

USAID/Mozambique STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE CLOSE OUT REPORT

SO Name: Government and Civil Society are Effective Partners in Democratic Governance at Local and National Levels

SO Number: 656-002

Approval Date: March 1996¹

Geographic Area: Mozambique

Total Cost:

USAID

Mission Funding	DA	\$34,485,000
	ESF	\$7,050,000

Total USAID Funding **\$41,535,000**

Principal Implementing Partners:

Local

Austral Consulting
Caldeira, Silva and Associates
Center for Legal and Judicial Training
Ética Moçambique
Mozambican Association for the Development of Democracy (AMODE)
Mozambican Center for the Study of Democracy and Development (CEDE)

International

African American Institute
America's Development Foundation
CARE
The Carter Center
Deloitte & Touche
Education Development Center
Electoral Institute of Southern Africa
International Foundation for Electoral Systems
International Organization for Migration

¹ Strategic Objective 656-002 (SO2) was created as a result of USAID reengineering in the mid-1990s and ran the duration of USAID/Mozambique's FY 1996-2003 Country Strategic Plan. However, the Mission already was conducting democracy and governance (D&G) activities in Mozambique under the Democratic Initiative Project (656-0227), which began in 1991. The DIP was incorporated into SO2. This report covers USAID/Mozambique D&G activities from 1991 through the end of FY 2003, all considered to be under the umbrella of SO2.

International Republican Institute
National Center for State Courts
National Democratic Institute
Private Agencies Collaborating Together
State University of New York at Albany
United Nations Development Program

Background

Mozambique is widely considered to be a development success story. Since the early 1990s, the country of 18 million has successfully navigated a transition from civil war and to peaceful democracy and a growing, market-based economy. USAID/Mozambique began its democracy and governance (D&G) efforts in a society torn by armed conflict and devoid of democratic experience. By 2003, Mozambique was a model democratic success in Africa, an example for other nations of post-conflict reconciliation and continuing political development.

USAID/Mozambique launched its Democratic Initiatives Project (DIP) in 1991 as the country was about to enter its 16th year of civil war. The ruling party FRELIMO, which came to power at independence from Portugal in 1975, was moving away from its Marxist-Leninist past. The FRELIMO government had begun a process of political and economic liberalization, which included a new Constitution assuring future multi-party elections, and requested USAID assistance “in support of our process of democratization.”

Peace negotiations between FRELIMO and its armed opposition, the guerilla movement RENAMO, had been underway for nearly a year when the DIP started, although no end to the war was assured. The war finally ended the following year when FRELIMO and RENAMO signed peace accords in October 1992. With peace, USAID revamped its operations to focus on a War-to-Peace Transition Program with a D&G strategy that combined election assistance with efforts to build basic democratic institutions.

Mozambique’s first-ever multiparty democratic elections in 1994 were a success, and the newly elected National Assembly began operations in 1995. USAID began implementing a new Country Strategic Plan in FY 1996, creating the new Strategic Objective 656-002 (SO2): Government and Civil Society are Effective Partners in Democratic Governance at Local and National Levels.

In the following years, USAID/Mozambique continued to provide election assistance, but also implemented a variety of activities designed to consolidate democracy by strengthening the National Assembly and other government institutions, as well as civil society. In FY 2004, a follow-on SO that focuses on the municipal level (SO10: Municipal Governance Increasingly Democratic) was launched to coincide with a new Country Strategic Plan.

Overall Impact Summary

Following the October 1992 peace agreement, Mozambique has maintained peace, political parties have competed in a series of peaceful elections, national-level government institutions have matured, municipal governments have started to function and citizens increasingly see that they have a stake in government decisions. USAID contributions are one of the many factors in this positive trajectory. However, growth in all areas is incremental, significant challenges remain, and assistance will be required for many years to come.

USAID's efforts have helped to consolidate democracy by supporting more effective participation by civil society and increasingly capable and accountable government institutions. Over the life of SO2, substantial progress was made in strengthening the National Assembly, local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the two major political parties that were armed opponents only a few years earlier. USAID also played a pioneering role in bringing the issue of corruption to the forefront of Mozambique's political agenda.

