamic Chamber of Commerce, Lamitan
	11am – 1 pm	11:00-12 noon		Mayor Salic of Marawi City Marawi Resort Hotel	10:00 – 11:30 am		
	Charise Morales Lunch interview (BJSS Brgay Justice Adv) – 09167923873			Engr. Rodrigo Sicat, City Planning & Dev. Asst. Coord. + 3 others			
	Barangay Captain Vicmar Aguilar, BJA, Barangay Poblacion, Tubod, Lanao del Norte	12 – 1 pm	Dr. Macabangkit Ati, Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, Mindanao State University – Marawi Resort Hotel	11:45am - 1:15 pm		12noon - 1pm	
	Emma Mactao, BJA and Barangay Treasurer, Brgy. Poblacion, Tubod, Lanao del Norte			Hatimi Hassan, Deputy Chair, MNLF, Japanese Restaurant, Garden Orchid Hotel, Lunch interview		Drive back to Isabela, lunch at Jolibee	

	<p>1:00-2:30 pm Governor Muhamad Khalid Dimaporo, 09177209192, Prov. Capitol, TUBOD, Lanao del Norte</p>	<p>1pm - 5pm Travel to Pagadian</p>			<p>10am – 12noon Basilan MNLF Women’s Group Interview; will meet at Garden Orchid in Zambo.</p>	<p>1:30-3:00 p.m. Col. Rustico Guerrero, Commander, First Marine Battalion, Tabiawan, Basilan</p>
	<p>2:30- 3:30 p.m. Travel to Iligan City</p>			<p>1:30 – 3:00 pm Fr. Angel Calvo (0917-710-2926) – his Paz office, Claret School, at San Jose Road, ZC</p>	<p>1pm – 3pm Ulama Mufti- Abdullah (Basilan based) meeting at Garden Orchid Hotel</p>	<p>3:00-3:15 p.m. Tabiawan to Isabela 4:00-4:45 p.m. Ferry to Zamboanga City</p>
	<p>3:30pm – 5:30pm BJSS Group Interview Maya Rani Devero, Projects Coordinator and Admin Officer, 09278512347, Southern Philippines Research and Extension Division (IP of BJSS), Cheradel Suites</p>			<p>6:00pm -7:00 pm Congressional Young Interns Dr. Macabangit Ati Emma Salmani</p>	<p>3pm – 5pm Grace Rebollos, Western Mindanao State University (WMSU) -- interview at her office at WMSU (President’s Office)</p>	<p>5- 6:00 pm Karl Arbon, Amore at the Garden Orchid Hotel</p>
<p>4:00pm – 6pm Mayor Lawrence Cruz, Iligan City Tel: 063.2216.758</p>	<p>3:30pm – 5:30pm TAG interviewees, LGU partners 1. Ray Openiano 2. Councilor Maglinao at Cheradel Suites</p>			<p>7:00 pm Donna Mary Judd* WB, Conflict Advisor – Dinner interview</p>	<p>7:00 pm GEM Deputy COP Noel Ruiz Dinner interview</p>	

Team One Interviews

Thursday 15 May Basilan	Friday 16 May Davao City	Saturday 17 May Davao City	Sunday 18 May Davao City	Monday 19 May
6:45am Ferry to Basilan, Arrive 7:30am 8am – 9:30am Elsan Tindick – BJSS	8:00am Travel to Davao City Depart 7:40 AM, Arrive 8:35 AM	8:00am – 10:00am Interviews in Davao listed on Team Two Schedule (shared by both teams)	Team De-brief and Analysis Day	Manila
10:00-11:00 noon Disaster Preparedness – Espie Hupida, Nagdilaab Foundation (NGO grantee)	9:30-11 Noon Chief of WestMindanao Command	10:00am – 12noon		
11:15-12:00 pm Lunch				
12:50 pm Return to Zambo	1pm – 3pm GEM Group Interview (Charlie Feibel and component managers)	12noon – 2pm		
2-4 pm Dr. Jesus Nieves Regional Director Dep Ed		2pm – 4pm		
		Team Dinner		Return to Manila

APPENDIX 6: TEAM TWO TRAVEL AND INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Team Two: Jennifer Ulman, Cynthia Brady, Rufa Guiam and Vilma Bravo

VEHICLES: Black Everest LFE 571 (Pepe Buca 0918-8041070) and Brown Chevrolet 24133 (Jun Mejia 0918-8041105)

