EVALUATION

SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE, FOSTERING PEACE AND EQUITY (SAFE) PROGRAM

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

End-of-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Uganda's Supporting Access to Justice, Fostering Peace and Equity (SAFE) Program

Submitted to:

USAID/Uganda

Prepared by:

Rose Azuba – Team Leader
Abby Sebina-Zziwa
Joseph Muhumuza
Katherine Vittum

Disclaimer:

The authors' views expressed in this document do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Cover Photograph: Local mediation team in Paibona Sub-county, Gulu District, Uganda, comprised of a catechist/religious leader, cultural leader, Rwot Kweri, community leader and Local Council II Chairperson, June 2018.

ACRONYMS

AIP	Annual Implementation Plan
APS	Annual Program Statement
ADEFO	Adjumani District Elders Forum
AYINET	Africa Youth Initiative Network
ACORD	Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development
ADRM	Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
ALC	Area Land Committee
AMELP	Activity Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Plan
CECORE	Centre for Conflict Resolution
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CLA	Collaborating, Learning, and Adapting
CLV	Community Legal Volunteers
C-LRA	Countering the Lord's Resistance Army
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DISO	District Internal Security Organization
DLB	District Land Board
DRM	Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
DPC	District Police Commander
ET	Evaluation Team
EPR	End-of-project report
FBO	Faith-based Organization
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FHR	Foundation for Human Rights
FIDA	International Federation of Women Lawyers
GIZ	German Society for International Cooperation
GoU	Government of Uganda
JLOS	Justice, Law and Order Sector
KII	Key Informant Interviews
LAI	Land Administrative Institutions
LAS	Land Administration Systems
LEMU	Land and Equity Movement in Uganda
LCV5	Local Council Five Chairperson
LCs	Local Councils
LPC	Local Peace Committees
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MIRAC	Mid-Western Region Anti-Corruption Coalition
MLHUD	Ministry of Lands, Housing, and Urban Development
NCSC	National Center for State Courts
NSA	Non-State Actor
NUMEC	Northern Uganda Media Club
OPM	Office of the Prime Minister
PMP	Performance Management Plan

PRDP	Peace, Recovery and Development Plan
RDC	Resident District Commissioner
RICE-WN	Rural Initiative for Community Empowerment West Nile
SAFE	Supporting Access to Justice, Fostering Peace and Equity program
SCC	Sub-county Court Committees
SOW	Statement of Work
TIP	Teso Initiative for Peace
ToC	Theory of Change

Table of Contents

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The **Supporting Access to Justice, Fostering Peace and Equity** (SAFE) program, a $15 million Activity, was implemented from 2012 to 2017 by the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) in partnership with Search for Common Ground and its consortium partners in 20 districts of Uganda. The 5-year program implemented with an additional one-year no-cost extension was designed to "strengthen peace building and conflict mitigation in Uganda by improving access to justice on land matters and enhancing peace and reconciliation in conflict-prone regions." Its overall goals were to mitigate conflicts related to land, the discovery of oil, and cultural and ethnic diversity, to address the residual effects of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) conflict in northern Uganda, and to transform emerging conflicts into peaceful outcomes. The SAFE program was implemented through two distinct but mutually reinforcing components that sought to i) strengthen access to justice by focusing on institutions, processes, and services of land administration, and ii) foster peace and equity with a focus on enhancing peace and reconciliation mechanisms.

The purpose of this end-of-term evaluation was two-fold: a) to inform the design of future conflict and land activities; and b) to learn and develop best practices for adaptive Activity management, including relevant approaches to grantee management. The evaluation addressed the following questions:
(i)   To what extent did the Activity achieve its objectives as set out in the SOW?
(ii)   To what extent did the theory of change (ToC), approaches and assumptions clearly relate to the SAFE objectives?
(iii)   To what extent was the management of SAFE adaptive?

For the logical flow of this evaluation, the findings in Evaluation Question 2 (EQ2) will be presented first, followed by the findings in EQ1.

This SAFE evaluation employed qualitative methods, informed by an examination of the theory of change. The evaluation covered 9 of the 26 districts (35%) where the SAFE program was implemented. The ET reviewed findings from Activity reports, which were used to inform the evaluation design and approach to data collection. The findings were validated by data gathered from the field. The sources of information included district officials and leaders, members of Land Administrative Institutions (LAIs), both formal and informal, implementers, other government officials, and other national-level land actors.

Since the conflict landscape in Uganda is very dynamic and fragile, SAFE was designed to adapt and respond quickly to a changing context. The interventions were focused on training, sensitizing and convening stakeholders and citizens to resolve conflicts peacefully and to strengthen formal and informal institutions to ensure conflicts were mitigated. By working simultaneously on strengthening the supply and demand side in land management, and by forming reconciliation platforms, a foundation for long lasting peace would be built.

The evaluation team found that SAFE mostly met its targets, in some cases well and beyond. The number of people trained, legal aid services delivered, publications and peace messages disseminated, and reconciliation groups formed have been sufficient to generate several positive outcomes. These include citizens being more satisfied with land-related services, land administration institutions becoming more functional, and increased use of citizens using peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms. The program generated both intended and unintended outcomes that will allow for learning and continued

peace building efforts in beneficiary communities and at USAID. Key indicators that measured outcomes prove that SAFE was a successful program and achieved expected outcomes in the geographic areas where it operated.

SAFE also proved to be adaptive, especially in solving bottlenecks and problems that were encountered by beneficiaries and grantees. However, most adaptations were implementation adaptations and did not reach planning tools such as the Performance Management Plan (PMP) which could have initiated course correction decisions to guide strategic planning on how to address larger structural problems.

One of the three outcomes that SAFE identified for the program in the PMP was to foster an enabling environment to mitigate conflicts through efficient mechanisms and systems for fair resolution of land-related disputes and service delivery. The Evaluation Team found that the enabling environment at large prevented SAFE from achieving objectives beyond peaceful conflict resolutions in the targeted areas. For example, skepticism among some local stakeholders prevented buy-in and the larger justice system was not in tune with supporting the gains in peaceful resolutions on the ground. Even if disputes were solved in the targeted areas, and trust restored for local efforts, the referral system was only partial receptive and functional to allow for the objective of access to justice to be achieved. In short, SAFE achieved its objectives in the two components of the Results Framework, but there was no evidence of those gains translating into sustainable access to justice and peace.

A fully developed and periodically tested Theory of Change would have allowed SAFE to anticipate and plan for how to address external factors that prevented the gains to be turned into sustainable peace. By identifying programmatic and contextual assumptions, the challenges that SAFE was unable to solve with an ad-hoc adaptive approach could have been addressed strategically to either allow for more sustainable outcomes or allow for course correction to limit the scope. There was a debate between the Implementing Partner and USAID/Uganda on whether the overall scope was to improve access to justice or to access to land justice in targeted areas. By identifying some missing outcome indicators that combined the two components and clarifying the relationships between the components, these uncertainties would have been solved.

A well-developed theory of change that guides implementation would also have allowed for even larger gains in the targeted areas. When SAFE interventions were synchronized and simultaneously supported supply and demand, the overall objectives were met. A theory of change to allow for synchronization was clear in the Results Framework for component 1. However, if the lessons from these results had been transferred to a theory of change for the entire framework, SAFE could have thought through the geographic locations of the interventions to ensure maximum impact of limited resources. Synergies between components 1 and 2 were not leveraged to allow for even better results and higher impact.

2.0 INTRODUCTION

This report presents findings, conclusions, and recommendations of an end-of-term evaluation for the USAID/Uganda funded program, 'Supporting Access to Justice, Fostering Peace and Equity', abbreviated as SAFE. The evaluation took place between May and August 2018. The $15 million five-year program, herein referred to as an 'Activity', was initiated in 2012, ending in 2017 (2012-2017) with a one-year no-cost extension to July 31, 2018. It was implemented by the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) and its consortium partners[1] in 20 districts of Uganda.

2.1   Evaluation Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this end-of-term performance evaluation, as articulated in the Statement of Work (SOW)[2] (see Annex 1), was two-fold: a) to inform the design of future conflict and land Activities; and b) to learn and develop best practices for adaptive Activity management, including relevant approaches to grantee management. Key stakeholders to benefit from the evaluation findings include: i) USAID, (ii) the Government of Uganda; iii) development partners addressing related and similar programs; and iv) beneficiaries both national and international.

The end-of-term SAFE performance evaluation focused on three (3) core elements: Activity performance assessment that sought to determine the extent to which the Activity achieved its objectives; examining the internal consistency, assumptions, and relevance of SAFE's theory of change (ToC) to determine the extent to which the ToC, approaches, and assumptions relate to SAFE objectives; and examining the relationship between adaptive management and Activity performance with the aim of establishing the extent to which the management of SAFE was adaptive.

2.2   Activity Context

Uganda is faced with numerous threats to national and human security. Such threats emanate from conflicts such as disputes within and between internal groups, as well as from cross-border confrontations among groups from neighboring countries. These are both violent and latent in nature and have evolved in response to various drivers of conflict. Uganda has suffered from civil unrest and witnessed several regime changes since the early 1980s. In 1986 the National Resistance Army/Movement took power and began another protracted conflict in northern Uganda which lasted over two decades, involving the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Throughout the unrest in the region, USAID/Uganda supported peace and conflict mitigation programs and made significant contributions to recovery and development, especially in northern Uganda.

Today, numerous challenges to peace and security remain. These include unaddressed legacies of war; gaps in transitional justice processes; illicit small arms proliferation; terrorism and extremism; trafficking in persons; international and internal border disputes; increased displacement of communities due to oil and mineral discoveries; escalating organized crime; youth unemployment; natural and man-made disasters, including climate change; competition for natural resources; unplanned and rapid urbanization; widespread poverty; rural-urban migration; and conflicts between and among political parties.

---

[1] Global Rights, involved in the initial stages only, and Search for Common Ground.
[2] Statement of Work –SAFE EVALUATION, see Annex 1.

A 2010 inter-agency conflict assessment for Uganda identified five key potential drivers of conflict. In particular, the assessment noted that emerging conflict over land and discovery of oil resources, ethnic and cultural diversity, and the need for deeper reconciliation in LRA-affected areas of northern Uganda were new grounds for conflict in the country. Informed largely by this assessment, USAID/Uganda launched the SAFE program in 2012.

2.3   Activity Overview

SAFE, a five-year program (2012–2017) with a one-year no cost extension, was implemented by NCSC in partnership with Search for Common Ground. The program was designed to "strengthen peace building and conflict mitigation in Uganda by improving access to justice on land matters and enhancing peace and reconciliation in conflict-prone regions." Its overall goal was to mitigate conflicts related to land, the discovery of oil, cultural and ethnic diversity; address residual effects of the LRA conflict in northern Uganda; and transform emerging conflicts into peaceful outcomes. The SAFE activities primarily targeted twenty (20) districts: Amuru, Arua, Buliisa, Gulu, Hoima, Jinja, Kibaale, Kiboga, Lira, Masaka, Masindi, Mbale, Mbarara, Mityana, Moroto, Mukono, Nebbi, Tororo, Soroti, and Wakiso.

SAFE was designed in alignment with the Government of Uganda's first (2010-2014) National Development Plan strategy on improving land administration and management (Chapter 6.5) and enhancing access to justice for all, particularly the poor and marginalized (Chapter 8.2). Interventions on land administration and management were largely a direct response to government policy of decentralizing services with an aim of taking services closer to the people. Land services being highly decentralized, multiple centres of authority emerged at which access to justice and legal services were required. The SAFE program built on previous USAID interventions for conflict mitigation in northern Uganda, such as the Community Resilience and Dialogue (CRD) program, the Northern Uganda Peace Initiative (NUPI), and the Stability, Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Uganda (SPRING) program. Unlike these previous palliative interventions, the SAFE design sought to address what were identified as the root causes of the conflicts, not only in the northern region but in Uganda at-large. The SAFE program aimed to create a conducive environment for peace and reconciliation and to improve access to justice for land governance countrywide.

The SAFE program was implemented through two distinct but mutually reinforcing components that sought to i) strengthen access to justice by focusing on institutions, processes, and services of land administration, and ii) foster peace and equity with a focus on enhancing peace and reconciliation mechanisms.

Component 1 was comprised of four results areas, namely i) institutions for land administration and dispute resolution made more accountable and accessible; ii) administration of land management and legal aid services made more efficient; iii) legal awareness on land matters increased; and iv) oversight by non-state actors (NSAs) increased. Component 2 was associated with two results areas, namely i) peace and reconciliation enhanced; and ii) emerging conflicts transformed into peaceful outcomes. The SAFE program was also designed to adapt and maintain flexibility during implementation so as to rapidly respond to emerging contextual changes and conflict dynamics in order to maximize results. Hence, SAFE adopted a learning approach and supported innovative methodologies applied by Grantees, facilitating reconciliation and peace building.

3.0 METHODOLOGY

The SAFE evaluation employed qualitative methods. These included Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), supplemented by a review of SAFE performance data and implementation records.

3.1 Geographical Scope

The ET visited and gathered field data from 9 districts out of the 10 that were selected which comprise 45 percent of the total districts that the SAFE program worked with. The districts were Arua, Gulu, Lira, Hoima, Masindi, Kasese, Kabarole, Bunyangabu, and Kampala. [3] A religious leader from Amuru District also met the team in Lira to give input on lessons learned from alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (ADRMs) and land justice related issues in Amuru district under the SAFE intervention. Adjumani, the second district selected to guide learning about refugee-related interventions, was removed after the ET realized that sufficient refugee-related learning had already been attained from the Rhino Camp Refugee Settlement in Arua district and time was limited. At the inception, the team discussed a detailed sample selection criteria derived from a mapping of all SAFE intervention activities in 26 districts. The selection focused on a balanced mix of representation across sub-regions, districts, the two program components, and the need for learning from districts with key conflict triggers associated with land, oil, gas, cultural-ethnic divide, and post–LRA conflict. A summary of the district selection and criteria used is attached as Annex 2.

3.2 Approach to Data Collection

3.2.1 Sample Selection

The following nine districts were sampled: Arua, Gulu, Lira, Hoima, Adjumani, Kasese, Kabarole, Masindi and Kampala. In broad terms, the district sample mirrors several overarching sample selection criteria:

- It recognizes major adjustments in the SAFE program. In the fourth year, SAFE was recalibrated to focus on Countering the Lord's Resistance Army (C-LRA); this meant a greater focus on LRA-affected areas, specifically the Acholi and Lango sub-regions.
- SAFE responded to emerging conflicts in several districts that were not included in the original program design.
- SAFE refocused on the north and added new districts to the program.
- The sample includes activities implemented in both components (i.e. land administration and conflict transformation).
- It reflects different implementation modalities (i.e. direct SAFE intervention, and grantee implementation and the APS mechanism).

In summary, the district sample selection takes into consideration performance evaluation, the theory of change, adaptive management, and the concentration of activities of the SAFE program. Table 9 in the SAFE inception report presents the rationale for selection of the nine districts covered in the evaluation.

---

[3] Although the SAFE program did not work on conflict prevention with beneficiaries in Kampala the ET chose to conduct interviews with some of the grantee organizations and development partners which would take place in Kampala where their headquarters were located.

The ET held 33 Focus Group Discussions with stakeholders across both components (Table 1) and, to get a deeper understanding of qualitative data, 120 Key Informant Interviews (Table 2).

Table 1: Focus group discussion participants

Stakeholder	Component 1	Component 2
Religious/traditional leaders/elders	2	2
Peace committee structures	-	5
Women	4	4
Youth	4	4
Mixed	4	4
Total	14	19

Table 2: Key informant interview participants

Stakeholder	Component 1	Component 2	Other
Grantees /Implementer	14	13	25
Land administration institutions	19	-	-
Elected leaders	-	-	2
Journalists	-	4	-
Religious/traditional leaders/elders	4	4	-
Other actors	-	2	-
Peace committee structures	-	8	-
Field monitors	-	16	-
Youth	-	-	4
Staff of SAFE	5	-	-
Total	42	47	31

*Includes officials from Office of the Prime Minister, Key Government Ministries (Land, Internal Affairs, Energy), Development partners, USAID, and International CSOs

3.2.2   Data Collection Methods and Sources

The evaluation employed three forms of data collection, i) a literature review of program documents, ii) secondary data collection from USAID/Uganda's Performance Reporting System (PRS) and primary data collection from a wide range of stakeholders including SAFE staff, USAID/Uganda staff, SAFE grantee staff, local government staff and, community members in the areas where SAFE was implemented.

Literature review of program documents:
- Design documents (SAFE Solicitation Document and Proposal)
- Quarterly and annual reports
- Monthly conflict assessment reports
- Grantee reports
- Mid-term review report
- Outcome harvesting reports
- Other relevant materials

Secondary data collection:
- SAFE Program performance data (PRS 2014-2017)
- Activity Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Plan (AMELP)/ Performance Management Plan (PMP)
- Conference proceedings from the National Land Learning Conference

Primary data collection:
- Focus group discussions
- key informant interviews (KII)
- One-on-one face discussions
- Site visits
- Observation of program activities

Primary data collection was implemented through FGDs and KII, using semi-structured questionnaires. In some instances, telephone conversations were also employed, guided by structured questionnaires. In most of the engagements, the discussions were also recorded with permission from the respondents. Primary data largely contributed towards validation and triangulation of the secondary data from program documents. The interview guides and protocols are attached as Annex 3(a) - (f).

Table 3: Respondents by Institution or Role

Category	Respondents consulted
Districts	▪ Leadership (CAO, LCV, RDC) ▪ Other duty bearers – DLB Secretary and Chairperson, land surveyor
Sub county	▪ ALC chairpersons, secretary, woman representative, LC III chairpersons ▪ Non-state actor ▪ ADR Mediation committee/teams, elders, members of council ▪ Community duty bearers resource persons, Conflict Monitors
Implementers	▪ Staff of CSOs/grantees /sub grantees, Non -state actors ▪ Staff of SAFE Uganda ▪ Staff of NCSC and search for Common Ground
USAID	▪ M&E team ▪ Governance team
National level actors and dev partners	▪ Officials from MLHUD ▪ Legal officers, LC chairpersons ▪ Other national land stakeholders met during the SAFE conference
Other dev partners	▪ ULA, ORRA

The ET aimed to conduct 153 interviews (120 KIIs and 33 FGDs) but attained 59% of the target, undertaking 90 interviews (76 KIIs and 14 FGDs). FGDs focused on members of peace structures, land administrative institutions (LAIs), and NSAs. In this regard FGDs were conducted for local leaders, women, youth, journalists, and grantees. KIIs focused on local experts or knowledgeable persons that included grantees, local leaders, women leaders, local government officials, conflict monitors, SAFE and USAID staff, and disputants.

Through these interviews the ET reached out to 269 respondents. These included 14 grantees and 2 sub grantees[4]. Over 90 percent of the targeted categories of stakeholders were reached. The list of respondents is attached as Annex 4. The categories of respondents (disaggregated by gender) is shown in Annex 5. These included Grantees, implementers, elected district leaders, journalists, leaders from cultural and traditional institutions, officers in land and justice administration, peace actors, field monitors, specialized services providers such as land surveyors and other actors from Government, the civil society, SAFE and USAID staff, as well as development partners.

3.3   Data Management and Analysis

At the inception, the evaluation design was pronounced as largely qualitative in nature. However, for validation and triangulation of information obtained from interviews, the SAFE indicator performance data (SAFE 2014-2018) from USAID/Uganda PRS and from progress reports was reviewed.

The team used ATLAS ti v7.5.7 to perform content analysis of the qualitative data gathered during field interviews. This qualitative analysis tool provided an in-depth analysis of the text according to pre-determined themes and sub-themes. In addition, the analysis provided the frequency a theme or sub-theme was mentioned to an attribute under inquiry. The ET, however, observed that during qualitative data analysis certain issues /variables, although mentioned only a few times, still proved to be very significant, for example cultural leaders opting for dialogue with Government to resolve long standing grievances *(Interview with Rwenzururu Kingdom Official)*.

---

[4] grantees – *see acronyms for full names* – KRC, NGO Forum, MIRAC, CEDO, THRIVE, LEMU, NUMEC, AYINET, JRP, CAP, CDRN, FIDA, RICE WN, WVU and sub-grantees –BUC and Radio Pacis.

4.0 FINDINGS

This chapter presents the findings of the evaluation based on evidence gathered in investigation of the three evaluation questions (EQs) guided by sub-questions under each as articulated in the inception report. In the Scope of Work for the evaluation, EQ1 relates to the extent to which SAFE achieved its objectives. EQ2 investigates the extent to which SAFE's theory of change relates to its objectives. EQ 3 discusses whether the SAFE Activity was adaptive. For purposes of a logical flow this chapter starts with a discussion of evaluation question two (EQ2) which illustrates the ToC, followed by evaluation question one (EQ1) which elaborates the results and ends with evaluation question three (EQ3), which discusses adaptive management and learning.