Despite some transparency problems, Mozambique's elections generally have been judged to be free and fair. USAID played a critical role in the successful 1994 general election for president and National Assembly. Nearly 90 percent of registered voters cast ballots in what was the first multi-party democratic election in Mozambique's history. A 1995 evaluation by Management Systems International concluded that USAID's election support "was a principal reason for the country's successful transition to a multiparty, constitutional democracy."

In 1997, a law creating 33 municipalities represented an important first step toward the decentralization of power. However, the first-ever municipal elections in 1998 were marred by a RENAMO boycott and low turnout. In the 1999 national elections, RENAMO refused to accept the results, charging that FRELIMO stole the presidency. However, international and national observers declared the voting to be generally free and fair, and Mozambique's Supreme Court confirmed that judgment.

With each election, domestic election observers trained as a result of USAID support have played a growing role in assuring fairness and transparency. In the municipal elections in 2003, a USAID-funded parallel vote count conducted by observers from Mozambican NGOs helped assure that results were correct and accepted by all participants. These successful municipal elections marked a new stage in Mozambique's democratic development. RENAMO won five of 33 mayoral races and control of four municipal councils – earning the right to share power with FRELIMO at the local level for the first time.

After five years of USAID assistance, Mozambique's competing political parties made great progress toward becoming more internally democratic, running effective campaigns, establishing alliances and coalitions, and strengthening their administrative structures. However, FRELIMO benefited more than RENAMO, which started out with

significantly less capacity than the ruling party. Ultimately, USAID support did not contribute significantly to leveling the playing field between the two parties.

The National Assembly has made significant progress since its inception in 1995, transitioning from a one-party rubber stamp to a viable multi-party legislature that provides some balance to the historical domination of the executive branch. As a result of USAID legislative strengthening activities, the National Assembly is more efficient, effective, transparent and independent than ever before. Today, all legislation introduced by the executive is analyzed, debated and modified, providing legislative oversight of the other branch. More than half of all adopted legislation originates in the National Assembly itself, compared to none in 1995 and 18 percent in 1998. However, despite these gains, the executive branch continues to dominate policy development and analysis, and the Assembly often focuses more on serving the interests of party leaders than it does on representing citizen concerns and strengthening itself as an institution.

Civil society has expanded and is becoming increasingly influential. Prior to 1991, civil society activity was closely controlled by the State. Few independent NGOs existed and the government generally impeded their efforts. By the end of SO2, civil society organizations routinely played a vital role in policy advocacy, monitoring elections, testifying in the National Assembly, working with government at the municipal level and investigating corruption. Every year, NGOs make an increasing number of allegations of public misconduct. A relatively new USAID-funded anti-corruption NGO is dedicated to empowering citizens to respond effectively to the petty corruption that fills daily life in Mozambique.

The quality of debate of public issues has improved substantially. A growing number of citizens report discussing their concerns with political actors. In urban areas, media coverage and public discussion of parliamentary debates is extensive. Quality of debate on the issue of corruption has improved exponentially since the publication of a USAID-funded Corruption Survey in 2001. Tangible results in the fight against corruption also are evident. In FY 2003, the Attorney General's new anti-corruption unit – created with USAID support – received more than 100 reports of corruption, indicted 11 people and successfully prosecuted three.

Perceptions among the public also have changed, reflecting improvements in the performance of key government institutions and the willingness of citizens to participate actively in Mozambique's developing democracy. For example, USAID-funded national public opinion polls conducted in 1997 and 2001 showed:

- In 2001, 59 percent of respondents said members of the National Assembly work for the interests of citizens, up from 29 percent in 1997.
- In 2001, the percentage of citizens who believed that collaboration among local government, citizens and the private sector helps resolve local issues increased by 74 percent over 1997, going from 43 to 75 percent.
- Between 1997 and 2001, the number of citizens presenting concerns to political actors rose by 167 percent for all forms of participation taken together.