Thursday 8 May	Friday 9 May	Saturday 10 May	Sunday 11 May	Monday 12 May	Tuesday 13 May	Wednesday 14 May
AM: Fly Manila-General Santos City; conduct interviews East Asia Royale Hotel T: (083)553-4123 Php 1,658 (w/out bkfst)	AM: Interviews Gen Santos; PM: Depart for South Cotabato; start interviews The Farm, Koronadal City, T: 083.228.9010 PhP 2,500 (w/bkfst for 2)	Interviews in South Cotabato The Farm, Koronadal City, T: 083.228.9010 PhP 2,500 (w/ bfast for 2)	AM: Interviews in S. Cotabato PM: Depart for Maguindanao; start interviews Estosan Hotel Cotabato City T: (6364)421-6777 Php 1,840 (w/bkfst)	Interviews in Maguindanao and perhaps Sharif Kabunsuan Estosan Hotel Cotabato City T: (6364)421-6777 Php 1,840 (w/bkfst)	AM: Interviews in Maguidanao PM: Depart for Cotabato City El Manuel Cotabato City T: (064)421-PhP 2,000 (w/out bkfst)	Interviews Cotabato City El Manuel Cotabato City T: (064)421-PhP 2,000 (w/out bkfst)
Thursday 15 May	Friday 16 May	Saturday 17 May	Sunday 18 May	Mon - Wed 19 – 21 May	Thursday 22 May	Friday 23 May
Depart for North Cotabato; conduct Interviews Grand Ficus Hotel Kidapawan City T: (064)278-3192 Php 980 (w/out bkfst)	PM: Depart for Davao @ 9:30am Marco Polo Hotel T: (082) 221-0888 Php 2,700 (w/out bkfst)	AM: Interviews in Davao PM: Depart for Davao City; conduct Interviews Marco Polo Hotel T: (082) 221-0888 Php 2,700 (w/out bkfst)	Spend day in Davao City for team debrief; depart for Manila 7pm Marco Polo Hotel T: (082) 221-0888 Php 2,700 (w/out bkfst)	Prep for Mission debrief	Mission Debrief from Team	Depart Manila

Re travel & GEM, coordinate with Malou (0917.700.3915 /082.225.1470 / or Quek (Rebecca Matias) 082.234.7720

Rufa's cell no: 091.891.80460; Vilma's cell no: 0916.490.2152

Ima's cell no: 0917.830.3434/ 0917-843-4070; GEM/Noel Ruiz cell no.: 0917-705-5487/ 0920-9103061

Team Two Interviews

Thursday 8 May General Santos	Friday 9 May Gensan and S. Cotabato	Saturday 10 May S. Cotabato and Maguindanao	Sunday 11 May	Monday 12 May S. Cotabato and Maguindanao	Tuesday 13 May Maguindanao and Cotabato City	Wednesday 14 May Cotabato City
<p>10am – 12noon</p> <p>Bai Matabay Diamad, former Chairperson, Muslim Business Forum tel: 083-301-3266; cell: 0927-7952135</p> <p><i>At East Asia Royale Hotel</i></p>	<p>9am – 11am</p> <p>Group Interview with City Hall Representatives Tel: 09196565293; 083-554-4214 (Gay)</p> <p>8am - 10am</p> <p>Bro. Crispin Betita, Director, Marcellin Found., Katangawan, Gen San (OSCY program implementer)</p>	<p>9:30am – 11am</p> <p>Mr. Dausay Daulog Exec Dir, Maguindanao Development Foundation, Inc.</p> <p><i>Mobile 0918-275-8104 MDFI Training Center, Odi Street (in front of PCA and Barangay Zone 3 Office), Koronadal City</i></p>	<p>Travel to Cotabato City/Maguindanao</p>	<p>8am – 930am</p> <p>Mayor Ramon Piang, Upi Municipal Hall, Shariff Kabunsuan (Commtly Policing)</p> <p>Tel: 091.5532.5908</p> <p>9am – 11am</p> <p>Mr. Bassit Accoy, Head, Technical and Management Office Mr. Diamadel Dumagay, Director of Regional Planning and Development Regional Office of the ARMM</p>	<p>9am – 10am</p> <p>Atty. Benedicto Bacani* Exec Dir, Institute for Autonomy & Governance</p> <p><i>Cell: 092.091.61393 IAG Office, NDU Campus, Cotabato City</i></p>	<p>8am – 10am</p> <p>Write-ups of Interviews</p> <p>10am – 11am</p> <p>Hadja Bainon Karon* Executive Director, Bangsamoro Women Federation of Multi-purpose Cooperatives, Inc</p> <p><i>FBMWMPC Office, Kakar Cell: 0927-296-2074</i></p>
<p>12n – 1:30pm</p> <p>Mr. Bayani Fredeluces, SFFAI</p> <p>Sydney Hotel, Tel: 0917.721.2634</p>	<p>10:45am – 12n</p> <p>Gov Miguel Dominguez</p> <p>Tel: 083.508.2258 or 0918.888.0300, Admin Gay Ulanday 0920.947.6051</p>			<p>10:30 – 11:30 am</p> <p>Gov. Zaldy Ampatuan, ARMM Governor ARMM Complex, Cotabato City</p> <p><i>T: (064) 421-1690 F: (064) 421-5814</i></p>	<p>10:30am – 12:30pm</p> <p>Moharrim Mohammad, Director of Bureau of Madaris in ARMM, DepED</p>	<p>10am – 12noon</p> <p>Arabie Bawarie, Head Imam of Masjid Al-Khaairat, (recipient of ECO-GOV)</p>
<p>12:30pm – 2pm</p>	<p>11:45 Travel to South Cotabato</p>	<p>12:30pm – 2pm</p> <p>Father Mercado</p>			<p>12:30pm – 2pm</p>	<p>12:30pm – 2pm</p> <p>Abhoud Syed, Director, Institute for Bangsamoro Studies Estosan Hotel</p>