4.1   EQ2: To what extent did the theory of change (ToC) approaches and assumptions clearly relate to the SAFE objectives?

The understanding and use of a Theory of Change has evolved in USAID/Uganda during the life of the SAFE program. When the program was initially designed, the Results Framework and the Development Hypothesis could very well suffice as the ToC. A traditional Results Framework, where outputs lead to outcomes which leads to impact, illustrated the assumptions organized in a linear logic. However, in the current understanding of a ToC expressed in USAID How-To Note on how to develop a logic model (2017) a Theory of Change is a comprehensive description and illustration of how and why a desired change is expected to happen in a particular context. It complements the Results Framework and the development hypothesis and is intended to explain how the interventions contribute to various changes (in the beneficiaries, actors, or context). The Theory of Change is considered both a process and product that informs the Activity level performance framework and learning It includes assumptions, both programmatic and contextual, underpinning the change, and how assumptions will be monitored.

This evaluation question examines the relevance, appropriateness, and approaches of the SAFE program Theory of Change under both components. The discussion pays specific attention to the assumptions that underpinned the theory at Activity level and change process under each component. The sub-questions that informed this line of inquiry were: i) Did the ToC relate to the objectives? If not, why? ii) Were approaches used by SAFE appropriate to achieve the expected results? iii) Were the assumptions relevant? Did they hold true? iv) Which contextual factors may have rendered the ToC relevant or irrelevant?

Background: SAFE Development Hypothesis and Results Framework

According to the SAFE solicitation document[5], the objectives of the program was to i) mitigate conflicts related to land, the discovery of oil, cultural and ethnic diversity, address residual effects of the LRA conflict in northern Uganda, and ii) transform emerging conflicts into peaceful outcomes. The means to achieve the above was envisioned through two (2) separate but mutually re-enforcing program components, namely i) improve access to justice by supporting local governments and land administration, support referral systems for adjudication of land disputes, and alternative (traditional) dispute resolution mechanisms for customary land as measures to mitigate conflict; and ii) enhance

---

[5] USAID/Uganda Solicitation # SOL-617-12-000002 -SUPPORTING ACCESS TO JUSTICE, FOSTERING EQUITY & PEACE (SAFE) pg. 10.

peace and reconciliation processes aimed at reducing conflict and promote peace gains in the LRA affected areas.

The development hypothesis as stated in the SAFE PMP (2012-2014) outlines three key outcomes and related changes:

- Return to peace and energies focused on recovery; through conflict mitigation and dispute resolution;
- Enabling environment fostered to mitigate conflicts through efficient mechanisms and systems for fair resolution of land-related disputes and service delivery; and
- Peace built and promoted through healing and reconciliation by developing capacity and mechanisms to effectively resolve conflicts and disputes between groups.

The SAFE development hypothesis is illustrated in the Results Framework shown in Figure 1 with two intermediate results: i) management of land–related disputes improved with four sub-intermediate results; and ii) peace and reconciliation processes enhanced with two sub-intermediate results.

Program Objective
Peace building and conflict mitigation strengthened

Intermediate Result 1
Management of land related disputes improved

Intermediate Result 2
Peace and reconciliation processes enhanced

Sub- Intermediate Result 1.1
Institutions for land administration and dispute resolution made More accountable & accessible

Sub- Intermediate Result 2.1
Emerging violent conflict transformed into peaceful outcomes

Sub- Intermediate Result 1.2
Administrative land management and legal aid services made more efficient

Sub- Intermediate Result 2.2
Processes for community reconciliation enhanced

Sub- Intermediate Result 1.3
Legal awareness on land matters increased

Sub- Intermediate Result 1.4
Non-state actor oversight improved

Figure 1: SAFE Result Framework (Source: SAFE PMP)

4.1.1 Did the ToC relate to the objectives? If not, why not? Were the approaches used by SAFE appropriate to achieve the expected results?

For purposes of this sub-question, the ET assumes (based on a thorough review of SAFE documents) the Development Hypothesis and ToC to be synonymous and the Results Framework (above) to be an illustration of the ToC. Considering whether the ToC related to stated objectives, the ET reviewed and assessed whether the indicators measuring each result would then tell whether the sum of each Sub-IR contributed to an increase in the IR and program objective indicators. Since the disaggregation of the data that the ET had access to did not allow for a contribution analysis, the discussion around whether the ToC related to objectives must be based on logic reasoning around the primary data collected in interviews conducted by the ET with support from the review of the program documentation The SAFE development hypothesis has two distinct parts that are synonymous with the two components of the program. The hypotheses are discussed by respective components.

Theory of Change for Access to Justice

The development hypothesis for Access to Justice as stated in the SAFE PMP 2012-2014 presumed that strengthening mechanisms for resolving land related disputes leads to accountable, transparent, efficient, and fair resolution of land-related disputes and; improving delivery of land services would foster an enabling environment that mitigates conflict. Further, mitigating conflict and strengthening mechanisms for resolving disputes related to land, ethnicity, and natural resources will have a direct impact on Uganda's ability to return to peace and focus its energy on recovery.

The Results Framework adds a hypothesis that is not expressed in the development hypothesis in SAFE PMP 2012-2014, which assumes that for the management of land to be improved, the institutions and services need to be more accessible and accountable AND legal awareness on land matters and the non-state actor oversight must be improved. The supply and demand hypothesis is clear in the Results Framework but was less clear in the PMP statement.

To strengthen the supply side of land management, SAFE supported knowledge systems and improved capacity to implement justice by i) informing LAI members of the land laws and procedures for land administration; ii) supporting planning capacities at local administrative level; and iii) providing logistical support for better record management, such as filing cabinets, and transparent-information on public noticeboards. In terms of mechanisms, SAFE-supported mechanisms of dispute resolution by i) supporting the open hearing of cases – collective and well-represented public mediation hearings; ii) providing a milieu of opportunities for improved interaction and coordination between formal, traditional or customary land administrators; and iii) reinforcing ownership and accountability of decisions made singularly or collectively during adjudication or mediation of land related matters.

To improve delivery of land services, the SAFE Activity i) imparted knowledge of the land laws (formal and customary), including rights of the disadvantaged, to the members of the traditional and elders' council; ii) enhanced skills of the above persons in land administrative procedures and approaches to dispute resolution, including ADR practices; and iii) established and operationalized a referral system linking ADR and formal DRMs; and fourth, provided legal aid services to the marginalized through legal, para-legal, or ADR mechanisms.

The SAFE activities, demonstrated that if community members and office bearers involved in the dispensing of justice have sufficient knowledge of the land laws and avenues for both formal and informal land-related legal redress, and the systems for redress are strong, then there will be high opportunities for conflict mitigation, i.e. resolving land, oil, or ethnicity related cases. The change was envisioned to happen by de-mystifying and simplifying the opaque technicalities around the land laws through sensitizing and training all key people at various levels and in various institutions about the laws. The SAFE intervention extensively supported the legal awareness activities in the districts of operation, including supporting networks and varying fora to widely disseminate the information. While the ET found this concept valid, we also note that increasing legal awareness was not the end product in and of itself but a means to an end[6] and therefore a realistic pathway towards other changes. It strongly linked and contributed to the other intermediate results, e.g. institutions made more accessible (Sub-IR 1.1) and services made more efficient (Sub-IR 1.2).

With respect to the theory linking improved accountability mechanisms to mitigation of conflicts (Linkage between Intermediate Result 1 and Program objective), the SAFE program did not identify specific indicators directly measuring improved institutional accountability. The ET, however, considered SAFE supported activities such as supplying public noticeboards and ensuring that land related information is announced on such boards as strong elements towards improving mechanisms for land dispute resolution. These structures contributed to visibility, transparency, and accountability of land dispute resolution. The ET, however, observed that accountability in broad terms may refer to 'ability to account for one's activities especially in relation to transparency and governance' which under this component, is a concept best reflected in activities specified under Sub-IR 4 – Non-state Actor Oversight Improved. NSAs' activities, such as observing elections of ALCs, tracking and reporting on their performance, contributed to making them accountable.

Interviews with NSAs (under Sub-IR1.4) revealed that outputs under their oversight roles are another pathway that contributes towards LAI accountability mechanisms. Drawing on documented success stories[7] of CSOs' roles in enhancing transparency and good governance, the SAFE intervention engaged CSOs to monitor the performance of the LAIs and conduct general oversight over activities related to dispute resolution. This part of the ToC only partially held true because CSOs were not available in all districts.[8] Secondly, some CSOs did not have sufficient capacity to prepare acceptable grant proposals and implement oversight activities such as monitoring and tracking performance of LAIs. The SAFE design did not, however, sufficiently articulate how to make the informal /traditional institutions more accountable despite being clearly included in the definition of LAS and dispute resolution mechanisms (DRMs).

Interviews and how SAFE report to the indicators reveals that the logic of the Results Framework has functioned as the predominant Theory of Change and guided the programmatic decisions. The ET found that the activities under all four sub-IRs simultaneously achieved IR 1, improved land management[9]. The ET found no inconsistencies in the logic that SAFE operated under when interpreting the Results

---

[6] Could be interpreted as short-term outcomes leading to higher or longer outcomes
[7] End-of-project report of grantees
[8] SAFE received only responses to call for proposal from 13 out of 26 targeted districts.
[9] See Findings and Conclusions under EQ for a presentation of detailed evidence on activity results.

Framework and designing activities that would achieve the expected results[10] under the Access to justice component.

The findings in this evaluation also stresses that the interlinkages between to sub-IRs are very strong and assumes that there is "push and pull" within each result. To increase legal awareness, the institutions, councils and citizen representatives were trained. Legal aid services were also delivered by citizen representatives and public institutions. At a first glance, the SAFE Results Framework compartmentalizes a reality that is highly complex. It was clear though, that SAFE and the grantees were able to manage those complexities and interpreted the Results Framework to simultaneously strengthen the supply and demand sides to achieve the objective a of more accessible and accountable land management.

Theory of Change for Peace and Reconciliation

The development hypothesis for this component as provided in the PMP[11] is stated as follows: "Collaborating with NGOs, religious organizations and traditional institutions that focus on promoting peace, and GoU institutions with a peace mandate to develop their capacity to effectively resolve conflicts and disputes between individuals and groups, will facilitate reconciliation and healing process in conflicts stemming from the Lords Revolutionary [sic] Army (LRA) and other ongoing regional disputes".

To achieve the results in this component, SAFE facilitated formation of peace platforms and structures (community peace monitors, local peace committees, truth telling reconciliation committees etc) and supported the work of conflict Monitors, community resource persons radio listeners groups and forum theaters. Interviews and FGDs claim that the interventions increased the application of non-violent means of conflict resolution and would thus have been appropriate to achieve the expected results.[12] The hypothesis in the PMP is less clear on how those activities are supposed to achieve results. The Results Framework is also vague in terms of the relationships between the expected output, short term outcomes and long-term outcomes. Interviews with stakeholders confirm that the hypothesis and ToC for component 2 provided less guidance for implementation purposes. Additionally, the indicators under this component are at the output while the sub-IRs are stating outcomes. The match between them is unclear. For example, he percentage of citizens using peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms increased from 0% in 2014 to 62% in 2017, but *how* that happened cannot be derived from the performance data.

SAFE implementers noted that the component addressed emerging conflicts of varying nature but all with a common characteristic of having a potential to transform into violent conflicts. Probably owing to this variance in approach, the SAFE and NCSC implementers who responded provided explanations which were less easy to analyze and find a common view. Three out of seven SAFE staff interviewed stated that there were weak intra-Activity correlations, since for each conflict the underlying causes and drivers were different.

The interviews revealed that SAFE worked under the belief that the peace dividends, tolerance, co-existence, and healing, are the long-term outcomes from the processes of conflict resolution. Addressing perceptions of inequality is part of the reconciliation process, which requires healing and trust. To realize lasting peace, the SAFE program attempted to establish lasting dialogues and shared

---

[10] See Findings and Conclusions under EQ1.
[11] Cited from the USAID-SAFE's Activity Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Plan, as is currently named.
[12] See Findings and Conclusions under EQ1 for a presentation of detailed evidence on activity results.

peace dividends. For already existing conflicts, SAFE used an approach focused on understanding the socio-economic causes of conflict and divergence, real or perceived, and engaging relevant agencies and actors to initiate conversation with the communities about the issue and to collectively agree on potential solutions. The approach was successfully applied to selected APS and refugee camps. It was a cost-effective, normative approach to building on what already existed rather than creating new stand–alone interventions.

SAFE built on lessons learned from previous programs in conflict prone areas such as northern Uganda to implement early warning/early response systems for addressing emerging conflict. The program was well aligned to the efforts and plans of the GoU to attain national reconciliation under the first National Development Plan[13] and the first and second Peace Reconciliation and Development Plan frameworks. USAID support was aligned to IR 2.3: Peace Building and Conflict Mitigation Strengthened under the second development objective of the 2011-2015 USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategy and was a follow-up of the previous support by USAID under the SPRING program. The border conflict in Moroto, Karamoja sub-region; oil-related conflicts in the Albertine region; and the multiple ethnic conflicts in the Rwenzori region are key examples of potentially emerging violent conflicts which accordingly to KIIs were satisfactorily addressed under the SAFE intervention[14]. Discerned from ET interviews with various people in the field, the change pathway had a specific pattern of identification of causes of conflict, rigorous reporting, activating structures and mechanisms to address the existing or upcoming conflict and eliciting reconciliation, and finally sharing peace dividends.

Also, the ET found that an elaborated hypothesis that clarified pathways and assumptions could have guided the implementers to address some of those capacities that were needed to ensure better results. Over and above the stated hypothesis, "capacity to effectively solve disputes was enhanced, and reconciliation and healing processes supported, then peace would prevail". However, the ET observed additional requirements on the communities, local government, and other local stakeholders, for the theory of change to effectively address objectives through appropriate approaches:
- First, knowledge and skills for monitoring, reporting, and managing conflicts;
- Second, strong innovative and participatory structures (platforms, messages and people) for conflict sensitive reporting; and
- Third, managing perceptions of inequality related to access to services and natural resources.

4.1.2 Were the assumptions relevant? Did they hold? Which contextual factors may have rendered the ToC relevant or irrelevant?

USAID identifies two types of assumptions that should be included in a logic model: programmatic assumptions and context assumptions.[15] Programmatic assumptions are the (often implicit) ways in which key outcomes are expected to contribute to the next level of outcome. Context assumptions are those external factors in the project context that are also outside the activity's control but are nevertheless necessary for success. SAFE identified three critical assumptions in its PMP 2012-2014. These assumptions were stated to help articulate expectations about factors in play that may influence the design, implementation, and outcomes of SAFE.

---

[13] National Development Framework 2010/11-2014/15 (Chapter 8) and
[14] See Findings and Conclusions under EQ1.
[15] How-To Note; developing a logic model, Version 2, July 2017

- Grantee generated data being consistent in terms of definitions, data collection methodologies, and data validity;
- data collection approaches, a mix of public opinions and key informants' opinions not being too negative or positive to influence results;
- external actors and/or factors will not excessively interfere with the completion of tasks and activities.

SAFE performance management data was, by and large, driven by data collected and compiled by sub-grantees. According to the PMP and Data Quality Assessments, grantee data definitions and collection methodologies were at large in harmony with SAFE's data collection procedures and quality management then this assumption held true. The ET did not find further information regarding the second assumption. SAFE interpreted the third assumption to refer to actors interfering and while key informants reported political interference in the work of some ALCs but measures through sensitization were made to correct this, and it did not substantially interfere with the completion of the tasks. Whereas politically provoked contexts, such as those in the Rwenzururu Kingdom, could not allow the changes to happen as expected, others were possibly overlooked at the design, such as failure to analyze the context for sustainable voluntary reporting of emerging conflicts or time required to secure ownership and commitment to the program.

The ET found that the three assumptions in the PMP did not significantly guide programming or facilitate adaptive management. However, interviews, FGD's and program documentation/research revealed a number of contextual factors that the activity continuously monitored to better implement their interventions.

Inefficient and dysfunctional legal services: This affects the provision or delivery of formal legal services related to land disputes. It renders the referrals from the alternative justice systems that SAFE created dysfunctional. SAFE championed informal and alternative justice systems that would need to plug into the functioning judicial systems. A functional and strong referral mechanism between the formal and ADR systems was envisioned to support the reduction of caseloads, assuming that some cases would effectively be handled through ADRMs. If the ADR institutions, which are cheaper, could offer fast, effective, and fair mediations, then more cases for the poorer persons who cannot afford expensive and tedious court hearings would be handled faster.

Levels of poverty of the population: A poor populace are not able to meet legal and non-legal costs related to lengthy legal procedures and court bureaucracies which require repeated visits. Even in the case of pro bono services established by SAFE, some vulnerable litigants, especially women, dropped off due to high transport costs and slow repetitive processes. As observed in the second National Development Plan, poverty, physical distance to service institutions, and higher illiteracy, are among those factors that limit access to justice.

Prolonged conflicts in the neighboring countries (South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea): In some cases, the causes of conflicts were bigger than what SAFE could address. Examples include:
- The continued influx of refugees from South Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo;

- Conflict in the Rwenzori sub-region;[16]
- Gender-related effects post-LRA conflict.[17]

These prolonged conflict areas are a source of an unending influx of refugees in Uganda. Peace building and reconciliation interventions with one wave of refugees does not eliminate the problem.

Stakeholders involvement: Top leadership of both MLHUD and the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs were unenthusiastic about SAFE interventions. For example, MLHUD did not sign off the memorandum of understanding and training manual.

Existence of other actors: Interventions of other development partners complemented effort towards change on some of the pathways addressed by SAFE.

Corruption in land management: The level of corruption in land administration created an opportunity for communities to fully embrace the SAFE program for its potential to create awareness about land and procedures. Especially in the Albertine region, the SAFE program educated the populace about their land rights to enable them to resist land grabbing and created a platform for discussions about land acquisition for the oil industry infrastructure and compensation rates.

The findings above allowed the Evaluation team to elaborate on what assumptions could have been useful to guide programming. The ET identified seven (7) additional assumptions that were necessary for the ToC to hold true but were not articulated at design stage. Five (5) of these are design related (context, actors, and factors around the actors); while the other two (2) were critical to the change process. The table below summarizes the ET's assessment of these assumptions.

Table 4: Assumptions for change

Context	Assumption	Comment on whether it held true
Assumptions about Context, Actors and Factors – effect on quality of Implementation	1. Interests, beliefs, perceptions in traditions, cultural norms of the various actors sufficiently addressed to commit total participation 2. Stakeholders are fully committed to embracing referral systems 3. Marginalized persons are able to meet other costs beyond costs of legal services 4. CSO availability and capacity secured and that the data they collect will be consistent in terms of definition, data collection, methodologies and data validity	▪ Commitment and 'buy in' by Senior Officials in MLHUD Government and JLOS- only partially held true ▪ Factors other than costs of legal services could be afforded – did not hold ▪ Limited commitment to changes and practices towards land administrative systems in Acholi - did not hold ▪ CSOs availability and capacity to write proposals - did not hold ▪ Capability for oversight NSA- partial held
Assumptions critical to the change process	5. Information and knowledge acquired adopted and adapted to inform changes 6. Community based dissemination effective in delivering messages for change	▪ Change process through knowledge acquisition informed changes – held true ▪ Changes were observed through community information dissemination channels - Held true
Assumptions	7. Free litigation services would increase	▪ Slow and repetitive court processes were

---

[16] The king of the region (Obusinga –Bwa Rwenzururu -OBB) community was still imprisoned by the time of the evaluation, which the local communities mentioned as potential cause of resurgence of conflict if not addressed.
[17] Failure of communities and families to assimilate children born to mothers raped by LRA commanders while in abduction: the Trauma and healing process related to such incidences required and still requires more time and perhaps approaches bigger than what the SAFE intervention could offer within its time frame.

external to the change process	demand for services by the vulnerable persons	cost-prohibitive to targeted vulnerable and affected consumption of services - did not hold

EQ2 Concluding Statements

Since the Theory of Change was not elaborated on in PMP and in other program documents, the Results Framework served as the main Theory of Change for implementation of SAFE as well as the ET in answering this question. In consideration of the findings presented above, the SAFE program theory of change derived from the Results Framework was related to the objectives identified within component 1 and component 2. Linkages to outcomes were evident for most of the intended intermediate results, however, the theory lacked detailed articulation of the pathways of change from intermediate results to the higher-level outcome of conflict mitigation, especially under component 1. Whereas component 2 had a more generic relationship between interventions, objectives and results, where in reality implementers were each dealing with unique circumstances and were employing a variety of approaches based on best practice or lessons learned.