- Between 1997 to 2001, the percentage of people who believed democratic institutions, on average, were performing well increased by 29 percent, up to 64 percent.
- Between 1997 and 2001, the perception among citizens that government officials were concerned about what citizens think increased by 40 percent.

However, despite this progress, it still is not common in Mozambican political culture for citizens to criticize, question, make demands or require explanation from government officials. This is especially true in rural areas. Decision-making through deliberation and bargaining remains rare, and views opposing those in power generally are not encouraged, articulated or accepted. Compounding this is the society's low tolerance for dissent and exclusion of many groups, including women, youth and political minorities, in political and economic decision-making.

Significant Changes in Results Framework

Developed in the context of USAID/Mozambique's FY 1990-1992 Country Program Strategic Plan, which combined policy reforms and development objectives, the DIP's initial purpose was to "facilitate increased Mozambican understanding of strategic options and related implementation requirements for democratic initiatives in the three core areas of multiparty elections, the institutionalization of an independent judiciary and decentralization of government." The project also sought to "facilitate creation of an enabling environment" for civil society organizations, but without providing specific assistance at the outset.

As mentioned previously, the civil war's end brought changes to USAID/Mozambique's focus as the Mission shifted to a Transition Strategy to support a successful war-to-peace transition. The DIP was redesigned, shifting from analytic/advisory activities to operational ones with the objective: "Support Mozambican democratic initiatives to establish a foundation for a stable democratic society." The project was amended in 1993 to allow USAID to provide implementation support for the planned 1994 elections. In addition, the amendment called for continued support for strengthening of the judicial system and traditional authorities (decentralization), and added civil society strengthening as an activity area.²

In 1995, USAID reengineering led to a new strategic framework that coincided with the Mission's new Country Strategic Plan for FY 1996-2003. The framework included SO2 – "Government and civil society are effective in democratic governance at local and national levels" – and three Intermediate Results:

IR 2.1 Key Macro-Political Reforms Implemented

IR 2.2 Increased Citizen Participation in Governance at National and Local Levels

² The 1995 DIP evaluation by Management Systems International concluded that election assistance dominated USAID/Mozambique's focus during the Transition Strategy period. The bulk of funding went to support the election, and other areas showed few results. For example, no judicial strengthening activities other than a preliminary assessment of the legal sector were done.

IR 2.3 Government and Civil Society are Effective and Accountable at National and Local Levels

Beginning in FY 1998, the number of Intermediate Results was reduced to two:

IR 2.1 Increased Citizen Participation in Governance at Local and National Levels

IR 2.2 Key Democratic Institutions are More Effective and Accountable

The Mission eliminated implementing macro-political reforms, in part due to the difficulty of measuring USAID's cause-and-effect impact on reforms and their implementation. The two retained IRs captured improvements in the public policy dialogue process (e.g. better policy analysis, increased influence of civil society organizations), which the Mission believed was more realistic than USAID assuming responsibility for achieving and sustaining particular macro-political improvements.

Activity Summary

SO2 was implemented through two projects, the Democratic Initiatives Project or DIP (656-0227) and the Political Party Training and Institutional Development Project or PARTIDO (656-0245). The DIP began in 1991 with the signing of a Project Grant Agreement with the Government of Mozambique. With numerous amendments, the DIP spanned the entire life of the SO. A general, flexible program, it was an excellent tool for enabling targeted USAID assistance in a wide variety of activities relative to the shifting needs of the Mozambican government.

Cumulative DIP funding over the life of the SO was \$37,395,000. However, by the late 1990s, the Mission's D&G funding was significantly below levels contemplated when the FY 1996-2003 CSP was approved. Budget reductions forced an end to support of local governance grants and curtailment of governance grants with two U.S. implementing partners in FY 1999. Reduced funding also led to elimination of justice sector reform activities in 2000.