Thursday 8 May General Santos	Friday 9 May Gensan and S. Cotabato	Saturday 10 May S. Cotabato and Maguindanao	Sunday 11 May Cotabato City	Monday 12 May S. Cotabato and Maguindanao	Tuesday 13 May Maguindanao and Cotabato City	Wednesday 14 May Cotabato City
<p>2pm – 4pm</p> <p>Dean , Prof. Alicia P. Pulido and Principal Ms. Tess Colipano</p> <p>MSU College of Ed. (Rufa's Office) Tel. No. 301-6301</p>	<p>1:30 – 3pm</p> <p>Site Visit and Interview LEAP Sumbakil Cluster Leader Maguid Ludsiman and Arnold Dacula,</p> <p>TCEP-LEAP LEAP 092.66887386</p>	<p>9am – 11am Mr. Dausay Daulog, Executive Director, Maguindanaon Development Foundation, Inc., Koronadal City, South Cotabato</p> <p>Write up FCR's from Interviews</p>	<p>3pm – 4pm</p> <p>Sheikh Moner Bajunaid, Former Muslim Ed. Advisor</p> <p>0926.457.4666 Estosan Hotel Cotabato city</p>	<p>2pm – 4pm</p> <p>Dr. Danda Juanday, BDA Chairman and Exec Director</p> <p>Tel: 064.390.2553</p> <p>4pm – 5pm</p> <p>Ms. Nelia Agbon, NDI Country Director, Cotabato City</p>	<p>2pm – 4pm</p> <p>Mr. Guiamel Alim, Exec Director, Kaduntaya Found., Inc & Mr. Maulana, Exec. Director of Consortium of Bansamoro Civil Soc. Orgs</p> <p>Cell. 0917-726-3530 KFI Office, Dona Pilar St.</p> <p>3pm – 4:30 pm</p> <p>Hadja Sittie Mariam (Maria Lourdes D. Lim, Director, National Economic Development Authority NEDA 12 Office, ARMM Compound Cotabato City Mobile no. 0916618-4728</p> <p>Mahdie Amella, United Youth for Peace & Development (CMP partner), Doton St, Sharif Kabunsuan, Brgay Rosary Heights, Cotabato City</p>	<p>2pm – 4pm</p>
<p>4pm – 5:30pm</p> <p>Ms. Wahida M. Abtahi, Hadja Insih Omar, Joy Masdoc MNLF Selatan Kutawatu State Women's Committee MSU College of Ed. Rufa's Office East Asia Royale Hotel (083)553-4123</p>	<p>4pm – 6pm</p> <p>Mr. Eduardo "Boy" de la Fuente, Jr., Executive Secretary to the Mayor</p> <p>Mayor Muslimen Sema's Office, City Hall, Cotabato City Koronadal City The Farm (083) 228-9010</p>	<p>5 pm</p> <p>Koronadal City The Farm (083) 228-9010</p>	<p>4pm</p> <p>Pacific Heights Cotabato City T-064-421-2249</p>	<p>4pm – 5:30pm</p> <p>Mayor Muslimin Sema City Mayor's Office (064) 421-8970-8971/72</p> <p>Pacific Heights Cotabato City T-064-421-2249</p>	<p>4pm – 6pm</p> <p>Pacific Heights Cotabato City T-064-421-2249</p>	<p>4pm – 6pm</p> <p>Mr. Abhoud Syed Lingga, Executive Director, Institute for Bangsamoro Studies</p> <p>Estosan Hotel Cell: 0920-808-0188</p> <p>Pacific Heights Cotabato City T-064-421-2249</p>