In conclusions, given that SAFE achieved most of its performance targets, the lack of documentation and tracking of programmatic and contextual assumptions did not have serious effects on program outputs. However, if SAFE had deliberately addressed the suggested assumptions in table 2 as well as six contextual factors identified from the ET's data collection, opportunities could have been leveraged and challenges addressed more systematically to achieve even better results. Without a complete ToC and a structured MEL framework that test and validates the ToC, opportunities will be missed.

4.2   EQ1: To what extend did the activity achieve its objectives as set out in the SOW?

This section focuses on findings of both components of the SAFE program, namely access to justice, and peace and reconciliation. The section examines the effectiveness of SAFE interventions but will also explore the results achieved, both intended and unintended, for each of the components. The findings for Evaluation Question 1 (EQ1) are presented below, starting with component 1 (Access to Justice) followed by component 2 (Peace and Reconciliation). The findings for each component are discussed under four (4) evaluation sub-questions:

   i)   Did the project achieve the intended outputs and targets in each results area?
   ii)   Were the outputs sufficient to translate into expected outcomes?
   iii) What factors enabled the achievement (or led to non-achievement) of the Activity's objectives?
   iv)   How did the Activity incorporate cross-cutting issues (women, youth, oil) into the program and how effective were those interventions?

4.2.1   Component 1: Access to Justice

Access to justice refers to citizens' ability to use various public and private services on demand.[18] Elsewhere, it is defined as the ability of people to seek and obtain a remedy through formal or informal institutions of justice for grievances[19] in compliance with human rights standards. Under component 1

---

[18] Handbook for democracy and governance indicators (EN-ACC-390) -1998
[19] United Nations Development Programme, *Programming for Justice: Access for All: A Practitioner's Guide to Human Rights-Based Approach to Access to Justice (Bangkok: UNDP, 2005): UNDP, Programming for Justice, 2005.*

the SAFE program focused on supporting systems for land administration and management, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, legal aid, legal awareness, and civil society oversight, see the Results Framework (Figure 1).

For clarity in presentation of findings of this component, 'strengthening land administration and management' is delineated and discussed separately from 'strengthening access to justice'. This is due to the fact that the targeted institutions (DLBs and ALCs) that operate under MLHUD are not mandated[20] to resolve land disputes, even if in reality they do so. On the other hand, access to land justice - in this case understood as protection or restoration of the land rights – is a mandate of the courts of law under the Ministry of Justice, Justice and Constitutional Affairs. The informal LAIs, regarded by the Activity as traditional institutions, included clans and councils of elders who also endow land rights and therefore administer justice.

Key findings
1. The levels of trust and confidence in the ALCs was reported to have increased (all four DLBs interviewed & all relevant KIIs: N=25, Female=14).
2. The expansion of structures for delivery of land justice to include paralegals, LC IIIs, specially-trained CSOs, community legal volunteers, traditional leaders, and mediators which enabled scores of beneficiaries to access land justice through additional avenues such as ADRMs (SAFE EPR pg. 11).
3. Collaboration and coordination between formal and informal institutions has improved (3 of 4 grantees interviewed and non-state actors interviewed as KIIs: N=9, Female=6). Safe annual report year 4: PP8.
4. High levels of awareness and understanding of key elements of land rights (all relevant KIIs: N=46, Female=19 and PRS 2016 at 80% beneficiaries).
5. Existence of a functional referral mechanism where cases are referred between and among LAIs (all relevant KIIs: N=15. Female=9).
6. The NSAs proved to be a critical catalyst for exposing corrupt tendencies among LAIs. (SAFE EPR pg. 13.)

Did the Activity achieve the intended outputs and targets in each results area and were the outputs sufficient to achieve the expected outcomes?

For component 1, one of the expected outcome is translated into an indicator that measures the percentage of local governments in targeted areas with improved functional land administration and management structures resulting from USG assistance. The data entered in PRS shows a slow start and a sudden full achievement in 2016 (100%). However, the denominator was changed from 268 to 217 local government units. Interviews and FGDs confirm that the number of units they worked with changed and the interventions' effect on the outcome was delayed until 2016. They also confirmed that SAFE trained people and supported delivery of services and set up oversight systems over the years which eventually translated into functional land administration and management structures.

SAFE met the targets of The proportion of land cases that have been resolved with USG assistance, well and beyond. The targets of the percentage of the land cases resolved favourably with USG assisted legal aid were also met over the life of the activity. The percentage of citizens satisfied with land-related services in target districts also ended on a high note, with 62% in 2016 and 76% in 2017.

---

[20] Uganda Land Act 1998

Figure 2: SAFE Indicators related to Access to Justice outcomes, PRS 2018.

The following sections will assess each result area per sub-IR to assess whether the targets where met and if the outputs where sufficient to achieve the expected outcomes.

A. Land institutions made more accessible and accountable

Under this result area, SAFE conducted capacity building trainings for LAIs and other actors. A total of 2,888 people, including members of DLBs and ALCs, Recorders, judicial officials, and traditional leaders, were trained in land administration procedures; enforcement of land regulations; transparency and accountability; and coordination of conflict mediation efforts. In addition, SAFE provided supplies to enable officials to carry out their functions in relation to land matters. 3,595 copies of the Land Act and Regulations were printed and distributed to local land management officials. Available performance data from USAID/Uganda's PRS[21] for the year 2016 indicates that the achievements of SAFE exceeded targets on key indicators[22] related to LAIs.

---

[21] USAID/Uganda Performance Reporting System
[22] Percent of local governments in targeted areas with improved functional land administration and management structures resulting from USG assistance; Number of DLB and ALC members, and traditional leaders trained based on project-supported curricula; Number of people trained in using oversight toolkits for monitoring performance of ALC, DLBs, ADR and cultural institutions.

Figure 3: SAFE Indicators related to Sub-IR 1.1, PRS 2018

Where the outputs sufficient to translate into expected outcomes in Sub-IR 1.1?

The ET inferred Improved accessibility of LAIs from incremental land registration applications, whereas accountability of institutions was taken to mean fulfilment of administrative mandates, vertically with DLBs and horizontally with other formal and informal land administration institutions. Apart from the outcome that was measured of functional land administration, the qualitative data collection and analysis revealed a number of intended and unintended outcomes. Under this result area, SAFE produced numerous but varied outcomes. Following are some of the outcomes that stand out:

1. **Functional LAIs (DLBs & ALCs) with confident members:** Resulting from SAFE supported trainings, members of the LAIs have become more confident and actively process land applications in accordance to their mandate (EPR 2017). All interviewed NSAs (N=9, Female=6), whose role in this program was to monitor performance of land administration institutions, confirmed that currently ALCs i) conduct land inspections/surveys in accordance with the regulations; ii) write better inspection reports; iii) draw proper sketch maps; and iv) write more comprehensive minutes - all of which has resulted in very few applications being rejected or deferred by the DLBs. Members of the LAIs too acknowledged the confidence gained after SAFE trainings as attested to by an ALC Member from the Albertine region, "At first, I did not know what to do much as I was a member of the ALC. However, after they taught us, I now know what to do." The improved capacities of LAIs were confirmed by a local government official from Albertine sub-region with the following quote, "Capacity building and support to ALCs has eased the work of ALCs".

2. **Increased interest in land registration[23], increased application[24]:** This is reflected in increased applications for freehold land titles in districts where land is held under customary tenure (Amuru, Soroti, Gulu and Lira). Applications for freehold titles increased to 10-15 per quarter from previous only one or two. *(2 of 5 FGDs, all KIIs with LAIs & grantees & duty bearers confirmed this & EPR 2017).* A female ALC member from the Albertine region also mentioned that the cases of land registration in the last one year (2017) had increased to 3 - up from 10 of the previous year (2016).

---

[23] Interest in land registration is manifested in the number of applications submitted.
[24] Interest in land registration is manifested in the number of applications submitted to ALCs.

3. **Improved documentation of land under communal ownership:** For example, in Lira district, community leaders trained by SAFE not only helped their communities but were also helping neighboring communities to document their community land and resolve land disputes *(FGD in Lira, CSO Gulu and SAFE grantee, LEMU).*

4. **Reduced time of processing land registration applications:** It was reported that the applications from ALCs are always complete and free of errors and therefore get approved on the first submission *(all three members of DLBs interviewed from Gulu, Hoima, and Masindi; and 9 NSAs, SAFE annual report year 4).*

5. **LAIs demonstrating improved accountability:** Resulting from SAFE intervention, LAIs started to maintain records of land transactions they handled; to conduct frequent community meetings to provide feedback on their actions and decisions; to report upwards and downwards; and to conduct community outreaches (NSAs and SAFE reports).

6. **High quality accountability reports produced by LAIs:** ALCs in all the districts prepared high quality reports. SAFE annual report year four reveals the occurrence of the first local government land administration and governance accountability reports for Hoima and Masindi districts. At a dissemination meeting at Hoima district the secretary of the DLB admitted that: *…I feel that I am the prime beneficiary of this ending project [SAFE]. When I attended the training for Land Administration Institutions last year [December 2015] that was organized by SAFE, for sure I never expected the enthusiasm within the ALCs and the DLB as I have witnessed now! My Office has recorded tremendous successes, all documented in the copy of this beautiful annual report. I want to thank SAFE Program for enabling the District Land Office to compile and present the first ever public accountability report"* (Male LAI member Albertine Region).

7. **Inclusion of women in ALC activities:** LEMU progress report 2014 gives an account of ALCs adopting innovative ways of ensuring that women are actively involved in most of their activities. For instance, in Gulu district the ALCs made it a practice not to conduct any land inspections unless women and children are present, which is one way of ensuring that their rights and interest are protected. This took place after SAFE, in collaboration with MLHUD, trained ALCs on land laws, land rights, and procedures.

8. **Opening land inspection events to wider participation:** In 2 of 4 FGDs held to discuss land (Hoima and Gulu) said that LAIs invite other key stakeholders i.e. elders, clan leaders and Recorders to participate in the land inspection activities. As in (g) above, this change following the training received by DLBs and ALCs by the MLHUD and SAFE on land laws, rights and procedures.

9. **Integration of land dispute resolution in the function of the ALCs:** ALCs participated in resolving land disputes by applying ADRMs. For instance, in Gulu district in the period from January 2017 to March 2017, ALCs registered a total of 42 land disputes for mediation. Of these, only five could not be mediated to completion and were referred to courts of law. Thirteen (31%) of the 42 cases were referred to ALCs by CSOs working in the district and 2 were referred by traditional leaders (SAFE EPR, *not dated* pp 8-9).

10. **Reduction in the number of land disputes:** SAFE annual report year four indicates a progressive reduction in the number of reported land cases. During a quarterly meeting, the chairperson of Layibi division ALC, Amuru District reported that: *"Although I am the chairperson of the ALC in Layibi division, I am the Secretary to the Sub-county court committee as well. Since*

November 2016, I have noticed a reduction of cases brought to the committee. From about 10 to just 2 or even none per month". In Palaro Sub County, the Chairperson ALC stated that, "*I am a member of the traditional committee that handles land disputes in my community and since January 2017, we have only received 2 land disputes that were successfully resolved. But in 2015 and 2016, we were sitting almost every weekend to hear land disputes*" (SAFE EPR pp 11).

11. **Peaceful and affordable resolution of land disputes:** By training CLVs and clan leaders, and by introducing the ADR approach, SAFE instituted affordable dispute resolution mechanisms within communities. In Nebbi district, of the 65 land disputes reported across the five chiefdoms, 44 were successfully mediated and settled by cultural leaders and the land rights monitors trained by SAFE. The SAFE EPR 2017 reported that mediation efforts reconciled parties and promoted peaceful co-existence as well as social cohesion in some communities. A stand out example was recorded in Gulu district where, in November 2016 two clans of Boke-Ber Village, Paicho sub-county were successfully reconciled by ALCs and traditional leaders following a violent land dispute.

> ADR involves cultural leaders/chiefs. Sometimes people pursue the formal system, but when it gets expensive, then people come back to ADR. Local leaders help to enforce decisions. Whereas the formal court rules in favor of the person who brings evidence and witnesses, the ADR looks for a win-win solution [for both parties] (Duty Bearer, Gulu District).

12. **Improved performance of LAIs:** During field interviews respondents (DLBs=3; 3 traditional leaders & FGDs=5) ranked performance of LAIs above average on scale of 1-5 scale (N*ot sure=1, Poor=2, Average=3, High=4 and Very high=5)*. The responses affirm that there was general perception of improvements in LAIs - but much more in informal / traditional institutions than in formal institutions (DLBs & ALCs). The improvements in performance were associated with the submission of fully completed and free of errors applications by ALCs and faster processing of application by both DLBs and ALCs.

B. Administrative Land Management and Legal Aid Services Made More Efficient

SAFE defined administrative land management and legal services as any service provided to resolve issues related to land - whether it's the recording of land transactions, the resolution of land-related disputes, or any other matter related to the administration of land and land rights. Land cases were understood to mean any disagreement(s) or disputes linked to land; while resolved meant that an agreement had been reached that satisfied both parties involved in an earlier dispute or conflict.

Smoothness of processes in recording land transactions and resolving land related disputes would constitute efficiency. Ordinarily, efficiency would also include the time taken to process a land title or certificate of customary ownership, time to resolve a land case, the actual cost in terms of money spent, and the fairness of the process. Efficiency of land administration and management services included the existence of a functional referral system as well as coordination of services amongst institutions.

To achieve the intended result, SAFE trained more than 200 community legal volunteers (CLVs), trained 100 elders and members of the clan councils in ADR, facilitated linkages between traditional authorities, local authorities (e.g. Local Council Courts) and Magistrates Courts, facilitated the translation, printing, and distribution of legal resources and relevant information, education, and communication products (e.g. Land Rights Handbook and sensitization toolkit for traditional leaders), and supported the provision

of legal and paralegal services. SAFE's performance data in USAID's PRS indicates that a total 11,239 citizens received legal aid services from SAFE grantees.

Figure 4: SAFE Indicator related to Sub-IR 1.2, PRS 2018

Where the outputs sufficient to translate into expected outcomes in sub-IR 1.2?

SAFE defined efficiency of land administration and management services to mean the existence of a functional referral system as well as coordination of services amongst institutions. To improve efficiency, a referral system was envisaged in which the ADRs and formal dispute resolution institutions would be linked with the aim of increasing coverage and improving coordination of services. SAFE's outcomes harvesting reports and the SAFE land conference proceedings have all documented evidence that the Activity strengthened mechanisms for mediation, but equally important, established strong links between courts of law and the elders', or traditional councils. Specifically, SAFE outcomes harvesting reports revealed that traditional leaders refer cases to ALCs for alternative solutions. In the same reports, traditional leaders were reported to co-opt ALCs to participate in dispute resolution meetings of clan councils.

Available performance data from USAID/Uganda's PRS for the years 2014 -2017 indicates that SAFE achieved all targets on key indicators related to this result area. Consequently, program outputs produced the following outcomes:

1. **Expanded coverage legal aid services:** Through its grantees, SAFE expanded coverage of (increased access to) legal aid services. The legal aid services included mediations; legal advice and counselling; filing of land cases in court; legal representation; drafting of legal documents; and mediation of disputes. Mobile legal aid clinics supported by SAFE have helped to bring legal services directly to the communities, especially in hard-to-reach or far-flung localities. It is reported that CLVs provide paralegal services to women, youth, and other underprivileged persons in the communities.

2. **Better collaboration and coordination between formal and informal LAIs[25]:** The

---

[25] This is exemplified by the adopted practice of traditional leaders who invite members of ALCs to participate their arbitration sessions and meetings related to land management (2 FGDs – Gulu & Lira)

evaluation revealed the existence of better coordination between formal and informal institutions as attested by religious and clan leaders in Amuru and Gulu districts. The SAFE program improved the networking (coordination and collaboration) between traditional authorities, local council courts, and magistrate courts in the course of facilitating the resolution of land disputes. The roles and different mandates of various actors in the provision of justice on land matters and channels of communication of decisions or actions taken at different levels were streamlined. This contributed to building stronger legal referral or land administration networks within target districts. The CLVs identified and promptly referred cases of vulnerable women and children to SAFE grantees for legal representation. This has in effect expanded access to legal aid services -legal advice or counselling and legal representation (SAFE annual report 2014, NSA and FGD Lira). The International Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) respondent in Gulu confirmed collaboration between the police, ALCs, and traditional leaders. Similarly, a district level duty bearer in Hoima noted that SAFE intervention and collaboration between Mid-Western Region Anti-Corruption Coalition (MIRAC) and other CSOs helped in strengthening the communication between the communities and local government. Three of the duty bearers and five of the grantees interviewed attribute the improved efficiency to increased knowledge of land laws by all actors. This was affirmed in three of the five FGDs.

3. **Improved capacities of local actors to mediate land disputes:** Capacities of community-based actors to mediate disputes were improved. Local leaders and CLVs were trained in laws governing land and legal procedures and were equipped with mediation skills. Currently, CLVs are actively involved in raising awareness on land rights and provision of legal advice to community members. Some of the CLVs have been co-opted into lower local council courts as resource persons with knowledge of land laws (SAFE annual report 2014).

4. **Increased preference for ADRMs:** ADR has gained widespread acceptance among the communities and local leaders involved in dispute resolution (SAFE Annual Report Year 4: pp 8) Interviewed duty bearers in Gulu and Amuru (KIIs) reported an increase in the application of the mediation approach in processes of resolving land disputes. This was confirmed by two grantees, FGD Lira and SAFE reports. All five FGDs in component 1 pointed out that the full-time availability of CLVs and traditional leader trained in ADR approaches eliminated the need for parties in dispute to go to formal courts.

5. **Satisfactory handling of land applications by LAIs:** Available performance data indicates that 76 percent of the beneficiaries were satisfied with the handling of land applications (PRS data 2014-2017). This was confirmed by interviews conducted with three (3) members of the district land board.

C. Legal Awareness on Land Matters Increased

At the inception of the program, lack of legal awareness was flagged as a key impediment to accessing justice, especially for disadvantaged groups who were deemed least likely to be familiar with their rights. Legal awareness on land matters was defined as acquired knowledge about land laws and rights and where to seek redress. The indications of increased legal awareness are manifested in community expressed understanding of land laws and rights *(SAFE annual reports FY 2013-2015).*

Under this result area, SAFE grantees conducted

- Capacity building training for traditional and local leaders on land tenure systems, land laws, and the procedures governing land administration.
- Community sensitization campaigns were conducted to educate citizens about the roles of DLBs, ALCs, and local council courts on land matters; individual land rights and mandates of institutions charged with land administration; and mechanisms (both formal and informal) for resolution of land disputes.
- Community dialogues on land issues, and the sensitization activities reached out to a total of 38,083 people.

Contributing the outcomes under this result, even if listed to also contribute to another sub-IR, were also the trainings of the DLBs and ALCs. SAFE, in collaboration with staff from the MLHUD district zone office, conducted trainings for DLBs and ALCs on land laws, procedures, and discussed mandates of each under Uganda's land law *(ibid)*. According to the SAFE end-of-project report (EPR, 2018), under component 1, at least 75 percent (15/20) of the targeted districts benefited from the interventions where more than 20,000 beneficiaries were covered. Based on SAFE progress reports, over 70 percent of the interventions designed to impart legal awareness were completed and over 60 percent[26] of the targeted population were aware of their land rights.

Figure 5: SAFE Indicator related to Sub-IR 1.3, PRS 2018

Were the outputs sufficient to translate into expected outcomes in sub-IR 1.3?

The outputs under this result area revolved around building up a critical mass of community members and duty bearers with adequate knowledge about land rights and channels resolving land. The achieved outputs produced the following outcomes:

1. **Increased awareness of processes and mechanisms for land registration:** Legal awareness of land matters was very high among community members. For example, in the Albertine region, 12 out of the 16 interviewed community beneficiaries were knowledgeable about land laws and procedures of LAIs and participated in all legal awareness dialogues. The

---

26 EPR 2018

SAFE program was regarded as 'an eye-opener' in situations where citizens' voices over land rights had been suffocated due to the oil and gas extraction. However, across all the SAFE targeted districts, following sensitization, some community members had made contact with LAIs to register their own land or follow up on their applications (KIIs Albertine, EPR pg. 6, NSAs).

