



USAID | **LIBERIA**
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

THE LIBERIA COMMUNITY INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM (LCIP)

FINAL EVALUATION OF LCIP 1 (2004 – 2008)

AND MIDTERM EVALUATION OF LCIP 2 (2007 – 2008)

SEPTEMBER 10, 2008

10 September 2008

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Chemonics International Inc.

THE LIBERIA COMMUNITY INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM (LCIP)

FINAL EVALUATION OF LCIP 1 (2004 – 2008)

AND MIDTERM EVALUATION OF LCIP 2 (2007 – 2008)

**Contract No. GS-25F-9800H
Task Order No. 669-M-00-08-00110-00**

The author's views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

CONTENTS

Acronyms	iv
Executive Summary	1
Major Conclusions	1
Major Recommendations.....	4
Map.....	7
Background	8
Evaluation Methodology	10
Findings.....	12
1. Strengths and weaknesses of project implementation strategies	12
2. Appropriateness and effectiveness of project activities in achieving desired results.	14
3. Appropriateness of technical areas and approaches now and in the follow-on.....	25
4. Degree of success in achieving indicator benchmarks or targets in LCIP 1 and 2.....	27
5. Degree of collaboration with the government of Liberia (GOL), other donors, and US government programs.....	28
6. Project support of Liberian government policies and plans relating to the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS).....	29
7. Impact at country level and on communities and beneficiary groups.	31
8. Impact on implementing partner technical and management capacity.....	32
9. Degree of replication and sustainability of project initiatives.....	42
10. Strengths and weaknesses in project management and cost effectiveness.....	44
Conclusions	49
Lessons Learned	53
Recommendations	56

Annexes:..... 60

Annex A: List and Schedule of Grant Sites Visited by Evaluation Team..... 60

Annex B: List of Social Reintegration Projects under LCIP 1 (as provided by LCIP)64

Annex C: List of Economic Reintegration Grants under LCIP 1 (as provided by LCIP) 65

Annex D: List of LCIP 1, Phase 2 Grants (as provided by LCIP)..... 66

Annex E LCIP 2 Grant Summary to June 2008 (as provided by LCIP) 68

Annex F: Persons Interviewed 69

Annex G: Key Documents Consulted 73

Acronyms

A&E	architecture and engineering
AfDB	African Development Bank
ALP	accelerated learning program
ARS	agriculture relief services
BCG	Buchanan – Cestos – Greenville (road)
CBO	community-based organization
CDC	community development committee
COP	chief of party
CTO	cognizant technical officer
DAI	Development Alternatives, Inc.
DDRR	disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
ESA	East and Southern Africa
ESR	economic and social reintegration
EU	European Union
GOL	Government of Liberia
ILO	International Labour Organization
IQC	indefinite quantity contract
IR	intermediate result
KRTTI	Kakata Rural Teacher Training Institute
LACE	Liberian Agency for Community Empowerment
LCIP	Liberian Community Infrastructure Program
MAC	managing African conflict
MAP	Monrovia apprenticeship program
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MPW	Ministry of Public Works
NCDDRR	National Commission for DDRR
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NWDA	North West Development Association
ODAFARA	Organization for the Development of Agriculture and Farmer Related Associations
PDE	person-days employed (or of employment)
PIP	private sector internship program
PMP	performance monitoring plan
PRS	poverty reduction strategy
PSI	private sector internship
RAP	rural apprenticeship program
REDSO	regional economic development service office
SBI	small business incubator
SSI	semi-structured interview
SSCI	small-scale community infrastructure
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

WARP
WB
ZRTTI

West Africa Regional Program
World Bank
Zorzor Rural Teacher Training Institute

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Liberia Community Infrastructure Program (LCIP) consists of two task orders written to the Managing African Conflict Indefinite Quantity Contract (MAC-IQC), a contractual mechanism used by USAID to support conflict prevention, mitigation, and response activities to address actual or potential conflicts in African countries. It can also be used to build host government and civil society capacity to manage development activities before and after conflict.

The first of these task orders (MAC-IQC Task Order #3), known commonly as LCIP 1, ran from March 2, 2004 through March 31, 2008 with a total funding of \$50 million. The second task order (MAC-IQC Task Order #10), known as LCIP 2, began April 1, 2007 and was recently extended 18 months to April 30, 2010, with a total funding level also of \$50 million.

When the Ghana Comprehensive Peace Agreement in August 2003 put a formal end to Liberia's 14-year civil war, the country embarked on a comprehensive process of disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDRR). Rehabilitation and reintegration efforts also included war-affected groups.

The contractor chosen to implement LCIP (1 and 2) was Development Alternatives, Inc., (DAI). DAI implemented both task orders primarily through grants to Liberian organizations – non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private sector firms. LCIP 1 began as an integral part of the United Nations DDRR process. It was agreed LCIP would work in the counties with the greatest number of returning ex-combatants. Program goals included employment generation, vocational training, social reconciliation, infrastructure rehabilitation, and restoration of essential services.

The second phase of the LCIP program, LCIP 2, was designed to supplement and extend LCIP 1 and ran concurrently with the first task order for one year. LCIP 2 continues the activities of LCIP 1, but focuses on improving basic economic activity and employment generation. Objectives of LCIP 2 include restoring the financial self-sufficiency of war-affected persons and groups, improving social cohesion in communities, and linking communities to government.

With LCIP 2 heading into its final 18 months, Chemonics International (Chemonics) fielded a three-person evaluation team in Liberia for one month (August 2008) to carry out a final evaluation of LCIP 1 and a midterm evaluation of LCIP 2. In addition to reviewing the relevant documentation and meeting with DAI staff in Washington, D.C. and Monrovia, the team spent two weeks in the field interviewing partner staff and beneficiaries and evaluating the soundness, success, and sustainability of past and current program activities.

The most important conclusions and recommendations of this report are as follows:

Major Conclusions

- The LCIP program has shifted through three strategic approaches. In the immediate post-conflict years, the program focused on income generation and vocational training for ex-combatants, rehabilitation of essential community infrastructure, and social and community reconciliation. After the inauguration of the new Liberian administration in February 2006, LCIP shifted to the rehabilitation of important governmental buildings and highways. In 2007, under LCIP 2, the program considerably expanded its economic development activities, while maintaining its pledge to restore large public buildings and roads.
- DAI effectively generated short-term paid employment for thousands of ex-combatants and war-affected persons in the first years of LCIP 1. Psychosocial counseling and reconciliation activities were carried out in a variety of ways, but the more successful activities focused on communities and employing traditional healing and reconciliation methods. Vocational training of ex-combatants, does not seem to have worked well, with the exception of the early apprenticeship program where on-the-job training enhanced skills acquisition.
- LCIP 2's expansion into economic and social reintegration (ESR) activities represented an appropriate shift from relief to economic development activities. Its proposal to build a development corridor promises to link road rehabilitation with clustered economic development projects.
- Agricultural production and marketing of both cash and food crops, coupled with employment generation and small business development, provide an excellent portfolio for LCIP in its final phase—provided it does not attempt too great a variety of schemes and spread itself too thinly for effective impact and sustainability.
- The emergency period of 2004 and 2005 created a focus on only two performance indicators: person days of employment (PDEs) and number of beneficiaries. However, for nearly two years LCIP reported project accomplishment against Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) targets established in September 2004. This ceased to be the case in the fall of 2006, when explicit reference to the 2004 PMP and its indicators vanishes from LCIP reports. The program developed a new set of 31 indicators in April, 2008, but these have not yet been approved by USAID. In the absence of a functioning PMP, it is difficult to assess the project's degree of success in meeting its planned targets.
- LCIP has worked with the government of Liberia (GOL), other donors, and other USAID funded programs. This collaboration has been explicit, as in the case of the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) funding in 2006-07, and with LCIP's early interaction with the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), but it has also been informal. The latter has included implicit capacity building at the Ministry of Public Works (MPW), as well as field-based interaction with different donors. However, there has been little strategic collaboration between LCIP and other relief and development actors.

- Although LCIP 1 and 2 preceded Liberia's current Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), its activities fall squarely within the PRS's stated goals. While it is unusual for a USAID project to cover all the development pillars articulated by a PRS, LCIP touches on all four pillars, although not with equal focus or intensity. LCIP activities in road and agricultural rehabilitation correspond especially well with those featured in Liberia's PRS.
- In the absence of satisfactory data, it is not possible to fully evaluate the impact LCIP 1 and LCIP2 have had on beneficiaries and communities. Nevertheless, a good deal of anecdotal evidence suggests that they have had a favorable impact, especially in large-scale employment and social reintegration activities in the post-conflict period. The projects' large public works activities have clearly heightened the image of the new administration and improved services. LCIP 2 ESR activities have begun to have an impact in the rehabilitation of the smallholder agricultural and artisanal small business sectors.
- Liberian implementing partners lack technical and management capacity. While LCIP has not carried out activities designed expressly to build this capacity, it has provided additional monitoring of IP activities and allowed them additional time to complete activities. LCIP invested its own management time in building the capacity of the implementing partners.
- The immediate post-conflict LCIP interventions (implemented between 2004-2006, did not aim to be sustainable. While rehabilitated structures have remained functional, vocational skills upgrading, and some rehabilitated agricultural infrastructure (such as the swamp rice fields) have not lasted.
- The sustainability of LCIP 1 and LCIP 2 ESR activities has yet to be proven, although activities such as the smallholder rubber rehabilitation work should prove to be durable. Some other cash and food crop activities will need to be pursued beyond the current grant period to become sustainable.
- LCIP 1 and LCIP 2 intervention models do not seem to have been replicated by other donor projects, former implementing partners, or beneficiaries. Most NGOs, international and local, are still in relief mode and may yet imitate some of the current LCIP projects.
- Over the last four years, LCIP has undergone significant changes in its scope of work and activity mix. Tasked initially to reintegrate ex-combatants into communities, it deployed considerable staff despite security concerns and successfully met or exceeded its targets. The ability to meet an extensive payroll in 2004–2005 testifies to LCIP good practices and cost-effective implementation. After being directed in mid-2006 to shift its focus to large public works, LCIP was obliged to undertake activities that were not part of its comparative advantage. Even after upgrading its engineering

department, LCIP is still struggling with one road project that has cost three times its original estimate.

- LCIP 2's diversified portfolio has the potential of reducing risk and cost by spreading its resources. At the same time, this is mitigated by the heightened management costs required to monitor a more heterogeneous and geographically dispersed set of activities. Since LCIP has by now learned which activities are more and less cost effective, a portfolio approach seems a questionable implementation strategy. Development resources can be more effectively applied by concentrating a number of activities in a geographically restricted area. Clustered implementation activities, such as the Todee road development corridor, can significantly reduce overall management requirements and increase cost effectiveness.

Major Recommendations

- LCIP 2 needs to develop a broad, explicit vision of how its infrastructure component and its economic and social rehabilitation component fit together. An effective way to do this would be to cluster ESR activities near the key farm-to-market roads that are being rebuilt. USAID should take an active part in the planning process.
- Within the ESR component, there should be an emphasis on strategically locating activities so that they also assist populations living away from the road. This emphasis would involve making provisions for small-scale infrastructure, as well as production and marketing activities.
- Infrastructure activities should continue to focus on rehabilitation of educational institutes and county administration buildings, as well as on repairing those trunk and feeder roads that are most important for governmental administration and rural market development. USAID should take an active part in the planning process.
- ESR activities should focus on the rehabilitation of smallholder cash and food crops. Smallholders can learn a great deal about advanced production techniques and marketing of produce, but the grants must reflect the time needed to transfer the necessary learning and confidence. Therefore, grants should be prepared as soon as possible for the post-October period and granted for the length of the remaining program.
- The successful Rural Apprenticeship Program (RAP) should be extended to as many counties as managerially and logistically possible, since it is ready to go to scale. It should also be reintroduced into the counties where it has already proven itself, but where it is not currently active.
- The Small Business Incubator (SBI) and Private Sector Internship (PSI) programs should continue as planned, but other ESR value-chain activities (such as honey/snail production and fruit and vegetable processing/preservation) should be reevaluated. Any new pilot ESR activities should receive the same business plan analysis. Given

the short amount of time left to the project, it would be better to stay with the current set of activities than to explore other pilot activities, unless an exceptional case can be made.

- USAID and LCIP should collaborate in establishing a PMP, and LCIP should monitor a set of agreed indicators in its periodic reporting to USAID. The current PMP should be improved upon, in order to include monitoring of relevant “outcome” indicators that can provide evidence of LCIP’s success in rehabilitating various sectors of Liberia’s economy.
- With a view to short-term expediency, donor-funded programs often work around government ministries, in order to achieve their objectives. LCIP has worked informally to build the MPW’s institutional and human resource capacity, but a dedicated and explicit program of ministerial-level capacity building could have a significant and sustainable impact.
- In its next round of projects, LCIP should also explicitly incorporate direct capacity building training for implementing partners into their work plans, which will result in more successful and efficient project implementation. If local partners are not able to complete their assigned tasks, LCIP should consider using non-Liberian firms, in order to bring the greatest overall benefit to beneficiaries.
- There should be more systematic evaluation of the project activities’ impact on beneficiaries and communities of under LCIP 2. This need not involve extensive research, but rather more comprehensive documentation of the various projects in agriculture, marketing, small business development, and vocational and professional skills development. Analysis of profitability of food and cash crop producers can be carried out using a small sample of farmers. The same is true for businesses, apprentices, and interns in the RAP and the PSI program. Since the SBI program starts up in the near future, a baseline survey and end-of-project follow-up should be designed now for participating firms.
- Sustainability of ESR projects is highly important, especially if the model involves cash and food crop production. These sectors can and must be modernized and their output and productivity increased. The models currently in use by LCIP 2 seem effective and should be pursued going forward in the next grant cycle.
- LCIP should carefully evaluate whether it has the appropriate human resources in-house and in-country to undertake its activities. Of particular concern are engineering resources. LCIP must clearly understand the capacity of available local engineering and construction firms to carry out public works projects.
- Clustered interventions, such as in the Todee road model, can reduce management burdens and costs. This model should be continued in the future and intensified where practical and politically permissible. However, LCIP should reduce its number of activities, while focusing on those with proven high return. A diversified portfolio

approach brings with it unnecessary costs, especially in an environment where winning strategies have already been identified. Rice and cassava have been clearly identified as having a high return in terms of development goals and efficiency. Likewise, smallholder rubber production is a cost-effective and valuable strategy to pursue in the area of cash crops.

MAP of Liberia



BACKGROUND

LCIP consists of two task orders written to the MAC-IQC. The Regional Economic Development Service Office for East and Southern Africa (REDSO/ESA), the West Africa Regional Program (WARP), the Regional Center for Southern Africa (RCSA), and bilateral USAID Missions collaborated to design the MAC-IQC as a mechanism by which USAID could provide support for conflict prevention, mitigation, and response activities to address actual or potential conflicts in African countries and to build host government and civil society capacity to manage development activities just before and in the aftermath of conflict.

The first of these task orders (MAC-IQC Task Order #3), known commonly as LCIP 1, ran from March 2, 2004 through March 31, 2008 with a total funding of \$50 million. The second task order (MAC-IQC Task Order #10), known as LCIP 2, began April 1, 2007 and was recently extended 18 months to April 30, 2010 also with total funding of \$50 million.

With the formal end to Liberia's 14-year civil war through the Ghana Comprehensive Peace Agreement in August 2003, the UNMIL embarked on a comprehensive DDRR process. Reintegration efforts also included other war-affected groups. LCIP 1 began as an integral part of this process. Program goals included employment generation, vocational training, social reconciliation, infrastructure rehabilitation, and restoration of essential services. At the start of the program, it was agreed between USAID, UNMIL, and the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (NCDDRR) that LCIP would work in the counties with the greatest number of returning ex-combatants.

DAI was chosen to implement LCIP, and implementation was carried out through grants to Liberian organizations, both NGOs and private sector firms. With USAID funding, LCIP disbursed over 400 grants worth \$20 million to local implementing partners. By the end of LCIP 1, in March 2008, vocational training, social counseling, and work on community infrastructure had been provided to some 37,700 ex-combatants and war-affected persons. Of these beneficiaries, 16,000 engaged in more than 4.4 million person-days of work rehabilitating feeder roads and community infrastructure in eight of Liberia's 15 counties. Non-labor accomplishments included the rehabilitation of 20 schools, five county administration buildings, four clinics, and 26 roads in five counties.

The second phase of the LCIP program, LCIP 2 was designed to supplement and extend LCIP 1 and ran concurrently with the first task order for one year. LCIP 2 continues the activities of LCIP 1 as Liberia transitions to longer-term development and economic growth. LCIP 2's approach reflects the fact that economic recovery has not progressed as quickly as anticipated. Youth unemployment remains dangerously high, and basic services are still lacking in much of Liberia. USAID recognized that LCIP needed to bridge the gap between the provision of basic services and short-term needs. Therefore, LCIP 2's focus is to improve basic economic activity and livelihoods with an emphasis on employment generation. Objectives of LCIP 2 include restoring the financial self-

sufficiency of war-affected persons and groups, improving social cohesion in communities, and linking communities to government. Program activities focus on fostering community empowerment, participation, and the sustainable reintegration of war-affected groups, whether ex-combatants or returned populations. Reintegration is accompanied by activities promoting reconciliation, such as psychosocial counseling. Literacy and numeracy skills training are also considered important, given the long break in schooling for many youth.

EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

A three-person evaluation team was fielded in Liberia by Chemonics, a U.S.-based consulting firm contracted to carry out two evaluation activities: a final evaluation of the first task order (LCIP 1) and a midterm evaluation of the second task order (LCIP 2). The team consisted of a team leader, Dr. Philip Boyle, an expert in monitoring and evaluation (M&E), Mr. Chris Payne, and a Liberian logistics and community liaison consultant, Mr. David Wounuah.

Evaluation activities began on August 1, 2008 in DAI's Bethesda, Maryland headquarters, with the gathering of essential documentation and an in-depth interview with DAI's home office LCIP manager. The U.S.-based consultants arrived in Liberia on August 3. Work began on August 4 and Chemonics formed a full evaluation team with the inclusion of the local logistics/community liaison person.

The first week in country (August 4 - 10) was devoted to gathering available documents from the DAI/LCIP program office in Monrovia, identifying and interviewing stakeholders, and planning the two weeks of field work. Between August 11 and August 22, the evaluation team was in the field, visiting and inspecting LCIP 1 and LCIP 2 grant activities. Between August 11 and August 15, the team visited field activities of 16 grants in Margibi, Bong, and Nimba Counties (8 from LCIP 1 and 8 from LCIP 2). Between August 18 and August 22, the team visited activities from 12 grants in Grand Bassa, River Cess, Bomi, Grand Cape Mount, and Montserrado Counties (8 from LCIP 1 and 4 from LCIP 2). Under the LCIP 1 Rehabilitation of Artisans grant in Buchanan and Cestos City, the team visited nine of 20 shops.