Team Two Interviews

Thursday 15 May N. Cotabato	Friday 16 May Davao City	Saturday 17 May Davao City	Sunday 18 May Davao City	Monday 19 May
<p>9am</p> <p>Site Visit and Interview Pikit Mayor Sumulong Sultan, Brgy. Captain of Rajah Muda, and GEM-RIP Engr</p> <p>GEM-RIP Pikit (Buliok) Interview at Rajah Muda Elementary School Bgry Rajah Muda, Pikit, North Cotabato</p>	<p>8:30am - 11am</p> <p>Travel to Davao City 2.5 hour drive Arrive 11am</p>	<p>8am – 10am</p> <p>Father Albert Alejo Ateneo Davao University</p> <p>9am – 10:30am</p> <p>Ms. Mags Maglana, PO, Local Gov't Support Programme in ARMM Cell: 0920.953.0070 <i>Ms. Villanueva</i> Cell: 0920-953-0035 <i>m.villanueva@lgsipa.org.ph</i></p>	<p>Team De-brief and Analysis Day</p>	<p>Manila</p>
<p>11am – 12noon</p> <p>FR. BERT LAYSON, OMI * Organizer, Spaces for Peace Pikit Parish, Pikit, North Cotabato Cell: 0917 717 6900</p>		<p>9am - 10am</p> <p>Ustadz Omar, Davao Islamic Dawah (TSAP), Serawan, Toril, Davao City</p> <p>10am – 12noon</p> <p>Anita Morales At METSA Foundation, (TSAP) Km 20, Los Amigos, Davao City</p>		
<p>1pm - 2 pm:</p> <p>Travel to Midsayap</p>		<p>11am – 1pm</p> <p>GEM Group Interview Charlie.Feibel and component managers</p> <hr/> <p>1pm-3pm</p> <p>Dr. Jo Aca, Prov Cap, Compostela, Davao</p>		

Thursday 15 May N. Cotabato	Friday 16 May Davao City	Saturday 17 May Davao City	Sunday 18 May Davao City	Monday 19 May
<p>2pm - 4pm</p> <p>Joe Agarano and key partners (EQuALLS) Session Hall, Municipal Bldg., Midsayap</p>	<p>3:15pm – 4:15pm</p> <p>Diosita T. Andot* Programme Mgr, UN-ACT for Peace</p> <p>Cell: 0917.549.0755 UN-ACT for Peace, Davao City; need 30 mins to trvl</p> <hr/> <p>3:15 – 4:15pm</p> <p>Dr. Josephine Villafuerte, City Health Officer and Dir. Maduh Damsani (POPCOM Director) Davao Medical Center Office of Dir Damsani</p>	<p>2pm – 4pm</p> <p>Mr. Virgilio Leyretana, Undersecretary and Chairman, MEDCo 4th floor, SSS Bldg, JP Laurel Ave, Bajada Tel: 082.221.1345</p>	<p>Return to Manila ETD: 7:20 pm ETA: 9:15 pm</p>	
<p>5pm - 7pm:</p> <p>Travel from Midsayap to Kidapawan</p> <p>RON at Grand Ficus Hotel, Kidapawan</p>	<p>5 pm Arrive at Marco Polo Hotel Davao City T: (082) 221-0888</p>	<p>6 pm Marco Polo Hotel Davao City T: (082) 221-0888</p> <p>Team Dinner</p>	<p>Return to Manila</p>	

APPENDIX 7:

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS – MANLIA-BASED SCHEDULE

Time	May 2 (Fri)	May 5 (Mon)	May 6 (Tues)	May 7 (Wed)	May 20 - 22
8:00-9:00				8am – 10am 1) EcoGov/DAI : Dr. Guiang, COP 2) AMORE 3) FISH/Tetra Tech	
9:00-10:00		OD, SO Team Leaders, SO Teams	Sec. Jesus Dureza, Office of Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), 7F, Agustin Bldg I, Emerald Ave, Pasig City		
10:00-11:00		OEDG/Teret Calabia: SO 12 Program Manager	Travel Time	EnRICH/SHIELD – Ray Gonzaga (CCF)	Sec. Silvestre Afable scheduled on (Mandarin Hotel)
11:00-12:00		OEDG/Gerry Porta: Conflict Assessment & Democracy Activities	JSOTF Representative from Basilan	MABS/Chemonics – John Owens	
1:00-2:00		OEE Team Leader	EQuALLS/EDC – Bill Potter & Marcial Salvatierra	1:30pm – 2pm Travel time	
2:00-3:00	MEC	OED Team Leader	2:15pm - 4:30pm TAF/Ky-Johnson, Acting Country Representative –at TAF Office at 36 Lapu-Lapu St., Magallanes Village, srood@asiafound.org ; kjohnson@asiafound.org ; 8511466/ 8530474	UNDP/Alma Evangelista (CIDA – regrets NEDA – will answer questions by email)	
3:00-4:00		OH Team Leader	3:30pm - 4:00pm Travel time (part of the team)	Prep time for Evaluation Team	Debrief with Mission: May 21, 2008
4:00-5:00			AUSAID / Patricia Georgina Domingo, Program Manager, RCBC Bldg, Makati City		Outbrief with US Embassy: May 22, 2008

APPENDIX 8: FINAL INTERVIEW GUIDE

Evaluation Intro: Greetings. Thank you for taking the time to meet with us today. Perhaps a brief summary about this evaluation was provided in the setting up of this interview; however, allow us to provide further detail about who we are and our specific purpose and evaluation focus.