2. **Increased interest in obtaining land titles and customary Certificates of Ownership (CCO):** Applications for land titles by community members increased. Mbarara district stood out as having recorded the highest number of applications for land registration from 673 in 2015 to 735 in 2016 an increment of 92 percent (SAFE EPR pg. 6). The ALC chairperson, Gulu district, observed that *"As a result of the increased awareness, we are now receiving at least three applications every month as compared to my first term in office when we were not receiving any applications. This is because we were not trained and therefore not confident enough to stand before the community and sensitize".*

3. **Formation of community-based pressure groups to resist land grabbing or reject low compensation rates:** Especially in the Albertine region, communities successfully petitioned the government and oil companies to review compensation rates and resettlement procedures. Similarly, another community petition from the same region was launched to request that the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) would investigate cases of illegal land grabbing in the area. These developments followed SAFE-led trainings on stakeholder participation and land rights marking a new wave of collective community action to pressure the government to address to their concerns over land rights (SAFE grantee also indicated in *SAFE Uganda: Outcome Harvesting Report).*

D. Non-state Actor Oversight Improved

NSA (oversight) were structures established to monitor performance of ALCs, and track and report on cases related to land-issues on a regular basis. The SAFE program envisioned NSAs playing a greater role in monitoring performance of LAIs (*SAFE Solicitation document pg.17).* Under this result area, SAFE developed a monitoring toolkit that was used in the collection and analysis of data on land related decisions by the ALCs, DLBs and traditional leaders; and SAFE trained local CSOs in the step-by-step use of the tools developed.These interventions aimed to increase engagement of NGOs and community-based organizations in monitoring the composition of ALCs and DLBs, and increase performance of these LAIs, including ADRMs. They further aimed at strengthening capacity of NSAs in tracking administrative caseloads, enforcing decisions and GOU budget transfers to local government for land management and administration, and monitoring transparency and accountability among professional bodies and service providers on laws and land transactions (*SAFE annual reports FY2013-2015).* The LAI monitoring toolkit was rolled out in four districts, Nebbi, Gulu, Amuru, and Masindi *(KIIs with SAFE staff, EPT pg. 13 & Annual report FY 2014).* In these districts, the NSAs monitored the use of supplies distributed by SAFE and provided a monthly update on items required for upcoming land inspections.

According to PRS records, only 120 individuals were trained in using oversight toolkits, which was below the targets set for the years 2014-2017 (330 individuals).

Figure 6: SAFE Indicator related to Sub-IR 1.4, PRS 2018

Where the outputs sufficient to translate into expected outcomes in sub-IR 1.4?

Under this result area, SAFE rolled out the LAI monitoring toolkit in the four districts of Nebbi, Gulu, Amuru, and Masindi. Consequently, the NSAs monitored the implementation of AIPs and activities of ALCs and DLBs. The following outcomes were achieved:

1. **Culture of monitoring activities and writing reports established:** With SAFE facilitation, the NSAs instituted a practice of compiling and filing monthly monitoring reports on performance of DLBs and ALCs. "I was charged with writing reports and to refer people to the appropriate authorities to handle their land issues" (KII and NSAs Albertine Region).

2. **Establishment of community accountability platforms:** SAFE intervention facilitated community meetings where LAIs provided feedback on their actions and decisions (KII and NSAs Albertine Region).

3. **Improvement in operations of ALCs:** The NSAs interventions improved the performance of the ALCs in the four districts where oversight activities were implemented, there was clear evidence that many of these supervised land committees were doing the right things (SAFE EPR 2017: pp 14). The improvements are characterized by submission of fully complete applications and free of errors; conducting land inspections/surveys in accordance with the regulations; writing of better inspection reports; and drawing proper sketch maps and writing more comprehensive minutes.

4. **Enhanced case referral:** NSAs influenced case referral from courts of law to traditional leaders for mediation, e.g. Nebbi district.

5. **Mitigation of fraud in land transactions:** The oversight activities and reporting practices of NSAs exposed illegitimate actors, extortionist practices, fraudulent land transactions, and processes whereby land registration documents were given to unsuspecting members of the communities (a case of Amuru and Gulu districts).

6. **ALCs were not trained in mediation,** a role overlooked by the program, but have inevitably assumed the mediation roles and are performing well. This unintended outcome is currently a good practice but with a potential for being abused if not streamlined in the future.

4.2.2   Component 2: Peace and Reconciliation

Under component 2 the SAFE program focused on transforming conflicts into peaceful outcomes and enhancing processes of reconciliation. Conflict transformation was defined as the process by which conflicts were transformed into peaceful outcomes by addressing both behavioral and structural manifestations of the conflict.[27.] Elsewhere[28], conflict has been defined as a state of discord caused by the actual or perceived opposition of needs, values and interests. A conflict can be internal (within oneself) or external (between two or more individuals). On the other hand, reconciliation was defined a restoration of relations and mutual respect amongst individuals and communities in conflict.

In pursuit of peace and reconciliation objectives, SAFE supported strengthening of mechanisms for mitigating conflicts in targeted districts. Through the grantees, SAFE facilitated formation of peace platforms and structures, namely community peace monitors, local peace committees, truth telling and reconciliation committees, etc. In addition, SAFE facilitated the work of Conflict Monitors, community resource persons, radio listeners groups and forum theatres. The findings under this section are presented according to the two result areas of component 2:

Key findings
1   The early warning mechanism for systematic monitoring and reporting of conflict incidences established and facilitating timely responses (Source: Monthly conflict assessment reports=60).
2   Peace platforms and structures established (Source: KIIs and SAFE annual reports).
3   Reduction in the number and nature of violent conflicts or transformed into peaceful outcomes (mentioned by all 10 FGDs on peace and reconciliation).
4   Increased application of non-violent means of conflict resolution was evident (21 of 26 KIIs interviewed peace and reconciliation, all FGDs, SAFE EPR).
5   Reconciliation and improved relations between previously hostile communities (8 of 10 FGDs on peace and reconciliation).
6   The culture of conflict–sensitive reporting and mass communication entrenched at media houses under the SAFE intervention (2KIIs & 2 FGDs on media).
7   Conflict-sensitive leadership practiced (all local leaders interviews N=17, Female=9, M=8).
8   Perceptions about inequality in resource sharing and access to services improved (7 of 11 FGDs).
9   Monthly conflict assessment reports utilized to design responses to emerging conflicts (all KIIs of SAFE, USAID & Field Monitors).
10 Local capacities to facilitate reconciliation processes increased (all KIIs and FGDs).

Did the activity achieve the intended outputs and targets in each results area and were the outputs sufficient to translate into outcomes?

One indicator was identified to measure the result of the IR 2. Enhanced peace and reconciliation. The outcome measure, Percentage citizens using peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms, had slow start but

---

[27] Sollicitation Document Number: SOL-617-12-000002, page 18
[28] CONFLICT MONITORING TRAINING, Training Guide in Conflict Analysis, Monitoring and Reporting, page 11

achieved actuals beyond targets in 2016 and 2017. The performance data of SAFE in the USAID PRS indicate increase in the application of peaceful dispute resolution (2015=4%; 2016=50% and 2017=62%).

Percentage of citizens using peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms

Figure 7: SAFE indicator related to outcomes for IR 2, Peace and Reconciliation.

In this section, the results are presented by the two sub-intermediate results (result areas) of Component 2.

A. Emerging violent conflicts transformed into peaceful outcomes

To achieve the results in the Sub-IR, interventions that were organized to contribute to Sub-IR 2.1 and the overall IR 2, also contributed greatly to this Sub-IR. Interviews with SAFE staff revealed that the interlinkages between the results and the outputs were clear to SAFE staff so the compartmentalized Results Framework structure did not prevent SAFE from leveraging the synergies in the interlinkages between results.

To achieve this result, SAFE trained 6,208 persons[29] (72% of the 8,400 targeted) in conflict prevention and management. SAFE developed a training guide in conflict analysis, monitoring and reporting which was used to train 538 Field Monitors. SAFE facilitated the establishment of an early warning and early response mechanism through a nation-wide network of Conflict Monitors (N=538 of which 42% were females). These Conflict Monitors regularly compiled monthly conflict assessment reports basing on early warning signs. SAFE supported the implementation capacity building training for local leaders and communities to monitor, analyze, report and manage conflicts; dissemination of peace messages; convening of round tables discussions to promote transparency and public awareness on matters regarding oil and natural resources; and inclusion of youth and women in peace processes.

To achieve results in this Sub-IR, SAFE also facilitated formation of peace platforms and structures, namely: community peace monitors, local peace committees, truth telling, reconciliation committees, etc. In addition, SAFE facilitated the formation of mechanisms for exchange of peace messages. In total

---

[29] USAID's PRS 2014-2017

627 peace messages were exchanged, surpassing the target of 364 by 72 percent. SAFE supported the training in conflict sensitive leadership.

The PRS records show mixed results in meeting targets. Number of people trained was mostly met and overall, SAFE met the targets of Number of local women participating in a substantive role or position in a peacebuilding process supported with USG assistance. In total, 171 women participated on average per year while the target was set to 165 on average per year. SAFE did not meet the targets of the two output measures Number of new groups or initiatives created through USG funding dedicated to resolving conflict or the drivers of conflict, and Number of community-based reconciliation projects completed with USG assistance.

Figure 8: SAFE Indicators related to sub IR 2.1, PRS 2018.

Were the outputs sufficient to translate into expected outcomes in Sub-IR 2.1?

Under this result area, the outcomes of the SAFE program revolve around peaceful resolution of disputes and transformation of conflicts. At the end of the activity, 62 % of the citizens used peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms in the areas of SAFE influence. The qualitative data collection and analysis also revealed intended and unintended outcomes that qualifies the statement of the interventions being translated into outcomes and provides important lessons learned.

The following are some of the outstanding outcomes:

1. **Reduction in the numbers of violent confrontations:** For example, at Rhino Camp relations between hosts communities and refugees improved. Previously, about fifteen cases were registered per month but currently reported incidents of violent conflicts have reduced to one case per month.[30] The Refugee Welfare Council 1 (RWC), Tika village reported that because of SAFE dialogue meetings and trainings, incidences of tribal-tensions have reduced from approximately four per week to one or two in six months.[31]

2. **Non-violent means of resolving disputes adopted:** In Karamoja, a formula for equitable utilization of communally shared natural resources such as sharing grazing land, water resources and markets has been found acceptable by local communities in Rupa & Katikekile sub-counties. According to the PRS records, the percentage of citizens using peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms-shown in Figure 3 has been on the increase.

3. **Tolerance and peaceful co-existence:** For example, according to feedback from 16 out of 17 interviews (13 KIIs and 4FGDs) conducted in the Rwenzori sub-region previously hostile groups e.g. Bakonzo and Bamba of Bundibugyo district now co-exist peacefully. In Arua refugees and host-communities co-exist peacefully to the extent that local residents can now easily marry refugee ladies and vice versa.[32] In Bundibugyo, 80 percent of interviewed local leaders testified that they participated in dialogues and radio talk shows in the presence of their former political opponents - which could not have happened before SAFE intervention.

4. **Improved collaboration and coordination on resources management:** SAFE interventions improved collaboration and communication between Government and communities regarding resources-based disputes; and remedial actions like evictions and compensation rates. The case in point is the resolution of the conflict between the National Forest Authority and community members of Kasange Parish, Masindi district. An agreed settlement was reached on the demarcation of the forest boundary and the suitable grace period for complete withdrawal from encroached and degraded areas of the forest reserve (6 out of 10 KIIs, Masindi).

5. **Reduction in gender-based violence:** All interviewed local leaders (N=17, Female=9) reported reduced incidences of GBV. For example, in Gulu, 47 cases were reported in 2015 and 2016 compared to 12 cases in 2017.

6. **Systematic collection and sharing of early warning information:** The sharing of early warning reports enabled CSOs and Government to respond to emerging conflicts with appropriate mitigation measures. According to information gathered from interviews with SAFE and USAID staff (7 KIIs) the development of APS[33] was informed by early warning reports. In these interviews several cases of either CSOs or local authorities taking appropriate actions to mitigate emerging conflicts were revealed. The interview with LC III chairperson, Muhokya sub-county, Kasese district confirmed the actions taken by the sub-county leadership to resolve the conflict between Bakonzo, Banyabindi and Basongora over water sharing. He gave an account of how the sub-county leadership deployed security to guard irrigation infrastructure, while at the

---

[30] RICE – WN USAID SAFE End of Project Report, 2017, page 9
[31] Ibid, 2017, page 9
[32] Interview with an FGD the host community at Tika 1 zone Rhino camp Arua, June 2018
[33] Annual Program Statement (APS) was an annual emergency fund to respond to emerging conflict situations. It is a fast and flexible approach in-built into component 2 of SAFE with particular emphasis on responding to conflict flares and triggers. The APS was based on periodic conflict assessment reports that identified emerging conflict dynamics, opportunities for peace and reconciliation (SAFE Solicitation document).

same time, convened inter-ethnic (Bakonzo, Banyabindi and Basongora) dialogue meeting to find an amicable solution for water sharing.

B. Processes for community reconciliation enhanced

Under this result area, the SAFE program aimed to strengthen structures for promoting peaceful co-existence, community cohesion, and reconciliation of parties in conflict. SAFE supported the formation of platforms and structures for reconciliation. A total of **368** peace building structures: - Peace Clubs, Peace Committees and District Reconciliation Committees - were established to front SAFE supported initiatives. The intervention implemented 275 community level reconciliation initiatives (SAFE MTR 2015). In addition, SAFE supported development of multimedia peace messaging campaigns. SAFE trained local journalists in multimedia peace messaging and conflict sensitive reporting, who developed and disseminated messages of tolerance and harmonious living using various communication channels including banners, billboards, radio talk shows, and spots /jingles. SAFE supported trauma healing activities and as result 4,552 persons (against the targeted 2,600) received trauma healing services in LRA affected areas (PRS 2014-2017).

The achievement of the targets for number of new groups and initiatives, reconciliation projects completed and women participating are presented above under the IR results. The interventions are contributing directly to the IR outcome and the sub-IR results. As for the peace messages, SAFE met the targets well and beyond.


Figure 9: SAFE Indicators related to sub IR 2.2, PRS 2018.

Were the outputs sufficient to translate into expected outcomes in Sub-IR 2.2?

Under this result area, the outcomes of the SAFE program revolve around reconciliation and harmonious co-existence. The following are some of the outstanding outcomes:

1. **Conflict-sensitive mass communication or messaging:** All journalists interviewed (two FGDs and 4 KIIs) reported that the SAFE supported multimedia trainings entrenched the culture of conflict–sensitive radio reporting and mass messaging. The skills acquired have been vital in

framing and modulating radio discussions that transcend ethnic divisions, maintain a focus on peace and promotion of harmonious co-existence. Peace messages are integrated in all radio programs.

2. **Increased capacities within local communities to mediate disputes:** The SAFE program improved capacities of local peace actors to facilitate reconciliation within communities. By training numerous local leaders and members of peace forums, the SAFE program trained 6,208 persons[34] to mediate conflicts within communities. Seven out of 11 Conflict Field Monitors and Community Resource Persons (interviewed as KIIs) and all (8/8) youth leaders in two youth attended FGDs in Kasese and Fort Portal reported that acquired skills enabled them to analyse and mediate conflicts within their environments. For example, in West -Nile, community peace monitors trained by SAFE acquired knowledge and skills to mediate conflicts between refugees and host communities, while youth leaders in Kasese used theirs to mediate the conflicts between volatile youth groups (Team-No-Sleep and Team-No-Joke).

3. **Integration of other services into peace and reconciliation initiatives:** Within the Acholi sub-region mental health treatment and post-traumatic counselling services have been integrated into community reconciliation activities (3 of 4 FGDs Gulu).

What factors enabled the achievement (or led to non-achievement) of the Activity's objectives?

Based on FGDs, KIIs and program documents, the ET found that the results of the SAFE program were influenced by a combination of factors, some of these enabling in nature, while others constrained the achievement of desired outputs and outcomes. These factors include contextual, structural, programmatic, and technical issues. The complex web of these factors required a comprehensive programmatic response from the SAFE program to mitigate, on one hand, and to unleash the full potential of interventions, on the other. Nonetheless, SAFE adopted a simultaneous approach to dealing with all these factors with a view to achieve greater efficiencies in terms of desired outputs and outcomes. This section will discuss factors underpinning SAFE achievements as 'enablers' and 'challenges'.

Enablers

For component 1, the ET team found five key factors that enabled SAFE to be successful;
i. SAFE commenced when the legal and Government planning frameworks (i.e. the National Development Plan) had already specified key weaknesses and the needs of the land sector by region. Structures of land administration such as ADRMs were already in place but required strengthening.
ii. SAFE program was largely implemented through grantees (CSOs). CSOs in 13 of the 20 districts targeted under component 1 were already undertaking similar land-related activities with which it was easy to integrate SAFE interventions.
iii. Other development partners were already supporting land administration interventions in most of the targeted districts.
iv. Capable human resources existed which enabled SAFE and its grantees to recruit volunteers and other community-based resource persons.

---

[34] USAID's PRS 2014-2017.

v.   The magnitude of issues, like land grabbing and corruption in land administration, created an opportunity for communities to wholly embrace the SAFE program.

Similarly, for component 2, much of SAFE activities were carried out through grantees that previously worked on related thematic areas, and often covering the same geographical scope. This strategy enabled SAFE implementation to build on gains and experiences of a wide scope of existing peace actors trusted by communities such as MIRAC (Albertine sub-region) and KRC (Rwenzori sub –region). Further, to reach out to hostile communities, the religious leaders of the Inter–religious Council adopted a rather safe and more acceptable approach as informed by one of them. They moved as a group, constituted by a representative of each of the four key denominations, Roman Catholic, Anglican, Islamic Khadi, and Pentecostal. The leaders took time to accompany a SAFE grantee to address hostile communities. SAFE always encouraged an approach in which a mix of actors - community leaders, religious leaders, and traditional elders - collectively addressed gatherings. This was found more effective. To these actors, SAFE provided logistics and technical back-stopping

SAFE involved and collaborated with district and local government leaders, local communities, and other key stakeholders at every stage of program implementation. The strategy to harness their acceptance and ownership of SAFE activities first, then to get them to change their often strong and divisive attitudes and biases helped SAFE to implement its planned activities.

The SAFE program encouraged and supported regular 'under the tree' dialogues- a cheap but effective free-for–all activity is which sharing and physical interaction between hostile communities was practically demonstrated. This was the primary platform for testing tolerance.

Production of peace messages, technical guides and information, education, and communication materials in local languages helped the population to easily relate and understand the issues being addressed. Mobilization for participation in SAFE activities in local languages enabled beneficiaries to directly receive important messages. In addition, formation of radio listeners groups, especially among refugees helped to pass the messages faster and wider. The SAFE program helped to close the information gaps and /or address pressing issues.

Challenges

Implementation of component 1 also met challenges. Although MLHUD participated in the implementation of the SAFE program, specifically in the training of ALCs and DLBs, its participation was late, starting with the training in the third year. The low enthusiasm and slow response from MLHUD affected the pace and commencement of training of DLBs and ALCs. The absence of a memorandum of understanding between the two parties also affected procurement of the logistical support to the DLBs and ALCs. Further, it took MLHUD almost a year to approve a list of logistical items proposed by SAFE for AIPs. Hence items for AIPs were distributed at the beginning of 2016, two years before the end of the SAFE program.

The response at higher levels of MLHUD was slow and unenthusiastic. As a result, the much-anticipated memorandum of understanding to guide the implementation of some aspects of the SAFE program never materialized, even though some of the root causes of land-related conflicts required policy engagement.

Relatedly, MLHUD delay in depositing the certificates of customary ownership at the sub-county for the recorders to distribute to applicants led to a loss of confidence by the community in the work of ALCs. In some districts ALCs received about 100 applications every month but that amount of certificates of customary ownership were not always available (SAFE Annual report, KIIs).

The members of ALCs encountered difficulties in making reports of land inspections and surveys. This resulted from inadequate documentation skills.

> **Widow re-telling her experience with the ADRM**
> A dispute started when we came back from the camp. When I came back home in 2008, the issue started with my neighbor. A neighbor started disturbing the land. I took the issue to "Rwot Kweri" (a level below LC1 in charge of an 'area' and responsible for settling land disputes) but it was not resolved *(Rwot Kweri is the father of the person she was disputing with, but she didn't know where else to go).*
>
> The family then decided to turn to cultural leader ("Kal Kwero") (instead of to LC1). He ruled in my favor in 2015 but did not provide a copy of the ruling. (She has been denied a copy of the ruling to date). The other party was told to vacate the land but refused. She could have taken the case to the higher formal court, but she needed a copy of the lower court (LC2 ruling) and it also costs money that she did not have.
>
> Respondent brought the issue to the LC2 court; they (LC2) went to disputed land and mediated and created a boundary with the neighbor where she lost some of her land. It is still there. She wants the boundary to be increased. Her family agreed with the boundary

The training manual / curriculum did not cover these skill areas.