The grant projects visited by the evaluation team were selected by the team from lists of grants supplied by DAI/LCIP. A schedule of three field trips outside of Monrovia was then worked out between the team and LCIP management, making an effort to include the maximum number of LCIP 1 and LCIP 2 projects. A considerable number of grants was selected, requiring moving rapidly once in the field. During the first field trip to Nimba, Bong, and Margibi Counties, some 16 past and present grant activities were visited in five days. All major types of activities were visited, including some where it was felt interviews could be held with local community members and graduates of no-longer active grants. Interviews with many of the implementing partners were also conducted. In sum, the team was satisfied with the variety of grants visited and with the randomness of their selection from among a long list of previous and present grants.

Data collection in the field consisted of semi-structured interviews (SSI) with a wide variety of participants in grant activities, including implementing partner staff and beneficiaries. This was easier for LCIP 2 activities than for those that had ended in the earlier phase of LCIP 1 (2004-2006), when the focus was on employing ex-combatants in the restoration of essential infrastructure, such as roads, schools, and clinics, as most of these earlier beneficiaries were no longer found in activity sites. Interviews with LCIP 1 and 2 beneficiaries included focus groups and individual interviews with project participants and community members.

Interviews were structured to the extent that the evaluation team members were seeking answers to some basic questions focusing on what the grantees actually did, who participated from communities and how, how activities were monitored by implementing partners, how these partners were monitored by the DAI/LCIP staff in Monrovia, how beneficiaries actually benefited, the degree of likely impact and sustainability of grant activities, and what lessons were learned by LCIP and its grantees between March 2004 and August 2008. Questions began with the general and then proceeded to probe more deeply in a reiterative process.

In its first phase of work within the comprehensive DDR process, LCIP 1 had had a different and more immediate set of priorities than LCIP 2 at its inception in April 2007. It was imperative to move quickly to employ and pay ex-combatants, who might otherwise become peace process “spoilers.” Therefore, evaluation team questions concerning LCIP 1 activities focused less on issues of sustainability and wider impact than for those now under way in LCIP 2. Of particular importance for moving forward in the final phase of LCIP 2 (August 2008 – April 2010) was the assessment of which grant activities appeared most successful in generating cost-effective impacts that could move to scale and which others might be phased out in favor of new ideas. Moreover, it was important to assess what new ideas might already be in the course of development or pilot activity and how they fit strategically into LCIP activities moving forward.

From August 23 until their departure on August 30, the U.S.-based consultants continued to interview key participants and stakeholders in donor and Liberian government agencies, and initiated report writing. A debriefing of preliminary evaluation findings was held in USAID on August 28, which included the Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO) for LCIP 2 and his alternate. The draft report was subsequently submitted by email to USAID/Liberia on September 1, 2008 and this final report, incorporating Mission comments, on September 10, 2008.

FINDINGS

1. Strengths and weaknesses of project implementation strategies

Overview

LCIP 1 and 2 have been strategic in implementation, although the strategic approach has evolved substantially since 2004. LCIP 1 in its early years (2004-2006) responded correctly and adequately to the immediate aftermath of conflict in Liberia. It was imperative to provide paid employment to disarmed combatants, young men and women that had not known peace for 14 years. In most cases, this meant that they had grown up with war and tended to resort to violence to satisfy immediate needs.

Following the presidential election of 2005, LCIP was tasked by USAID to provide clear signs that a stable central government had finally emerged and would reconnect its institutions with the people. Consequently, a shift in strategic emphasis occurred in June 2006, in which LCIP 1 placed a great deal of emphasis and funds on rehabilitating large public works infrastructure. This meant substantial shifts in personnel in the DAI/LCIP office in Monrovia and the closing of five of six field offices. Several of these major works are still being completed today under LCIP 2.

LCIP 2 began in April 2007, after the maximum funding amount under LCIP 1 had been reached in mid-2006. There was no clear mandate under the second task order for LCIP 2 to depart substantially from activities under LCIP 1. The large public works projects would continue and be completed. However, few new public works projects were anticipated. By early 2007 there was no longer an urgent need to occupy previously armed combatants in paid employment but rather a need to create sustainable employment, through skills training and/or assistance to the small business sector. The agriculture sector also needed revitalization, since many youth were no longer interested in arduous rural labor but sought quick rewards in urban areas. Rural communities continued to experience problems of loss of social fabric after years of anarchy. In addition to the restoration of economic activity and livelihoods, LCIP 2 program activities would focus on fostering community empowerment, participation, and the sustainable reintegration of war-affected groups, whether ex-combatants or returned populations. Moreover, by the time LCIP 2 began, ex-combatants were no longer singled out for attention in grant activities; the term of war-affected persons now included them. The emphasis had clearly shifted from post-conflict stabilization to the creation of sustainable livelihoods.

LCIP 1 (2004 – 2008)

There were two basic implementation strategies under LCIP 1. The first of these responded to the needs of post-conflict and lasted until a second strategy took on greater importance in mid-2006. DAI has termed these LCIP 1 Phase 1 and LCIP 1 Phase 2. These two distinct emphases under LCIP 1 lead DAI to produce an unsolicited final

report for the first period of LCIP 1 from March 2004 to June 2006. DAI's required final report for LCIP 1 Phase 2 covered only the period from March 2006 to March 2008.

LCIP Phase 1

From 2004 – 2006, LCIP 1 grant activities focused on supporting the reintegration of ex-combatants and other war-affected groups into their communities of origin. They also concentrated on the economic and social rehabilitation of communities by restoring essential infrastructure, particularly roads. By June 2006, over 25,000 people had participated in labor concerned with rehabilitating feeder roads, agricultural fields, water systems, small bridges, community buildings, clinics, community housing, cultural centers, and government offices (including five county administration buildings). LCIP, however, tracked only two key indicators: number of beneficiaries and PDEs generated. Rural feeder roads were a means by which large numbers of ex-combatants could be quickly employed in wage labor to remove brush and fill potholes. While this type of roadwork was not sustainable, rehabilitation of community infrastructure has generally been of sufficient quality to ensure structural sustainability to the present. This includes the swamp rice fields, although many of these are not being farmed at present. An exception noted by the evaluation team was the Phebe – Gbotota road¹ finished in January 2006 but being redone today.

The program strategy also included the integration of psychosocial activities into the infrastructure rehabilitation and employment efforts, by providing counseling, literacy and numeracy skills development, and conflict mitigation training. These activities usually occurred during lunch breaks on wage labor sites. It is not possible to tell at this point to what degree these activities reached their objectives, but the integration of psychosocial activities into regular work schedules is strategically creative. Vocational training and apprenticeships were also developed and integrated programmatically in this early phase of LCIP.

LCIP 1 Phase 2

After July 1, 2006, LCIP 1 focused on seven infrastructure rehabilitation projects that had been selected by the Liberian government as important symbols for central governmental accomplishment under the “150 Day Action Plan.” In essence, programmatic emphasis shifted from a focus on keeping ex-combatants and other war-affected populations occupied through work projects to large public works projects. According to the LCIP 1 Final Report (June 2008), USAID funding focused exclusively at this time on completing public works activities, in order to galvanize Liberian capacity to provide public service delivery to rural populations. Community-focused programming (ESR) continued with DFID funds from mid-2006 to August 2007. During this period, some 13 grants worth \$1,341,000 were awarded to implementing partners. These ESR projects were placed, to the extent possible, in clusters around the major public works projects. Many of these project models – as well as the clustering of ESR activities near public works,

¹ This was grant LCIP/ER/107.

particularly roads – were taken up in LCIP 2 in the expanded ESR strategy that can be seen today.

The LCIP 1 final report makes the claim that the shift in programmatic strategy had some negative outcomes. It says:

This shift significantly reduced the program’s effectiveness on integrating community-based and psychosocial counseling approaches into all LCIP 1 activities – which seems to have resulted in unintended consequences. At times, infrastructure activities [occurred] that lacked real integration with community-based, local government officials, and other stakeholders to the public infrastructure efforts, sometimes leading to poor communication of objectives, lack of consensus on expectations, and in a few cases ‘stop-work’ demands from local officials or outright discouragement by local communities.²

LCIP 2 (2007 – Present)

Under LCIP 2, major public works begun under LCIP 1 continued toward completion and new structures and roads were added or their feasibility formally assessed. Within the infrastructure component, large public works received funding priority, but a number of ESR activities have also flourished, some of which had been developed under DFID-funded LCIP 1 activities. Strategically, the effort to strengthen central governmental functioning has been loosely coupled with ESR activities focused on smallholder agricultural development, employment generation, small business development, and on-the-job skills training (apprenticeships). A proposed development corridor around the nearly completed Todee Road holds promise, but there has yet to be a grouping of economic development activities along this corridor. This model bears serious promise and should be extended to other road rehabilitation activities. The concept of clustering LCIP economic development activities along rehabilitated roads might also be joined to other donor projects in health and education strengthening.

With current grants expiring at the end of October 2008, LCIP 2 must explicitly identify an explicit ESR strategy for the final 18 months. Rather than engaging in a number of new pilot activities spread widely across Liberia, it would be better to cluster and concentrate activities in fewer areas, particularly areas with feeder roads that can be rehabilitated. Community mobilization and participation efforts should also be intensified, as despite efforts to the contrary, communities have not participated to the extent desired under LCIP 2.

2. Appropriateness and effectiveness of project activities in achieving desired results.

² DAI 2008. “Liberia Community Infrastructure Program I (March 2006 – March 2008): Phase II Final Report.” June 2008. Page 4.

LCIP 1 Phase 1 (2004-2006)

The achievements of the first stage of LCIP 1 from March 2004 through June 30, 2006 were reported on by DAI in the fall of 2006. According to DAI, LCIP 1 Phase 1 targeted three results: (1) peace process and good governance enhanced; (2) economic and social conditions exist at the community level to facilitate reintegration and rehabilitation of infrastructure; and (3) increased formal and non-formal learning opportunities.³ These corresponded to LCIP activities under: (1) psychosocial counseling and reconciliation; (2) employment generation; and (3) formal and non-formal education.

According to the summary report, LCIP successfully launched over 380 ESR support grants totaling just over \$25,380,000 and engaging over 25,000 direct beneficiaries – primarily ex-combatants – in public works jobs and training programs.⁴ The program also carried out peace and reconciliation activities in the communities in which it focused other interventions. Approximately two-thirds (65%) of the value of these grants went to employment generation for ex-combatants and other war-affected persons. Another 25% of the total grant value went to formal and non-formal education (school repair and vocational training), while only 10% was used for psychosocial counseling and reconciliation.

Employment Generation

The heart of this early phase of LCIP 1 was employment generation for recently demobilized ex-combatants. By the summer of 2004, the estimated number of ex-combatants leaving the DD program had reached 103,000.⁵ In addition to 26 roads in five counties (549 kilometers), LCIP 1 by June 30, 2006 had rehabilitated 20 schools, five county administration buildings, and four clinics.⁶ Road rehabilitation, while costly, resulted in large numbers of PDEs, one of two indicators, along with number of beneficiaries, tracked by LCIP to the present. By June 2006, over 25,000 people had participated in labor-intensive construction brigades or job skills training.⁷ This was the expanded target set for LCIP for its participation in the United Nations DDDR process.⁸

³ DAI 2006. "Liberia Community Infrastructure Project. Phase 1 Quarterly Report and Summary Report on Phase 1 Grants (April 2004 – June 2006)." Fall 2006. Page 8.

⁴ There is some discrepancy in these figures between the 2006 report and the LCIP 1 final report in 2008. In the latter, the number of grants is reported as "more than 400" and their total value is given as \$20 million.

⁵ DAI 2006. Op. cit., p. 43.

⁶ DAI 2008. Op. cit., p. 2.

⁷ DAI 2006. Op.cit., p. 16.

⁸ This target was actually increased from 20,000 to 25,000 by UNMIL.

LCIP also reached its PDE target, registering a total of 4,490,638 PDEs from March 2004 through June 2006.⁹ Rehabilitation activities included roads and bridges, schools, agriculture and agribusiness, environmental sanitation and drainage, administrative buildings, health centers, and micro-enterprise. Nearly half of PDEs (49%) was generated in agricultural activities and 38% from road projects. That 87% of employment days are found in these two sectors is due to the longer length of these activities and the high level of manual labor involved. Work projects lasted from one to twelve months, with an average of 4.5 months per project.¹⁰

Vocational Training

According to the LCIP Phase 1 summary report, a total of 7,180 people were engaged in some form of vocational or skills training. This is about 29% of the 25,000 beneficiaries involved in work brigades during the first phase of LCIP 1.

Vocational training, a key component of reintegration activities in all DDRR programs, was the means by which LCIP sought to upgrade the skills levels and employability of targeted beneficiaries. According to the DAI/LCIP summary report for 2004-2006, “a serious attempt was made to closely associate vocational training with the work brigades.”¹¹ Thus, LCIP identified a number of small enterprise activities, and appropriate skills training was offered through a number of local NGOs. Specific trainings offered included training in carpentry, masonry, blacksmithing, auto mechanics, tailoring, soap making, ceramic arts, rattan furniture making, baking, and shoe making. Beneficiaries could apply the skills learned to launch microenterprises. The Monrovia Apprenticeship Program (MAP) was launched in the capital, while the Rebuilding Artisans Program (RAP) was launched in Bong and Nimba Counties. The RAP involved support to 25 artisans and provided training to 25 apprentices in each artisanal business. A total of 1,038 trained apprentices graduated from MAP and RAP between April 2004 and June 2006. The apprenticeship programs were about eight months in duration.

Under post-conflict conditions, LCIP accomplishments should be judged more by target attainment than by the quality or sustainability of vocational skills imparted. The attempt to create tradesmen skilled enough to find employment through rapid training of large numbers of workers is not likely to succeed in an immediate post-conflict environment, and this is even less likely if the goal is for beneficiaries to launch small businesses. Nevertheless, vocational training was supposed to be provided to ex-combatants as part of the RR process. Given the scale of these activities, no serious follow-up was likely and none was apparently attempted. On the other hand, the apprenticeship programs, while producing relatively few graduates compared to other means of vocational training, serves as a model for similar activities to date.

Psychosocial Counseling and Reconciliation

⁹ DAI 2006. Op.cit., p. 36.

¹⁰ DAI 2006. Op.cit., p. 35.

¹¹ DAI 2006. Op. cit., p. 38.

According to the LCIP 1 Phase 1 summary report, reconciliation involved an approach in which the social, physical, and psychological needs of the ex-combatants and war-affected persons were addressed holistically. To do this, LCIP made available to all persons and communities targeted by the program a range of social reconciliation opportunities, which included financing some 1,100 community-oriented and livelihood joint ventures for ex-combatants and war-affected persons. Community Development Committees (CDCs), created and developed by LCIP, were the vehicle through which these community activities were carried out. It was felt that “establishment of CDCs was important as it led to a degree of sustainability of both social and economic activities once the LCIP withdrew from these communities.”¹² No evidence of such sustainability is offered by LCIB, nor was this really necessary as the objective was to reconcile community members in the war’s immediate aftermath. Some 184 communities in eight counties were directly involved with LCIP activities during LCIP 1 Phase 1.

Psychosocial counseling has been an integral part of LCIP activities, but it was more intensive during LCIP 1 Phase 1. As wage labor was organized for ex-combatants and war-affected persons, counseling initially took place during lunch breaks, directed at promoting reconciliation between participants and laying a foundation for follow-up activities in communities where the ex-combatants expected to return. After finding counseling at lunch break was not sufficient, community-level counseling services were established instead, employing traditional reconciliation mechanisms that varied from county to county. According to the summary report, all communities in which LCIP implemented projects were provided with counseling services, whether one-on-one or group counseling, or traditional healing and cleansing ceremonies. In August and September 2005, two courses for 90 community animators were held on reconciliation, conflict resolution, and psychosocial healing. Some 12,000 people from 92 communities with the highest levels of ex-combatants received counseling interventions through these animators. All in all, LCIP estimates that 36,406 people benefited from some form of psychosocial counseling.¹³

While it is unclear which psychosocial methods were most effective, a mix of such activities was certainly well worth undertaking in post-conflict Liberia. Psychosocial counseling and social reconciliation activities should be a part of any post-conflict situation, but it is unclear what lessons have been learned through LCIP about what methods work best and on a sufficiently large scale to be replicated in other countries.

Other Social Reintegration and Reconciliation Activities

Other activities engaged in under the component of social reconciliation were sports and media activities. According to LCIP, by the end of 2005 over 9,500 people were participating in sports such as kick ball, soccer, and volley ball, with more than 200 teams formed, many of which had organized local leagues. The effectiveness of these activities

¹² DAI 2006. Op. cit., p. 23.

¹³ DAI 2006. Op. cit., p. 28.

has not been documented, but bringing together former enemies in sports activities is a common tool in social reconciliation in post-conflict situations. The use of media messages has also been deemed effective in other countries and was a wise choice to reach communities through local stations.

LCIP 1 Phase 2 (2006-2008)

As noted earlier, beginning July 1, 2006 all USAID-funded activities shifted to support large public works projects included in the new Liberian administration's 150-Day Plan. The community-focused approach of 2004-2006 was replaced by a focus on building up the national government and renewing its capacity to unify the people, command respect, and begin providing services. Community-focused activities continued using DFID funding from mid-2006 through August 2007.

Accompanying this programmatic shift, program results were modified under work order modifications in March 2006 and September 2006, shifting LCIP's focus to (1) supporting government administrative structures to enable a functioning administration; (2) improving access to teacher training; (3) strengthening the MPW capacity to repair vital infrastructure; and (4) stimulating employment and improving the skills of employed youth.¹⁴

Infrastructure

From July 2006 through March 2008, LCIP 1 completed five vertical structures with USAID funding in excess of \$7 million: (1) Executive Mansion; (2) Capitol Building; (3) Zwedru Multilateral High School; (4) Grand Bassa County Administration Building; and (5) Bomi County Administration Building.¹⁵

Other infrastructure-related activities during LCIP 1 Phase 2 included: (1) drilling of boreholes and wells at educational and training facilities (\$115,000); (2) Monrovia construction projects (\$36,186); (3) provision of heavy-duty road equipment to the MPW (\$2.1 million); (4) rehabilitation of two major highways (Ganta – Sanniquellie and Buchanan – Cestos – Greenville [BCG])¹⁶; and assessments for the construction of two rural teacher training institutes and five county administrative buildings.

These activities are appropriate and effective means of achieving the program results. Moreover, these vertical structures, roads, and other infrastructure projects are an appropriate mix of activities in pursuit of strengthening the new democratic government

¹⁴ DAI 2006. Op. cit., pp. 13-14.

¹⁵ LCIP Phase 2 was funded by two Task Order #3 modifications (March and September 2006), totaling some \$13,243,444.

¹⁶ The Buchanan – Greenville highway is currently in its final stage of completion under LCIP 2 with a total cost of \$5.3 million. The Ganta – Sanniquellie Road cost \$520,766.

both structurally and symbolically. Large public works activities have continued under LCIP 2 (April 2007 to present).