Management Systems International (MSI) was contracted by USAID/Philippines to carry out an evaluation of the impacts of their programs on conflict in Mindanao. Our evaluation team is made up of 7 people total, including two people from MSI's home-office, three local Filipino experts, one person from USAID-Washington and one from the Mission in Manila. We have broken up into two teams to cover a selection of provinces including: Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Zamboanga City, Basilan, Maguindanao, Davao City, Gensan, North and South Cotabato, and Cotabato City.

Evaluation Purpose: Our purpose is to provide USAID with key findings, conclusions and recommendations as to determine what effects U.S. assistance programs have had on the conflicts and peace processes in Mindanao since 2000.

Evaluation Focus: More specifically, our core evaluation questions are: What impacts have USG programs had in reducing the various sources of conflict and in strengthening factors that promote peace? The evaluation is also concerned with related questions such as whether Mindanaoan local governments have been strengthened and whether an appropriate mix and balance of development programs has been implemented and how well these programs have been implemented.

Questions:

1. Tell us a little bit about yourself. How do you perceive your role (or your project's role if an implementer) within the community?
2. In general, how are things going in your area/community lately (or the area/community where you are working)? What types of development progress have you seen?
3. Please describe the most prevalent kinds of conflict and violence in your area/community (or the area/community where you're working).
4. What are your thoughts as to the mix of programming in place to address these types of conflict? Are there other activities needed to sufficiently address these issues?
5. To what extent have these activities achieved their intended objectives? Are these outcomes relevant to the central causes of conflict?
 - a. Have these activities and their implementation had any negative impacts on peace and conflict dynamics?
6. Are/were there (or do you anticipate) sustainable or lasting impacts of any kind from these activities? Please explain.
7. How productive have these programmatic approaches been in relation to their cost and effort? Looking back, are there any alternative approaches that you would recommend?
8. How are these activities connected with other programs, organizations, donors, etc. in this area? Are there any specific linkages with higher level processes (e.g. peace processes)?
9. What types of outside factors had an impact, either positive or negative, on the success of these activities?
10. Do you have any recommendations for us about these programs and approaches (i.e. expand, drop, shift) or additional ideas about things that should be done to promote peace and prevent conflict?

Optional: What additional projects or additional components to existing projects would assist (or would have assisted) in promoting peace and development in Mindanao?

APPENDIX 9: LIST OF USAID PROJECTS REVIEWED

Mindanao Evaluation for USAID/Philippines				30	Projects
	Projects	Start	End	Funding	% Presence
SO2: Economic Governance and Democracy (3 projects)					
1	BJSS: Barangay Justice Service System - BJSS (also funded under SO12)	9/1/1998	3/31/2007	\$3,550,000	100%
2	CMP: Conflict Management in the Philippines (also funded under SO12)	10/1/2003	9/30/2006	\$2,900,000	80%
3	TAG2: Transparent and Accountable Governance 2 (also funded under SO12)	9/22/1999	9/30/2007	\$10,613,000	80%
SO 3: Family Health (7 projects)					
4	EnRICH / Enhanced and Rapid Improvement of Community Health in Sulu Project	10/1/2002	9/30/2006	\$1,000,000	100%
5	EnRICH / Enriching Partnership for Peace through Health in ARMM	8/15/2002	8/14/2006	\$1,685,680	100%
6	EnRICH / Family Planning and Community Empowerment Project in Basilan	9/16/2002	9/15/2006	\$5,500,000	100%
7	EnRICH/ Health Families in Tawi Tawi	9/16/2002	2/28/2007	\$1,876,385	100%
8	LEAD: Local Enhancement and Development for Health Project	10/1/2003	9/30/2006	\$33,961,559	50%
9	PhilTIPS: Philippines TB Initiative in the Private Sector	10/1/2002	9/30/2006	\$11,868,600	30%
10	TSAP: The Social Acceptance of Family Planning Project	8/15/2002	9/15/2006	\$11,631,188	30%
SO 4: Energy and Environment (4 projects)					
11	AMORE: Alliance for Mindanao Off Grid Renewable Energy 2 / SERED	10/1/2004	9/30/2009	\$10,400,000	100%
12	EcoGov 1 Environmental Governance Project	12/4/2001	11/30/2004	\$9,100,000	60%
	EcoGov 2 Environmental Governance Project	10/1/2004	9/30/2007	\$25,000,000	60%
13	EJP: Environmental Justice Project CIEL	11/1/2000	9/30/2007	\$1,309,607	30%
14	FISH: Fisheries Improved for Sustainable Harvest Project	9/22/2003	9/21/2008	\$12,348,457	50%