For some communities the formal systems of dispensing land justice were incompatible with the traditional practices. For instance, in the Acholi-sub-region the Kal Kwer ideology of land justice does not follow the stipulated land laws, often breeding land disputes, as pointed out by the member of the LAI in Gulu district.

Indifference from duty bearers and /or political interferences curtailed achievement of SAFE results. In some of the districts SAFE grantees (CSOs or NSAs) did not receive expected support from district land offices. A case in point is Amuru district. SAFE grantees experience political interference and hostile treatment from both land grabbers or owners of large tracks of land and public officials especially in Hoima district. (SAFE EPR pp 7).

The creation of new districts rendered some beneficiaries trained by SAFE redundant. Three new districts were created out of Kibaale district after SAFE had trained all the ALCs in the greater Kibaale. In Gulu district, ALCs and local leaders trained by SAFE from four sub-counties were 'trans-located' to the newly created Omoro district.

Absence of credible and capable partners delayed implementation of activities in some districts. The first call for proposals to train CSOs did not yield any positive results. CSOs experienced capacity challenges especially inadequate human and financial resources. Only 13 of the 26 districts had partners who could work with SAFE (EPR, 2017). In response SAFE changed strategy to attract individuals and CSOs.

The implementation of component 2 also met a number of challenges. This section discusses the prominent challenges revealed by the evaluation:

- Participation of women in peace and reconciliation undertakings was often undermined by patriarchal customary barriers. In order to garner women's involvement at community dialogues

or reconciliation meetings, in some of the cases SAFE grantees resorted to holding separate meetings for women.

- Short duration (one-year) grants did not allow for sufficient time to mitigate all the factors underlying violent conflicts. Mostly these grants were approved as APS'. In effect, the APS worked on triggers but not the root causes since factors underlying (and feeding into) conflicts were deep-rooted and had been in existence for a long time.[35] This limitation was rightly observed by the Head of SAFE, component 2. *"Addressing root causes would require longer periods of time and not the one year that was given to grantees. Solutions would have required more time and more engagement."*
- Conflicts in some districts were beyond the scope of the SAFE program. For example, grievances and fights over land allocation in Kasese district. A significant amount of land area is occupied by Government institutions, namely the army farm, the prison farm, Ministry of Agriculture farm, and two national parks. This has been exacerbated by the Government's formula of re-distributing land at a ratio of 1:3 between Bakonjo and Basongora.
- SAFE never specified the mechanism through which the relevant government ministries and other end users would provide feedback or the forums for sharing monthly conflict assessment reports.
- The APS in Rwenzori sub-region addressed some aspects of the complex conflicts between communities and groups of people. However, some of the factors that feed into conflicts were deep rooted structural issues like access to and utilization of land that needed multi-dimensional solutions by varied actors. In the case of a violent clash in 2016 between the army and kingdom loyalists in Kasese district, the delayed response to early warning reports undermined the potential outcomes of mitigation efforts.
- The National Peace Building Policy and the Operationalization of the Transitional and Justice Policy, both of which would define and spell out how peace building and reconciliation initiatives would be carried are lacking. They intentions have been discussed at national level yet to be implemented.
- Cultural barriers curtailed women's full participation in many activities.

How did the Activity incorporate cross-cutting issues (women, youth, oil) into the program and how effective were those interventions?

In order to maximize *"opportunities for peace building and conflict mitigation, but also minimize the unintended consequences of program activities"* (SAFE Solicitation pg. 21) the implementation involved addressing issues related to oil and gas, gender and youth.

Youth and Women participation

Targeting women and youth as peace agents was an effective strategy for prevention of conflicts and advancing reconciliation. It enabled women and youth to play an active and direct role in peace and security efforts; and to engage in peace processes and conflict prevention mechanisms in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820.[36] Discussions during the four FGDs held in Rwenzori sub-region (Youth=2 and Women=2) affirmed that youth and women involvement in peace processes contributed to improved relations between communities. Furthermore, inclusion of women and youth in reconciliation efforts yielded lasting solutions. For example, women and youth peace forums reconciled the militant rival political camps (*Team No Sleep* and *Team No Joke*) of Bundibugyo.

---

[35] John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (1997), xvi and 49–51.
[36] UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 of 2000

Women participation resulted into women taking up leadership roles in peace processes. For instance, all the Rwenzori sub-region and district peace chapters are headed by women.

However, SAFE's gender mainstreaming was reportedly in KIIs hampered by customary practices and patriarchal attitudes. Women were reported to experience additional challenges in claiming their land rights and especially land registration than men. Inclusion of women in mediation of land disputes is summarized by a Recorder from Amuru district who reported that, "*Women never used to even take part in mediation of disputes involving them. But we are now changing that, we invite them for mediation and sensitization and even encourage them to speak for themselves*". Despite the customary draw backs, the legal awareness sensitization was praised to have yielded outcomes to women. In Amuru district for example, women groups sensitized by SAFE began to sensitize other women in the community (EPR pp. 13). In Gulu district, it was reported that 5 of the 56 freehold certificates of titles issued since 2016 belong to women (ibid). In Lira, a grantee ensured the participation of women and youth in boundary harmonization. Women leaders were always part of the ADR land–related dispute resolution meetings, and they contributed to the discussions. Meetings were scheduled at a time favorable for all parties involved especially women. The election framework of leaders of the communal land association was designed to ensure men and women were elected to the leadership positions of managing the community lands. Other grantees adopted a similar approach by ensuring that sensitization activities included women. Timing and location of dialogues were often adjusted to suit women's work schedules. Women (58%) compared to men (42%) benefited more from legal aid services (SAFE Annual Report Year 4). From interviews conducted in the field, 46 out of 62 (74%) respondents confirmed that women benefited most from the SAFE interventions because they got to know their rights to family land. This was most appreciated and emphasized in Albertine region where women had been most affected by the oil and gas extraction.

The ET found no written gender policy although gender was mainstreamed in SAFE activities especially in sensitizations implemented by grantees. SAFE management noted that *"I think we should have had specific engagement with the women and the youths as a specific group with their own needs instead of requiring grantees to mainstream gender and youth requirements into project activities"*. In the fourth year however, SAFE developed a gender and youth strategy which mainly focused in component 2. Nevertheless, in Lira, a grantee ensured the participation of women and youth in boundary harmonization. Women leaders were always part of the ADR land–related dispute resolution meetings and they contributed to the discussions. Meetings were scheduled at a time favorable for all parties involved especially women. The election framework of leaders of the communal land association was designed to ensure men and women were elected to leadership positions of managing the community lands. Other grantees adopted a similar approach by ensuring that sensitization activities included women. Timing and location of dialogues were often adjusted to suit women's work schedules.

Despite high levels of awareness of land rights and land laws among all stakeholders, some districts still display very low women participation in land registration processes due to cultural impediments. For instance, in a district such as Guru different categories of people have varying views about the best land tenure system and whether land should be registered or not.

In the design of the Theory of Change, the contextual issues affecting women and the disadvantaged were not accurately articulated, especially within the gender context. As a result, women and the marginalized groups may not have benefitted wholly from free legal services especially where mobility and costs arising from long and repetitive bureaucratic court cases remained prohibitive to the resource poor.

Oil and Gas

Under component 2, especially result area of transforming emerging conflicts, the matters related to oil and gas often manifested as triggers of conflict whose effects required a strategic approach to reconciliation.

Apart from stating that SAFE would work with existing networks to address perception of inequality in access to services and natural resources, the design did not articulate clearly the appropriate interventions to implement. Further, no performance indicator(s) were identified to assess achievements on this issue. SAFE supported MIRAC and its sub-grantee, Bunyoro Choice Uganda, to sensitize the communities, leaders, and the general public in Bunyoro and Masindi on the socio-economic, environmental and cultural impacts of the oil extraction on communities and their livelihoods. The SAFE records indicate that 2,283 citizens were reached through various community dialogues. Platforms and avenues for regular conversations and information sharing were established.

The SAFE intervention informed the communities about oil and gas. For example, at one FGD, Kigorobya Hoima, all 16 (F=8, M=8) respondents were well informed about oil and related extractive activities and repercussions. Women were particularly aware that they needed to seize the opportunity, take interest in ongoing oil-related activities for the benefit of their families and households. The knowledge gained on land, oil and gas, and related laws, policies, and conventions enabled communities to start laying claim on their rights to what they considered reasonable compensation rates. Threats of potentially violent conflicts and pressure by communities awakened the Government - Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, the district leadership and the private oil sector companies to the need for appropriate and timely responsive actions to the concerns raised by the communities in relation to oil and gas. This is to avoid violent conflicts. As a result, affected communities obtained higher compensation rates. Re-settlement camps were set up. The communities in the resettled camp have formed the Oil Rights Representative Association – supposed to be the representative voice for the others. The communities in the camps have been given land.

4.3   EQ3: To what extent was the management of SAFE adaptive?

USAID defines adaptive management as *an intentional approach to making decisions and adjustments in response to new information and changes in context.*[37][38] *Collaborating*, learning, and adapting (CLA) is the USAID framework for operationalizing adaptive management in the program cycle. The sub-questions to EQ 3 were: During implementation, what adjustments were made to the SAFE program or activities? What factors influenced the adjustments to the SAFE program/activities? What were the triggers? How did adjustments affect the activity's performance? What emerged from the adjustments? What lessons can be drawn from the Activity adjustments?

The ET looked at learning and adaptive management as related themes. In short, learning focused on key lessons about the SAFE design, implementation and partnerships while adaptive management focused on how SAFE used this learning. This included exploring how the monitoring, evaluation, and learning system enabled activity adjustments, how adaptive management affected performance, and innovative activity approaches. The findings for this section of the report largely come from SAFE reporting, the

---

[37] See ADS 201.6 https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/201.pdf and https://usaidlearninglab.org/sites/default/files/resource/files/dn_-_adaptive_management.pdf
[38] Ibid

May 2018 SAFE Conference and interviews with SAFE staff, USAID, grantees and formal land institutions.

Learning and adaptive management cuts across components #1 and #2. Unless otherwise indicated, the findings are not specific to either component.

4.3.1 What adjustments were made, what triggered these adjustments and how did the adjustments affect the activity's performance?

Review of activity documents and interviews revealed that a number of implementation adjustments were made during the life of the activity. The ET found that SAFE constantly learned from implementation challenges, or lessons learned from own experiences and was agile and adaptive to implement quick course corrections that did not require shifts in Theory of Change, Results Framework or the award documents.

SAFE reporting shows that much of the SAFE learning agenda was carried out through partnerships with local organizations through grants under contract. [39] Diverse respondent groups, including SAFE staff (7), grantees (32) and duty bearers (15) discussed the importance of a learning approach to capture and build on what is working well and adapt where needed.

Some of the key learning and adaptations identified in SAFE reporting include:
- Year 2:
  - **The adoption of conflict-sensitive leadership training for political leaders** as a standard feature of APS grants following a successful pilot effort in Moroto and Napak districts.
  - **Quarterly reflection meetings with grantees** to promote learning and track implementation were also introduced. (The ET did not confirm whether these meetings were held as anticipated).
- Year 3:
  - **Expansion into Moroto in northeastern Uganda and in Arua and Adjumani districts** (in West Nile) in response to the uptick in conflicts resulting from an influx of refugees from South Sudan.
  - introduction of a **capacity assessment tool for grantees** to help identify areas of capacity needs. Also, aninternal staff training was conducted to discuss withUSAID the grant evaluation process and opportunities for improving the process
  - **Improvements in data collection systems** in response to reported Year 2 challenges regarding data storage and access.
  - A mid-term **review of land related performance indicators** in response to challenges identified in meeting these data needs
  - **Cultivating partnerships** with other stakeholders involved in access to justice and peace and reconciliation, which helped to communicate and create awareness about SAFE's work (SAFE noted that USAID was helpful in fostering these relationships) as well as the creation of social media pages on Facebook and Twitter and a policy on media engagement as part of the communication strategy.[40]

---

[39] See e.g. SAFE Annual Report Year 4, p11
[40] SAFE Annual Report Year 3, p24

- Year 4:
  - o **Increased attention on oil and gas issues** affecting local communities in the Albertine region and increased attention in northern Uganda to mitigate the lingering effects of the LRA conflict
  - o **Learning agenda shared** amongst grantees that enabled partners to identify methods for the greatest number of beneficiaries to receive legal assistance.
- Year 5:
  - o **Large investment in outcome harvesting** in to better capture and demonstrate key achievements; increased attention on Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). SAFE also highlighted in the May 2018 conference that there were adaptations to access to justice grants in Year 5, including:
    - Working more closely with grantees to develop their proposals (which resulted in better quality proposals);
    - Providing substantive training on issues such as how to work with mentally ill patients and how to use media effectively for public messaging;
    - Collaborating with Justice Centers Uganda, the Legal Aid Service Providers Network and Avocats Sans Frontières (ASF) to develop a community-based mediators training program in response to the demand and need for fair and accessible ADR. [41][42]

SAFE end-of-project reporting also identifies additional learning points and best practices for implementation and partnerships for component 1, such as the adoption of radio announcements in preparation for land registration, the value of beneficiaries sharing land registration success stories during community sensitization sessions, and the need to clearly define activities in the proposal.

However, in some cases, SAFE encountered difficulties in overcoming challenges with adaptive management. Interviews and FGDs highlighted seven structural challenges that could either only be solved partially or not solved at all.

Design flexibility: SAFE was designed to adapt and respond quickly to changes on the ground.[43] For instance, under component 2, SAFE had the option to respond to emerging conflicts outside of the target SAFE districts; the Annual Program Statement (APS) mechanism was introduced to fund grant activities on a rolling basis and rapid-response initiatives that matched needs identified through monthly conflict assessments. SAFE staff emphasized that USAID/Uganda was a strong advocate for SAFE and worked hard to sustain it in the face of potential funding constraints. However, SAFE respondents (7 staff) expressed the need for quicker APS approvals by the Mission, noting that a lengthy approval process (including the requirement to clearly demonstrate that a conflict was escalating and documenting what other actors were doing to address the conflict) diminishes the efficacy of an early warning response system. The respondents underscored the value of the field conflict monitoring reports for tracking conflict trends but lamented that the reports were not used to identify grantees due to SAFE's pre-established system for awarding grants. According to them, this meant that it was not possible to address emerging conflicts if the grant award cycle had ended.

---

[41] SAFE Conference, May 2018: SAFE experience Group 4_Ian Morrison_LAND JUSTICE RESULTS (final)
[42] The May 2018 SAFE Conference reports are included as Annex XXX of this report. They include valuable information on recommendations for the future based on learning from SAFE.
[43] SAFE RFP, p25

Grant duration: As outlined under EQ1 above, SAFE emphasized that one-year grants to implement legal aid and mediation activities made it challenging to achieve the expected results. End-of-project reporting indicates that it took grantees three months to complete the contractual process and commence actual delivery of services, and that by the time communities came to appreciate the activities, the grant was ending. SAFE recommended that grants for legal aid-related activities be longer-term and have a smaller geographic focus to enhance results. SAFE staff (7) also reported that the granting system has distorted the local CSO agenda by encouraging CSOs to chase donor money and hire short-term staff to deliver projects. These staff leave the project once the grant ends. Senior SAFE staff recommended longer-term engagement to address the root cause of conflicts, especially if the root causes involve policy matters. They noted that the initial APS grant can help to establish the cause(s) of the conflict and that a longer grant can then target those issues. They noted this would require dealing with policy and legal issues as well as advocacy and public information efforts. It would also involve engaging appropriate government structures such as Parliament and district councils. The ET did not find evidence of efforts to change the one-year grant duration.

Stakeholder engagement and receptivity: Government officials (6 out of 7), grantees (8 out of 8) and elected leaders (6 out of 6) noted that it took time to build partnerships and secure stakeholder receptivity to SAFE. They highlighted the importance of sustained engagement and sensitization of stakeholders to confront suspicion and doubts and possible resentment of the activities. For instance, in Hoima, respondents discussed having to manage perceptions that the activities were anti-government, resentment by the wealthy and those with significant land holdings, and skepticism in certain sub counties where individuals initially thought they were being tricked into registering their land and that it would be taken away.

In Lemu, a SAFE grantee described the time-consuming process of developing community-specific rules for communal land associations during their first grant. While the process was reportedly effective for promoting stakeholder buy-in and sustainability, it required the grantee to be in each community two days per week, which was a strain both for the grantee and the community. When the grantee received a second grant, they introduced a communal land management framework for the entire region, which has reportedly been a significant time saver and still allows communities to tailor the land association rules to their specific needs. This was noted as an important adaptation, though the results of this change in approach are not yet known.

Innovative approaches for engaging women and youth: SAFE highlighted some innovative approaches for securing the participation of women and youth, such as the use of theater, peace clubs for school youth, gender- sensitive radio programming, and efforts to address gender-based violence (noting that GBV and land issues are interrelated[44]). SAFE staff noted that the initial gender mainstreaming approach did not adequately address, monitor and report gendered outcomes, but that SAFE implementing partner Search for Common Ground built partner capacity in this area and that the last round of grants was awarded from a gender perspective.[45] One senior SAFE staff member recommended that SAFE should have engaged women and youth directly as target groups instead of requiring grantees to mainstream gender and youth as part of their grant activities. See EQ1 and EQ2 above and *Cross-cutting themes* below for further discussions on women and youth engagement.

---

[44] SAFE Conference May 15, 2018, Working Group 1 Ppt: Gender Equality
[45] Ibid

Government entities: SAFE cited challenges with engaging the Ministry of Lands Housing and Urban Development (MLHUD) and Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS). For instance, staff noted that the project proposal, "*should have outlined the areas of engagement for the ministry to include advocacy efforts to contribute to the policy and legislative reforms in the land sector using some of its lessons and best practices*" and that outlining advocacy engagements at both the national and local level in the proposal "*would have provided better opportunities for visibility, identifying partners and creating synergies with the different stakeholders.*"[46] SAFE respondents described relations with MLHUD and JLOS as "lukewarm." USAID noted that SAFE and USAID did their best to engage MLHUD and JLOS (including extensive discussions with designated staff about the project concept, providing draft training manuals and materials with MLHUD for input and collaborating with the Ministry for all ALC and DLB trainings) but said it was difficult. SAFE reported more success engaging operational level staff than technical staff. USAID indicated that Ministry delays in approving materials did not notably affect project achievement. For component 2, SAFE described attempts to work with the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development (MEMD) but said the Ministry was not forthcoming. The ET did not hear of improvements in these relationships over the course of the project. SAFE respondents (7) reported that district leadership was generally more receptive to the project and that it was easier to work with district officials than with national institutions because the project focused on issues affecting communities on a daily basis. (See the following section below). SAFE staff added that it should not be assumed that the implementer will engage government easily. They recommended that USAID take a greater role in high policy level issues with national institutions in the future and noted that greater involvement by policy makers is important for addressing some of the root causes of conflict and may help to achieve more lasting results.

Delay in high level engagements of the MLHUD and JLOS despite numerous attempts by USAID subsequently hindered the achievement of some of SAFE results i.e. launching of training tools.

Local government/ leaders: SAFE (7 respondents), USAID (2 respondents), duty bearers and grantees noted the importance of engaging local government and traditional leaders to foster stakeholder receptivity to SAFE and activity implementation. SAFE identified the mobilization of communities through their local leaders for community sensitization as a best practice, "*since communities listen to their local and traditional leaders*" and "*beneficiaries believe that when a local leader is present during sensitization, then the community will believe and listen to the ALCs.*[47] Duty bearers (15) highlighted the need for CSOs and NGOs to engage the government, police and courts earlier in the process and more, and to integrate their work plans with those of the government. grantees emphasized the value of engaging broad stakeholder groups, noting for example that consulting with local government at the proposal stage and agreeing to share activity reports with them helped to ease implementation. In one instance where grantees determined that a chairman and religious leaders were impeding peace building activities, they decided to bypass these individuals and reach out to the community directly and cited this as a success. The ET did not have an opportunity to hear the views of community members or local leaders in this community. USAID noted that the decision to engage communities directly following the lack of reciprocity from the government side was an important adaptation.