PARTIDO, which started in 1998, was a unilateral obligation implemented through a grant to the National Democratic Institute. The total cost of the project over five years was \$4,190,000. As its name suggests, PARTIDO was designed to strengthen political parties in Mozambique.

DIP Major Activities

Elections and Political Processes

Pre-Peace Accords

In preparation for possible eventual elections, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems undertook an assessment of electoral needs in early 1992. IFES was to provide USAID and Mozambique's government with a recommended package of electoral options and corresponding budgets, but the final product was deemed unacceptable by

USAID and GRM (see DIP Mid-Term Evaluation p. 20). The United Nations Development Fund ultimately did the work at the Mozambican government's request.

1994 National Elections

USAID spent about \$17 million in support of Mozambique's first-ever multi-party democratic elections, which were held in October 1994. Of that, \$8.5 million went to the UNDP's Electoral Process Trust Fund Project, which was created to facilitate coordination of donor contributions. USAID's contribution to the UNDP fund was targeted to election officer training (52,400 officers trained), production and distribution of voter education materials, and the purchase of 4,000 hours of fix-winged aircraft services, which allowed election officials to move personnel, equipment and materials between provincial capitals and towns, villages and remote areas not easily reached by road. The election was widely considered to be a success, with 88 percent of registered voters casting ballots.

USAID also supported activities implemented by 1) the National Democratic Institute (NDI), which trained trainers and produced civic and voter education materials, including radio plays, for a national voter education program that reached 1.7 million eligible voters; 2) the International Organization for Migration, which provided support for logistical assistance to political party election monitors, including training, transport to voting tables and monitoring allowances; 3) CARE, which trained political party election monitors and 4) the International Republican Institute, which worked with opposition parties to increase knowledge of multiparty democracy, promote dialogue among political groups and train party monitors. A combined total of 32,000 political party poll watchers were trained and deployed to 7,000 voting locations.

1998 Municipal Elections

These elections were the first held under a 1997 law creating 33 municipalities with democratically elected mayors and municipal councils. Through a grant to NDI, USAID provided support for voter education materials (1,000 training manuals and 50,000 voter pieces), candidate forums (19), capacity-building services to the Mozambican Association for the Development of Democracy (AMODE), and training for four newly elected municipal assemblies. The voter materials were reproduced for the 1999 national elections.

1999 National Elections

USAID provided funding to the Carter Center to observe a comprehensive new voter registration effort called for under an electoral reform law. USAID was the principal supporter of domestic election observation efforts, which saw more than 2,000 domestic observers mobilized by NGOs and political parties. Under the Supporting Electoral Choice Program, USAID – along with other donors and the government – contributed to a non-partisan, transparent and accountable public campaign fund in an effort to provide for more competitive elections. Funding was available to political groups fielding presidential candidates, groups holding seats in the National Assembly, and extra-parliamentary parties contesting in the legislative elections. With USAID financial and

technical support, the major political parties accounted for 100 percent of monies received from the fund, a sharp improvement in accountability from 1994.

2003 Municipal Elections

USAID played a key role in the success of the 2003 municipal elections, which saw RENAMO win five mayoral elections and control of four municipal councils – bringing the main opposition party to power for the first time. Working with a partnership of Mozambican civil society organizations, including AMODE, USAID supported the training and deployment of more than 400 citizens as poll-watchers who conducted a “parallel” vote count to compare to the official results in 10 key municipalities. The parallel vote count was widely considered to be a great success and a substantial advance in Mozambique’s ability to assure the fairness of its own elections. AMODE also implemented candidate debates and voter education in addition to its election observation work. The Electoral Institute of Southern Africa implemented an activity to train political party poll watchers, which included production of training manuals and participant handbooks. USAID also supported international election observation through the Carter Center, which deployed 15 observers from 12 countries who visited 60 polling sites and 130 polling tables in 11 municipalities.