Economic and Social Reintegration

DFID-funded ESR activities were designed to focus on the community level near USAID-funded infrastructure rehabilitation, clustering ESR activities geographically. The ESR component sought to enhance the gains made during LCIP 1 Phase 1, and was aimed at moving beyond short-term economic stimulus to longer-term economic opportunities. The program result pursued was job creation and skills improvement for those already employed. LCIP 1 disbursed 13 grants worth \$1.34 million to 10 implementing partners between mid-2006 and August 2007, which together generated 208,757 PDEs and 1,130 employed persons. Conflict mitigation activities had some 7,176 direct participants (excluding road sensitization activities) and an estimated 25,000 indirect beneficiaries.¹⁷

ESR activities were focused on four areas: (1) development of lowland rice and seed multiplication; (2) smallholder rubber farming; (3) business support and apprenticeships; and (4) conflict mitigation (psychosocial healing). While psychosocial counseling was built into all sectors of grant activity, NGOs were also hired to carry out road sensitization activities. It is unclear how effective these sensitization activities were, since community members in Yonden between Buchanan and Yarpa Town on the Buchanan – Cestos – Greenville road only recall being given a football and pump and playing soccer.

Road sensitization. In earlier infrastructure projects LCIP found that community members had received erroneous information about roadwork objectives and had become angry when final results did not match their expectations. Under the DFID buy-in to LCIP 1, five of the 13 grants dealt with road sensitization, aimed at managing community expectations and disseminating accurate information with respect to the road work being done. Grants were made to local social NGOs for the following road segments, of which four lay along the BCG highway: Buchanan to ITI; Yarpa Town to Cestos City; ITI to Greenville; and Ganta – Sanniquellie.

According to LCIP, road sensitization included the following activities: sensitization meetings; open-air sensitization; distribution of recreational materials; facilitation of recreational activities, including cultural performances; community-wide assessment of towns and villages along the roads; investigation of potential impact and value of road work; capacity-building training workshops; formation of community structures/road teams; dissemination of awareness messages; community radio programs; and publication of pictorials in local newspapers. How well all of this was carried out by the implementing partners cannot be determined at this time, but it appears very ambitious.

Road sensitization activities also included psychosocial support to communities reintegrating ex-combatants, internally displaced persons, and refugees. Along the BCG

¹⁷ DAI 2008. Op. cit., p. 6.

road, sensitization activities purportedly involved 5,809 direct beneficiaries and 25,000 indirect beneficiaries (their families).¹⁸

According to LCIP, the major problem with these road sensitization grants was that the road work was not in fact complete when grant activities ended. Moreover, grant activities were not renewed with the end of the DFID-funded grants in August 2007. Delays in completing the roads (the BCG is still not finished) meant that community expectations, even when modified, were still left unsatisfied.

Road and building sensitization activities picked up again in 2008 under LCIP 2 and were observed along the Todee Road by the evaluation team. In addition to cultural performances, a social NGO is working with communities along Todee to organize and register community-based organizations (CBOs). At least with respect to road corridors, LCIP appears to be using a better model for community mobilization and sensitization than was the case in 2007. It appears that LCIP has learned from its earlier experiences on roads and is intent on creating sustainable community organizations along road-based development corridors.

ESR activities built upon and deepened some of the activities developed under the first two years of LCIP. The emphasis now was on developing models that promised some measure of sustainability of skills and businesses. These were appropriate and effective activities and corresponded well to the desired result of employment creation and skills development, although their scale was small. These models have been pursued and expanded under LCIP 2.

LCIP 2 (2007 – Present)

All current grants under LCIP 2 are scheduled to end on October 31, 2008, when a new round of grants will be bid out and awarded. At present there are only monthly and quarterly reports available for LCIP 2, which run from the August 2007 monthly report to that for June 2008. The annual report has not yet been produced. The division between large infrastructure projects and all other activities follows that for the final phase of LCIP 1.

Infrastructure

The following infrastructure activities are reported on in LCIP monthly reports:

Major Building Renovation:

- Capitol Building
- Ministry of Public Works Complex

Roads:

¹⁸ DAI 2008. Op. cit., p. 83.

- BCG Road
- Ganta - Sanniquellie Road
- Todee Road Development Corridor

Road Equipment:

- Provision of Heavy Duty Equipment and Trucks to the MPW

Educational Training Institutes:

- Kakata Rural Teacher Training Institute (KRTTI)
- Zorzor Rural Teacher Training Institute (ZRTTI)

County Administration Buildings:

- Bomi County Administration Building
- Grand Bassa County Administration Building
- Lofa County Administration Building
- Sinoe County Administrative Building

Of these projects, the Capitol Building, Ganta –Sanniquellie Road, Bomi Administration Building, Grand Bassa Administration Building, and the KRTTI (except for teaching staff housing) have been completed. The evaluation team inspected all of these infrastructure projects, except the the ZRTTI and the administrative buildings in Lofa and Sinoe counties.

According to the June 2008 monthly report, several infrastructure projects are currently under design or in the pre-construction stage:¹⁹

- Maryland County Administration Building
- National Election Commission
- Tubman National Institute for Medical Arts Building
- University of Liberia Fendall Campus (Engineering Building)

Economic and Social Rehabilitation

The following ESR activities reported on in LCIP 2 monthly and quarterly reports are all currently active, except for small-scale community infrastructure in Nimba and Grand Gedeh Counties:

Smallholder Tree Crop Rehabilitation:

- Smallholder Rubber Rehabilitation (Nimba and Bong Counties)

¹⁹ DAI LCIP Monthly Report for June, 2008.

- Rubber Nursery Development (Nimba and Bong Counties)
- Smallholder Cocoa and Coffee Production (Lofa County)
- Smallholder Oil Palm Production (Grand Bassa)

Agricultural Production and Marketing:

- Rice, Vegetable, Root and Tuber Production (Bong and Grand Gedeh Counties)
- Tilapia Fish Production (Bong and Grand Gedeh Counties)
- Honey and Snail Production (Nimba County)
- Vegetable Production and Marketing (Lofa County)²⁰
- Fruit and Vegetable Processing and Preservation (Lofa, Bong, and Grand Gedeh Counties)

Small-Scale Community Infrastructure:

- Wells, Hand Pumps, and Conflict Mitigation Activities in Village Clusters (Nimba, Grand Gedeh, Bong, and Lofa Counties)

Small Business and Vocational Skills Development:

- RAP²¹ – Lofa, Nimba, and Bong Counties
- Private Sector Internship Program (PIP) – Montserrado County
- Small Business Incubator Project (Bong, Nimba, Grand Bassa, Montserrado Counties)

As stated in Task Order # 10 and repeated in the Annual Work Plan submitted to USAID in May 2007, three results were to be achieved:²²

1. Restore the financial self-sufficiency of war-affected persons (particularly youth and women) through activities that provide employment and skills development opportunities.
2. Contribute to social cohesion in communities, particularly through activities to restore community infrastructure and essential services.

²⁰ This project also has a substantial conflict mitigation component.

²¹ RAP was known as the Rehabilitation of Artisans Program under LCIP 1.

²² DAI 2007. LCIP Annual Work Plan. May 4, 2007. P. 2

3. Link communities to government by rehabilitating and reconstructing key national county and local-level infrastructure (such as administrative buildings, roads, and schools)

LCIP 2 activities correspond well to these three results. Emphasis, however, has been placed on Results 1 and 3 with little relative attention paid to social cohesion or peace building in communities through small infrastructure provision and conflict mitigation activities, such as psychosocial counseling and sports for youth. Psychosocial counseling has nevertheless remained a small component of business and skills development activities and is emphasized considerably more in some projects than in others. An example is the agricultural production and marketing project in Lofa County, where a number of conflicts are being dealt with through community dialogue and counseling.

Under LCIP 2, there is no indicator among the 31 identified by the current PMP (April 2008) directly related to psychosocial counseling. The closest indicators of the group of 31 are #13 - number of community-based reconciliation projects completed; and #24 - number of community meetings/workshops facilitated by LCIP 2. While these activities may contain elements of psychosocial counseling, they are focused elsewhere. On the other hand, psychosocial counseling is a standard – although small – part of many ESR grants, such as the RAP. While LCIP feels that some level of psychosocial counseling should be a part of most or all ESR activities, there is no indicator that reports on counseling outputs or outcomes.

LCIP informed the evaluation team that there is no standard methodology or guidance for psychological counseling by implementing partners. Measuring the success (or lack thereof) of such counseling has only been anecdotal to date, although LCIP states that a current objective is to standardize the methods, tools and procedures used by implementing partners. Moreover, as part of integrated community development and counseling services, implementing partners will in the future be required to collect structured social and demographic data that can be used to demonstrate “quantitative” changes in key measures of counseling performance. This may prove to be a difficult task, unless counseling is standardized and related to specific conflict situations.

Building renovations. Linking government to communities is certainly being enhanced through the rehabilitation of county administration buildings destroyed and dilapidated after 14 years of war. The evaluation team visited a number of these buildings (Nimba, Bong, Bomi, and Grand Bassa Counties) and found them in full use. These structures physically and symbolically promote the increased stability of the central government. It was appropriate and effective to focus on these structures in infrastructure activities in both LCIP 1 and LCIP 2.

While considerably more costly, the renovation of the Capitol Building (and before that the Executive Mansion) is of considerable symbolic and practical use in supporting the new GOL in its aim to restore order and economic growth. The rehabilitation of the MPW is justified among other ministry buildings by the close working relationship between LCIP and this ministry, particularly since 2006. There is symbolic value in

having a MPW structure that serves as a visible model of reconstruction and engineering competence. It is also important that the MPW be equipped appropriately to participate in major road work and maintenance.

Teacher training structures. Investing in the rehabilitation of the two rural teacher training institutes in KRTTI and ZRTTI was another entirely appropriate and effective choice, since these institutions will produce the teachers that can staff the numerous schools rehabilitated or constructed by donor organizations, including USAID, since 2004.

Roads. Investing in the rehabilitation of major roads under LCIP 2 has been effective in two places (Ganta – Sanniquellie and Todee Roads), but has been problematic in the BCG endeavor. The numerous problems that plagued the BCG Road serve as lessons learned, but should not discourage further road rehabilitation in the last phase of LCIP 2. A case in point is the Madina – Robertsport road. It would be even more appropriate to replicate along other roads in key locations the Todee Road Development Corridor that combines road rehabilitation with economic development and community participation activities.

Good trunk roads not only link isolated county capitals, such as Robertsport and Cestos City, to the rest of Liberia, but also symbolize to the Liberian people that the national government is effectively rebuilding the country. However, leaving rehabilitated roads without effective maintenance for a few years will have the opposite effect. Relying on communities to maintain “their” roads will not be sufficient to prevent road deterioration in the absence of MPW maintenance activities.

Self-sufficiency. LCIP 2 economic and social integration grants are focused on restoring financial self-sufficiency of war-affected persons (particularly youth and women) through employment and skills development opportunities. Rather than being reintegration activities, ESR grants are focused now on technical and business skills training primarily to the small business or small farm sectors. The smallholder tree cropping projects, for example, are working to rehabilitate agricultural practices that once were more efficient and profitable before the war. Rubber is another excellent example of rehabilitation, since the buyers already have their collection stations along nearby roads. Rehabilitation of tree cropping for smallholders is an effective way to increase small farm income.

Food crop production can be for subsistence or for sale, with most small farmers doing both. The emphasis on rice, vegetable, root, and tuber production is appropriate, as is the model used to bring in young farmers to central places from surrounding communities to learn the techniques and skills in producing high yields. The plan to provide follow-up of extension services to these farmers once they have returned to their communities is an excellent idea, but unfortunately collides with the relatively short-term nature of the grants that underpin these agricultural activities (8-10 months usually). An example of this in Bong Mines was examined by the evaluation team. Current grant activities will end before the agricultural and aquaculture cycles can be effectively completed, let alone providing time enough for extension follow-up. Moreover, the introduction of tilapia fish

production into the rice/vegetables/roots/tubers mix is particularly ambitious, given the short grant cycle. Market linkages, too, will need to be solidified. Rehabilitating the road back from Bong Mines to the main highway would be a useful way to launch a development corridor. If another donor carries this out, all the better.²³

Restoration of previous agriculture and trade skills is a far better idea than parachuting new ideas into places where there is little previous experience and dubious market linkages. Cottage industry activities carried out by LCIP 2 represent entirely new business development on smallholder farms, rather than restoration of lost skills or introduction of modern techniques. Thus, the honey and snail production activities on 100 farms in Nimba County are likely to be difficult to sustain. It is not clear why apiculture has not been a traditional activity in Liberia; honey is only collected by seeking out wild hives. Snails, too, are only harvested in the wild. As a pilot activity and given the demand for and profitability of honey, this activity may appear worth undertaking. However, while this is commonly attempted in small-scale agricultural projects in other countries, it far more often fails than succeeds beyond the short term, particularly if all inputs are provided free as is the case of the Nimba project. This activity should be thoroughly evaluated before it is continued or replicated under the LCIP 2 extension.

With regards to fruit and vegetable processing and preservation, this pilot activity aiming at increasing value-added may also be worth doing as a pilot, but it is several levels of complexity and difficulty above rehabilitation or technical improvement of traditional crops. As in the honey project, the free provision of all elements of the value chain means that beneficiaries are likely to be interested only as long as they do not have to invest their own funds. Technical problems also arise in the quality control and sanitary standards of processed or preserved produce and in acquiring the necessary storage recipients. This project, too, should be thoroughly evaluated before it is continued or replicated under the LCIP 2 extension.

The other major focus of activities targeting the restoration of financial self-sufficiency through employment and skills development opportunities are the small business and vocational skills development activities. These are off-farm activities, located in urban or peri-urban areas. This is appropriate because an enormous number of young Liberians have left the land and are concentrated in the towns and cities. They lack the necessary skills to engage in value-adding activities, such as in the trades sector.

RAP. The flagship program is the RAP, having its origin in the first years of LCIP 1. It produces about 10 – 20 apprentice graduates from each selected small business every 8 months or so, depending on the nature of the business. A few of the graduates remain with the assisted business owner; others have pursued spin-off businesses of their own. A majority of graduates seek to work as employees for other business owners, but not all of these succeed. Exact follow-up figures for these apprentices are lacking.

²³ It is rumored that the Chinese may rehabilitate the Bong Mines road to reactivate mining activity there.

This means of developing vocational skills is undoubtedly more effective and appropriate than in the overly short courses in LCIP 1. On the other hand, vocational training can also be too long, too expensive, or contain too much classroom time. The eight to nine months working on the job should be sufficient to impart needed skills. Moreover, the number of graduates produced per training cycle is not insubstantial. Currently some 955 apprentices are engaged in three county-based projects, with 55% of them females. The business owners encouraged to receive these apprentices also receive substantial inputs, normally a new or expanded workplace, 3-5 years of advance lease payments, a generator, tools for their shop and for the apprentices when they graduate, and elements of business training. Psychosocial counseling is also a component of the RAP, since youth from a variety of backgrounds and wartime experiences are brought together in a small workplace.

Comparison of Costs of Vocational Training and the RAP. Vocational skills training sessions in LCIP 1 Phase 1 lasted about 6 months.. The average for six such programs between February and December 2005 (see Annex B) was 5.83 months at an average cost of \$157,628 for 360 trainees, or about \$438 per trainee. The total number of trainees in these six programs was 2,160 for a total cost of \$945,768. Of these 2,160, some 1,727 (80%) were ex-combatants. These trainees also received psychosocial counseling.

The RAP program was also begun in 2005 in Bong and Nimba Counties (two programs) with a total of 591 apprentices and 20 artisans and their shops. The total cost of \$816,200 for the nine month program (May 2005 –March 2006) works out to a cost per apprentice of \$1,381 and a cost per artisan/shop of \$40,810. Only ex-combatants are indicated as beneficiaries. There was an average of 29.6 apprentices per shop.

Under the DFID-financed ESR activities in LCIP 1 Phase 2, a total of 788 apprentices and 43 artisans and their businesses were supported in two programs for a total of \$845,636. The average cost per apprentice was \$1,073 and \$19,666 per artisan and shop. The average number of apprentices per shop was 18.3.

Under LCIP 2, there were three RAP programs, running respectively in Lofa, Nimba, and Bong Counties between October 2007 and June 2008. Together they involved 955 apprentices, including 522 (55%) women, and 96 artisans and their shops. The total cost of these programs was \$1,560,542 for a cost per apprentice of \$1,634 and per artisan/shop of \$16,256. This is about \$173,394 per month for the three RAP programs. The average number of apprentices per shop was 9.9, a rather significant reduction compared to previous RAP programs. This number has dropped by about half from the previous year and to approximately one-third the average number in 2005-2006. This reduction is motivated by the desire to increase the number of businesses assisted while limiting the number of apprentices to a more manageable number.

In conclusion, the costs of vocational skills training per trainee were considerably less at \$438 than the apprenticeship program running at roughly the same time in 2005, which cost \$1,381 per beneficiary. However, the apprenticeship program ran for approximately 3 months more (50% longer). The cost in 2007-2008 per apprentice was 18% above the

cost in 2005, but some 52% above the cost in 2006-2007. The reduction in average number of apprentices per assisted artisanal business accounts for much of this.

Beyond skills training, the RAP also seeks to strengthen artisanal businesses in a variety of trades, so that they may sustainably employ more tradesmen. While this additional employment may come from apprentices that remain with the master craftsman, other graduates are expected to set up their own small businesses. When the evaluation team visited the River Cess and Grand Bassa RAP programs one year after apprentice graduation, only a few graduates had remained in their place of apprenticeship and even fewer had launched their own businesses. While some graduates were working for other employers in the same trade, perhaps a third of graduates had disappeared over the preceding year, and it was not known whether they were employed in their trade elsewhere or not.

A more advanced program to assist small business has recently been launched called the Small Business Incubator (SBI) Project to be implemented in Bong, Nimba, Grand Bassa, and Montserrado Counties. This program will select promising small businesses for higher level training, many of which have been stars in the RAP activities of their counties. Individualized training and technical assistance will be favored over group training. Some provision of inputs may also be a part of the assistance package, but care should be taken to wean these businesses off any dependency they may have developed with respect to LCIP or other donors. It remains to be seen what this project can achieve in terms of expanding these businesses with the ultimate objective of generating more paid employees. It is certainly worth pursuing as a pilot activity, but its cost-effectiveness should be evaluated.

Finally, the Private Sector Internship Program (PIP) targets educated youth that cannot get started in careers because of lack of practical experience. According to the June 2008 monthly report, 190 interns were working in 17 Montserrado-based businesses, ranging from banks and construction firms to hotels and restaurants. Some 93 of these (49%) are to be hired as employees or contractors by these firms, although the evaluation team noted that some promises to recently graduated interns are not being fulfilled.²⁴

The evaluation team spoke with two interns in the field and one available at LCIP's office. Others in the field had left their work sites to attend the graduation ceremony. While the principal objective was for firms to retain these interns, it seems that some firms have made promises they cannot keep, as was reported to the team by an intern from the Liberian Bank for Development and Investment and by the PIP manager in LCIP. On the other hand, interns with Cellcom are being retained in various counties almost without exception. A Cellcom supervisor in Sanniquellie noted that his experience with the interns had been an unqualified success. The interns in the Accelerated Learning Program (Creative Associates) in Sanniquellie had also been well received and employed, although their long-term prospects depend on the sustainability of the Learning Research

²⁴ DAI 2008. LCIP Monthly Report for June 2008.

Center. The final rate of placement for the recently graduated interns (August 2008) will need to be calculated in the months ahead.