SO 11: Education (7 projects)					
15	EQuALLS-1: Education Quality and Access for Learning and Livelihood Skills 1 Basic Education and Policy Support (BEPS)	9/28/2004	8/3/2006	\$7,888,383	100%
16	EQuALLS PPA - Education and Livelihood Skills Alliance (ELSA)	10/1/2004	9/30/2007	\$4,200,000	100%
17	EQuALLS PPA - Dabayawang Igpaw sa Wastong Agkataw (DIWA) ("Cooperative Leap for Proper Intelligence)	10/1/2004	9/30/2007	\$3,121,567	100%
18	EQuALLS PPA - Television Education for the Advancement of Muslim Mindanao (TEAM Mindanao)	10/1/2004	9/30/2007	\$1,000,000	100%
19	EQuALLS PPA - Assistance for the Comprehensive Educational Development of Mindanao (ASCEND-Mindanao)	10/1/2004	9/30/2006	\$2,622,877	100%
20	EQuALLS PPA - Educ Assistance Program for Mindanao [TUDLO - Mindanao]	10/1/2003	9/30/2008	\$830,876	100%
21	EQuALLS PPA - Improving English Language Teaching and Learning in Mindanao (IELTM)	10/1/2004	9/30/2006	\$1,000,000	100%
SO 12: Conflict Reduction (7 projects)					
22	CUES: Credit Union Empowerment and Strengthening (also funded under SO2)	9/1/2002	2/28/2006	\$750,000	90%
23	GEM- I: Growth with Equity in Mindanao I	8/28/1995	9/30/2002		100%
24	GEM- II: Growth with Equity in Mindanao II	8/15/2002	8/14/2007	\$84,000,000	100%
25	LEAP: Livelihood Enhancement and Peace Program	7/1/1997	12/31/2005		100%
26	Handicap Intl., Wheelchairs Project	6/4/2004	6/7/2008	\$750,000	100%
27	MABS/M Microenterprise Access to Banking Services in Mindanao (also funded under SO2)	11/30/1997	9/30/2007	\$17,400,000	75%
28	Promoting Democratic Governance of the Police	8/15/2003	10/31/2005		100%
Humanitarian Assistance (2 projects)					
29	MAP: Mindanao Assistance Project: Mindanao Water/Sanitation 1 -Basic Livelihood Assistance to IDPs	10/1/2004	9/30/2006	\$450,000	100%
30	DPR Project: Disaster Preparedness and Response to Conflict-Affected Areas in Mindanao	3/24/2003	7/30/2009	\$1,274,646	100%

APPENDIX 10: ILLUSTRATIVE TIMELINE OF PROJECTS REVIEWED

Mindanao Evaluation Projects Illustrative Timeline																															
No.	Project	TIME																													
		1995		1996		1997		1998		1999		2000		2001		2002		2003		2004		2005		2006		2007		2008			
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2
SO2		Economic Governance and Democracy (3 projects)																													
1	Barangay Justice Service																														
2	Conflict Management in the Philippines																														
3	TAG 2																														
SO3		Family Health (6 projects)																													
4	EnRICH in Sulu Project																														
5	EnRICH in ARMM																														
6	EnRICH in Basilan																														
7	EnRICH in Tawi Tawi																														
8	SHIELD																														
9	Phil-TIPS																														
10	LEAD for Health Project																														
SO4		Energy and Environment (4 projects)																													
11	AMORE 2 / SERED																														
12	EcoGov 1																														
13	EcoGov 2																														
14	FISH																														
SO11		Education (7 projects)																													
15	EQuALLS1 - (BEPS)																														
16	EQuALLS PPA - (ELSA)																														
17	EQuALLS PPA - (DIWA)																														
18	EQuALLS - (TEAM Mindanao)																														
19	EQuALLS PPA - (ASCEND-Mindanao)																														
20	EQuALLS PPA - (TUDLO - Mindanao)																														
21	EQuALLS PPA - (IELTM)																														
SO12		Conflict Reduction (7 projects)																													
22	CUES																														
23	GEM- I																														
24	GEM II																														
25	LEAP																														
26	Handicap Intl., Wheelchairs Project																														
27	MABS/M																														
28	Promoting Democratic Governance of the Police																														
Humanitarian Assistance		Humanitarian Assistance (2 projects)																													
29	(MAP): Mindanao Water/Sanitation 1 -Basic Livelihood Assistance to IDPs																														
30	DPR Project: Disaster Preparedness and Response to Conflict-Affected Areas in Mindanao																														

APPENDIX II:

EXPANDED METHODOLOGY DESCRIPTION

Further detail was requested by USAID/Philippines as to the process utilized for the three prescribed stages adopted from the SOW as the core methodology. As noted in the main methodology section of this report, the three stages included: Stage I: Document Review; Stage II: Household Survey; and Stage III: Fieldwork/Interviews.