Governance

Between 1995 and 2002, USAID funded a legislative strengthening activity implemented by the State University of New York at Albany (SUNY). The goal was to strengthen the deliberative, legislative, representative and executive oversight capacities of the National Assembly. SUNY provided training to elected members and permanent staff to improve work quality, and assisted them in 1) creating a legislative services department to draft and analyze legislation, 2) organizing public committee hearings to build dialogue between members and constituents, and 3) publishing various information products about the National Assembly’s work for public distribution. Among the outputs, 41 bills were analyzed or drafted, 32 public hearings held, 219 staff and members trained, and 195 information products published. By the end, the National Assembly showed signs of maturity and increasing organizational effectiveness. However, there were some stumbling blocks along the way. A large turnover in Assembly membership in 1999 brought work to a near standstill, and it became apparent that the SUNY activity’s success depended too heavily on the leadership of a few individual members. Beginning in 2003, Deloitte and Touche began a legislative strengthening activity that built on the earlier SUNY project, with a stronger focus on sustainability.

In 1998 and 1999, the Education Development Center implemented the Local Empowerment in Governance Activity (LEGA) with the goal of engaging local communities in planning and decision-making relative to their own development interests. LEGA operated in five districts in Zambezia Province where the civil war had greatly damaged the local social structure. LEGA was designed to create developmental alliances among local-level stakeholders in the public sector, civil society organizations and the general population. With the help of technical assistance and training, communities in the five districts substantially improved their ability to identify issues of

common concern, carry out participatory processes for identifying potential solutions, and develop and implement plans to improve residents' quality of life. Results varied from tangible outcomes, such as creation of community development councils and new bridges, wells and schools, to increased social capital and new attitudes. LEGA also provided micro-grants for specific community projects. Although LEGA itself was hampered by a long delay in government approval, other donors have implemented similar programs in its wake.

The Greater Accountability and Transparency Initiative (GATI) began in 2002 and continues in the new strategic period. It is designed to create sustainable institutional capacity to fight corruption, which affects many Mozambicans on a daily basis. USAID provided technical assistance to the Attorney General's office to set up an anti-corruption prosecution unit and funded creation of an anti-corruption organization, *Ética Moçambique*, the first local NGO aimed at strengthening integrity and transparency in the public sphere. USAID also funded *Ética's* 2001 survey on corruption, which found that nearly half the population had been the victim of extortion or attempted extortion by government employees such as police, teachers, nurses, doctors and civil servants in the previous six months. USAID also provided funds to conduct 70 follow-up focus group sessions across the country, laying the groundwork for a public education campaign designed to empower people to fight corruption in their own communities. USAID also supported the Center for Legal and Judicial Training for the training of more than 40 judges and prosecutors on issues of corruption, investigative techniques and case management.

Civil Society

Between 1994 and 1997, the African American Institute provided training and technical assistance to Mozambican NGOs in project planning, management and evaluation, constituent needs analysis, and strategic planning. AAI awarded 37 sub-grants to partner NGOs.

Between 1997 and 2000, Private Agencies Collaborating Together (PACT) provided institutional strengthening and capacity building services to 22 Mozambican NGOs and awarded sub-grants to eight of them involved in maternal/child health, rural incomes and HIV/AIDS. The NGOs showed improvements in financial management, administration, training, external relations and governance. Most PACT activity took place in Nampula Province in Northern Mozambique. Funding also came from Mission Health and Agriculture funds.

Between 1998 and 2000, America's Development Foundation implemented the Civil Society Proposing Policy Alternatives Activity, known as PROPOR. It was designed to give civil society organizations the means to develop and offer opinions on concrete proposal for macro-political reforms that promote sustained development. Nearly 100 Mozambican NGOs received training on advocacy skills, as well as technical assistance in fundraising and conducting advocacy campaigns. The project was not extended due to

funding constraints and complaints from beneficiary NGOs that the advocacy style was “Americanized” and inappropriate for Mozambique.