The objective of the PIP pilot activity should not simply be the hiring of these interns by the firms participating in the program. While that is desirable, it seems unlikely that all interns can be accommodated, even if rated highly by employers. Those interns that leave their place of internship have work experience and confidence, which should help them find employment elsewhere. Moreover, participating businesses can continue to train new interns without the necessary expectation that they have to hire them all. While it is true that these businesses have free labor for from three to six months, the bargain seems a fair one, since they have to take inexperienced university or vocational school graduates and train them on the job. A follow-up study of these interns should be conducted to determine the cost-effectiveness of this program, particularly the degree to which these interns do find appropriate employment, where, and when.

3. Appropriateness of technical areas and approaches now and in the follow-on.

The technical areas within which the LCIP program has operated over the life-of-program are: large-scale infrastructure; small-scale infrastructure; workforce mobilization; non-formal education; community mobilization; conflict mitigation; small business development, and private sector skills development. As indicated in Section 2, these activities have varied during the program, particularly between the first phase of LCIP in 2004 – 2006 and the program from 2006 to the present. In essence, LCIP activities during the post-conflict crisis matured into activities focused on strengthening central governmental structures and generating sustainable employment.

LCIP 2 (2007 - present)

In 2008, LCIP 2 continued the previous year's technical focus on large public works and has built up an impressive engineering staff of 15 persons (July 2008). There are two community infrastructure engineers, three building engineers, and six road engineers. All engineers are primarily focused on road construction at this time. LCIP is currently finishing a number of structures as well as the Todee and Buchanan – Greenville roads. Other vertical structures and roads are in the planning stage.

There are at present nine ESR staff, including one person in charge of small-scale community infrastructure. These staff are specialized in the following sectors of economic activity: (1) smallholder tree crop rehabilitation; (2) agricultural production and marketing; (3) small-scale community infrastructure; and (4) small business and vocational/professional skills development.

The appropriateness and effectiveness of activities in these technical areas were discussed in Section 2. Rehabilitation of tree crop production is entirely warranted under LCIP and began appropriately with rubber. Rehabilitation of food crops by smallholders is being pursued in rice, vegetable, root, and tuber production. Currently, over 200 young farmers are involved in work on a demonstration farm in Bong Mines. A similar project is

underway in Grand Gedeh. Aquaculture of tilapia has been added to this mix. Implementing partners personnel in charge of these activities appear to have the necessary technical skills. Small-scale infrastructure activities continue under LCIP 2 and focus on boreholes in communities. Although it is not clear how this activity relates to the others being pursued under ESR, these wells and boreholes appear not to have posed technical problems for the implementing partners providing them to communities.

Finally, there has been increasing emphasis under LCIP 2 on business skills development, as well as skills development in various common trades. The small business incubator project, private-sector internship, and RAP were described in Section 2. These are well chosen technical sectors within which to work and should continue to receive attention during the remainder of LCIP.

Proposed Technical Activities for the final phase of LCIP (2008 – 2010)

The follow-on phase of LCIP 2 will begin on November 1, 2008 and last for 18 months. This is sufficient time to develop grant projects that can begin as early as December 2008. Determination on whether and how to take up current grant activities again in the final phase of LCIP has yet to be made, but the current emphasis on tree crop and food crop production should not be abandoned. These areas of agricultural production are important sources of subsistence and cash income for a majority of Liberians.

Other agricultural production and marketing activities, such as honey and snails, fruit and vegetable processing and preservation, and even vegetable and tilapia production require sophisticated technical assistance. Continuing or extending these activities should be based on a realistic appraisal of the likelihood of sustainability once LCIP ends. It would probably be better to concentrate on less complicated schemes. In the case of the honey/snails project in Nimba County, all elements of the complex necessary to maintain the endeavor have been provided free of charge to farmers. Training for skills required to support apiculture, such as for local carpenters in beehive and snail box construction, has also been delivered by the implementing partner. The question of how to preserve the honey in jars with sanitary seals is problematic, in spite of a donation of bottles from a donor source. Creating a whole complex of techniques, none has existed before, is not likely to succeed. This goes well beyond rehabilitation of more traditional skills.

The coupling of work on large demonstration farms, as in Bong Mines, with a follow-up extension effort promises to generate more production and employment than totally new cottage industries. Many of these activities can be seen as rehabilitation of agricultural skills that once existed but were largely lost during 14 years of war. It is not clear what will happen to activities when current grants expire on October 31, but there should be a mechanism by which grants and grantees can bridge the two or more months during which grants are rebid and grantees chosen. The activities at Bong Mines are impressive. They deserve replication and a sufficiently long period of activity to allow extension follow-up of trainees.

It will also be important to replicate and extend the RAP program into new areas, notably Grand Cape Mount and Bomi Counties. The program ought to return to areas in which it

is no longer active, such as River Cess and Grand Bassa Counties and should be maintained for another grant cycle in Lofa, Nimba, and Bong Counties. The PSI program should continue under a new grant and place as many young graduates as possible, without focusing too much on how many interns are being employed by the participating firms. The experience alone will be very useful for these young people, even if firms cannot immediately hire them. Finally, the SBI project has real potential, but has not yet had a chance to advance beyond the training of trainers. These trainers will act as extension agents working with a select number of promising small businesses, several of which have already emerged as stars in the RAP program.

4. Degree of success in achieving indicator benchmarks or targets in LCIP 1 and LCIP 2.

USAID projects set program targets in order to inform the client, as well as to be used by the implementing partner or contractor as a management tool to inform its own performance and allow for continuous evaluation and adjustment of project activities to achieve desired project outcomes. LCIP has published two performance management plans (PMPs) containing benchmarks and targets to be achieved across various intermediate results (IRs). The first PMP was developed in September 2004 at the beginning of LCIP I, while the second appeared in April, 2008 under LCIP 2.

While the 2004 PMP lists a number of indicators, it quickly became apparent that during the “emergency” period covering the reintegration process the US Embassy and USAID were most interested in two variables: PDEs and the number of beneficiaries. The project set these targets at four million, and 25,000, respectively, both of which were surpassed by June, 2006 according to LCIP’s summary report for April 2004 – June 2006, which does not make explicit reference to the September 2004 PMP. Interestingly, previous quarterly reports faithfully reported results against the 2004 PMP. This may help explain why DAI staff in Bethesda as well as Monrovia initially insisted that the project had not completed a PMP in 2004, until this evaluation discovered through document review that it should exist. Once this was pointed out by the evaluation team, the PMP was quickly located.

The next PMP was published by LCIP in April, 2008. It is an expanded document listing 31 indicators, of which a subset are considered reportable “F” indicators per USAID’s list of qualifying indicators. According to LCIP, it has not yet received a response from USAID/Monrovia regarding this proposed PMP. Monthly reports since its publication do not reference the PMP, although they thoroughly report on project accomplishments and activities. Current LCIP reports do not provide an understandable format for whether newly proposed PMP indicators are being met. As in its reporting from 2004 onward, the indicators of PDEs and number of beneficiaries are included in the expanded 2008 PMP. Indicators are overwhelmingly of the ‘output’ variety, listing number of people trained, number of buildings rehabilitated, number of acres rehabilitated, and so on, instead of more informative ‘outcome’ level indicators which might demonstrate significant economic change within LCIP’s area of influence.

5. Degree of collaboration with the GOL, other donors, and U.S. government programs.

Collaboration between USAID projects, the host government, and other donors and US government programs can yield significant benefits during project implementation by reducing duplication and by leveraging outside resources to accomplish common goals. Depending on the situation and the collaborator, such interaction can be absolutely necessary. However, it is also recognized that there are opportunity costs associated with collaboration which require up-front investment in time and resources.

LCIP has worked with the GOL, other donors, notably DFID, and other US government programs. The degree to which this collaboration was formalized, its degree of success, and its outcomes has varied depending upon the collaborator and the level of collaboration – whether at the national strategic level or at a local activity-based level.

At the national or strategic level two collaborations stand out. These are the interactions with the MPW and with DFID. The interaction with the MPW is exemplified by the project's work on roads and public buildings, where LCIP collaborated with the ministry in agreeing on standards, methods of work, and final outcomes. LCIP provided substantial capacity building, both explicitly by rehabilitating the ministry building and providing heavy equipment, as well as implicitly by providing technical assistance to ministry staff during the course of their working relationship. There was, however, no program to explicitly build ministerial technical capacity beyond the provision of equipment. This slowed the working relationship between the two entities, since a lack of capacity with the MPW placed additional management burdens on LCIP.

LCIP's collaboration with DFID stands out, as DFID provided substantial funding to what has turned out to be a notable component of LCIP – the ESR program. As noted previously, LCIP has striven to link ESR activities with infrastructure development. The much discussed Todee road rehabilitation is only the most recent example of this integrated approach. As it is somewhat unusual for USAID to pool its resources with other bilateral donors such as DFID, it is worth highlighting this contribution to LCIP.

Other multilateral donors and agencies are also present in Liberia. These include the World Bank (WB), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the European Union (EU), and UNMIL. During the early stages of LCIP, the project interacted with UNMIL on reintegration issues. However, more recently national level interaction with UNMIL or other agencies has been little or non-existent. LCIP does report that at the field-level there is informal collaboration between the project and other agencies that are present in the same areas.

In respect to potential collaboration with similar programs, both the ILO and the EU have road programs. While the relevant person in EU was not available for interview, the evaluation team spoke with the head of a labor-based road maintenance project currently financed by the Dutch government (until December 2008) but planned to be part of a future public works component of a joint World Bank – African Development Bank (AfDB) project in River Gee and Maryland Counties. This community-based road

maintenance project stresses the use of large numbers of local laborers using simple road maintenance equipment. ILO trains small contractors, many of which have little experience in roads. These contractors are deliberately picked from within communities. This desire to build local organizational capacity echoes LCIP objectives that were not always successful (e.g., the BCG road).

It appears that there are possible areas of collaboration between the ILO methodology and current LCIP plans to rehabilitate more feeder roads. It is likely that some form of formal collaboration between ILO and LCIP can be found. The ILO project manager has already met with LCIP engineers to discuss collaboration.

The Liberian Agency for Community Empowerment (LACE) engages in community development work similar to what is planned for the Todee development corridor. LACE senior management told the evaluation team that they have not yet formally collaborated with LCIP in the field, in spite of similar community-level economic and infrastructure activities. However, recent discussions between LACE and both the EU and USAID concerning collaboration within the WB/AfDB project in River Gee and Maryland Counties seemed to indicate that LACE will use the development corridor approach in its community infrastructure program. LCIP may be able to center some of its ESR activities in the same corridors. LACE management saw LCIP as a highly successful program with which they would be pleased to collaborate formally.

In sum, while contacts have occurred between LCIP and other similar programs, there has not yet been any significant formal collaboration since the DFID buy-in. LCIP could be more proactive in this regard, especially since its new model of “development corridor” cries out for such multi-donor collaboration and IP clustering of activities for increased synergy. Collaboration with other US funded programs appears to be limited to the ESR funded internship program where LCIP interns are placed in learning centers of Creative Associates’ Accelerated Learning Program (ALP). Creative Associates is being funded through USAID.

6. Project support of Liberian government policies and plans relating to the PRS

The GOL’s Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), published in April, 2008, represents the government’s national development priorities and policies for the period 2008-2011. Divided into four mutually reinforcing pillars, the PRS covers:

- Consolidating Peace and Security
- Revitalizing the Economy
- Strengthening Governance and the Rule of Law
- Rehabilitating Infrastructure and Delivering Basic Services

Since the PRS is a recent document, LCIP was not specifically designed to address its development priorities. Nonetheless, many LCIP activities, past and present, support the PRS’s development priorities. Beginning in 2004, LCIP reintegration activities supported the security environment which makes this year’s PRS goals achievable. Subsequent

activities in the rebuilding of public and community infrastructure -- especially roads -- align well with the PRS's stated goals and indirectly strengthen governance by building the capacity of the MPW. Furthermore, those agricultural activities being undertaken by LCIP align with the PRS's goal of revitalizing the economy, of which agriculture is a bedrock component.

The PRS's findings, as well as those of this evaluation, repeatedly highlight roads and bridges as the most critical and desired infrastructure rehabilitation required in the country. These structures have been addressed by both LCIP 1 and 2, notably the rehabilitation of secondary roads such as the Todee Road Development Corridor, as well as primary roads such as the Buchanan to Greenville road. For a full listing, please refer to Annex D.

Public buildings have also been identified by the PRS as being in urgent need of rehabilitation, in order to support the proper functioning of government. LCIP anticipated this need in 2006 by taking on a number of large public works projects, as noted previously.

In order to revitalize the economy, the PRS highlights multiple sectors, including forestry, mining and services industries. However, chief among its concerns is the revitalization of Liberian agriculture, a driving force in food security and poverty reduction in this largely agrarian society. More specifically, the PRS highlights food crops such as rice, cassava, and vegetables (which can be categorized as a cash crop), as well as primary cash crops, notably rubber, coffee, cocoa, and palm oil, as being critical to any revitalization of the agricultural sector. LCIP is already working in these targeted sectors. The program is active in rehabilitating rubber plantations and creating associated rubber nurseries. It is actively engaged in rehabilitating rice swamps and providing capacity building in vegetable and root and tuber production. Finally LCIP has begun to work in the coffee and cocoa sub-sectors.

Outside the agricultural sector, the PRS also intends to support and strengthen private sector development, in order to grow and sustain a vibrant economy. LCIP is addressing these goals in different ways, including rural apprenticeship programs, the private sector internship program, and a program-wide commitment to rely on Liberian implementing partners and contractors to carry out all work.

Lastly, LCIP has supported the PRS goal of consolidating peace and security through its first mandate in 2004 and 2005 to work with ex-combatants and war affected persons. Through its various post-conflict projects, LCIP managed to employ tens of thousands in various labor and training programs. While these programs do not strictly adhere to the PRS's modern goals of strengthening national security institutions or building public confidence in the government's ability to maintain public safety, LCIP support to reintegration and reconciliation activities have made these subsequent goals realizable.

7. Impact at country level and on communities and beneficiary groups.

LCIP 1 Phase 1 (2004-2006)

Employment Generation

The heart of this early phase of LCIP 1 was employment generation for recently demobilized ex-combatants. As noted earlier, labor brigades rehabilitated bridges, roads, agricultural infrastructure, environmental sanitation and drainage structures, schools, clinics, and county administrative buildings.

While employing ex-combatants was most important, the infrastructure produced had community-level impact. All buildings still remain in good shape today and serve as reminders of the useful work produced by the ex-combatants and other needy workers in 2004-2006. While evidence of widespread swamp rice paddy field rehabilitation remains today, the extent of use is much reduced, judging from examples seen at Tappita and Saclepea in Nimba County. The economic usefulness of those fields is currently far below their potential and at Tappita and Saclepea, the rice fields further back from the road are returning to bush. This is more an issue of sustainability than initial impact.

The socio-economic impact of these activities was measured only informally by LCIP, as there was no time or budget for quantitative baseline and follow-up surveys in the targeted counties. LCIP did conduct an informal survey of community infrastructure and business activity in 14 rural towns in early 2004 and again in mid-2006.²⁵ The follow-up survey suggested that economic recovery and reconciliation were underway in these towns. However, the specific contribution of LCIP activities to these trends could only be estimated, although the essential and pressing objective of employing some 25,000 ex-combatants and war-affected persons for about eight months was achieved. These workers earned from \$2 to \$3 per day and received a hot lunch, often their only meal of the day. Their work on essential community-level infrastructure, especially local feeder roads, and the multiplier effect of these wages must have contributed directly to the economic recovery of hundreds of Liberian communities. The level of destruction and lack of economic opportunity in Liberia after 14 years of war must be borne in mind.

Even though attempts were made to pass rehabilitated swamp rice paddies over to community structures such as CDCs, this occurred late in the RR process and with insufficient attention to ensure sustainability. However, the evaluation team did interview a small group of young men working on community swamp rice fields near Saclepea (Nimba County) three years after they had been rehabilitated by work brigades. Nonetheless, the two hectares under cultivation paled in respect to the 15 hectares rehabilitated over eight months in that same place in 2004-2005.

Vocational Training

According to the LCIP Phase 1 summary report, a total of 7,180 people were engaged in some form of vocational or skills training. This is about 29% of the 25,000 beneficiaries of LCIP 1 Phase 1. The large number of beneficiaries that had engaged only in paid labor

²⁵ DAI. 2006. LCIP Phase 1 Quarterly Report and Summary Report on Phase 1 Grants (April 2004 – June 2006), p. 21.

through LCIP later complained to the NCDDRR²⁶ that they had not received the skills training promised to them under the United Nations DDDR process. While the NCDDRR agrees that vocational training had been promised, LCIP maintains that its mandate involved a choice between wage labor and skills training for about eight months. Following this period of either skills training or wage labor, the ex-combatants were no longer eligible for assistance. According to the NCDDRR, some 11,000 ex-combatants left EU and LCIP rehabilitation programs without the necessary vocational skills.

There is no indication that LCIP vocational skills' training was less successful than that provided by other donor programs in the post-conflict years. In principle, all ex-combatants were to emerge from the RR period with viable skills. This encouraged a large number of short-term training activities (usually 6 months) for large numbers of ex-combatants (and others). The programs were too short and too large-scale to result in sufficiently skilled artisans. Moreover, the economy was severely depressed following 14 years of conflict and demand for tradesmen's services was correspondingly low. While no systematic follow-up of graduates has been made, it is not surprising that most of these probably simply sold the tools they received.

Vocational training has had limited success in post-conflict cases of Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi in about the same period, similar to what happened in Liberia. Whether in post-conflict or simply very poor contexts, many providers continue to grapple with the usefulness and success of vocational training. Plan International, for example, has traditionally included such skills training in its community development mix. In recent years, however, Plan has severely questioned the degree to which its graduates actually use their new skills or find jobs. The problem has been the lack of linkage between market demand and the supply of new artisans. Donors tend to feel erroneously that their trainees will win out over traditional skills training mechanisms, particularly apprenticeship, in which young apprentices toil for years for virtually no compensation but learn the skills they need to be competitive in a tight market.

Psychosocial Counseling and Social Reintegration

If the impact of wage labor and vocational training was not documented by LCIP, the impact of personal and community reconciliation activities is even harder to grasp. According to the LCIP 1 Phase 1 summary report, reconciliation involved an approach in which the social, physical, and psychological needs of the ex-combatants and the war-affected persons were addressed holistically. To do this, LCIP made available to all persons and communities targeted by the program a range of social reintegration opportunities.

The degree and type of psychosocial counseling obviously varied considerably from group sessions and workshops through traditional healing ceremonies to one-on-one sessions by community animators. It is highly unlikely that that the 36,000 people that took part in psychosocial counseling benefitted equally from such a mix of counseling

²⁶ National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reconciliation.

types. Yet, it can be assumed that the 12,000 people counseled by the 90 animators received far more meaningful attention than those involved in lunch-break counseling or workshops. Participants in traditional healing ceremonies must have had very different reactions to the process.

That some ex-combatants received only token counseling through a couple of workshops was attested to by Father Gary Jenkins of St. Dominic's School in Tubmanburg (Bomi County). He felt the impact of such counseling at his school, where he had enrolled ex-combatants as half his students, to be woefully insufficient. While Father Jenkins' saw little benefit from the workshops held for local ex-combatants in his school, the evaluation team visited a community (Tienii) in Grand Cape Mount County for whom LCIP had built a cultural center at their request, in order to realize traditional cleansing and reconciliation ceremonies. The location of the cultural center was the traditional open-air meeting place for such ceremonies. In this case, LCIP was able to build upon traditional mechanisms of community-delivered psychosocial healing, certainly more likely to succeed than workshops. According to LCIP, each community with which it worked selected what it wanted in terms of reconciliation activities. Sometimes this involved building a structure, more often it did not.