Stage I was a particularly useful exercise to become familiar with the 30 projects in which the evaluation team was to focus. The number of documents and reports for each project was impossible to cover in the few weeks allotted for literature review, so the team with input from the Mission, selected approximately four documents per project to be reviewed. In most cases, these four documents included the scope of the program, annual and/or final reports, and performance and/or evaluation reports as available. As with any secondary literature, the validity of information is highly dependable upon its source. In most cases the source was the actual contractor or grantee; however, in some cases, such as where an independent evaluation was conducted, the information was dependent on a third party source. The reviews were conducted by our local sectoral experts noted in Section III. C. and sent back to MSI. Although many of the documents were available electronically, a few of our experts received hard copies of documents from the Mission and/or MSI.

As noted in Section III of this report, a template was utilized to extract the pertinent information to respond to the core evaluation questions. Information sought included, identifying the populations that projects reached (i.e. indicators of health and education programs increased outreach to Muslim populations), evidence of increased social interactions among various community groups, impacts found of demobilization of armed groups, impacts of effective practices of police and security forces, project impacts on relations between civil society and various levels of government, effectiveness of coordination among programs/projects, and sustainable impacts of projects, just to mention a few. The full template used for the document reviews are found in Annexes 2 and 3. MSI saved the full set of document reviews on a media stick for the Mission's further utilization.

Data from Stage I was primarily used to inform the team of key accomplishments that may have led to progression of peace and conflict transformation throughout primary USAID project sites in Mindanao. Findings were used to both inform the development of the survey questions in Stage II as well as provide the team with a basic understanding of the 30 projects under review prior to conducting the fieldwork prescribed for Stage III.

The household survey conducted in Stage II of this evaluation took place May 17 – 21, 2008. Surveyors met with 1,000 household head respondents for an overall error margin of $\pm 3\%$ at a 95% confidence level. As mentioned in Section III, the 1,000 respondents were split into 750 households in USAID project sites and 250 from non-USAID project sites. Further broken down by province, this meant that each province had 200 respondents divided into 150 from USAID project sites and 50 from non-USAID project sites. A list provided by USAID/Philippines served as the basis for determining whether a barangay was a USAID site or not.

In this case, the household survey was organized in such a way, however, to first verify whether the interviewee or their family was a direct beneficiary and/or knowledgeable about USAID programs in their area. This qualifier allows for further follow-up as to the impacts of the individual USAID projects. Had

this evaluation decided to conduct a beneficiary survey, both questions and results would have been significantly different.

The provinces selected for the survey are the same provinces in which the evaluation team conducted their fieldwork in Stage III. A table denoting the percentages and numbers (N = number) of household respondents for each province is provided below.

Province	Respondents
North Cotabato	24% (N = 240)
South Cotabato	29% (N = 290)
Basilan	8% (N = 80)
Lanao del Sur	15% (N = 150)
Maguindanao/Shariff Kabunsuan	26% (N = 260)

A few general demographics of the household head respondents include: 64% male and 36% female and 84% married and 15% without spouse or partner. Educational levels were 27% with some elementary education, 29% completed elementary or had some high school, 28% graduated high school and had some vocational or college education, and 15% graduated from college or received a higher degree. Religious make-up was 47% Catholic, 40% Muslim, and 13% from other religious denominations. In addition, about seven out of ten household heads were employed at the time of the survey, while 23% were unemployed, but have worked before, leaving 7% who have never worked.

Although the original intention was to review and analyze survey findings prior to the fieldwork conducted in Stage III, timing did not allow for this additional preparation. This was due to a number of factors such as the collaborative development of the survey questionnaire as well as changes to the parameters of the actual survey (number of respondents was changed from 750 to 1000 to include a comparison group of 250 households in non-USAID project sites, causing an increase in funding and preparation time needed for the subcontractor). The survey was therefore conducted at about the same time as the fieldwork and as a result analysis of findings from both Stages II and III occurred simultaneously.

Stage III covered slightly more ground than the survey. In addition to the above-mentioned surveyed provinces, the evaluation sub-teams also traveled to Lanao del Norte, Zamboanga, General Santos, and Davao City. Part of the purpose of this stage was to allow the evaluation team to directly connect with implementers, local partners (government and civil society), as well as beneficiaries. Throughout the fieldwork time was allotted to discuss and record data among each sub-team. The tables in which the data was documented were collected and shared among the team. Towards the end of Stage III, in Davao City, the two sub-teams met for a final post team meeting to discuss key common themes, issues, and impacts that came out of the ten days of fieldwork.

Data Analysis

The compilation of these three stages provides the basis for cross-comparison of data and triangulation of certain components. Triangulation is an evaluation approach to data analysis that synthesizes data from multiple sources. Varying methods of data collection are purposely utilized throughout the evaluation in order to strengthen the validity of findings by which sound conclusions can be made. By examining data collected by different methods in different groups and populations, findings can be corroborated to increase the legitimacy of key findings and reduce potential bias.