---

[46] Ibid
[47] End of Project Report for Component 1, p22

Partnership with other development partners: The SAFE intervention was expected to work closely with UN agencies operating in the target districts and thematic program areas and in particular the UN Peace Building Fund project, the World Bank Land Information Management Systems project and multilateral & bilateral partners handling related programs. The list included GIZ, Trocaire and others. The ET learned from interviewed USAID staff that there was no formal collaboration established with the mentioned partners. USAID staff noted that there were efforts to coordinate with other implementers working on land issues but, *"we lacked an anchor to bring us [together]",* noting that this is a role that MLHUD could have played. Other development partners did participate in the end-of-project land conference held by SAFE in May 2018. We also note that towards the exit phase of project, as part of the collaborative learning, SAFE actualized a collaboration with a consortium of partners[48] spearheading the strengthening of mediation mechanisms in Uganda. SAFE also partnered with SAFER WORLD to carry out outcome harvesting exercise.

Notwithstanding the examples above, SAFE staff reported that there was a lack of adaptive learning that CLA should have been more systematic and well thought through, and that outcome harvesting should have been introduced from the beginning of the project instead of in Year 5.

4.3.2 To what extent did the monitoring, evaluation and learning system support adaptive management?

The answer to EQ2, to what extent did the ToC approaches and assumptions relate to SAFE objectives, determines that a fully articulated ToC with its the underpinning assumptions was not measured and reviewed systematically during the life of the activity. There was no structured mechanism for a periodic review to monitor the coherence of the original SAFE design. The lack of a structured mechanism would have detected and adjusted design deficiencies. For example, SAFE staff suggested that learning from Component 2 could have been applied to Component 1 to address access to land justice if a structured learning mechanism of the ToC were in place. Components 1 and 2 were designed to work together in promoting peace building but there was a disconnect in implementation. SAFE reporting describes the two components as *"work[ing], like two different projects with no connections at all [with] Component 1 focused on land administration [and] Component 2 focused on Peace building and consequently resolving violent land disputes; the core of the program was left out. It would have been good for the 2 components to work together."*[49]

The difficulty in identifying short-term outcome indicators and matching outputs with outcomes (especially in component 2), further hampered adaptive management. For Year 1 and 2 grantees, the performance indicators focused on basic output data, so the outcomes for these grants were not well known according to SAFE staff. SAFE activity reports for year 3 outline the support to SAFE staff and grantees to strengthen data collection and reporting skills, including providing monitoring and evaluation (M&E) training beginning in Year 3. This would be followed up through site visits and remote support. Nevertheless, at project end, SAFE identified gaps in results reporting efforts, including the need for a logical framework for monitoring and lack of consensus between the grantee indicators and SAFE indicators. They noted that indicators such as "Improving Functionality of Government Officials" were

---

[48] Through collaboration and learning, a consortium of partners including Advocacy San Frontier, Legal AIDS services, JLOS, LAPSNET and SAFE outside USAID funding fronted a concept to address short-comings of the mediation processes.
[49] End of Project Report for Component 1, p26

not well defined and that no data collection tool was developed for it.[50] Staff also reported that there was no deliberate monitoring of grants initially and therefore no chance to monitor adaptation but underscored that SAFE introduced outcome harvesting in 2016. SAFE described outcome harvesting as a major change that, "helped to re-orient the thinking." Senior SAFE staff recommended that future projects similar to SAFE require evidence-based reporting from grantees and regularly review and update performance indicators to reflect learning during implementation.

SAFE reports emphasize the importance of learning between local partners and grantees. For example, there was cross learning between CSO, duty bearers, elders and other actors such as UNHCR; between Gulu and Lango districts on comparing resolution of communal land disputes to other parts of the country. Grantees also shared lessons on successes and challenges within the implementation approach across regions and districts including sharing on CLA with respect to handling conflicts.

4.3.3   What lessons can be drawn from Activity adjustments?

As noted throughout the report, SAFE met its targets and achieved the expected results translated into the short-term outcome indicators. As described above, during the life of the activity, a number of adjustments and implementation adaptations were taken on by SAFE. The learning and sharing of lessons between grantees and SAFE happened within a learning framework, often driven by SAFE staff identifying a need to share and adapt. With new approaches and additional interventions to fill gaps, SAFE maintained performance and met the targets.

However, some of the structural challenges could never be fully addressed with an adaptive approach that solved problems on an ad-hoc basis. A more systematic pause and reflect approach to review and evaluate the ToC could have detected and planned for external factors that affect the outcomes of the activity. The challenges with buy-in from stakeholders (beneficiaries, local leaders, local government, Ministries and GoU) could have been addressed more strategically and deliberately if identified as a programmatic assumption that needed to be mapped, measured and addressed to ensure better outcomes.

Working in a dynamic conflict landscape requires adaptability. SAFE was designed to adapt and respond quickly and clearly did so even if there were delays and difficulties, especially regarding the APS mechanism and stakeholder engagement. SAFE proved to be agile and quickly pick up lessons from grantees and adapt to local context and bottlenecks. Innovative solutions improved and maintained performance. However, the agility and willingness to learn and adapt was not fully adopted in managing the program with deliberate MEL techniques that would have addressed some of the larger structural barriers that hampered performance. SAFE met the targets but could have contributed to more sustainable outcomes with a ToC review mechanism.

---

[50] End of Project Report for Component 1, p26

5.0 CONCLUSIONS

The following are major conclusions derived from the findings.

5.1 EQ2: To what extent did the ToC approaches and assumptions clearly relate to the SAFE objectives?

1. On the whole, the SAFE intervention ToC was relevant and coherent with the program design and the aspirations of Government of Uganda development framework.

2. The lack of a detailed articulation of the ToC, absence of structured mechanism for periodic reviews, and lack of a validation of the soundness of pathways to change was a missed opportunity to monitor the coherence of the SAFE design.

3. The ET observed that the theory 'inequality in access to resources' related to oil discovery, or gender divide or ethnic divide is not simply a 'perception' but a 'reality' moreover–land related. This and other land–related conflicts were bigger than the SAFE intervention because of their multi-complexities. Such are the; refuge–influx problem, land allocation inequalities in Rwenzururu – Kasese, divides stemming from LRA–related crimes, socio-cultural and gender norms and beliefs in Northern Uganda. They require bigger frames to address in terms of time, policies and constructs.

5.2 EQ1: To what extent did the activity achieve its objectives as set out in the SOW?

5.2.1 Access to Justice – land component

1. SAFE training which enabled LAIs to gain confidence and to perform their duties has resulted into visibility of ALCs who have in turn become a referral center for land dispute resolution. This unintended outcome of referring cases to ALCs by different stakeholders for mediation of land disputes is an indication that these structures if well capacitated can replace the LC III courts.

2. The acquired knowledge about roles and responsibilities between and among the different stakeholders in the land administration and land justice structures has led to an emerging coordination and referral practice.

3. The presence of NSAs and monitoring of SAFE interventions led to ALCs' adjustment of practices, including ownership and accountability for action, accuracy in reporting, and transparency in land transactions.

4. There is a need for more ADRM structures and legal aid services. ADRMs are an effective catalyst for addressing land disputes involving vulnerable women and youth.

5. The approach adopted by SAFE in training the different stakeholders and collaborating with CSOs in delivering effective services, appears to be more effective than the one normally used by MLHUD. It would be more cost effective to include the mediation module in the ALC curriculum than it would be to conduct separate trainings with Local Council III bodies with current limited knowledge of land law.

6. The reluctance of MLHUD to endorse and co-brand training materials developed by SAFE was a missed opportunity to consolidate capacity of MLHUD trainers to deliver effective public education on land matters and with a specialized four-part practice direction.

5.2.2 Peace and Reconciliation

1. SAFE interventions contributed to improved cohesion, peaceful coexistence, and community reconciliation by preventing or mitigating violent conflicts, through establishing early warning systems, training of Conflict Monitors, and establishment of peace structure. Supporting the development of an early warning system that launched rapid responses was a more effective way to prevent or mitigate emerging conflicts.

2. Building capacities of a broad range of actors delivers greater results in mediation and reconciliation. However, including economic empowerment interventions to ensure peace dividends is fundamental to the healing and recovery process.

3. The APS was a good model to address potentially emerging conflicts. However, the APS response mechanism was not consistently responding as rapidly as possible.

4. The SAFE intervention underscored the culture /practice of conflict sensitive communication mechanisms (mediation, investigation, communication and leadership) which are key to conflict mitigation, healing and reconciliation. SAFE changed the way journalists and media houses were reporting and messaging, and this positive reporting helped reconcile divided communities, leading to peaceful coexistence and sharing of resources between communities and refugees in West Nile.

5. Peace and reconciliation prevailed in the areas where SAFE program was implemented. SAFE supported the formation of community-based peace structures which contributed towards conflict mitigation and reconciliation. Targeting women and youth as peace agents was an effective strategy for prevention of conflicts and advancing reconciliation.

6. Incidence of violent clashes were effectively reduced or prevented in targeted districts.

5.3 EQ3: To what extent was the management of SAFE adaptive?

1. The management of SAFE was adaptive to some extent. SAFE identified clear learning points and effectively applied learning in some cases, example. The flexibility of the project design and broad commitment to learning by SAFE contributed to project performance. Innovative approaches for engaging women and youth and the bypassing of government to work directly with communities in some instances were effective responses to implementation challenges.

2. The monitoring, learning and evaluation system partially supported adaptive management. SAFE lacked a strategic approach to Collaborating, Learning and Adapting (CLA) and may have missed opportunities to make adjustments earlier in the project that could have eased implementation and improved performance. The one-year duration for grants (especially for legal aid) was a key challenge that SAFE was not able to address. Similarly, the lengthy APS approval process may have diminished the ability of the project to address emerging conflicts. The complex environment demands longer term engagement to implement effective legal aid and conflict mediation activities.

3. The introduction of M&E training for SAFE staff and grantees in Year 3 and the introduction of outcome harvesting in Year 5 were important- while late- adaptations. SAFE stakeholders advocated for a more diligent and robust learning approach for future activities. Similarly, given that the learning agenda is largely carried out through grants to local partners, it would have been important to align the performance reporting systems for SAFE and its grantees.

4. End-of-project reporting and the May 2018 SAFE conference documents contain valuable information on key learning points that can inform the design and implementation of future access to justice activities for land matters.

6.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

Drawing on the findings and conclusions as outlined above, the evaluation team recommends the following for design of future programs of similar nature:

6.1 Theory of Change

Recommendation 1: For the future, USAID's Program Office should entrench regular reviews and revision of the ToC pathways and assumptions at strategic points during Activity implementation. The reviews should include reflection on the ToC pathways and assumptions to improve coherence and strategically inform learning, adaption and the AMELP reporting. Implementers should use results of the reviews to revise Activity ToC as needed and USAID should utilize the learnings to inform future program designs. The Evaluation Team includes an alternative ToC that could have better guided adaptive management, Annex 1.

6.2 Access to Land Justice

Recommendation 2: USAID should advise MLHUD to transfer and streamline the mandate to mediate land disputes from LC III courts to the ALCs. This will establish a clear line of accountability and will be more cost-effective. Further, because ALCs are now knowledgeable about land law they are better suited to mediate land related disputes than would be the LC3 courts with limited knowledge about land law. MLHUD should adopt and then incorporate the internationally harmonized mediation toolkit for ALCs capacity building. MLHUD and development partners should encourage CSOs to use the same mediation toolkit.

Recommendation 3: Future programming support should focus on strengthening community-based structures (including ALCs) to provide mediation and other dispute resolution services. In addition, efforts should be guided towards linking community-based mediators or structures to court systems. The formalization of linkages with formal judicial systems should include capacity building for recording and filing proceedings of arbitrations in courts of law.

Recommendation 4: USAID should encourage MLHUD to fully adopt the curriculums developed by SAFE, popularize them and harness CSOs to use the same materials for speedy up-take of land registration by the communities. Specifically, MLHUD should i) review its training curriculum to include mediation, agreement drafting, and recording case proceedings, and ii) adopt the Training of Trainers curriculum and the specialized four-part training curriculum to achieve similar results to those of SAFE.

Recommendation 5: Building on the SAFE achievements in access to justice and peace and reconciliation outlined above, the Government of Uganda (MLHUD), supported by the development partners, should quickly capture the momentous gains, own the products developed, and take the next step to upscale land registrations, and specifically cover more sub-counties within districts.

6.3 Peace and Reconciliation

Recommendation 6: Conflict prevention program response should rapidly commence as soon as the early warning is registered. The APS was a good innovative design that should be upheld in the future

USAID supported conflict mitigation programs. USAID and any Development partner who have intentions of adopting such a model should be able to make flexible programmatic adjustments to prevent the conflict in its early stages.

6.4   Adaptive management and Learning

Recommendation 7: If USAID/Uganda develops a future access to justice Activity for land matters, it should integrate a CLA (Collaborating, Learning, and Adapting) mechanism and Outcome Harvesting as a monitoring method into quarterly and annual reporting; and work with the implementers to take a more systematic and energetic approach to CLA, drawing on available USAID CLA guidelines and tools.

Recommendation 8: For future project similar to SAFE, USAID should seek opportunities to streamline the APS approval process so that it serves as a true rapid-response mechanism for addressing emerging conflicts. Similarly, USAID should consider extending the grant period (or other forms of support) for legal aid and conflict mediation activities beyond one year to more effectively address the complex needs.

Recommendation 9: Development partners and Government (MLHUD) should harness all stakeholders to take effective measures for women to gain from land justice through ADRMs and legal aid, and to ensure land registration takes into account women's land rights.

SAFE Final Evaluation

1. Background

Supporting Access to Justice, Fostering Peace and Equity (SAFE) is a $15 million five-year (2012-2017), USAID/Uganda funded activity, (currently operating under a one year no cost extension to August 2018) implemented by the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) and its consortium partners[51]. In 2017 the Activity was extended for another 12 months to 2018. The SAFE was designed in response to a 2010 Interagency Conflict Assessment that identified land, oil and the residual effects of the LRA conflict as key drivers of conflict in Uganda. The Activity aims at strengthening peace building and conflict mitigation in Uganda by improving access to justice in land matters in 2052 districts and enhances peace and reconciliation in conflict-prone regions. During implementation, the SAFE Activity was recalibrated to focus on Countering the Lord [sic] Resistance Army (C-LRA). The adjustment also meant deepening activities in northern Uganda.

SAFE strengthens systems of land administration, first, by reinforcing both formal and informal dispute resolution mechanisms, and creating awareness of the systems. Secondly, SAFE supports local actors to prevent and transform emerging conflict into peaceful outcomes. Working with community networks, faith-based organizations (FBOs), local government structures, and CSOs where appropriate, SAFE will build indigenous capacity for conflict prevention and reconciliation in Uganda. SAFE is situated in the Democracy, Rights and Governance office, and contributes to the mission goal of peace-building and conflict mitigation strengthened.

2. Purpose of the Evaluation

The purpose of this end-term performance evaluation is twofold; a) USAID will use the findings of the evaluation to design future conflict and land activities; and b) the evaluation findings will be used by USAID to learn and develop best practices for adaptive Activity design and management including most relevant approaches to innovative programming and grantee management.

3. The Scope

This is an end of Activity performance evaluation of the SAFE and will focus on three (3) core elements. First – Activity performance assessment. The evaluation will assess the extent to which the Activity achieved its objectives as set out in the SOW. In answering this question, the Evaluation Team (ET) will examine and identify factors which enabled the achievement (or led to non-achievement) of the Activity's objectives. USAID/Uganda is a CLA Mission, as such during the course of implementation there were adjustments to the Activity including specific results. The Evaluation Team will examine how this affected or enabled achievement of results, including unintended outcomes – positive and negative – and how SAFE responded/managed these outcomes. The Evaluation Team (ET) will also identify areas /institutions where success has been registered as well as paint a picture of that success, including documenting what would have been lost if SAFE had not intervened.

Second, the ET will examine the relevance, appropriateness and relatedness of SAFE's theory of change, its approach(es,) hypothesis, assumptions and Activity objectives. In examining these nuanced relationships, the ET will seek to answer a core design question: *To what extent did the theory of change (ToC), approaches and assumptions clearly relate to the SAFE objectives?* In seeking answer(s) to this question, the ET shall examine the relevance of the ToC. Attention will be paid to the main thrusts of the SAFE Activity and the context within which it was designed and implemented. In addition, the ET will examine which components of the Activity as outlined in the SOW were well implemented and how they relate to the ToC. The ET will also examine contextual factors that may have rendered the ToC and some Activity components – if any - irrelevant or made it more useful or both.

Lastly, the evaluation will also attempt to answer the question: *To what extent was the management of SAFE adaptive?* In answering this question, the ET will identity triggers and drivers of adaptive management, including how the

---

[51] Global Rights –involved in the initial stages only –and Search for Common Ground

[52] Amuru, Arua, Buliisa, Gulu, Hoima, Jinja, Kibaale, Kiboga, Lira, Masaka, Masindi, Mbale, Mbarara, Mityana, Moroto, Mukono, Nebbi, Tororo, Soroti and Wakiso.

monitoring, evaluation and learning system supported (or not) the adaptive management. In addition, the ET will also examine the relationship between adaptive management and Activity performance, with the aim of establishing the extent to which performance is related to adaptive management.

4. Evaluation Questions

The evaluation will address the following broad questions:

(iv) To what extent did the activity achieve its objectives as set out in the SOW?
(v)   To what extent did the theory of change (ToC), approaches and assumptions clearly relate to the SAFE objectives?
(vi) To what extent was the management of SAFE adaptive?

5. Evaluation Methodology

The evaluation team is expected to employ quantitative and qualitative methods to address the evaluation questions. The ET will develop and share their detailed methodology with USAID/Uganda for approval before commencing fieldwork. The proposed methodology should demonstrate the consultants' understanding of the level of complexity of the evaluation and how it will be addressed. The methodology should explicitly state the sampling procedures for identifying interview respondents as well as a justification for each category of institutions and/or persons selected for interview. In addition, the sampling frame will spell out how the team will select Activity sites to be visited by the ET. In designing the evaluation methodology, where possible the consultants will take into consideration sample size, sampling framework, and Activity sites visited by the baseline, and CLRA study in northern Uganda to enable comparison of data and trend analysis. When selecting key informants, the ET should ensure a balanced mix of key project participants and stakeholders, namely: CSOs, Local Government officials, Cultural Leaders, Elders, Local (authorities) Councils I & II, Magistrates and SAFE staff. The group of individuals who have not interacted with SAFE may be interviewed as a counterfactual.

The ET will review program documents and related literature. Some of the program documents are listed in Annex 1. It will be important to capture views and perspectives of different stakeholders on the implementation processes, effectiveness of approaches or interventions and resultant outcomes. The ET will conduct in-depth key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs) with key program participants and /or stakeholders who are knowledgeable about SAFE. These interviews are intended to gather views and perceptions about SAFE and the kind of changes that have resulted since the implementation of its interventions.

Analysis: The ET will propose data analysis strategies, tools and analysis software for both the qualitative and quantitative data. The ET will be expected to conduct trend analysis and comparisons of performance across districts. The ET will also conduct other comparisons that may highlight achievement or lack of achievement of positive effects of SAFE. Wherever applicable, data disaggregation and analysis by gender and age to establish the differential effects of the project on men, women and different age groups will also be expected.

1. Deliverables

The evaluation team is expected to deliver the following outputs:

Deliverables	Due date
1. <u>In-Briefing</u>: Introduction of the evaluation team and discussion of the scope of work and other emerging issues that may affect the evaluation.	February 2nd 2018
2. Draft and present an Inception Report to be reviewed by USAID/Uganda DRG office. The report will include: ● The evaluation team's interpretation of the key evaluation questions and their approach to how each question will be addressed. The Consultant shall attach a completed evaluation design matrix using the template attached as Annex 2. ● Methodology including sampling/selection procedures for key informants, beneficiaries, and project sites to be visited. ● A detailed work plan showing a timeline for each evaluation activity to be undertaken, including the field work and allocation of expertise level of effort.	February 9th 2018

• Detailed analysis plan /map for each of the evaluation questions. • Draft instruments for data collection.		
3. Draft and present to USAID/Uganda a detailed Desk Review of secondary data	February 16th 2018	
4. Fieldwork in the selected SAFE sites	February 26th 2018	
5. Present preliminary findings from fieldwork to USAID/Uganda.	Within 5 working days after completion of fieldwork	
6. Draft and submit a <u>Draft Evaluation Report</u> for review by USAID/Uganda. The draft report should comply with the USAID/Uganda Evaluation Report standards set out in Annex 3.	Within 6 working days after presentation of preliminary findings	
7. <u>Final Evaluation Report</u>: Draft and submit a Final Evaluation Report incorporating comments from USAID/Uganda and other stakeholders. The Final Evaluation Report should be cleared by the USAID/Uganda before submission to the DEC. The final report should be a maximum of 25 pages of text in body of the report (excluding the Abstract, Executive Summary, Table of Contents, Glossaries, and Annexes), provided in 4 hard copies and 1 electronic copy. This final draft report will also include a 2-4-page briefer that highlights the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations presented in an attractive and easy to understand format for wider public use.	Within 6 working days after receipt of comments from USAID	

2. Team Composition and Qualifications

The ET should present a detailed plan for how it intends to deploy or utilize team skills /expertise in conducting this evaluation. The foregoing notwithstanding, at a minimum the ET will comprise of, a Team Leader, a conflict specialist and land administration and management expert.