In April 2005, DAI/LCIP carried out an independent appraisal of the social integration component and concluded it was not delivering adequate results. LCIP decided to intensify its activities in this area and focused on 33 volatile communities with a high number of ex-combatant residents as well as a history of conflict. According to the summary report, these communities were gradually brought around to reintegrate these ex-combatants through public forgiveness and reconciliation ceremonies. The example just noted in Tienni is one of these successful interventions. However, no follow-up study was conducted to determine to what degree these 33 communities responded specifically to LCIP-sponsored reconciliation activities.

In sum, the impact of these psychosocial counseling activities was not tracked by LCIP in any systematic way, nor can this be easily done. Given the urgency to provide counseling to ex-combatants, war-affected persons, and to community members where ex-combatants sought to return, LCIP appears to have been creative in the use of various methods whose relative impact cannot now be measured.

Other Social Reintegration and Reconciliation Activities

Other activities engaged in under the component of social reconciliation were sports and media activities. The extent of impact of such activities in promoting social reconciliation or serving as a form of informal counseling cannot now be determined. This is also true for the media activities engaged in by LCIP during this period through local radio stations. Nevertheless, sports activities and media messages through community radio have been considered effective means of community reconciliation in other post-conflict programs (e.g., Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi).

LCIP 1 Phase 2 (2006-2008)

As noted earlier, beginning July 1, 2006 all USAID funding was shifted to support large public works projects included in the GOL's 150-Day Plan. Community-focused activities continued only through the DFID contribution to LCIP.

Infrastructure

The impact of public works rehabilitation is clearly felt at the country level. Rehabilitating important government buildings such as the Executive Mansion and the Capitol Building provides a means to govern, while at the same time symbolizing the return of effective national government after years of weakness or anarchy. The construction of county administrative buildings, which has continued under LCIP 2, has the same impact on county populations. These buildings provide a physical place where citizens can interact, albeit in varying degrees, with those who govern them. The rehabilitation of schools and clinics, carried out during the work projects of 2004-2006 had the same impact on community members. These structures all represent the State to the people, a State that can provide services and govern once again.

Other infrastructure-related activities during the period from July 2006 through the end of March 2008 included small infrastructure projects in educational and training facilities and roads and bridges in and around Monrovia. These have all had lasting impact to the extent that rehabilitation has produced viable structures down to the present. The Neezoe community bridge in Montserrado County, completed in 2006, is especially appreciated by that community, as revealed by interviews conducted with passers-by. On the other hand, pothole filling in and around Monrovia left no lasting impact.

The impact of Monrovia construction projects and the provision of wells to educational and training sites have community-level impact, but the rehabilitation of roads can have regional or national impact. Again, this impact lasts to the extent that the infrastructure remains useable. That is the advantage of infrastructure projects compared to socio-economic activities. If not sustained, the latter often fade rapidly in people's memories.

Heavy duty road maintenance equipment provided to the MPW, for example, has had as yet little impact on road maintenance. The plan was to rent it out to private firms to do the work. Nevertheless, the two major trunk roads rehabilitated by LCIP (Ganta – Sanniquellie and BCG) are beginning to deteriorate, even as the BCG road is being terminated in its sections closer to Greenville.

Economic and Social Reintegration

As noted previously, DFID-funded ESR activities were designed to focus on the community level in the vicinity of USAID-funded infrastructure rehabilitation and to support these interventions by clustering ESR activities geographically. The ESR component also sought to pursue the gains made over the previous two years under the first phase of LCIP 1. The objective was to move beyond short-term economic stimulus to longer-term economic opportunities. DFID-funded LCIP 1 activities generated 208,757 person-days of employment and 1,130 employed persons. Conflict mitigation

activities had some 7,176 direct participants (excluding road sensitizations activities) and an estimated 25,000 indirect beneficiaries.²⁷

LCIP 2 (2007 – Present)

As noted earlier, all current LCIP 2 grants are scheduled to end on October 31, 2008, at which time a new round of grants will be bid out and awarded. This may well have implications for the impact of current activities, many of which will not have gone through a sufficiently long agricultural cycle. These activities probably should not have been conceived under the short grant cycles of LCIP. Nevertheless, they seem to hold potential for considerable community agricultural impact, if they can be maintained long enough.

Infrastructure

The actual and potential impacts of large public works infrastructure are the same as those described previously for LCIP 1 Phase 2. As noted earlier, six of these large public works projects have been completed. At least four more are under design or in the pre-construction stage, three of which are in Monrovia. At least one more county administrative building is planned, and it is entirely possible that more of these county buildings will be requested of LCIP by the Ministry of Interior. At least one government official interviewed by the evaluation team felt that LCIP had established a comparative advantage in the rehabilitation of county government administrative buildings. To some degree this is true.

Economic and Social Reintegration

The actual and potential impacts of LCIP 2 ESR activities fall into two categories: (1) increase in income from smallholder farm and small business activities; (2) employment in agriculture and in small business (including the professional-level interns). Currently, some data is being collected in LCIP on sales of produce, but it is not clear that longer-term rates of return are being calculated. In other words, the economic sustainability of these small businesses (cottage industries) is not yet firmly established.

To the extent that apprentices are successful in establishing their own businesses, they will generate income and employment for new employees. However, the evaluation team noted that a small minority of RAP graduates from one year previously remained employees of their former owner/teacher and a few more sought employment nearby with other similar tradesmen (artisans). The majority of graduates had dispersed to the extent that it was unclear if they were still employed or not in the trade they had learned.

Beyond increased business income or wages for beneficiaries, it can be predicted that there will be wider community impact if new or improved businesses prosper to the point of being emulated (replicated), or if they hire new employees. If a new business idea really thrives in a particular environment, such as is hoped for Honey/Snail Production in

²⁷ LCIP Program 1 March 2006 – March 2008: Phase II Final Report. P. 6.

Nimba, it is likely that other entrepreneurs will imitate the example. How many of those 100 farmers who are now experimenting with honey (and snail) production will maintain or grow their businesses over the next few years is unclear. Many such projects have failed in other countries.

Community impact is clearly the target in the small-scale community infrastructure component of ESR, but it seems as if this activity has been reduced to a minimum compared to the remainder of the ESR portfolio.

The table below summarizes these various levels of impact, which for now can be verified only anecdotally. While rehabilitating central governmental structures have impact at all levels, these impacts are most obvious in better governance or are largely symbolic. The same is true of the smaller governmental structures. On the other hand, rehabilitation of educational institutes can have large payoffs through time.

Trunk and feeder roads have both a national and community-level impact and introduce an economic benefit through the access of communities to markets and services, primarily transportation, health, and education. They can also have negative environmental impacts, such as the logging that has resumed down the BCG road.

Small-scale infrastructure has community-level development impact, in addition to the immediate benefits realized by users of boreholes, small bridges, and the like.

Finally, the overt economic benefits accruing to small business or to wages from increased employment ultimately concern the whole nation, but are best seen with immediate beneficiaries, their families, and the wider community through the multiplier effect of increased disposable income.

Table 1: Types of Impacts under LCIP 2 Grant Activities

Activity Type	Country Impact	Community Impact	Beneficiary Impact
Central government structures	Better governance and administration Symbolizes democracy and a strong state	Communities linked to central governmental administration and public services	More and better served users of public services
County administration buildings	Better governance and administration Symbolic of democracy and an effective local administration	Better local governance and administration	More and better served users of public services
Trunk and feeder roads	Economic growth stimulated regionally and nationally Symbolizes a strong and effective state	Increased access to public services Increased access to input and produce markets	More and faster access to services and markets Decreased transaction costs
Educational institutes	Better educated population Increased level of professional skills	Employment and educational possibilities	Increased access to education at all levels
Smallholder tree crop rehabilitation	Economic growth	Multiplier effect of increased income and employment generation	Increased income and steadier employment
Agricultural production and marketing	Economic growth	Multiplier effect of increased income and employment generation	Increased income and steadier employment
Small-scale community infrastructure	National pride Symbolizes a strong and effective state	Increased community cohesion and identify	Greater access to essential public services
Small business and vocational or professional skills development	Economic growth	Multiplier effect of increased income and employment generation	Increased income and steadier employment

8. Impact on implementing partner technical and management capacity.

LCIP documents an across the board lack of technical, management, financial, and contractual capacity across the breadth of Liberian NGOs, ministries, contractors, construction companies, and architecture/engineering (A&E) firms. By its decision to engage with only Liberian entities, LCIP set for itself a difficult challenge, requiring significant additional management and technical resources on its part. On the other hand, in the early days of 2004 – 2006 LCIP was pleasantly surprised to find more capacity than expected within the private sector, although this sector would later become quickly overstretched, as LCIP documents.

LCIP works closely with the MPW but also the Ministry of Youth and Sports and the Ministry of Education. LCIP notes that many donors take the capacity of ministries, especially of the MPW, for granted. Noting a lack of capacity, LCIP actively (and perhaps without choice) engaged the MPW in an indirect way to build its capacity. This included seconding MPW staff to LCIP activities. To what degree this was able to strengthen the MPW is not clear, although the Deputy Minister did express his appreciation for the effort.

LCIP noted a distinct lack of management and technical capacity amongst Liberian NGOs and private sector companies, especially in the construction sector. Qualified engineers and architects were not available in sufficient numbers to complete the needed work in the desired time frame. Management staff in these same construction firms was also not able to properly plan and schedule resources correctly and frequently requested changes in budgets. The same was true of its ability to efficiently handle required financial transactions, namely cash flow.

In its key lessons learned section of the LCIP 1 final report, DAI states that:

“Throughout the project implementation, LCIP 1 consistently partnered with and supported the Liberian construction sector and other local organizations – as part of a deliberate effort to begin building the capacity of Liberian organizations during the more ‘relief’ stages of post-conflict implementation.”²⁸

Grantees working in ESR activities also lack technical, management, and financial capacity. One particular challenge highlighted by LCIP was its change from distributing grants-in-kind to fixed obligation grants in 2006. This placed an additional burden upon NGOs working in this sector. The result often was that grantees required longer than anticipated time periods to complete their work. Again, while LCIP did not provide direct capacity building activities for the NGOs, activity managers worked with grantees in order to fulfill grant requirements. To what degree this impacted the NGOs in their technical and management capacity is not clear. Despite these shortcomings, LCIP stuck

²⁸ DAI 2008. Op. cit., p. 9.

to its rules of relying exclusively on Liberian firms and attempted to compensate this drawback with additional monitoring.

Capacity building of local implementing partners and ministry staff has never been a formal and explicit part of program results or of sub-grant agreements with implementing partners. Nevertheless, early on LCIP chose to build local capacity primarily in two ways: modeling good behavior and through close partnership with implementing partners. LCIP continued to be demanding of its implementing partners, “although the supply of needed resources (skills, knowledge, materiel, management capacity, cash flow management, etc.) frequently was insufficient.”²⁹

Some of these local organizations have received several grants in succession, in spite of a strategy of spreading grants among a wide variety of Liberian entities, primarily NGOs in socio-economic activities and private sector firms for infrastructure. Spreading grants widely among a variety of entities has spread implementation risk, but has also allowed LCIP to judge the relative performance of these entities. In the absence of systematic data, appraising the capacity-building impact on implementing partners achieved through LCIP’s grants, or their sustainability, cannot be more than anecdotal, but some of the entities currently participating in ESR activities (e.g., ARS, Catalyst, and ODAFARA) appear to be highly competent. It is unlikely that they functioned at this high level in 2004.

9. Degree of replication and sustainability of project initiatives.

LCIP 1 Phase 1 (2004 – 2006)

The question of replication and sustainability of project initiatives applies considerably less to the first two years of LCIP 1 than to the second stage of LCIP 1 (2006 – 2008) and to LCIP 2 (2007 – present). Those early activities had the purpose of providing useful employment for large numbers of demobilized combatants and other war-affected people, for whom it was imperative to provide a decent income and a solid midday meal as promised under the DD process. That these workers produced a number of important structures and rehabilitated – at least temporarily – numerous feeder roads and swamp rice fields was secondary to the purpose of ensuring a peaceful transition from anarchy to democracy.

There is also the issue of whether replication applies to subsequent beneficiary activities or to further activities of implementing partners through other donors. In neither case is there evidence of deliberate replication, although many donors have independently done school, clinic, and road rehabilitation work.

Partial sustainability of some of the LCIP 1 activities was observed by the evaluation team in the field. Thus, the schools, clinics, and administration buildings rehabilitated in 2004- 2005 are still being used effectively, at least judging from those observed on the

²⁹ ²⁹ DAI 2008. Op. cit., p. 9.

field trips. In some cases, as in the Zorghowee clinic (Nimba County), another donor (Africare) took the clinic under its wing and provided further maintenance and assistance, notably medical and vaccination supplies with refrigeration produced by solar panels. The nearby primary school at Gbobayee was still entirely functional, without donor assistance as far as could be determined.

Feeder roads were generally only cleared of brush, and potholes filled. While road rehabilitation was replicated widely by LCIP and other donors, roads quickly deteriorated. Even roads that received more extensive rehabilitation with laterite application, culverts, and log bridges could decline rapidly. During an evaluation team visit to the Phebe to Gbotota Road, locals said it was virtually impassable a year after rehabilitation. However, along most roads visited by the evaluation team, side brush has not encroached on the road. Community members must be clearing it occasionally, as was observed in places during the field trips.

The degree of replication or sustainability of vocational and apprenticeship training of ex-combatants or youth in general by implementing partners in field sites could not be verified by the evaluation team, nor could the degree to which ex-combatants had ever used the skills they had learned or the apprenticeship training they had received. In any case, this concerned only about one-fifth of all participants in LCIP 1 activities in 2004-2006 (including all beneficiaries of psychosocial counseling and social reintegration activities).

On the other hand, LCIP itself replicated the early apprenticeship program under the DFID-funded ESR activities in 2006 – 2007, and the RAP remains an important part of LCIP 2 activities to date. It is not known whether other donors have replicated this activity. There is no indication of it among the numerous project signs dotting Liberian communities visited by the team.

Psychosocial counseling and social reconciliation have been practiced by a wide variety of donor and local organizations in post-conflict Liberia and with good reason. It cannot be said that other donors or local NGOs replicated LCIP activities, however. The sustainability of community-level reconciliation activities probably depends on the type of reconciliation activity practiced. For example, in a few cases communities requested structures within which traditional healing ceremonies could be performed. A good example of this is the cultural center built by NWDA for the citizens of Tienii (Grand Cape Mount County). Termed the “cultural village” by locals, since it consists of four buildings, this impressive complex is still used by a variety of local cultural and youth groups. This and 190 low-cost houses for homeless families and ex-combatants were funded by LCIP 1 in 15 communities along the main highway to Sierra Leone. All of this served to achieve social reintegration and reconciliation within a string of related communities. The structures all remain used or inhabited and stand as visual reminders of the work LCIP 1 funded there.

Psychosocial counseling is still practiced by LCIP 2 in its current projects through individual or small group counseling. One of the problem areas is the close proximity of

apprentices in small workplaces. Underlying tensions have often boiled over, requiring constant attention by social counselors of the RAP project. Building and road sensitization activities have also been continued under LCIP 2, although the use of outside cultural troops has annoyed some local administrators. A case in point is in Buchanan (Grand Bassa County), where the superintendent and deputy superintendent for administration felt that more local participation in the sensitization activity should have occurred. The activity concerned the care and maintenance of the rehabilitated Grand Bassa County Administrative Building, rehabilitated by LCIP 1 but not completed until 2008. Sustainability of infrastructure projects seems assured for the foreseeable future, unless maintenance issues contribute to their decline.

There does not appear to be any evidence that other donors or former implementing partners are deliberately replicating rehabilitation or economic development concepts formulated by LCIP 1, but there is enough similarity in many upcoming programs to warrant attempts at linkage and collaboration.

LCIP 2 (2007 – present)

LCIP 2 has built upon the infrastructure and ESR activities carried out in the last two years of LCIP 1. Once again, while there is no indication of deliberate replication by other donors or implementing partners, the agricultural and small business promotion ideas are common tools in spurring employment and small business development in other developing countries. Should the LCIP 2 activities prove to be sustainable, it is likely that other donors will replicate them widely. For the moment, it appears that most NGOs are still in the “relief” mode and have not yet begun many small economic projects. A key element missing thus far is rural and urban credit vehicles for smallholder farmers and urban and peri-urban entrepreneurs. In its final phase, LCIP 2 should consider seeking one or more partnerships with microfinance institutions to bring credit to its small business beneficiaries. LCIP should not attempt to extend credit itself.

LCIP should replicate its development corridor concept, in which it plans to cluster socio-economic interventions around the rehabilitation of an important farm to market road. Todee Road is the model, but inclusion of more LCIP ESR interventions should occur before it can be called a “development corridor.” If an integrated and targeted approach concentrates resources on such corridors, there may be enough sustainability to warrant further replication of this model by both LCIP and other donors. Moreover, other donors should be invited to place their health, education, agricultural, small business, and microfinance investments in the same corridors. While neglecting some areas in favor of concentration in others, it may constitute a critical mass of investments that can truly spur sustainable development. This would then tend to replicate itself by example.

10. Strengths and weaknesses in project management and cost effectiveness

Effective project management and use of project resources are an integral part of any project implementation that extends beyond its original strategic and technical design. LCIP has faced a number of external hurdles, which have challenged its management and cost effectiveness. These include insecurity in 2004 and 2005 during the reintegration

process, a substantial change in programmatic scope in 2006, a significant road rehabilitation project problem (Buchanan to Greenville Road), as well as significant changes in staffing levels and personnel, including multiple chiefs of party.

While external factors, such as insecurity or USAID's expressed desire to take on significant public engineering works, challenged LCIP and played to both weaknesses and strengths, so, too, did LCIP's own decisions provide challenges to be overcome. Staffing levels and configurations, strategic implementation directions not explicitly directed by USAID, and daily activity management methods all demonstrate these strengths and weaknesses.

In 2004, LCIP entered a volatile, uncertain, and at times a totally insecure environment in Liberia. Despite these challenges, LCIP exceeded its targets and became the largest program working on reintegration. LCIP management systems allowed for a large payroll numbering in the thousands to be met on a regular basis, and fulfilled its project requirements. It demonstrates the strength of LCIP systems, as well as the commitment of its staff.

When in 2006 LCIP underwent a substantial change in its programmatic scope, the program was called upon to lay off numerous staff, close most field offices, and bring in new staff to meet its new requirements. LCIP demonstrated flexibility in this regard and was able to adjust to the substantially altered scope of work.

During the reintegration phase, LCIP employed thousands of ex-combatants and war affected persons in cash for work activities. This required detailed records for payroll processing; however, it also required reporting to the UN on beneficiaries. LCIP documents that it had insufficiently rigorous monitoring and evaluation systems in place to complete this task. Subsequent efforts to convince the UN of the veracity of their data consumed valuable management time and inefficiently used program resources.