In the case of this evaluation, triangulation of the literature reviews, survey results and field interviews were used to verify accuracy of information wherever viable. Given the various sources used in each stage, triangulation of data is not always possible. This is especially true in the collection of data from the field interviews, as face-to-face interviews provide much more depth on certain topics than can say a survey. It is often the case in such personal interviews that pertinent and sometimes unexpected information is elicited through informal conversations. This type of information is often difficult to verify and therefore needs to be utilized as empirical data rather than factual data. This report attempts to identify any particular results that were not able to be fact-checked either for lack of additional resources or in some cases lack of time to conduct additional interviews. Analysis leading to conclusions and recommendations in this report strive to provide explicit details of where information was found and from whom (to the degree possible without naming individual interviewees).

All evidence found from the first two stages has been provided to USAID/Philippines in electronic format. This includes all data sheets from the literature review as well as data collected for each individual question in the survey conducted by SWS. As with most field interviews, anonymity of individuals interviewed is key when conducting a professional evaluation and therefore data cannot be shared. The team, however, makes every effort to provide the reader with the area (province or region) in which the data was found as well as the type of source that relayed the information. See Table 1 in Section III.A. for further explication of those interviewed.

SELECTED SOURCES USED

Selected Sources⁴⁴

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⁴⁴ A supplement of sources is provided above, which includes the list of 30 projects assessed for this evaluation along with associated number of documents reviewed during stage I. Due to the high volume of documents, they are not listed individually.

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Supplement to Sources Used

Mindanao Evaluation for USAID/Philippines – Documents Reviewed Stage I

	Projects	# of Document Reviewed		
		Part I	Part II	Total for Project
SO2: Economic Governance and Democracy (3 projects)				
1	Barangay Justice Service System (also funded under SO12)	2	5	7
2	Conflict Management in the Philippines (also funded under SO12)	1	5	6
3	Transparent and Accountable Governance 2 (TAG-2) (also funded under SO12)	3	2	5
Total Document Reviews for EcoGov				18
SO 3: Family Health (7 projects)				
4	EnRICH / Enhanced and Rapid Improvement of Community Health in Sulu	1	3	4
5	EnRICH /Enriching Partnership for Peace through Health in ARMM	1	4	5
6	EnRICH / Family Planning and Community Empowerment Project in Basilan	1	3	4
7	EnRICH/Health Families in Tawi Tawi	1	6	7
8	Local Enhancement and Development (LEAD) for Health Project	1	20	21
9	Philippines TB Initiative in the Private Sector (PhilTIPS)	1	16	17
10	The Social Acceptance of Family Planning Project)	1	15	16
Total Document Reviews for Family Health				74
SO 4: Energy and Environment (4 projects)				
11	Alliance for Mindanao Off Grid Renewable Energy 2 (AMORE 2) / SERED	2	7	9
12	Environmental Governance Project (EcoGov 1 &2)	4	16	20
13	Environmental Justice Project (EJP) - CIEL	1	6	7
14	Fisheries Improved for Sustainable Harvest Project (FISH)	1	12	13
Total Document Reviews for Energy and Environment				49
SO 11: Education (7 projects)				
15	Education Quality and Access for Learning and Livelihood Skills 1 (EQuALLS1) Basic Education and Policy Support (BEPS)	1	4	5
16	EQuALLS PPA - Education and Livelihood Skills Alliance (ELSA)	1	1	2
17	EQuALLS PPA - Dayawang Igpaw sa Wastong Agkataw (DIWA) ("Cooperative Leap for Proper Intelligence)	1	3	4
18	EQuALLS PPA - Television Education for the Advancement of Muslim Mindanao (TEAM Mindanao)	1	1	2
19	EQuALLS PPA - Assistance for the Comprehensive Educational Development of Mindanao (ASCEND-Mindanao)	1	2	3
20	EQuALLS PPA - Educ Assistance Program for Mindanao [TUDLO - Mindanao]	1	5	6
21	EQuALLS PPA - Improving English Language Teaching and Learning in Mindanao (IELTM)	1	1	2
Total Document Reviews for Education				24
SO 12: Conflict Reduction (7 projects)				
22	Credit Union Empowerment and Strengthening (CUES) (also funded under SO2)	1		1
23	Growth with Equity in Mindanao I (GEM- I)	1	3	4
24	Growth with Equity in Mindanao II (GEM II)	1		1
25	Livelihood Enhancement and Peace Program	1		1
26	Handicap Intl., Wheelchairs Project	1	3	4
27	Microenterprise Access to Banking Services in Mindanao (MABS/M) (funded under SO2)	1	3	4
28	Promoting Democratic Governance of the Police	1	1	2
Total Document Reviews for Conflicts Reduction				17
Humanitarian Assistance (2 projects)				
29	Mindanao Assistance Project (MAP): Mindanao Water/Sanitation 1 -Basic Livelihood Assistance to IDPs	1	1	2
30	DPR Project: Disaster Preparedness and Response to Conflict-Affected Areas in Mindanao	1	1	2
Total Document Reviews for Humanitarian Assistance				4
Total				186