(i) Team Leader
Education Requirements
- Must have master's degree in peacebuilding and conflict, political science, international affairs, development studies, or a related field.

Required Experience of Team Leader
- Ten years' experience evaluating peacebuilding and conflict mitigation and management programs.
- Must have played significant roles in five or more evaluations, serving as team leader in at least three evaluations.
- Experience of evaluating peacebuilding and conflict mitigation programs in East Africa, will be an added advantage.
- Must have demonstrated success in interacting and communicating effectively with a broad range of stakeholders.
- Must have demonstrated experience producing high quality evaluation reports for complex programs.
- Demonstrable evidence of experience in conducting, developing, and utilizing evaluations of development programs using social research methods, including innovative qualitative methods.
- Must possess strong team management skills as well as facilitation skills and use appreciative enquiry methods.

Responsibilities of Team Leader
- Coordinate activities, assign tasks to team members, and supervise performance. Serve as the primary point of contact between the ET and the task manager at USAID.
- Develop, manage, and communicate updates to USAID/Uganda on evaluation progress.
- Ensure that the tasks within the evaluation work plan are best suited to and most efficient for achievement of the objectives of the evaluation.
- Review all plans and outputs and be responsible for delivering quality products to USAID on a timely basis.
- Take lead in reporting, editing and assure all reports, presentations, and briefers attain the highest quality standards and are error free.

- Ensure that the final report incorporates USAID/Uganda and key stakeholders' feedback.

(ii)   Conflict Expert
Education Requirements
- Must have master's degree in peacebuilding and conflict or political science.

Required Experience for the Conflict Expert
- Seven years' experience working on peace building, conflict mitigation and management programs.
- Must have experience either managing, designing or evaluation conflict early warning and community reconciliation activities in a developing country.
- Demonstrable evidence of experience in conducting, developing and utilization of evaluation of development programs using social research methods including use of innovative qualitative methods.
- Demonstrable evidence of undertaking similar evaluations in the past for other donors or international organizations.
- Demonstrable evidence of understanding of Uganda conflict dynamics including national peacebuilding frameworks.

(iii)   Land Management & Administration Expert

Education Requirements
- Must have master's degree in land administration and management or law or political science or social sciences or international development.

Required Experience of Land Management & Administration Expert
- Must have at least 7 years of experience in land administration and management at district or national level;
- Proven experience in land administration, land reforms and land policy analysis in Uganda.
- Good knowledge of Uganda land administration system and the land sector;
- Demonstrable understanding /knowledge of various land administration systems and of modern land administration practices.
- Excellent understanding of the key land administration tools and policy in Uganda;
- Conceptual analytical and evaluative skills to conduct independent research and analysis, including familiarity with and experience in the use of various research sources, will be an added advantage.
- Demonstrable experience facilitating Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) processes at community level.

3. Institutional Relationship and Reporting
- Whereas the ET will be supervised by the QED Group LLC in their daily work, they will be answerable to USAID/Uganda for all deliverables.
- USAID/Uganda will review and approve all deliverables produced by the ET for this evaluation.

4. Roles and Responsibilities
QED Group LLC will be responsible for managing the evaluation by ensuring the recruitment and management of a competent team of consultants to execute the assignment in strict compliance with USAID standards and contracting requirements. QED Group LLC will be responsible for the day-to-day management of the consultants and quality assurance of all products and deliverables before they are submitted to USAID. This will involve:
- Review of USAID's SOW and provision of comments especially on the clarity of the tasks and allocation of efforts.
- Procure and supervise the consultants.
- Review consultants' work, especially key deliverables, to ensure they respond to the SOW and meet USAID quality standards.
- Facilitate and supervise fieldwork.
- Provide office space, assistance with logistics, and requirements as required by the ET while conducting the evaluation.

- Submit a copy of the duly approved Final Evaluation Report to the Development Experience Clearing House (DEC)

USAID's roles and responsibilities include:
- Review and approval of the SOW and all deliverables from the consultants.
- Grant approval /clearance of selected evaluators.
- Convene USAID, SAFE and other relevant stakeholders to review evaluation reports and discuss emerging lessons and their implications for existing and future programs.

SAFE's roles and responsibilities are to:
- Provide input in the design of the evaluation.
- Review and provide comments on SOW and draft evaluation reports.
- Provide relevant documents as needed.
- Assist with setting up meetings and interviews.
- Advise the consultants on identifying translators.

5. Level of Effort (LOE) required
The SAFE evaluation is estimated to start on March 2nd, 2017 and be completed no later than June 30th, 2017.
Evaluation team members will be expected to spend approximately 82 days overall on the evaluation.

No.	Activity	Team Leader	Land Mag't & Admin Expert	Conflict Experts
		# Days	# Days	# Days
1.	In-briefing (with the Mission, QED & NCSC)	1	1	1
2.	Preparation of inception report	3	3	3
3.	Desk Review of secondary data & development of data collection tools	3	3	3
4.	Field work and interviews, including travel time.	10	10	10
5.	Presentation of preliminary findings to USAID and select partners	1	1	1
6	Preparation of draft evaluation report	7	5	5
7	Preparation of Final Report	5	3	3
	Total	**30**	**26**	**26**

6. Timeline

	Activity	Expected Duration/ Turn-around time
1	Development, review and approval of SOW	November 17th 2017
2	Procurement and clearance of consultants	January 12th 2018
3	In-brief with the Mission, QED & NCSC	February 2nd 2018
4	Presentation of the inception report	February 9th 2018
5	Submission of final inception report with comments from USAID and partners incorporated	February 16th 2018
6	Presentation of Desk Review report	February 16th 2018
7	Fieldwork and interviews /data collection	February 26th 2018
8	Presentation of preliminary results to USAID and Partners	March 16th 2018
9	Submission of Draft Report	March 30th 2018

| 10 | Submission of comments to Consultants | April 18th 2018 |
| 11 | Finalization and submission of Final Report | May 30th, 2018 |

Key SAFE Documents

The list of documents to be reviewed are;

1) SAFE proposal
2) SAFE Activity Monitoring and Evaluating Plan, including results framework & data tools
3) SAFE Monitoring and Outcome Harvesting Reports
4) SAFE performance data
5) SAFE quarterly and annual report
6) SAFE mid-term review report
7) SAFE grantee reports and applications
8) SAFE baselines
9) Monthly conflict assessment reports
10) Selected grantee progress reports

Criteria to Ensure the Quality of the Evaluation Report

- The evaluation report should represent a thoughtful, well-researched, and well-organized effort to objectively evaluate the strategy, project, or Activity.
- Evaluation reports should be readily understood and should identify key points clearly, distinctly, and succinctly.
- The Executive Summary of an evaluation report should present a concise and accurate statement of the most critical elements of the report.
- Evaluation reports should adequately address all evaluation questions included in the statement of work, or the evaluation questions subsequently revised and documented in consultation and agreement with USAID.
- Evaluation methodology should be explained in detail and all sources of information properly identified.
- Limitations to the evaluation should be adequately disclosed in the report, with attention to the limitations associated with the evaluation methodology (selection bias, recall bias, unobservable differences between comparator groups, etc.).
- Evaluation findings should be presented as analysed facts, evidence, and data and not based on anecdotes, hearsay, or simply the compilation of people's opinions.
- Findings and conclusions should be specific, concise, and supported by strong quantitative or qualitative evidence.
- If evaluation findings assess person-level outcomes or impact, they should also be separately assessed for both males and females.
- If recommendations are included, they should be supported by a specific set of findings and should be action-oriented, practical and specific.

Impacts

Increased recovery and development in the areas

More productive Usage of Land and Energies in the community

Continued positive perceptions and respect for disparities gender, culture , tradition and wealth

Continued reference to developed reading materials, guiding resources and tools and the law

Land Tenure Security Increased

Increased Trust in the just systems

Continued Dialogue and Monitoring of land activities Increased

Outcomes

Formal and Informal land administration and adjudication institutions more transparent & better accountable

Legal services more efficient and accessible

Reduced violent conflicts due to early warning, early response

More equitable sharing and tolerance between communities

Capacity of national and sub –national land governance institutions enhanced

Dialogue & Coordination in administering land legal services between formal and informal units stronger

Capacity of Non –state actors to monitor and track land issues enhanced

Legal Awareness of land matters enhanced

Early identification & reporting of emerging conflicts

Communities increase engagement in reconciliatory activities

Outputs

1. Trained Human Resource on land matters &, obligations

1. Knowledge of ADR, mechanisms, interlink-ages with formal - systems and applications

1.3 Provision of legal aid services, & community sensitization to services

1.4 Over-site tool kits, guides, grants, selected Non-State Actors

2. Trained Peace Monitors, Recorders, journalists, government & community leaders

2.2 Messages of peace widely disseminated, mechanisms of early warning ,

Project Inputs

Skills and knowledge

Legal and P-legal services

Platforms for dialogues, information systems & peace messages

ToT curriculum, Practice guide, program, Plans s

Training/awareness sessions

Non –state actors, sub grantees

Administrative Improvement Plans

Knowledge & Resource materials (Law handbook tool kits, manuals and guides

Finances for activities

Skills and

Platforms for dialogues, information systems & peace messages

Assessment reference guides,

HR - Local govt, Opinion and private

Peace structures and

Finances for activities

Annex 3: Rationale for District Selection, Component Covered

DISTRICTS	RATIONALE	GRANTEES, PROGRAM COMPONENT
Gulu	• Center of the Lord's Resistance Army insurgency; residual effects of the insurgency remain • Received previous USAID support • Benefited from both components of the Activity • Longest interaction period with the program • Existence of baseline data (particularly land conflicts) • Highest number of grantees • Activity was recalibrated to focus on Countering the Lord's Resistance Army (C-LRA)	• LEMU (Access to justice) • AYINET (Peace & reconciliation) • ACODEN (Access to justice) • FIDA (Access to justice) • CAP (Peace & reconciliation) • JRP ((Peace & reconciliation) • THRIVE (Peace & reconciliation)
Lira	• Residual effects of the LRA insurgency remain • Received previous USAID support • Benefited from both components of the Activity • Long interaction period with the program • Existence of baseline data (particularly land conflicts) • High number of grantees • Activity was recalibrated to focus on Countering the Lord's Resistance Army (C-LRA) in Gulu	• LEMU (Access to justice and peace & reconciliation) • AYNET (Access to justice and peace & reconciliation) • ACODEN (Access to justice and peace & reconciliation) • FIDA (Access to justice) • JRP (Peace & reconciliation)
Hoima & Masindi	• The hub of the oil and gas activities. • Benefited from both components of the Activity (though land conflicts were not as exacerbated as in the north) • Has individual customary landownership • Ideal to assess the up-take of land registration efforts and activities by SAFE and to assess the element of social accountability in oil and gas industry	• CEDO (Access to justice) • MIRAC (Peace & reconciliation
Kasese & Kabarole	• Kasese district was home to post-2016 election violence • SAFE activities in relation to component II were fully operationalized in Kasese thus fitting the APS of the program • Indications of Collaborative Learning and Adaptability (CLA) • Lessons from component II on peace and reconciliation	• KRC (Peace & reconciliation • RFPJ (Peace & reconciliation)

Adjumani	• A special case involving a refugee crisis focusing on mediation; fits the APS elements of the program • Cross-border dimension offers learning from a broader regional perspective (CLA) • Access to justice of vulnerable women and youth regarding land rights • Local government capacity for effective land administration • Features Promoting Conflict Sensitive Journalism through Radio in Uganda • Youth programming targeted.	• FIDA (Access to justice) • RICE –WN (Peace & reconciliation, APS) • GLACCR (Peace & reconciliation • URN (Peace & reconciliation) • Life Concern (Peace & reconciliation and access to justice) • Nebbi district NGO forum (Access to justice)
Kampala	• Home to most grantee head offices; allows for assessment of CLA, ToC, and formal systems of land administration and adjudication • Interlocutors on land policy • Development partners and other actors working on land, peace and conflict	• FHRI (Access to justice) • ACCORD (Peace & reconciliation) • FIDA (Access to justice) • Development partners in the district (WB, FAO, UN, JLOS, GIZ, Trocaire, ZOA)
Arua	• The crisis in Arua resulted from the influx of refugees from South Sudan, and now hosts the second largest number of refugees in the country. The crisis triggered a rapid conflict assessment by SAFE, • Two of the 5 APS grants were issued for Arua, • Given the cross-border nature of the crisis, Arua presents an opportunity to learn about regional security challenges and how to address them. • Only component II of the Activity was implemented in Arua.	• RICE-WN (Peace & reconciliation) • URN (Peace & reconciliation)

Annex 4: List of Persons Consulted

S/N	NAMES	Category	District	Sex	Designation
1	Nanziri Edrini	Dev Partner DRC	Arua	F	SGBV Officer-DRC- Rhino camp
2	Onzima Ismail	Dev Partner DRC	Arua	M	Protection Team Leader- DRC
3	Acema Dria Genesis	District - HQ	Arua	M	Vice Chairman Arua District
4	Paul. Samuel Mbiiwo	District - HQ	Arua	M	Deputy CAO
5	Amule Daniel	grantee Partner	Arua	M	Journalist - Radio Pacis
6	Ayoku Tonny	grantee Partner	Arua	M	Journalist - Radio Pacis
7	Ayutobua Noel	grantee Partner	Arua	M	Journalist- Radio Pacis
8	Gaetano Apamaku	grantee Partner	Arua	M	Journalist - Radio Pacis
9	Munduru Liberia	grantee RICE WN	Arua	M	Coordinator
10	Yikiru Comfort	grantee RICE WN	Arua	M	Manager Program
11	Riek	Refugee	Arua	M	Community Member
12	John Tor Chap	Refugee Admin	Arua	M	Vice -Chair Rhino camp - RWC
13	Mabil John	Refugee Admin	Arua	M	Chair- Rhino camp- RWC1
14	Mohamed Jackson	Refugee Admin	Arua	M	Chair Rhino camp -RWC 1
15	Marthan Nyekoang	Refugee Admin	Arua		Rhino Camp -Water User Com
16	Adaku George	Refugee host	Arua	M	Youth
17	Akello Stephen	Refugee host	Arua	M	Project Coordinator
19	Amatre Mateo	Refugee host	Arua	M	LCIC/P
20	Arike Felix	Refugee host	Arua	M	Youth
21	Asiku james	Refugee host	Arua	M	LCI C/P
22	Atako Nola	Refugee host	Arua	F	Community- Women Rep
23	Cakuru Lydia	Refugee host	Arua	F	Interpreter
24	Drabile Alex	Refugee host	Arua	M	Elder
25	Driwaru Agnes	Refugee host	Arua	F	Community Women Rep
26	Mychoice Francis	Refugee host	Arua	M	Youth
27	Olema jildo	Refugee host	Arua	M	Elder
28	Chok Ruei	Refugees	Arua	M	Community Member
29	Daniel Murdic	Refugees	Arua	M	Community Member
30	Fatuma Achau	Refugees	Arua	F	Rhino Camp -Water User Com
31	Gatnyach Peter	Refugees	Arua	M	Youth community member
32	Guzu Mercy	Refugees	Arua	F	Interpreter
33	Joseph Manyok	Refugees	Arua	M	Community Member
34	Philip Ajith	Refugees	Arua	M	Youth Member

S/N	NAMES	Category	District	Sex	Designation
35	Rehema Wilson	Refugees	Arua	F	Community Member
36	Waleya Christine	Refugees	Arua	F	Community Member
37	Acidri Augustine	Tika-Rhino Camp	Arua	M	Peace Club Patron Rhino Camp
38	Manume John	Bunyangabu	Bunyangabu	M	Vice C/Person LC5
39	Kusemererwa Annet	Bunyangabu	Bunyangabu	F	Sec Works Technical Services
40	Ategeka James	Bunyangabu	Bunyangabu	M	LCV Chair Person Bunyangabu
41	Okwir Isaac Odiya	grantee JRP	Gulu -Lira	M	Head of Office - JRP
42	Okidi Bosco	Binya	Gulu	M	Lay Counselor
43	Okumul Langol	Blackstone	Gulu	M	(USA) News
44	Akena Robinson	Bungatira S/C	Gulu	M	C/P LCIII Sub County Gulu
45	Akera Benard	Bungatira S/C	Gulu	M	Recorder Bungatira Sub County
46	Atube Marian	Bungatira S/C	Gulu	M	Community Oversight Persons
47	Lalam Pamela	Bungatira S/C	Gulu	F	Community Oversight Persons
48	Magret Odoki	Bungatira S/C	Gulu	F	Women community member
49	Okello Kenneth	Bungatira S/C	Gulu	M	GISO -District
50	Margaret Odolo	Bungatira S/C	Gulu	F	W/Counselor
51	Ottorach George	Buntagira S/C	Gulu	M	ALC Chairperson
52	Oketta Andrew	FIDA	Gulu	M	Para legal
53	Ajok Lillian	FIDA (W)	Gulu	F	Legal Clerk and Proj. Assistant
54	Harriet Olanya	FIDA (W)	Gulu	F	Program Coordinator
55	Simon Onen Tonny	grantee CAP	Gulu	M	Staff
56	Gladys Oroma	grantee NUMEC	Gulu	F	Editor
57	Okanokodi E	grantee NUMEC	Gulu	F	Reporter
58	Akera Allen	grantee THRIVE	Gulu	F	Counselor
59	Ala Sigle Dora	grantee THRIVE	Gulu	F	Staff
60	Austin Ojara -	grantee THRIVE	Gulu	F	Counselor
61	Onen Vicent	grantee THRIVE	Gulu	F	Literacy Manager
62	Opiyo Amos	grantee THRIVE	Gulu	M	Community Oversight Persons
63	Steven Olyema	Granttee CAP	Gulu	M	Project officer
64	Obup Amos	Gulu	Gulu	M	Translator
65	Omara Fred	Gulu	Gulu	M	Editor
66	Onyango Stephen	Gulu	Gulu	M	Interpreter
67	Odwor Santa	Gulu DHQ	Gulu	M	PA Secretary CAO's Office
68	Okello Bernard Joe	Gulu FM	Gulu	M	Host/Take
69	Owam Fred	Gulu FM	Gulu	M	Manager

S/N	NAMES	Category	District	Sex	Designation
70	Oola Simon Peter	Gulu HQ	Gulu	M	Vice Chair Person- District LG
71	Obong Godfrey	Gulu PAWEL	Gulu	M	Peace Monitor
72	Banya Michael	Lamola	Gulu	M	Counsellor
73	Jenneth Omona	Lamola	Gulu	M	Lay Counselor
74	Laong Betty	Lukwoor	Gulu	F	Counsellor
75	Obel Bosco Arweny	Lukwor	Gulu	M	Lay Counselor
76	Odong Bosco Oreng	Lurwor	Gulu	M	Patient
77	Omony Abrish	Lurwor	Gulu	M	Patient
78	Akena Charles	NUMEC	Gulu	M	MDE
79	Aceng Jane	ODEK H/C III	Gulu	F	E/N
80	Achan Everlyne	ODEK H/C III	Gulu	F	Community Member
81	Anon Vicky Harriet	ODEK H/C III	Gulu	F	Nursing Officer P
82	Lanyero Sarah	ODEK H/C III	Gulu	F	MCO
83	Okello Lastone J.	ODEK H/C III	Gulu	M	LAB
84	Okoya Francis	ODEK H/C III	Gulu	F	I/C ODEK
85	Omagon Barbara	ODEK H/C III	Gulu	F	EMW
86	Obol Bosco Awany -L	Odek S/C	Gulu	M	Community beneficiary
87	Omana Janet Lamala	Odek S/c	Gulu	M	Community beneficiary
88	Dolapose Palaro	Odek S/C	Gulu	M	Community beneficiary
89	Okidi Bosco Binga	Odek S/C	Gulu	M	Community beneficiary
90	Akello Florence	Paibona	Gulu	F	Rwor Okori
91	Alok Ludia	Paibona	Gulu	F	Rwor Okoro
92	Aloyo Jackline	Paibona	Gulu	F	Community Leader
93	Lakot Joyce	Paibona	Gulu	F	Lamema Kal Kworo
94	Nyeko Vincent	Paibona	Gulu	M	Rwot Kweri
95	Okello Ronald	Paibona	Gulu	M	Cultural Leader
96	Oola Peter	Paibona	Gulu	M	Religious Leader
97	Ouma Santo	Paibona	Gulu	M	LC III
98	Rose Oola	Palaro Parish	Gulu -	F	Lay Councilor
99	Ajok Lillian	Palazo	Gulu	F	Patient
100	Akot	PAWEL	Gulu	M	Community Beneficiaries
101	Alok Grace	PAWEL	Gulu	F	Community Beneficiaries
102	Amomy Susan	PAWEL	Gulu	F	Community Beneficiaries
103	Odong Richard	PAWEL	Gulu	M	Peace Monitor
104	Owor S.	PAWEL	Gulu	M	Peace Monitor