LCIP employed apprenticeships as well as vocational training to build capacity within a large group of unemployed youth. LCIP now focuses on apprenticeships, instead of vocational training as the preferred method of imparting skills. This procedure of trying multiple training scenarios and then focusing on the most beneficial is a cost effective management strategy for which LCIP needs to be commended.

LCIP has distributed a number of grants in the agriculture, training, and road sensitization programs. Typically these grants have lasted for six to eight months, too short for most agricultural cycles. Rubber rehabilitation and nursery activities, fish ponds, and swamp rice rehabilitation projects have suffered from being deprived of funds at critical times. Even if additional grants are forthcoming later on this year, the risk exists that "the season will have been lost" unless grantees and beneficiaries can keep themselves going without project support. By allowing for short grant cycles, LCIP has risked the loss of crucial management time and inputs. It is an inefficient use of resources.

LCIP's ESR program has pursued a 'diversified portfolio' approach in planning and implementing its activities. The intention is to minimize risk by spreading resources across a large number of activities (and perhaps geographically as well), in order to ensure overall success. The idea, much as in financial markets, is that the failure of any one activity will not damage the overall success of the program. There is also the previously noted benefit of learning from a variety of experiences and selecting the best.

Yet, there are costs associated with this portfolio approach, notably the fact that managements costs spread over a large number of heterogeneous activities and geographical areas tend to increase these costs. There are also opportunity costs incurred when already proven approaches are neglected in favor of experimentation with others. LCIP has by now considerable knowledge of which projects are more successful than others. Given this fact, it must be questioned why the project does not focus on the winners and terminate relatively poorly performing projects with decreased probabilities of success. Spending management time and resources on honey and snail projects, for example, in which the project is trying to establish entire value chains from A to Z with questionable benefit, seems unwise when highly cost effective projects in tree and food crop rehabilitation could be implemented with greater potential for success.

LCIP has identified its programmatic shift in 2006 as being a challenge to its core competency, requiring it to substantially alter and increase its staff mix. LCIP had to alter its capabilities while at the same time implementing new activities. The program adapted by hiring substantially more engineers and also learned the degree to which local contractors lacked the capacity to implement these engineering activities. Incapable construction firms and lack of technical oversight most certainly increased costs and lengthened implementation schedules. To what degree LCIP – as distinct from its sub-contractors – is responsible for these costs and lost time is difficult to gauge. Nonetheless, LCIP has clearly stated that it underestimated the changes that were implied by its new scope of work focused on large public works.³⁰ Looking forward, however, LCIP is now far better positioned to take on large engineering works in its last 18 months of activity.

LCIP has repeatedly documented the weakness of Liberian construction and A&E firms working on buildings, but the real problems have lain in road and bridge rehabilitation projects. As a result, LCIP was forced to commit substantial management resources to the building of technical capacity and to the direct supervision of the work of these firms. The program has most definitely built capacity and increased the sustainability of these firms, as well as their ability to carry out future donor-funded work. In the short term, however, LCIP has paid a significant, though not precisely definable, cost. To what degree these additional costs could have been limited by bringing in more qualified outside contractors is not clear; however, LCIP in retrospect identifies this option as one that should have been considered.

An oft-cited weakness associated with the rehabilitation of buildings and roads is the lack of a comprehensive maintenance plan. The Capitol Building and some roads are already

³⁰ DAI 2008. Op. cit., p.4.

showing signs of disrepair. While this condition is primarily a weakness of design, not of implementation management, there are cost effectiveness implications. By all accounts the Capitol Building was rehabilitated within cost parameters, and maintenance is now strictly an issue for the GOL. However, LCIP management clearly understood that the GOL might not have the capacity to follow through on its responsibilities. While USAID has clearly done its part in assisting the GOL to rehabilitate the Capitol Building, it should not be surprised if in future it is approached for further assistance on this issue.

LCIP, like many projects, has used fixed-price construction contracts. These limit its exposure to price fluctuation and provide a measure of predictability to project managers. On the other hand, risk is incurred by contractors who must either plan for or tolerate changes in prices of inputs or other resources. Some contractors, such as the one that completed the Capitol Building, have absorbed price increases, and in this case, building materials were also stolen from the work site. Although, it is unlikely the contractor made any profit on the Capitol project, it did not seek a contract modification from LCIP. In other cases, however, contractors have sought modifications due to unexpected changes in fuel and cement costs. LCIP adhered to its fixed-price contracts and did not alter these. The risk is that these contractors might go out of business as a result. While in principle correct, LCIP may be eliminating some of the minimal construction capacity that does exist in Liberia. This goes against its expressed desire to build grantee capacity.

During 2006, LCIP moved from issuing grants-in-kind to fixed obligation grants and the average grant size increased. This contractual change adversely impacted grantees, since their cash flow requirements increased. In several cases, they were not able to achieve what they had originally planned, and extensions had to be granted in order for them to meet their deliverables. This was an unforeseen change which incurred additional management burden and lengthened implementation schedules.

The rainy season is a natural phenomenon in Liberia that impacts all types of activities. In the context of LCIP, this most directly impacts construction activities, many of which can only be carried out during the relatively short dry season. LCIP construction activities have indeed incurred a great variety of delays, whether during procurement, contracting, or implementation. A common thread has emerged that nearly all of these delays were compounded by the fact that much work on buildings and especially roads cannot be carried out in the rainy season. LCIP managers have worked diligently with implementing partners to minimize the effects of delay and to keep positive working relationships with these partners. This has positively affected future activity implementation.

During the implementation of some activities, LCIP managers were able to closely collaborate with beneficiaries, in order to achieve the best possible outcomes. Of note are the numerous county administrative buildings rehabilitated by LCIP. County superintendents report that LCIP staff kept them closely advised of the steps and progress being achieved on their respective buildings. Moreover, the quality of work performed on these buildings is regarded as high by these same superintendents. It is an example of good and cost effective management.

The Todee road development corridor, which clusters a number of activities around a common road, is regarded as a cost effective and developmentally sound strategy. This is the result of good strategic project planning. From a management perspective, the benefit here is the superior management and cost savings that can be achieved by clustering activities in a narrow geographic focus. Managers will be able to provide a higher degree of monitoring and supervision to such projects, because activities will be in close proximity.

CONCLUSIONS

- The strategic approaches used in implementing the LCIP program have shifted appropriately through three phases. In the immediate post-conflict years, the program focused on income generation and vocational training for ex-combatants, rehabilitation of essential community infrastructure, and social and community reconciliation. Immediately following the inauguration of the new democratic administration, LCIP shifted to the rehabilitation of important and symbolic governmental structures. Beginning in 2007 under LCIP 2, the program considerably expanded its economic development activities, while maintaining its pledge to restore large public buildings and roads.
- The program has strategically shifted from post-war conflict mitigation and relief to standing up the new central government, to piloting economic development concepts around farm-to-market roads. The Todee Road development corridor provides an excellent model to complete and replicate.
- The generation of short-term paid employment for thousands of ex-combatants and war affected persons was carried out effectively by DAI under the first years of LCIP 1. Psychosocial counseling and reconciliation activities were also carried out in a variety of ways, and were more successful when focused on the community and employing traditional healing or reconciliation methods.
- Vocational training of ex-combatants, on the other hand, does not seem to have worked well, with the exception of the early apprenticeship program, where on-the-job training enhanced skills acquisition.
- When LCIP shifted to a focus on large public works in mid-2006, DAI found itself outside of its comparative advantage and recent program experience. DAI retooled the program and rose to the occasion in most but not all respects; for example, experience on the Buchanan – Greenville road has not been a success.
- When LCIP 2 began, without abandoning its public works endeavors, LCIP again expanded ESR activities that represented an appropriate shift from relief to economic development activities. The concept of development corridor promises to link road infrastructure rehabilitation with clustered economic development projects.
- Agricultural production and marketing of both cash and food crops, coupled with employment generation and small business development, provide an excellent portfolio for LCIP in its final phase, if it does not attempt too great a variety of schemes and spread itself too thinly for effective impact and sustainability.

- The specific technical areas within which LCIP has functioned for the last four years have been appropriately chosen to flow from post-conflict relief to major infrastructure to small projects commonly associated with employment generation in skills and capital-deficit contexts. The move to large public works from community infrastructure was a technical and managerial challenge for LCIP, but one met by the program in large part successfully.
- LCIP now has two years of experience in ESR projects that it can draw upon to design its final 18 months of employment generation and economic development activities. It should carefully examine this experience and elaborate upon it, rather than branching out into too many new endeavors.
- Current LCIP staff, both in Liberia and the US, note that the dynamic emergency period of 2004 and 2005 created a focus on only two indicators – PDEs and the number of beneficiaries. A review of documents, however, has demonstrated that during many reporting quarters, LCIP faithfully reported project accomplishment against PMP targets established in September 2004. This ceased to be the case in the fall of 2006, when LCIP published its retrospective for the previous two years. At this point, explicit reference to the 2004 PMP and its indicators vanishes from LCIP reports. Subsequent reports, while faithfully reporting project activities also fail to explicitly report against an acknowledged PMP. In the absence of an acknowledged PMP, it is difficult to assess the program’s degree of success in meeting targets.
- LCIP has worked with the GOL, other donors, and other USAID funded programs. This collaboration has been explicit, as in the case of the DFID funding or in LCIP’s early interaction with UNMIL, as well as informal. This has included the implicit capacity building at the MPW, as well as field-based interaction with different donors. There has generally been little strategic collaboration between LCIP and other actors, a situation recognized by LCIP management.
- Although LCIP 1 and 2 clearly preceded the publication of the PRS, LCIP activities fall squarely within the goals articulated by the GOL through the PRS. While it is somewhat unusual for a USAID project to cover all the development pillars articulated by a country’s PRS, LCIP touches on all four pillars, though not with equal focus or intensity. While it may be presumptuous to consider one aspect of a PRS more important than another, clearly road and agricultural rehabilitation feature prominently in Liberia’s PRS. While LCIP clearly precedes the PRS, its focus matches squarely with that of Liberia’s PRS.
- Impact can only be demonstrated in the post-conflict years of LCIP 1 anecdotally. There was certainly no time to conduct serious baseline information gathering on ex-combatants and community members, and the scale of the employment and rehabilitation challenge would have rendered such an exercise futile. Going forward

under LCIP 2, baseline data along new development corridors can and should be collected (see recommendations).

- The degree to which various methods of psychosocial counseling and community reconciliation were successful cannot be determined at this time, so that valuable lessons learned for future post-conflict situations in other countries are not available. The need for speed and scale superseded the need for documentation and evaluation of methods used.
- Impact on direct beneficiaries of cash and food crop rehabilitation, apprenticeship training, and small business development can be quantified, but the longer-term impact is important to follow up, even if only anecdotally. Case studies of successful apprentices, small business owners, and smallholder cash croppers are now lacking but potentially possible before the end of LCIP in 2010. Detailed examination of costs and benefits of various agricultural and small business schemes should have been produced.
- Liberian implementing partners suffer a significant lack of technical and management capacity across the board. While LCIP has not carried out any direct activities to build this capacity beyond equipment procurement, it has responded with additional monitoring, allowed additional time to complete activities, and invested its own management time to indirectly build the capacity of its implementing partners. To what degree this has helped is difficult to ascertain.
- LCIP 1 and LCIP 2 intervention models do not seem to have been deliberately replicated by other donor projects, by former implementation partners, or by beneficiaries. Most NGOs, whether international or local, are still in the relief mode and may yet imitate some of the economic models currently being implemented.
- Sustainability of immediate post-conflict LCIP interventions (2004-2006) was not the primary objective. While rehabilitated structures have remained functional, vocational skills training and rehabilitated agricultural infrastructure (swamp rice fields) have not generally been sustained.
- The sustainability of LCIP 1 and LCIP 2 ESR activities has yet to be proven, although the smallholder rubber rehabilitation work should prove to be durable. Some of the other agricultural activities do not appear to be funded long enough to realize their planned accomplishments, especially the follow-up extension stage.
- LCIP has undergone a significant change in scope since its inception in 2004. Tasked initially to reintegrate ex-combatants it deployed numerous staff despite ongoing security concerns and successfully met and exceeded its targets, even when the number of beneficiaries was raised from 20,000 to 25,000. The intense focus in the

early days to report nearly on a daily basis the number of individuals drove the project toward counting beneficiaries and work days perhaps to the exclusion of some other necessary activities. LCIP reports that it had insufficient monitoring systems in place that later dissatisfied the demands of UNMIL. Despite this, the management of these thousands of workers and the ability to meet an ever growing payroll is in fact testament to LCIP good practices and cost effective implementation.

- The much discussed change in scope in 2006 to large engineering and public works projects severely taxed LCIP's resources and ability to adapt quickly enough. That these changes in scope were not proposed by LCIP, but instead imposed upon it by USAID, provides some degree of explanation of why there were shortcomings in activity implementation. To what extent LCIP should have better appreciated these rather substantial changes and reacted proactively is difficult to judge. USAID itself has commented that it too was under resourced during this time period and could not provide the standard level of monitoring and supervision. LCIP has dramatically changed its engineering capacity since the early days of 2006. However, USAID still reports some doubts that LCIP is properly configured to meet its targets.
- LCIP's diversified portfolio approach to implementing its ESR activities has the double-sided effect of reducing theoretical risk and cost by spreading its resources, but it also allows for the possibility of increased management costs by creating the requirement to monitor a more heterogeneous and geographically dispersed set of activities. In an environment in which LCIP has learned which activities are more effective or less costly than others, the portfolio approach seems a questionable implementation strategy.
- Clustered implementation activities, such as the Todee road rehabilitation project, can significantly reduce overall management requirements and increase cost effectiveness. By concentrating a number of activities in a geographically limited area, development resources can be more effectively applied.

Lessons Learned

- In response to a request by USAID, LCIP made an important strategic shift in 2006 that it might not otherwise have made. While strategically appropriate in 2006, this shift into large public works was not an easy adjustment for LCIP and might better have been procured by USAID through another mechanism. This would have allowed LCIP to shift from relief to socioeconomic development grants of sufficient size and duration to achieve sustainability.
- Vocational training on a large scale and without on-the-job training is not likely to be successful in producing sufficient skills for large numbers of ex-combatants or marginalized youth to earn a livelihood. It is also unrealistic to think that even when supplied with on-the-job training and tools, such a marginalized population can succeed in launching successful small businesses in a short horizon.
- Economic development activities of the type promoted under ESR will be especially difficult to sustain in a post-relief environment, where donor dependency is far greater than in non-relief developing countries. Keeping small business activities as simple as possible and only adding more complex or innovative elements after initial signs of sustainability greatly enhance their likelihood of success.
- A program with a comparative advantage in community-level infrastructure (schools, clinics, wells, latrines, bridges, feeder roads) can retool itself to contract out and supervise large public works projects. However, there is a cost involved in terms of project staff changes and leadership during this change. There is also the potential for getting into serious difficulty, as the Buchanan – Greenville road has shown. This risk should have been clearly acknowledged by USAID and DAI up front.
- A PMP is a standard management tool used by USAID, implementing partners, and contractors, which informs their performance and allows for continuous evaluation and adjustment of project activities to achieve desired outcomes. It is a macro-level tool meant to summarize and report on a whole series of activities and provide a comprehensive overview of project accomplishments. When necessary, the PMP can act as a red flag, signaling the need for prompt adjustment of project activities. LCIP is currently not relying on a reportable PMP, in spite of designing one in April of 2008, and is instead providing activity-level reports focused on two, largely outdated “stand-by” indicators – PDEs, and the number of beneficiaries. LCIP is currently depriving itself, at least in its published reports, of this valuable management tool. This is not standard practice in USAID projects. This is not to say that LCIP is not carefully noting its lessons learned and its project’s successes. However, a rigorous process of reporting against a PMP would improve its reporting and management ability.

- Two important lessons may be drawn from LCIP's experience: first, DFID funding made it possible for the project to pursue a notable and effective component of its implementation strategy. Without this outside funding source, the project's impact on beneficiaries would have been reduced. Second, considerable LCIP management effort was expended to build the capacity of the MPW. Though there was no grant or contract given for this activity, aside from heavy duty equipment, informal capacity building proved necessary to achieve LCIP's goals. The outcome of the lack of strategic collaboration with other agencies is more difficult to gauge. However, it is likely that with relatively low management costs, LCIP might have achieved a clearer view of other agencies' actions leading to increased opportunities for coordination.
- USAID clearly foresaw some of the most important development goals that Liberia required and subsequently articulated in the PRS. It is fortunate that there is substantial overlap between Liberia's goals and USAID's implementation strategy.
- The impact of large infrastructure projects may ultimately prove to be more lasting and large-scale than the small pilot projects in agriculture and small business development. These pilot activities must be sustainable without constant project investment. However, the current state of dependency, in which beneficiaries seem to think that only outside forces can provide for change, works against greater and growing impact.
- Lack of implementing partner technical and management capacity has reduced the efficiency of project implementation, reduced benefits to beneficiaries, and extended the time to complete assignments. On the other hand, implementing partners have benefitted from substantial capacity building through their very implementation of LCIP grants. There is no doubt that many implementing partners are now far more competent than just a few years ago and will continue to benefit from contracts with donor agencies. While lying outside LCIP's core responsibility, the project's indirect capacity building initiatives have increased the long-term sustainability of Liberia's small/medium business sector.
- A longer grant cycle is useful in sustaining pilot agricultural or small business development activities; the more attention given these pilot activities the better. Seeking as much investment (time and money) from beneficiaries as possible will promote sustainability. If beneficiaries make minimal investment, they have little to lose, especially if they feel that donors will always provide for any need. Keeping agricultural and small business schemes as simple as possible, at least until they prove sustainable at that level, is a must.
- When a project's efforts are concentrated in limited areas, both sectorally and geographically, increased management and cost effectiveness can be achieved. LCIP's ex-combatant reintegration, although geographically dispersed, focused the project's activities on a relatively narrow target. As a result, LCIP was able to exceed its targets and do so cost effectively.

- When a project's scope is dramatically altered, as it was for LCIP in 2006, then one must expect management difficulties and increased management costs. The same challenges were faced by USAID, which did not have the proper resources available to monitor and supervise sufficiently the revised activities being undertaken.
- A portfolio approach to implementation strategies is more appropriate at the beginning of a project, rather than later on. Risk abatement from a portfolio approach must be balanced with the increased management costs that this type of strategy requires. ESR activities in LCIP specifically fall into this category.