Rule of Law

Between 1997 and 2001, USAID provided assistance to improve the case flow and administrative efficiency of the Maputo City Court, the country’s largest commercial court. After initial work done by the National Center for State Courts, USAID contracted with a local law firm, Caldeira, Silva and Associates, to develop a computerized case-tracking system, bench books, model forms and training for the court. USAID also provided equipment such as computers and motorbikes for process servers. The activity helped the court dispose of numerous old cases – some pending for decades – and improved case-processing time. Among the results was an increase in the percentage of cases processed in 12 months or less – 44 percent in FY 2002 compared to 19 percent in FY 1999.

In 1999, USAID supported drafting and passage of a new arbitration law, a flexible, business-friendly law allowing for binding arbitration of commercial disputes and establishment of decentralized arbitration centers.

PARTIDO Activities

Between 1998 and 2003, NDI implemented PARTIDO, providing training and technical assistance for the institutional development of Mozambique’s political parties in the form of seminars and workshops, consultations for top party leaders, training of trainers and overseas study missions.

NDI worked separately with the two main parties, FRELIMO and RENAMO, which were at different stages of development and had different needs. While FRELIMO had been a political party for decades and in power since 1975, RENAMO was an armed guerilla movement that became a political party only in 1994. Although there was a stark dichotomy in the capacity of the two parties to define their needs, absorb technical assistance and effectively apply the knowledge acquired from training and study tours, both parties made considerable improvements when compared to 1998. However, the playing field ultimately was not leveled between the two.

RENAMO made great strides from being a quasi-military movement to a political party. RENAMO adopted and began to implement very basic internal democratic practices, as well as new, more effective organizational and administrative procedures. USAID technical assistance also enabled RENAMO to develop more consistent and effective political messages.

FRELIMO was able to take greater advantage of the assistance because of its more efficient internal organization and more skilled leaders and members. FRELIMO made progress in further improving its already strong party machine, using more sophisticated

polling for message development, increasing discussions with different interest groups and developing a more efficient internal records and communication system.

Under PARTIDO, a sub-grant went to the Mozambican Center for the Study of Democracy and Development for political and policy dialogue activity aimed at bringing together stakeholders at the local and provincial level around policy or political conflict issues to improve participation/representation and diffuse political tensions. The activity used participatory action-research and conflict resolution methodologies. Five provincial policy forums and three municipal forums were created.

Sustainability Issues

While Mozambique's success in transitioning from war to its current model state would suggest the consolidation of democratic values and practices, serious concerns remain about the prospect for democracy and good governance in Mozambique. The country's democracy remains fragile and incomplete, and significant challenges remain.

FRELIMO, the governing political party, continues to dominate politics at all levels, blurring the line between party and State. RENAMO continues to struggle to cope with the challenges of being an effective political party and the legacy of its guerrilla movement origins. Political competition, competition between branches of government, and competition of ideas are fragile. The historic absence of a plural, democratic culture that regards government as an instrument of the people is a significant impediment to developing full participatory democracy. In addition, high levels of poverty and illiteracy – combined with a large, isolated rural population – contribute to a deficit in democratic culture in Mozambique.

Corruption and poor service delivery erode public confidence in government on a daily basis and create disincentives for transparency and accountability. However, prospects for fighting corruption are improving as the new FRELIMO government elected in 2004 had made it a priority at all levels.

Although there is still heavy reliance on donors for election assistance, important steps toward sustainability have been made. Civil society organizations have established capacity to monitor elections and conduct parallel vote tabulations, key tools for assuring free and fair balloting. The campaign finance fund is ongoing without USAID or other donor support. The government also has taken on a growing share of election expenses. In the 2003 municipal elections, the government paid for 37 percent of total costs, up from eight percent in 1994, 22 percent in 1998 and 25 percent in 1999.

The new follow-on SO10 shifts USAID/Mozambique's focus to the local municipal level in an effort to promote democratic consolidation from the ground up. Activities will be designed to repair disconnects between citizens and their governance bodies, and to fight corruption in every day life.

Sustainability issues regarding individual activities are discussed in the following *Lessons Learned* section.