Recommendations

- Taking a strategic approach to LCIP 2 activities moving forward from the mid-term (August 2008) would require a broad, explicit vision of how the infrastructure component and the ESR component fit together. The clearest way to do this would be to cluster ESR activities around rehabilitation of key farm-to-market roads. Other infrastructure related to national governmental needs should continue to be focused on education and county administration.
- Within the ESR component, there should be emphasis on strategically locating activities along rehabilitated roads so that they also assist populations some distance back from the road. This would mean involving them in the provision of small-scale infrastructure, as well as in the production and marketing activities of LCIP.
- Infrastructure activities going forward should continue to focus on rehabilitation of educational institutes and county administration buildings, as well as those trunk and feeder roads that are most important for governmental administration and rural market development.
- In the post-midterm phase of LCIP 2 (September 2008 – April 2010) infrastructure activities should include both large-scale public works and small-scale community infrastructure. The latter should not be neglected in favor of other ESR activities.
- ESR activities should focus on the rehabilitation of smallholder cash and food crops. There is much that smallholders can learn about advanced production techniques and marketing of produce. These activities should be focused in areas where they have been traditionally successful, and farm-to-market roads should be rehabilitated in those areas as possible. Other small-scale infrastructure (boreholes/pumps, small bridges, ditches on side roads) should also be clustered in these key production areas.
- Going forward, LCIP 2 should gather some systematic baseline data along the roads it intends to rehabilitate and transform into development corridors. This should be easy for LCIP, since it already claims to conduct such an assessment in order to design community interventions and do informal follow-up. A more rigorous assessment would involve a count of households, community infrastructure, large and small shops, and booths, tables, and stalls in periodic or permanent marketplaces. The types and relative proportions of various cash and food crop fields should be estimated. The volume of cash and food crops (including key vegetable types) for sale in these local marketplaces should also be estimated and their prices verified. Prices paid by middlemen to transport these crops out of the community should be inventoried, as well as the costs of transportation for persons and freight to regional towns or markets. Non-economic social indicators should be tracked as well: number of girls and boys in school relative to the overall school-age population; number and proportion of households with access to clean water and sanitation facilities; and empowerment of local communities as a function of the number and types of their

registered and unregistered community-based organizations (project development committees, community development committees, road maintenance committees, farmers' associations, businessmen's associations, church committees, etc).

- The successful RAP should be extended to as many counties as managerially and logistically possible, since it is ready to go to scale. It should be reintroduced into the counties where it has already proven itself (River Cess and Grand Bassa). It should at a minimum continue in Bong, Nimba, and Lofa Counties, return to River Cess and Grand Bassa Counties, and be extended into Grand Cape Mount and Bomi Counties.
- The SBI and PSI Programs should continue as planned, but complex value-chain activities (such as honey/snail production and fruit and vegetable processing and preservation) should be subjected to close scrutiny for their likelihood of success and/or sustainability. Launching new pilot ESR activities should receive the same scrutiny before launch. This involves serious business plan analysis.
- The technical approaches currently under way in LCIP 2 are appropriate for going forward, subject to the recommendations concerning mix of program activities in infrastructure and ESR.
- It is urged that USAID and LCIP collaborate in establishing an agreed upon PMP and that LCIP include it in its periodic technical reports to USAID. Furthermore, an attempt should be made to improve upon the proposed PMP, in order to include the most relevant 'outcome' indicators that may provide dramatic indication of LCIP's success in rehabilitating various sectors of Liberia's economy.
- It is not unusual for post conflict countries such as Liberia to have weak and under-capacitated governmental institutions. In the name of short-term expediency, donor-funded programs often "work around" government ministries in order to achieve their objectives. Longer term sustainability, however, requires governmental capacities if donor-affected changes and improvements are to remain. LCIP worked informally to build the human resource capacity of the MPW. However, it is likely that a dedicated and explicit program of ministry capacity building would have a larger long-term impact.
- LCIP and USAID were fortunate that DFID stepped forward to fund a strategic component of LCIP 1's implementation. It is not clear that USAID would have been able to make up any shortfall had this not occurred. It is recommended that USAID and its implementation partners clearly understand the implications of such a potential shortfall in ESR and have program realignment strategies available to implement, if the shortfall should occur again for political reasons.
- LCIP staff has clearly indicated that it views the PRS as an important guiding document, as it plans and executes forthcoming activities. Specifically within the context of the PRS, it is recommended that staff continue this practice and continue to engage USAID and the GOL in its project planning.

- There should be more systematic analysis of the impact of activities on beneficiaries and communities going forward in LCIP 2 from the midterm. This need not involve extensive research, but rather serious documentation of the various projects in agriculture, marketing, small business development, and vocational and professional skills development. Analysis of business success of producers of food and cash crops can be carried out with a small sample of farmers. The same is true for follow-up of businesses and apprentices in the RAP and interns in the PIP. Finally, close scrutiny should be given to the results under the Incubator project. Sales success should involve more than how much is sold in specially organized trade fairs.
- LCIP and future projects would be well advised to incorporate explicit and direct capacity building for implementing partners into their work plans. The return on investment will most certainly be a more successful and efficient project implementation. Additionally, when it is recognized that local partners are not able to complete assigned tasks, guidance -- such as that to only use Liberian organizations -- should be modified in order to bring the greatest overall benefit to beneficiaries, both on a short and long-term basis.
- Replication of LCIP activities may be possible by other donors, as NGOs turn decisively from relief to development activities. LCIP seems to have taken the lead in rehabilitation of cash and food crops at this time and should seek to influence other donors to replicate their models.
- Sustainability of infrastructure activities is less problematic than ESR activities, except in the case of road rehabilitation where lack of maintenance returns roads rapidly to their previous state. Even the Todee Road is said to be good for only three to four years without serious reworking. While the community can be involved to some degree in maintenance, the MPW will eventually have to be equipped in each county to carry out grading on roads every two to three years.
- Sustainability of ESR projects is highly important, especially if the model involves cash and food crop production. These sectors can and must be modernized, and their output and productivity increased. The models currently in use by LCIP 2 seem effective and should be pursued going forward from the midterm.
- Going forward, LCIP should carefully understand whether it has the appropriate resources available to undertake its activities. Of particular concern are engineering resources. Associated with this, LCIP must clearly understand the available capacity of local engineering and construction firms to carry out the work.
- Clustered activities, such as the Todee road, can reduce management burdens and costs. As such, this strategy should be continued in the future and intensified where practical, or permissible from a political standpoint. 'Clustering' or 'focusing' should also be a watchword when choosing implementation strategies. A diversified portfolio approach has unnecessary costs associated with it, especially in an

environment where ‘winners’ have been clearly identified. In food security, rice and cassava have been clearly identified as having a high return in terms of development goals and efficiency. Likewise rubber production rehabilitation is considered a cost effective and valuable strategy to pursue in the area of cash crops. LCIP is encouraged to reduce the number of activities and focus on high-return activities.

ANNEX A

List and Schedule of Grant Sites Visited by Evaluation Team

MARGIBI/ BONG/ NIMBA COUNTIES

Project Activity	Task Order	County	Grantee or Subcontractor	Status	Date Visited
Todee Road Development Corridor	LCIP II	Margibi	Engineering Design – LCIP Engineers Grantee – LIDA Subcontractors – SSF, Catalyst & REDES	Ongoing	8/15/2008
KRTTI Rehabilitation	LCIP II	Margibi	Current Subcontractor – LRDC Architect – ACE Planning	Ongoing Phase II.	8/15/2008
Rice, Vegetables, Tubers, Roots, Fish Ponds – Bong Mines	LCIP II	Bong	ODAFARA	Ongoing	8/14/2008
Bong County Administration Building	LCIP I	Bong	Subcontractor – Triple W	Completed 2005	8/14/2008
Tapita Rice and Vegetables	LCIP I	Nimba	CUSD	Completed 2005	8/12/2008
Tapita Rubber Nursery	LCIP II	Nimba	ARS	Ongoing	8/12/2008
Tapita Rubber Rehabilitation	LCIP II	Nimba	ARS	Ongoing	8/11/2008
Saclepea Rice Swamp Rehabilitation	LCIP I	Nimba	CUP	Completed 2005	8/12/2008
Bee Keeping/Snail Raising – Ganta	LCIP II	Nimba	UMCAP	Ongoing	8/12/2008
Private Sector Internships (2 sites) – Sanniquellie	LCIP II	Nimba	Making Enterprises	Ongoing	8/13/2008
Ganta to Sanniquellie Highway (Cross Drainage Rehab)	LCIP I	Nimba	Engineering Design – Milton & Richards Subcontractor – Atlantic Engineering	Completed 2007	8/14/2008
Zorgowee Clinic	LCIP I	Nimba	Engineering Design – Milton & Richards	Completed 2005	8/13/2008
Gbobayee Elementary School	LCIP I	Nimba	Engineering Design – Milton & Richards	Completed 2005	8/13/2008
Phebe to Gbotota Feeder Road	LCIP I	Nimba	Engineering Design – Milton & Richards Subcontractor – Crossroads	Completed 2006	8/14/2008
Sanniquellie Administration Building	LCIP I	Nimba			8/13/2008

BUCHANAN/RIVERCESS

Project Activity	Task Order	County	Grantee or Subcontractor	Status	Date Visited
Rehabilitation of Buchanan Admin Building	LCIP I	Grand Bassa	Architecture Design – ACC Subcontractor – Triple W	Completed January 2008	8/20/2008
Rehabilitation of Buchanan to Cestos Road	LCIP I & II	Grand Bassa Rivercess Count	LCIP I Engineering Design – Milton & Richards LCIP II Engineering Design – LCIP Engineers Subcontractors – Westwood Construction, Triple AAA Construction	Ongoing	8/19/2008
RAP – Buchanan	LCIP I – DFID	Grand Bassa	ODAFARA	Completed July 2007	8/20/2008
RAP – Cestos City	LCIP I – DFID	Grand Bassa	ODAFARA	Completed July 2007	8/19/2008

BOMI/GRAND CAPE MOUNT COUNTIES

Project Activity	Task Order	County	Grantee or Subcontractor	Status	Date Visited
Rehabilitation of St. Dominik's Highschool and Ex-Combatant Training	LCIP I	Bomi	Engineering Design – Milton & Richards	Completed 2006	8/21/2008
Market – Voint Venture. Valley Center Market and Gbalasuah General Market.	LCIP I	Bomi	WAS	Completed 2006	8/21/2008
PLANNED – Rehabilitation of Medina to Robertsport Road	LCIP II	Cape Mount	TBD	Planned – LCIP II Extension	8/21/2008
Rehabilitation of Bomi Admin Building	LCIP I	Bomi	Engineering Design – Finda Architects Subcontractor – Gilgal Construction Company	Completed March 2008	8/21/2008
Traditional Cleansing Peace Festival and Village Housing	LCIP I	Cape Mount	NWDA	Completed 2006	8/21/2008

Monrovia

Project Activity	Task Order	County	Grantee or Subcontractor	Status	Date Visited
Rehabilitation of Ministry of Public Works	LCIP II	Montserrado	Original Design – Milton & Richards Current Supervision – LCIP Engineers Subcontractor – Ecocon Inc.	Ongoing	8/8/2008
Rehabilitation of Capitol Building	LCIP I	Montserrado	Architecture Design – Milton & Richards Subcontractor – Sawyer and Associates	Completed November 2007	8/22/2008
Neezoe Community Bridge	LCIP I	Montserrado	Engineering Design – Milton & Richards	Completed 2006	8/26/2008

Annex B: List of Social Reintegration Projects under LCIP 1 (as provided by LCIP)

Grant Number	County	Project Title	Implementing Partner Acronym Names	Project Type	Project Duration		Grant Value
					Start Date	End Date	
LCIP/SR/161	Bong	Integrating 130 XCs & WAPs through skills training	SEED	Counseling & Reconciliation	8-Feb-05	8-Aug-05	60,934.00
LCIP/SR/279	Bong	Reconciliation and Psychosocial Support for 480 work forces	LDI	Counseling & Reconciliation	1-Jun-05	25-Mar-06	34,549.00
LCIP/SR/266	Bong	Joint venture activities in 15 communities	LDI	Joint Venture	1-May-05	4-Nov-05	83,606.00
LCIP/SR/188	Bong	Integrating skills training for Bong Mines	LCA	Skills training	21-Feb-05	22-Aug-05	57,397.00
LCIP/SR/246	Bong	Integrated skills training program	Hope Dev.	Skills training	11-Apr-05	11-Nov-05	107,864.45
LCIP/SR/116	Margibi	BWI skills training for 800 former excombatants	BWI	Skills training	1-May-05	1-Nov-05	500,916.30
LCIP/SR/281	Bong	Facilitation of exit strategies for 670 workforce	Smile Africa	Counseling & Reconciliation	13-May-05	13-Mar-06	45,478.00
LCIP/SR/274	Bong	Psychosocial counseling for work brigade (Phebe to Bonota)	PADI	Counseling & Reconciliation	14-Apr-05	13-Jan-06	78,579.25
LCIP/SR/271	Bong	Psychosocial counseling for work brigade (Totota to Sanoyea road)	OAD	Counseling & Reconciliation	14-Apr-05	13-Jan-06	78,579.25
LCIP/SR/275	Bong	Psychosocial counseling for work brigade (Bonota to Sanoyea)	MRRDN	Counseling & Reconciliation	14-Apr-05	13-Jan-06	78,579.25
LCIP/SR/292	Bong	reconciliation and reintegration through culture	SADDA	Cultural Festival	25-Apr-05	24-Feb-06	23,041.00
LCIP/SR/307	Nimba	Facilitation of exit strategies and reintegration of 1,300 workforce in Nimba	MRRDN	Counseling & Reconciliation	23-May-05	22-Feb-06	49,047.68
LCIP/SR/299	Nimba	Facilitation of exit strategies and reintegration of 980 workforce in Nimba	SEARCH	Counseling & Reconciliation	2-May-05	31-Jan-06	48,498.87
LCIP/SR/309	Nimba	Facilitation of Exit Strategies and Reintegration of 1,500 workforce in Nimba	YMCA	Counseling & Reconciliation	18-May-05	31-Jan-06	45,444.55
LCIP/SR/144	Grand Gedeh	Sensitization and Mobilization of excombatants and war affected communities	RECCEID	Counseling & Reconciliation	10-Dec-04	10-Jun-05	32,951.20
LCIP/SR/202	Grand Gedeh	Psychosocial counseling and conflict resolution at the community level	ECREP	Counseling & Reconciliation	30-Mar-05	30-Sept-05	31,568.70
LCIP/SR/297	Bong	Capacity Building in Project Management & Leadership	CESP	Traditional Cleansing	16-May-05	15-Aug-05	36,982.00
LCIP/SR/251	Grand Gedeh	General auto mechanic training for rehabilitation of excombatants	ZMHS	Skills training	1-Jul-05	30-Dec-05	196,351.00
LCIP/SR/128	Bong	Vocational skills training in hair dressing	Ma Esther	Counseling & Reconciliation	20-Feb-05	4-Jun-05	25,306.00
LCIP/SR/295	Lofa	Reconciliation and reintegration of workforce through psychosocial healing	Lofa Youth	Reconciliation & Counseling	25-Apr-05	3-Feb-06	52,342.00
LCIP/SR/264	Cape Mount	Reconciliation and Psychosocial healing through culture activities and skills Training.	NWDA	Traditional Cleansing	3-May-05	3-Feb-06	81,755.00
LCIP/SR/286	Cape Mount	Reconciliation and reintegration through culture and skills training	SELF	Counseling Reconciliation &	1-May-05	2-Mar-06	73,163.00
LCIP/SR/283	Bomi	Reconciliation, psychosocial healing and capacity building for the workforce	WAS	Skills training	23-May-05	13-Feb-06	94,244.00

Annex C: List of Economic Reintegration Grants under LCIP 1 (as provided by LCIP)

Grant Number	County	Project Title	Implementing Partners Acrym Names	Project Type	Project Duration		Grant Value
					Beginning Date	Ending Date	
LCIP/ER/125	Cape Mount	Swamp-Rice Cultivation, Cassava, & Vegetable production	CAL	Swamp Rehabilitation	19-Nov-04	18-May-05	\$ 92,975.45
LCIP/ER/133	Cape Mount	Rehabilitation of Agriculture Activities in Porkpa District	SLPP	Swamp Rehabilitation	30-Nov-04	30-May-05	\$ 92,975.45
LCIP/ER/151	Gbarpolu	Rehabilitation of the Bopolu & Fasama Road	ADRHO	Sidebrushing	7-Feb-05	6-May-05	\$ 163,317.00
LCIP/ER/185	Cape Mount	Lowland Rice, Vegetable & Root/Tuber cultivation Training	PNO	Swamp Rehabilitation	15-Feb-05	14-Sep-05	\$ 96,889.50
LCIP/ER/191	Gbarpolu	Swamp Rice & Vegetable Production	PACESL	Swamp Rehabilitation	31-Mar-05	30-Sep-05	\$ 280,026.50
LCIP/ER/193	Cape Mount	Extension of the trial Pulpwood Plantation Rehabilitation Project	AGRHA	Forestry	28-Jan-05	29-Aug-05	\$ 352,285.00
LCIP/ER/221	Lofa	Rehabilitation of Five Schools in Lofa	Rescue Africa Crossroads Team Technical	Infrastructure Development	1-Mar-05	31-Aug-05	\$ 365,548.00
LCIP/ER/225	Lofa	Rehabilitation of Oil Palm in Foya District	ODAFARA	Oil Palm Rehabilitation	8-Mar-05	7-Sep-05	\$ 294,085.75
LCIP/ER/227	Lofa	Northwestern Swamp Rice Rehabilitation & Development Project	SASU	Swamp Development	20-Feb-05	14-Oct-05	\$ 321,110.15
LCIP/ER/231	Bomi	Tubmanburg vegetable production & training project	TECURD	Swamp Rehabilitation	15-Feb-05	15-Aug-05	\$ 155,360.90
LCIP/ER/249	Gbarpolu	Gbarma-Weasu Highway Road Rehabilitation Project	TECURD	Bridge program	25-May-05	24-Nov-05	\$ 381,888.94
LCIP/ER/270	Bomi	Reconstruction of Tubmanburg Blacksmith Training Center-MOA/FAO	Cubes	Infrastructure Development	15-Mar-05	16-May-05	\$ 66,000.00
Sub-contract # 5623-200-05S-001	Lofa	Excombatant Empowerment Project	UMCOR	All	1-Jan.-05	30-Sep-05	\$ 980,000.00
LCIP/ER/067	Grand Gedeh	Rehabilitation of Administration Building	Continental	Infrastructure Development	15-Sep-04	15-Feb-05	\$ 149,500.00
LCIP/ER/084	Bong	Rehabilitation of Administration Building	Tripple WWW	Infrastructure Development	15-Sep-04	15-Feb-05	\$ 120,500.00
LCIP/ER/104	Bong	Janyea Clinic Reconstruction Project	LECO	Infrastructure Development	7-Nov-04	15-Jan-05	\$ 18,660.67
LCIP/ER/107	Bong	Phebe to Gbotota Road	Crossroads	Road Rehabilitation	19-Apr-05	28-Jan-06	\$ 499,500.00
LCIP/ER/108	Bong	Gbotota to Sanoyea	Atlantic	Road Rehabilitation	19-Apr-05	28-Jan-06	\$ 440,850.00
LCIP/ER/109	Bong	Sanoyea to Totota	Westwood	Road Rehabilitation	19-Apr-05	28-Jan-06	\$ 451,575.68
LCIP/ER/118	Grand Gedeh	Integrated Community Inland Valley Swamp Rehabilitation & Development	MAP	Swamp Rehabilitation & Development	10-Jan-05	30-Jun-05	\$ 157,421.55
LCIP/ER/120	Nimba	TAPITA District Swamp Rehabilitation & Development	CUSD	Swamp Rehabilitation & Development	30-Nov-04	30-May-05	\$ 238,197.05
LCIP/ER/121/122	Bong	Productive Agricultural Reintegration Training	ODAFARA	Agriculture Training	10-Jan-05	4-Jul-05	\$ 159,335.85
LCIP/ER/124	Nimba	Sacleapea-Mah District Swamp Rehabilitation	CUP	Swamp Rehabilitation	18-Nov-04	17-May-05	\$ 243,162.55
LCIP/ER/125	Cape Mount	Swamp-Rice Cultivation, Cassava, & Vegetable production	CAL	Swamp Rehabilitation	19-Nov-04	18-May-05	\$ 92,975.45
LCIP/ER/133	Cape Mount	Rehabilitation of Agriculture Activities in Porkpa District	SLPP	Swamp Rehabilitation	30-Nov-04	30-May-05	\$ 92,975.45
LCIP/ER/139	Nimba	Upper Nimba Inland Swamp Rehabilitation Project	ARS	Swamp Rehabilitation	10-Dec-04	10-Aug-05	\$ 327,433.90
LCIP/ER/151	Gbarpolu	Rehabilitation of the Bopolu & Fasama Road	ADRHO	Sidebrushing	7-Feb-05	6-May-05	\$ 163,317.00
LCIP/ER/154	Grand Gedeh	Tian Town Swamp Development Project	V-WEFOL	Swamp Rehabilitation	2-Feb-05	2-Aug-05	\$ 65,298.10
LCIP/ER/236	Nimba	Yekepa Swamp Rehabilitation Project	YMCA	Swamp Rehabilitation	14-Feb-05	14-Oct-05	\$ 315,645.60

Annex D: List of LCIP I, Phase 2 Grants (as provided by LCIP)

Grant No.	Grant Name	Type	Primary IP
LCIP/INF/001	Executive Mansion	Public Infrastructure	Team Technical
LCIP/INF/002(B)	Capital Building	Public Infrastructure	Sawyer Construction
LCIP/INF/003(A)	Boreholes - FOG	Community Infrastructure	Living Waters
LCIP/INF/004	Zwedru Multilateral HS	Public Infrastructure	GilGal
LCIP/INF/005B	Ganta Sang Road	Public Infrastructure	Atlantic
LCIP/INF/006(B)	Buchanan Greenville Road	Public Infrastructure	7 Contractors
LCIP/INF/011(B)	Assessments MPW, KRTTI, ZRTTI	Public Infrastructure	M&R, Ace, AEP
LCIP/INF/012	Assessments for Todee and 5 Admin Buildings	Public Infrastructure	Techsult, TBD
LCIP/INF/013	Balance of Monrovia Small Roads	Public Infrastructure	Tutex
LCIP/DFID/001(A)	Small Rubber Farm Support Project	Rubber Rehab	ARS
LCIP/DFID/002	Central Nimba Rubber Rehabilitation and Development Project	Rubber Rehab	Catalyst
LCIP/DFID/003	RAP in Buchanan and Cestos	RAP	ODFARA
LCIP/DFID/004	RAP in Greenville and Zwedru	RAP	LAS
LCIP/DFID/005(A)	Ganta to Sanniquellie Road Sensitization and Support Project	Sensitization	Special Emergency Activity To Restore Children's Hope
LCIP/DFID/006(A)	Buchanan to ITI (Rivercess) Road Sensitization and Support Project	Sensitization	Buchanan Child Community Based Care
LCIP/DFID/007(A)	Yarpa Town to Cestos City Road Sensitization and Support Project	Sensitization	ECREP
LCIP/DFID/008(A)	ITI (Rivercess) to Greenville Road Sensitization and Support Project	Sensitization	LURCD
LCIP/DFID/009(B)	GIK - ITI (Rivercess) to Greenville Road Sensitization and Support Project	Sensitization	LURCD
LCIP/DFID/010(A)	Zleh Town Swamp Rehabilitation Project - Extension	Rice/Veggie production	Multi Agri-ssystem Promoters
LCIP/DFID/011(B)	GIK - Zleh Town Swamp Rehabilitation Project - Extension	Rice/Veggie production	Multi Agri-ssystem Promoters
LCIP/DFID/012(A)	Rural Seed Multiplicaction Program	Rice/Veggie production	Project New Outlook
LCIP/DFID/013(A)	Rice Processing Machines Installations	Rice/Veggie production	Catalyst

Annex E: LCIP 2 Grant Summary to June 2008 (as provided by LCIP)

GRANT CATEGORY		TYPE OF GRANT
Economic & Social Reintegration		
MPA004	Rehabilitation of Small Holder Rubber Farms	
	Grant (MPA004/C/01 - Agriculture Relief Services)	Rubber Rehab - Nimba
	Grant (MPA004/C/02 - CATALYST)	Rubber Rehab - Bong
	Grant (MPA004/C/03 - TECURD)	Rubber Rehab
MPA005	Rubber Nursery	
	Grant (MPA005/C/01 - Agriculture Relief Services)	Rubber Nursery - Nimba
	Grant (MPA005/C/02 - CATALYST)	Rubber Nursery - Bong
MPA006	Enterprise and Workforce Development	
	Grant (MPA006/C/01 - Organization For The Development Of Agriculture and Farmers Related A	RAP - Lofa
	Grant (MPA006/C/02 - Liberia Agro Systems, Inc.)	RAP - Bong
	Grant (MPA006/C/03 - MANO TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION)	RAP - Nimba
	Grant (MPA006/C/04 - Republic Consulting Group, Inc. (RCG))	Business Extension - Consulting
	Grant (MPA006/C/08 - Community Sustainable Development Organization (COSDO))	Food Processing/Preservation
	Grant (MPA006/C/06 - ODAFARA)	Trade Fair - Bong
MPA008	Community Driven Peace Building Initiative	
	Grant (MPA008/C/01 - Evangelical Children Rehabilitation Program)	Community Infrastructure
	Grant (MPA008/C/02 - Agricultural Development Reconstruction and Humanitarian Organization)	Community Infrastructure
	Grant (MPA008/C/05 - Agriculture Development Reconstruction and Humanitarian Organization)	Community Infrastructure
MPA009	Youth Employment, Community Reconciliation, and Small-scale Community Infrastructure	
	Grant (MPA009/C/01 - Making Enterprises, Inc.)	Private Sector Internship
MPA010	Agricultural Production and Marketing	
	Grant (MPA010/C/01 - Organization for the Development of Agriculture & Farmer's Related Assoc	Veggie Production - Bong Mines
	Grant (MPA010/C/02 - Rural Agricultural Alternatives, Inc.)	Veggie Production - LOFA
	Grant (MPA010/C/03 - Volunteers to Support International Efforts in Developing Africa)	Veggie Production - LOFA
	Grant (MPA010/C/04 - Faimaba Fisheries Development Cooperative, INC)	Veggie Production - Grand Gedeh
	Grant (MPA010/C/05 - United Methodist Church Agriculture And Rural Development Program)	Veggie Production - Nimba
	Grant (MPA010/C/06 - Project New Outlook)	Veggie Production - Grand Gedeh
Infrastructure		
MPA001	Renovation & Rehabilitation of Kakata Rural Teacher Training Institute	National Infrastructure - Margibi
	Subcontract (MPA001/A/001 - Liberia Reconstruction Development company)	
	Subcontract (MPA001/A/002 - Borbor Nyumah Construction Company & Associates)	
	Subcontract (MPA001/A/003 - Borbor Nyumah Construction Company & Associates)	
	Subcontract (MPA001/A/004 - Morweh Liberia Limited)	
	Subcontract (MPA001/A/005 - ACE Planning & Consulting Group)	
	Subcontract (MPA001/A/006 - Liberia Reconstruction Development company)	
	Subcontract (MPA001/A/007 - ACE Planning & Consulting Group)	
MPA002	Renovation & Rehabilitation of Zorzor Rural Teacher Training Institute (Ministry of Educat	National Infrastructure - Lofa
	Subcontract (MPA002/A/001 - Jusmart Engineering)	
	Subcontract (MPA002/A/002 - General Fabrication & Construction Business Corporation)	
	Subcontract (MPA002/A/003 - General Fabrication & Construction Business Corporation)	
	Subcontract (MPA002/A/004 - Cross Roads Construction Company)	
	Subcontract (MPA002/A/005 - Seek Engineering and Construction Services Inc.)	
	Subcontract (MPA002/A/006 - AEP Consultants)	
	Metal Sign boards	
MPA003	Renovation & Rehabilitation of Ministry of Public Works Complex (Ministry of Public Work	National Infrastructure - Montserrado
	Subcontract (MPA003/A/001 - Ecocon, Inc.)	
	Subcontract (MPA003/A/002 - Milton & Richards, Inc.)	
	Purchase Order(MPA003/A/007/08 Team Technical)	
MPA011	Lofa County Administrative Building (Ministry of Internal Affairs)	National Infrastructure - Lofa
	Seek Engineering and Construction Services Inc.	
MPA013	Sinoe County Administrative Building (Ministry of Internal Affairs)	National Infrastructure - Sinoe
	GIBBEL Construction Company	
	FINDA Achitectural and Construction Company	
MPA016	Todee Road Development Corridor (Ministry of Public Works)	National Infrastructure - Margibi
	SSF Entrepreneur Inc.	
	L DA	
	CATALYST	
	REDES	
	ADUMONN	
	CATALYST	
	REDES	
	Automatic Level Instrument	
	Ranging Poles	
MPA017	Rehabilitation and Renovation of Greenville-Buchanan Highway (Ministry of Public	National Infrastructure - Grand Bassa, River Cess, Sinoe
	Gray Construction Company	
	Regional Engineering Development Services	
	Cross Road	
	SMD	
	SSF Entrepreneur Inc.	
	West Wood	
	Direct Expenditures	

Annex F: Persons Interviewed

USAID/Liberia

Tony Carvalho	Infrastructure Officer
Joe-Hoover Gbadyu	Alternate CTO, LCIP Project
McDonald Homer	CTO, LCIP Project
Bill Massaquoi	Agriculture Advisor and Project Manager
Sharon Pauling	Program Officer

Liberia Community Infrastructure Program (LCIP)

DAI/Bethesda

Heather McHugh	LCIP Project Manager, DAI/Bethesda
----------------	------------------------------------

LCIP/ Monrovia

Heather Robertson	Deputy Chief of Party (Acting COP)
Boima Bafai	Environmental and GIS Manager
Alfred Godu	Building Engineer
Isaac Gorvego	M&E Officer
Jackson Kirungi	Road Engineer
Cynthia Mahoney	ESR Team Leader
Robert Obetia	Team Leader, Community Infrastructure
Simpson Snoh	Project Development Officer
Comfort Traub	Grants Manager
John Travis	Chief Engineer, Community Infrastructure
Macon Tubman	Agriculture Advisor and Project Manager
Antoinette Weeks	Technical Project Manager
James Whawhen	Technical Advisor and RAP Project Manager
Philip Zoryu Manager	Technical Advisor and Small Business Project Manager

Government of Liberia

Capitol Building (Monrovia)

James Cargeor	Maintenance Manager (House of Representatives)
Saah Mallen	Maintenance Manager (Senate)
Jewel Howard Taylor	Senior Senator

Ministry of Agriculture (Monrovia)

James Logan	Deputy Minister for Development and Planning
-------------	--

Ministry of Public Works (Monrovia)

Dr. Togba Ngangana	Deputy Minister for Technical Services
--------------------	--

Bomi County Administrative Building (Tubmanburg)

Mohammed Massaley	County Superintendent
-------------------	-----------------------

Bong County Administrative Building (Gbarnga)

Josephus Dormea Administrative Assistant to County Superintendent

Grand Bassa County Administrative Building (Buchanan)

Julia Cessell County Superintendent
Charles Cole Deputy Superintendent for Administration
Andrew Vah Political and Protocol Officer

Nimba County Administrative Building (Sanniquellie)

Robert Kamei County Superintendent
Abraham Zeigeay Protocol Officer

River Cess County Administrative Building (Cestos City)

Jerry Greeve Project Manager
John Zogar Assistant Superintendent for Development

Kakata Rural Teacher Training Institute (KRTTI)

Hillary Gbafore Business Manager
Joseph Blanco Academic Dean

Nyehn District Building (Bong County)

Morris Binda District Superintendent
Ernest Gargar District Commissioner
James Seh Administrative Assistant to District Superintendent
Steven Gobah Paramount Chief
Ikechi Anokwuru Social Mobilizer (NGO agent)
Andy Johnson Social Mobilizer (NGO agent)

Gbobayee Primary School (Nimba County)

Joseph Gono Principal

Zorgowee Clinic (Nimba County)

Robert Mamakeh Vaccinator
William Yeah Vaccinator
Peter Luogon Laboratory Assistant
Esther Suah Registrar

LCIP Implementing Partners, Contractors, and Project Sites

Agriculture Relief Services, Inc. (ARS)

Luogon Lah Director
Michael Zaine Project Office
Anderson Paye Administrative Officer
Austin Wehye District Supervisor

Buchanan Child Community-based Care (BUCCOBAC)

David Mendeh Executive Director
Joseph Mendeh Program Manager

Catalyst

Thomas Gayflor Executive Director

Cellcom GSM (Sanniquellie)

Harry Songay Deputy Supervisor, Sanniquellie

Community Union for Sustainable Development (CUSD)

Joseph Walker Administrator

Creative Associates – Accelerated Learning Program (Sanniquellie)

Robert Early Community Coordinator

J. Gbotoe Gardea, Jr. LCIP intern

Mohamed H. Sayou LCIP Intern

Organization for the Development of Agriculture and Farmers Related Activities (ODAFARA)

Philip Tamba Technical Manager (Bong Mines)

David Josiah Project Coordinator (Bong Mines)

ODAFARA -- Rural Apprenticeship Program

Bryant Joshua Small fishing business owner, Buchanan

James Toe Community Chairman, Buchanan

Kofi Asuan Fishing trainer, Buchanan

Peter Kiazer Cosmetology shop owner, Buchanan

Emmanuel Cheesman Tailoring shop owner, Buchanan

Teddy Kraingar Carpentry shop owner, Buchanan

Cyrus Wolo Two-stroke engine repair shop owner, Buchanan

Jeremiah Vandeh Metal works shop owner, Buchanan

Samuel Sawah Carpentry shop owner, Cestos City

Abraham Karpeh Fishery owner, Cestos City

James Waryondeh Master trainer in fishing, Cestos City

Sarah Johnson Tailoring shop owner, Cestos City

Phoebe – Gbotota Road

Arthur Wennah Paramount Chief

Liberia Agency for Community Empowerment

Ramses Kumbuyah Executive Director

Elizabeth Mulbah Deputy Director for Administration

Liberian Reconstruction and Development Company (LRDC)

James Kollie General Supervisor

Chris Ogunti General Supervisor

Making Enterprises, Inc (Private Sector Internship Program)

Sigmund Wright Technical manager
Blama Taylor Intern in banking

North West Development Association (NWDA) and Environs

Gbessie Feika Executive Director
Solomon Feika Secretary-General
Clarence Fahnbulleh District Commissioner (Tewor District)
Moriba Kromah Paramount Chief
Clarissa Passaway Township Commissioner, Bo-Waterside town

St. Dominic's School (Tubmanburg)

Father Gary Jenkins Director

Todee Road

James Charles Soil Specialist

United Methodist Church Agricultural and Rural Development Program (UMCAP)

Ezekiel Freeman Executive Director
Sylvester Kpar Site Supervisor

Yonden Community (Buchanan – Cestos City – Greenville Road)

Saturday Paye Community Chief
George Yonden Community Elder
Saturday Joe President of Community Youth Association

Others

International Labour Organisation

Henry Danso Labour Based Training Engineer

National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration

Rev. Jervis Witherspoon, Jr. Executive Director
Ruth Caesar Deputy Director for Operations

Annex G: Key Documents Reviewed

USAID MAC-IQC Task Orders

USAID/Liberia. "Task Order #3 for the Managing African Conflict – Indefinite Quantity Contract." March 2, 2004.

USAID/Liberia. "Task Order #10 for the Managing African Conflict – Indefinite Quantity Contract." April 1, 2007.

LCIP Final Reports

DAI. 2006. "Liberia Community Infrastructure Project: Phase 1 Quarterly Report and Summary Report on Phase 1 Grants, April 2004 – June 2006." Fall 2006. Washington, D.C.

DAI. 2008. "Liberia Community Infrastructure Program I: March 2006 – March 2008." Phase II Final Report. June 2008. Washington, D.C.

LCIP 1 Periodic Reports:

DAI. 2007. "Liberia Community Infrastructure Project." Quarterly Report October – December 2006. January 31, 2007.

DAI. 2007. "Liberia Community Infrastructure Project." Quarterly Report January – March 2007. April 30, 2007.

DAI. 2007. "Liberia Community Infrastructure Project." Quarterly Report April – June 2007. July 31, 2007.

DAI. 2007. "Liberia Community Infrastructure Project." Quarterly Report July – September 2007. October 31, 2007.

DAI. 2007. "Liberia Community Infrastructure Project." Quarterly Report October – December 2007. December 31, 2007.

LCIP 2 Periodic Reports

DAI. 2007. "Liberia Community Infrastructure Project II." Monthly Report – August 2007. September 6, 2007.

DAI. 2007. "Liberia Community Infrastructure Project II." Monthly Report – September 2007. October, 2007.

DAI. 2007. "Liberia Community Infrastructure Project II." Monthly Report – October 2007. November 2007.

DAI. 2007. "Liberia Community Infrastructure Project II." Monthly Report – November 2007. December 15, 2007.

DAI. 2008. "Liberia Community Infrastructure Project II." Monthly Report – December 2007. January 31, 2008.

DAI. 2008. "Liberia Community Infrastructure Project II." Monthly Report – January 2008. May 14, 2008.

DAI. 2008. "Liberia Community Infrastructure Project II." Monthly Report – February 2008. March 10, 2008.

DAI. 2008. "Liberia Community Infrastructure Project II." Monthly Report – March 2008 and Quarterly Report January – March 2008. April 10, 2008.

DAI. 2008. "Liberia Community Infrastructure Project II." Monthly Report – April 2008. May 14, 2008.

DAI. 2008. "Liberia Community Infrastructure Project II." Monthly Report – May 2008. June 10, 2008.

DAI. 2008. "Liberia Community Infrastructure Project II." Monthly Report – June 2008. July 10, 2008.

LCIP Performance Monitoring Plans

DAI. 2004. "Liberia Community Infrastructure Project – Performance Monitoring Plan." September, 21, 2004.

LCIP. 2008. "LCIP II Performance Indicator Reference Sheets." April 2008.

LCIP Work Plans and Strategy Sessions

DAI. 2004. "Liberia Community Infrastructure Project – Revised Work Plan July 2004 to June 2005." In association with CARE. August 23, 2004.

DAI. 2005. "Liberia Community Infrastructure Project – Annual Work Plan July 2005 to July 2006." July 8, 2005.

DAI. 2006. "Liberia Community Infrastructure Project – Work Plan for DFID Funding 1st July 2006 to 31st May 2007." July 31, 2006

DAI. 2006. "Liberia Community Infrastructure Project – National Infrastructure Projects II. September 22, 2006.

DAI. 2007. "Liberia Community Infrastructure Program – Annual Work Plan." May 4, 2007.

LCIP. 2007. "LCIP Strategy Sessions." December 13-14, 2007. Monrovia, Liberia.

Government of Liberia

Government of Liberia. 2008. "Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy." April 2008.