Lessons Learned

- First-time elections in countries emerging from war dominate the concerns, agendas and energies of all parties involved. It is unrealistic to expect other activities, especially those with more developmental objectives, to receive the attention they deserve. In the case of the early years of USAID/Mozambique's Democratic Initiative Project, the slow progress of project components other than those concerned with electoral assistance was understandable. Future designs should be less ambitious as to what can be accomplished in this context.
- First-time elections in countries emerging from war are much more a benchmark of the transition from war to peace than they are a transition from authoritarian to democratic rule. For a substantial period after transition elections, donor assistance primarily contributes to the consolidation of peace as opposed to the consolidation of democracy and improved governance. Assistance designed to attain developmental objectives related to democracy and improved governance is unlikely to lead to the full achievement of those objectives.
- Civil society development is a difficult sub-sector because it is extremely vast, constantly changing and, in Mozambique, not well understood. SO2 never developed a clear overall strategy in this area. Although each of the activities made sense as a discrete undertaking, project timeframes were too short for such a complex programming area and budgets were very small, especially considering the management costs of U.S. implementing partners. Trainings were conducted and sub-grants disbursed, but it is unclear whether the local NGOs and community organizations have the leadership, financing and organizational sophistication to use the inputs provided to them.
- In legislative strengthening activities, training of permanent staff needs greater emphasis to assure sustainability than the SUNY activity provided. Parliamentary work came to a standstill after the National Assembly experienced a 60 percent turnover in the 1999 election. There was too much reliance on individual political leaders – particularly the majority leader who was replaced in 1999 – rather than institutional structure, and too little involvement on the part of the National Assembly in planning. In this respect, formalizing program objectives and methodologies through approved policy is a good way to bolster prospects for sustainability.
- Political party strengthening programs are notoriously difficult activities in which to achieve desired results. Political will is absolutely essential, yet often lacking on the part of party leadership. The programs should not be undertaken without some type of guarantee of the will to change power structures and relationships.

Also the approach of providing equal support to unequal parties needs to be discussed and reassessed.

- In a predominantly rural, undeveloped country like Mozambique, it is not sufficient to target only national institutions and processes when attempting to promote democracy and good governance. Democracy programs must work in rural areas, or the end result will be simply a more democratized urban elite with little change elsewhere. This can contribute to polarization between urban and rural populations.
- Small, isolated impact is worthwhile when the goal is creating a democratic culture. As LEGA showed, even if a program is not high-profile and national in scope, it can lead to true democratic reform – changing how people think and their expectations of government. Changing the public’s sense of what is possible in a democratic system is important and sustainable because people will continue to behave differently even after the activity ends.
- It is important to be aware of and understand the cultural and institutional context when designing activities or they risk being irrelevant or inappropriate. The advocacy training provided by PROPOR was designed without analyzing how advocacy actually works in Mozambique. PROPOR used U.S.-style techniques that assumed civil society had a voice in central government decision-making, when in fact only certain individuals and organizations in Mozambique were capable of successfully advocacy, which occurred behind closed doors.
- Small efforts that are well-timed can make a big difference. A case in point was the 2001 corruption survey. Although conducted in only three provinces, the timing of its release and the publicity it created just before a joint government-donor Consultative Group meeting put corruption at the top of the international community’s agenda. As a result of donor and civil society pressure created by this investment of \$100,000, corruption became a profile issue and the government was forced to take action.

Performance Indicators

In the initial years of the DIP, the emphasis on defining strategic options and action plans did not lend itself to traditional impact evaluations. Instead, performance monitoring focused on reaffirming whether two underlying assumptions continued to hold and merited further support: 1) Is the project addressing issues fundamentally relevant to Mozambique’s political development and 2) Has the shared government/donor understanding of democratization evolved?

By 1993, the end of the war and subsequent shift to the Transition Strategy led to development of the following performance indicators:

- Free/fair elections implemented
- Majority of the electorate participates
- District-level judges applying new codes, procedures
- Traditional authorities play an active role in district-level decision making
- Number of Mozambican NGOs and community associations in selected areas

Beginning with the FY 1996-2003 Country Strategic Plan, USAID/Mozambique developed an innovative performance monitoring system that relied on data from national public opinion surveys and a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) contract with a local consulting firm, Austral. Five percent of the budget was dedicated to performance monitoring.

USAID/Mozambique concluded that impact would be best assessed through customer feedback in the form of periodic surveys of public opinion about understanding of and support for democratic values and principles. The resulting USAID-funded public opinion surveys played a key role in tracking results for SO2.

The initial survey – the first of its kind in Mozambique – was done in 1997 by Eduardo Mondlane University’s Center for Population Studies and established baseline data in many areas. Other baselines were established using data collected by Austral under the M&E contract. A second national survey was done in 2001, with a limited survey conducted in three provinces in 1999.

The new system provided valuable information for assessing impact and informing management decisions, allowing SO2 to select the right indicators, set reasonable expectations and go back and validate results. For example, when the National Assembly strengthening activity began to falter due to a change in legislative leadership, the indicators reflected a negative change in impact. The indicators also were valuable in showing the LEGA was having a discernible impact in the five districts where it operated.

SO2 public perception indicators were:

- Perceptions of influence by citizens – public surveyed who agree that citizens influence public decisions.
- Perceptions that local questions of interest are better resolved through collaboration among local government, citizens and the private sector.
- Perceptions that public issues are addressed in a participatory manner involving local governments, civil society and traditional authorities.
- Citizens believe democratic institutions are performing their functions well.
- Perception that government works for citizens.
- Citizen perception that government is interested in doing away with corruption.

Other SO2 indicators were:

- Political will for anti-corruption efforts by government, National Assembly and civil society.
- Share of local issues discussed in a participatory manner – target localities where most issues are resolved using participatory approaches.
- Number of non-governmental political actors testifying before various parliamentary committees.
- Actions taken by citizens when encountering corruption.
- Participation of citizens presenting concerns to political actors.
- Number of public fora in target areas.
- Quality analysis of key policies and issues by actors other than the executive at national and local levels.
- Electoral administrative costs financed by the government.
- Voter registry updated on an annual basis.
- Civil society initiated investigations of alleged government misconduct at national and local levels.
- Institutional development and performance by the Attorney General and anti-corruption NGO.
- Civil society institutions precipitate the introduction of legislation or other parliamentary actions or influence the substantive amendment of such actions in the National Assembly
- Increased democratic governance with civil society organizations.
- Increased effectiveness of civil society organizations' management
- Legislative initiatives drafted within AR and enacted (compared to totals).
- National Assembly provides substantive input into legislation proposed by the Executive Branch.
- Petitions reported to the National Assembly
- Average processing time for cases completed by civil section of Maputo City Court during proceeding 12 months
- Political parties have internal communication structures that promote two-way communication between party branches and headquarters to reflect a commitment to transparency, inclusiveness and accountability.
- Political parties establish and maintain key planning procedures and documents.
- Extent to which political parties organize and maintain linkages with other political parties and special interest groups at local and national level.

Conclusion

USAID/Mozambique's democracy and governance efforts under SO2 have helped the country move forward in democratic consolidation and development of democratic institutions. In some areas it is difficult to attribute progress directly to USAID, as investment in most sub-sectors has been modest and there are many intervening and un-measurable factors in democratic development. However, during the critical transition period that Mozambique faced following the signing of peace accords in 1992, measurable impact was achieved with modest but strategic investments. SO2 can take

credit for its significant contribution to the first ever multi-party democratic elections in 1994 as well as its role in documenting the problem of corruption and increasing pressure on government to mitigate it. Overall, the SO generally met or came close to meeting its performance targets, and exceeded expectations in many of them. As a result, today Mozambique's government and civil society are more effective partners in democratic governance than ever before.

Annex A: List of Evaluations, Special Studies and Reports

Legal Sector Consultancy Report for USAID, Checchi and Company Consulting, October 1992

Democratic Initiatives Project (656-0227): Mid-Term Evaluation, Management Systems International, June 1995

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