S/N	NAMES	Category	District	Sex	Designation
105	Joseph Omagor	Radio King	Gulu	M	Show host
106	Asiimwe Edward	District HQ	Hoima	M	Secretary ALB- Hoima
107	Kisakye Ruth	District HQ	Hoima	F	Secretary DLB-Masindi
108	Nyangoma Joseline	District HQ	Hoima	F	Natural Resource Officer -LG
109	Tinkamanyine Ali	District HQ	Hoima	F	Chairman III Buseruka
110	Akello Stephen	grantee MIRAC	Hoima	M	Project Officer
111	Bira Kiwanuka Nasser	grantee MIRAC	Hoima	M	Exec Director
112	Egopel George	grantee MIRAC	Hoima	M	Counselor
113	Ismail	grantee MIRAC	Hoima	M	Program Officer
114	Nsiimire William	grantee -MIRAC	Hoima	m	SEO
115	Rose Atugonza	grantee -MIRAC	Hoima	F	Program Assistant MIRAC
116	Akuguzibwe	Kigorobya	Hoima	M	Staff
117	Franscis	Kigorobya	Hoima	M	Community Volunteer
118	Godfrey	Kigorobya	Hoima	M	Community Beneficiary
119	Jane t	Kigorobya	Hoima	F	Youth work
120	Juliet	Kigorobya	Hoima	F	Community Beneficiary
121	Kahara Grace	Kigorobya	Hoima	F	Community Beneficiary
122	Lilian	Kigorobya	Hoima	F	Youth work
123	Mbabazi Margret	Kigorobya	Hoima	F	Community Resource Person
124	Mbabazi Ruth	Kigorobya	Hoima	F	Community Beneficiary
125	Mulimolambura M. Jackson	Kigorobya	Hoima	M	Sec Edu/Health- & Councilor
126	Murungi Moreen	Kigorobya	Hoima	F	Community Resource Person
127	Nyakahara	Kigorobya	Hoima	F	LCI volunteer
128	Richard	Kigorobya	Hoima	M	Community Beneficiary
129	Simon Kiiza	Kigorobya	Hoima	M	AG Secretary Chief
130	Tibakasa Christoper	Kigorobya	Hoima	M	Teacher
131	Alon Adogo	Kyakaboga	Hoima	M	beneficiaries - resettlement
132	Kisa Edward	Kyakaboga	Hoima	M	beneficiaries - resettlement
133	Kyalimpa David	Kyakaboga	Hoima	M	beneficiaries - resettlement
134	Midan Ukura	Kyakaboga	Hoima	M	beneficiaries - resettlement
135	Nyagoma Aneti	Kyakaboga	Hoima	F	beneficiaries - resettlement
136	Shabahurira Fabisi	Kyakaboga	Hoima	M	beneficiaries - resettlement
137	Tekakwo Sadam	Kyakaboga	Hoima	M	beneficiaries - resettlement
138	Torwosome Yacobo	Kyakaboga	Hoima	M	beneficiaries - resettlement
139	Tumuhairwe Fausta	Kyakaboga	Hoima	F	beneficiaries - resettlement

S/N	NAMES	Category	District	Sex	Designation
140	Turyatunga Ephraim	Kyakaboga	Hoima	M	beneficiaries - resettlement
141	Ubegiu Ociye Cani	Kyakaboga	Hoima	M	beneficiaries - resettlement
142	Hannington Asaba-Kiiza	District	Hoima	M	Ag Deputy CAO (PAS)
143	Mwesigwa David	grantee -CEDO	Hoima	M	Regional Coordinator -CEDO
144	Akugizibwe Richard	grantee -CEDO	Hoima	M	Legal Officer CEDO Uganda
145	Noel Kansiime	grantee KRC	Kabarole	M	USAID-Safe Coordinator
146	Mugarura David	grantee KRC	Kabarole	M	Project Manager
147	Winnie Rukaamya	grantee- KRC	Kabarole	F	SAFE Conflict Monitor
	Balaba Dunstan	Duty bearer	Kabarole	M	Chief Administrative Officer
148	Masereka Yonah	Voice of Toro	Kabarole	M	Journalist Bulhalho Foundation
149	Namayanja Rebecca	grantee -CDRN	Kampala	F	Program Officer
150	Kenneth Mugume	grantee MIRAC	Kampala	M	Former Coordinator MIRAC
151	Kabanda Naome	Government Ministry agency	Kampala	F	Commissioner -Land Administration, MLHUD
152	Syabwiramuli	Women Forum	Kasese	M	Kasese Women Forum -KWF
153	Agaba Julius	District - HQ	Kasese	M	SAFE Conflict Monitor
154	Asiimwe Kamuhanda	District - HQ	Kasese	M	SAFE Conflict Monitor
156	Makanika Edward	Guide Radio	Kasese	M	Ag Marketing Manager
157	Kasoke Ernest	Muhoyka	Kasese	M	LCIII C/Person Muhokya S/C
158	Bwambale C. Mumbahya	Spokesperson	Kasese	F	Rwenzururu Kingdom
159	Asaaba Wilson	Women forum	Kasese	F	CAO Kasese
160	Deborah Baguma	Women forum	Kasese	F	C/Person Peace Forum-RWPF
161	Hon. Loice B. Bwambale	Women forum	Kasese	F	Vice Chairperson Rwenzori WPF
162	Kagubu Rose A.	Women forum	Kasese	F	V/Chairperson Forum-RWPF
163	Kemigabo Stellah	Women forum	Kasese	F	Member Peace Forum-RWPF
164	Linda Irene	Women forum	Kasese	F	Mobilization RWPF women
165	Mbabazi Aidaloi Syauswa	Women forum	Kasese	F	Vice Chairperson - KWF
166	Mbambu Catherine	Women forum	Kasese	F	Chair/ Women Forum KWF
167	Mbambu Naome	Women forum	Kasese	F	Secretary -RWPF
168	Nyakairu Faith	Women forum	Kasese	F	Member RWPF
169	Akello Euxice	Abunga C H	Lira	F	Member
170	Akello Sara	Abunga C H	Lira	F	Member
171	Amadi Judith	Abunga C H	Lira	F	Member

S/N	NAMES	Category	District	Sex	Designation
172	Auma Lilly	Abunga C H	Lira	F	Member
173	Akello Gures	Agoli	Lira	M	Member
174	Okot Alex	Agoli	Lira	M	Member
175	Omodo Kristoper	Agoli	Lira	M	Member
176	Okello Peter	Amokigee	Lira	M	Member
177	Otim Emmanuel	Amokigee	Lira	M	Member
178	Ayaka Francis	Amo-Oleh	Lira	M	C/M CLA
179	Odero Moses	Amo-Oleh	Lira	M	Sec. CLA
180	Otika Samuel Ogikson	Amuru	Lira	M	Cultural Institution
181	Ojuka Peter	Anganaku	Lira	M	Member
182	Okello Lameck	Angapai	Lira	M	C/M LC
183	Oluk Saluatorio	Angapari	Lira	M	Member
184	Odongo Moses	Angapuri	Lira	M	C/M Leader
185	Adongo Venna	Barr S/C	Lira	F	Barr sub county
186	Akello Dorcus	Barr S/C	Lira	F	Barr sub county
187	Akello Eunice	Barr S/C	Lira	F	Barr sub county
188	Angom Evaline	Barr S/C	Lira	F	C/Person Ober Child Mother's
189	Angwee Esther	Barr S/C	Lira	F	Barr sub county
190	Angwee Jackline	Barr S/C	Lira	F	Barr sub county
191	Apil Esther	Barr S/C	Lira	F	C/P Abunga Child, Peace Builder
192	Auma Lilly Ackari	Barr S/C	Lira	F	Barr sub county
193	Ecun Robert	Barr S/C	Lira	M	Youth Community Peace Builder
194	Kia Sara	Barr S/C	Lira	F	Barr sub county Lira district
195	Opio Geoffrey Belmos	Barr S/C	Lira	M	Youth Community Peace Builder
196	Peace Akello	Barr S/C	Lira	F	Builder's Barr
197	Opio Solomon W. Ober	Barr S/C	Lira	M	Youth Community Peace Builder
198	Ayo Samuel	Burlobo	Lira	M	Member
199	Christine Obura	Burlobo	Lira	F	Member
200	Jaspan Ogwang	Burlobo	Lira	M	Member
201	Obua Jaleis	Burlobo	Lira	M	Member
202	Obua Richard	Burlobo	Lira	M	C/M LCI
203	Odur Alex	Burlobo	Lira	M	NAL LAND
204	Ogwang Richard	Burlobo	Lira	M	Care Burlobo

S/N	NAMES	Category	District	Sex	Designation
205	Okello Bosco	Burlobo	Lira	M	Member
206	Olea George	Burlobo	Lira	M	C/Man
207	Sarah Odulo	Burlobo	Lira	F	Member
208	Odongo Denish	Burlobo	Lira	M	Member
209	Ogwal Albino	Burlobo	Lira	M	Member
210	Adero Dilish	CLA	Lira	M	Women
211	Adong Simpo	CLA	Lira	F	Women
212	Akite Sarah	CLA	Lira	F	Member Treasury
213	Alaba Prisca	CLA	Lira	F	Women
214	Alum Joy	CLA	Lira	F	Women
215	Anyang Annia	CLA	Lira	F	Women
216	Apok Christine	CLA	Lira	F	Member Monitor
217	Atim Beatrice	CLA	Lira	F	Councilor of Women
218	Atuku Barbra	CLA	Lira	F	Secretary
219	Awor Santo	CLA	Lira	M	Women
230	Paul Anyii	CLA	Lira	M	Man
231	Egopel George	grantee AYINET	Lira	M	Counselor
231	Otim Moses Augustine	grantee AYINET	Lira	M	Community Officer
233	Stephen Okello	grantee AYINET	Lira	M	Field Monitor & Proj Coordinator
234	Akena Charles	grantee NUMEC	Lira	M	M&E Officer
235	Gladys Oroma	grantee NUMEC	Lira	F	Editor
236	Joseph Omagor	grantee NUMEC	Lira	M	Staff
237	Okello Benard Joe	grantee NUMEC	Lira	M	Talk Show Host
238	Oksenkodi Ema	grantee NUMEC	Lira	M	Staff
239	Okuma. L.	grantee NUMEC	Lira	M	Lango/Blackstar News
240	Obongo J. Jackson	Interpreter	Lira	M	
241	Wasio Dickers	LCF	Lira	F	MIN LANKS
242	Anyoro Denis	Okworokwor	Lira	M	Religious leaders
243	Opio Jepinia	Okworokwor	Lira	F	Member
244	Otim David	Okworokwor	Lira	M	Member
245	Moses Okullo Opio	Okwororwor	Lira	M	Chairman LCl
246	Okaba Benson	Okwororwor	Lira	M	Member
247	Angong Evalne Finna	PEACE Builder	Lira	F	C/Person - Peace Committee
248	Anya Bonny	Telela	Lira	M	Member
249	Rev. Otema George	A	Amuru	M	Religious leader

S/N	NAMES	Category	District	Sex	Designation
250	Boli Grace	Budongo	Masindi	F	Oversight Group Member
251	Kaliisa Roselime	Budongo	Masindi	F	Development Officer
252	Keji Scovia	Budongo	Masindi	F	Former ALC
253	Musinguzi Gilbert	Budongo	Masindi	M	Conflict Monitor
254	Olive Stephen Chandiga	Budongo	Masindi	F	Oversight Group Member
255	Akugizibwe Francis	Bwijanga	Masindi	M	ALC member
256	Awungi innocent	Bwijanga	Masindi	M	Civil educator
257	Businge Marble	Bwijanga	Masindi	F	Secretary Bwijanga S/C
258	Byaruhanga Y. R	Bwijanga	Masindi	M	ALC Member
259	Byarungu Hallen A	Bwijanga	Masindi	F	HB Bwijanga
260	Kabwa Lawrence Kugonza	Bwijanga	Masindi	M	CBM /Civil Administrator
261	Kajunju Rosemary	Bwijanga	Masindi	F	CBM Bikonzi
262	Karuhanga Alice	Bwijanga	Masindi	F	ALC Member
263	Muhumuza Paul	Bwijanga	Masindi	M	Secretary/ALC
264	Anyoro Denis	grantee-NGO forum	Masindi	M	M
265	Asiimwe Edward	grantee-NGO forum	Masindi	M	DLB - Chairman
267	Ayaka Francis	grantee-NGO forum	Masindi	M	M
268	Bedijo Siraji	grantee-NGO forum	Masindi	M	Youth Councilor Buseruka S/C
269	Odero Moses	grantee-NGO forum	Masindi	M	M
270	Odongo Moses	grantee-NGO forum	Masindi	M	M
271	Okeggo Lameck	grantee-NGO forum	Masindi	M	M
272	Steven Okello	grantee-NGO forum	Masindi	M	M
273	Ian Morrison	SAFE Uganda	Kampala	M	Chief of Party SAFE
274	Dr Samson Barigye	SAFE Uganda	Kampala	M	Head Comp II SAFE
275	Isaac Galiwango	SAFE Uganda	Kampala	M	M & E Advisor
276	Tusiime Agnes	SAFE Uganda	Kampala	F	M&E Officer
277	Ojok Anet	SAFE Uganda	Kampala	F	Legal Officer Uganda
278	Acan Susan	SAFE Uganda	Kampala	F	Gender & Civil Society Specialist
279	Carlotta Fassioti	Search for Common Grounds	Kampala	F	Regional Design M&E Specllaist

S/N	NAMES	Category	District	Sex	Designation
280	Mugumya Albert	NCSC	Kampala		Conflict Prevention and Reconciliation Officer
281	John Cipperly NCS	NCSC	USA	M	Executive Director – NCSC
282	Xavier Ejoyi	USAUD Mission	Kampala	M	Conflict Advisor Democracy HR and Governance
283	Morris Nsamba	USAID Mission	Kampala	M	Monitoring, Evaluation& Learning Advisor, Office of Democracy, Rights and Governance
284	Mark Meassick	USAID Mission	Kampala	M	Mission Director, USAID /Uganda
286	Cyndee Pelt	USAID Mission	Kampala	F	Director, Office of Democracy, Human Rights, & Governance
287	Jennifer Ver Noy	USAID Mission	Kampala	F	Head - Program & Policy Development (PPD)
288	Meaghan Wilson	USAID Mission	Kampala	M	Sr. Program Advisor, Program & Policy Development (PPD
289	Phiona Wata	USAID Mission	Kampala	F	Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, Program Office (PPD)
290	Mark Wilson	USAID Mission	Kampala	M	Deputy Director, Office of Democracy, Human Rights, & Governance
291	Augustine Wandera	QED/USAID	Kampala	M	M&E Director, Learning Contract, QED
292	Gilbert Matabi	QED/USAID	Kampala	M	Snr. M&E Specialist, Democracy & Governance, Learning Contract, QED

Annex 5: List of Interviews Disaggregated vs Proposed numbers

Stakeholder	Component 1					Component 2					Both Comps	
	KIIs		FGDs			KIIs		FGDs			Totals	
	M	F	No	M	F	M	F	No	M	F	M	F
grantees /Implementer	5	3				15	3	1	5	1	25	7
Land Administration Institutions	5	8										
Elected Leaders	6	0				2	0			8		
Journalists	-	-						1	5	1	6	
Religious/Traditional leaders/Elders	3	-				2					5	
Duty Bearers	5	2				6	2				11	4
Peace committee Structures	0	0						1	8	7	8	7
Field Monitors /NSAs/CRPs	3	6				7	3				10	9
Women			5	56	44			2		16	56	60
Youth	-	-						3	35	22	35	22
Other Actors*	6	1				12	1				18	2
Staff of SAFE	5	4									5	4
Total	41	21		56	44	44	9		53	55	154	115

* Includes officials from Office of the Prime Minister, Key Government Ministries (Land, Internal Affairs, Energy), Development partners, USAID, and International CSOS

Annex 6: List of Interview Protocols for Key Informant Interviews

KII Guide: For grantees (Land Administration, Component 1)

1. When did you first engage with the SAFE program? In what capacity were you involved in the program?
2. To your knowledge, has the SAFE program implemented as planned? If not, why not?
3. How did your organizations' involvement in the program help address the issues at hand, particularly land issues?
4. In your view, have these land issues been addressed? If so, how? If not, why not?
5. What are the current outstanding land problems/issues? How can they be addressed?
6. We understand there was support (training, etc.) to land administration institutions (i.e. DLBs and ALCs) to help communities secure their land rights. In your view, is there a difference in how these institutions currently handle land matters?
7. Which institutions are most popular/effective in addressing land disputes? Why? If you were to rank the performance of the DLBs or ALCs, for example, what score you would give them? (Excellent, Very good, Good, Poor, Not sure/Don't know)
8. What other institutions that you know of worked with the SAFE program to help the communities?
9. In your view, what else could have been done to improve land administration and dispute issues?
10. To your knowledge, have women benefited from the SAFE program? Why/why not? Can you give some examples?
11. What changes, if any, do you think your organization's project brought about in the area? Please elaborate.

KII Guide: For Beneficiaries of Legal Litigation (Land Administration; Component 1)

1. Have you heard about the SAFE program? If so, please tell me what you know.
2. We understand that the SAFE program helped resolve a land dispute that you were involved with. Please tell me about what happened? Was the dispute resolved satisfactorily?
3. What have been able to do with your land that you could not do before the dispute was resolved?
4. Have you heard of any other ways you can protect your land? If so, how?
5. Have you taken steps to protect your land? If so, how?
6. Can you independently make decisions on what to do with your land? If so, please elaborate. If not, why not?
7. Since the dispute was resolved, have you had any problems regarding this land? If so, please elaborate.
8. Since the end of the war, what activities related to land administration or conflict resolution have you participated in? Please elaborate (Who organized it? What did it focus on? Was it effective?)
9. In your view, are the mechanisms to resolve land disputes more effective now that in the past? Can you give examples?

KII Guide: For Program Beneficiaries—e.g. CSOs and Conflict Monitors, etc (Conflict Transformation, Component II)

1. When did you first engage with the SAFE program? In what capacity were you involved in the program?
2. If the person has been in a SAFE training, which one? Was it effective? If so, please elaborate and give examples. If not, why not?
3. If the person has been helped in resolving a dispute or reconciliation, please ask to elaborate. Was the intervention effective? If so, please elaborate and give examples. If not, why not?

4. In your view, have SAFE activities been effective in supporting peace committees/refugees/women's groups/peace clubs/youth/other in transforming violent conflict to peaceful outcomes? If so, please elaborate and give examples. If not, why not?

5. Do you think the project contributed to the long-term goal of strengthening peace and stability in your community? What changes in your community or beyond have occurred as a result of SAFE activities? Please elaborate and give examples (e.g. number of violent conflicts registered before and after SAFE intervention).

6. In your view, has the program effectively built the capacity of clan/religious/traditional leaders? If so, please elaborate and give examples. If not, why not?

7. To your knowledge, have SAFE trainings been in line with district development plans? Relevant to the Peace, Recovery and Development Plans (PRDPs)? Other peacebuilding activities or initiatives?

8. To your knowledge, how have relevant stakeholders used the early warning conflict reports? How could they have been more effective?

9. How, if at all, did women or youth benefit from the project? Please elaborate and give examples.

KII Guide: For grantees (Conflict Transformation, Component II)

1. Please tell us about your work under the SAFE program.
2. Was the project implemented as planned? If so, please give examples. If not, why not?
3. What challenges did the project face? Were they addressed? If not, why not?
4. Was the project relevant for this region? How could it have been improved?
5. Did you meet your objectives with this project? If so, please elaborate and give examples. If not, why not? What could have been done differently?
6. In your view, are SAFE interventions sustainable in the long term?
7. In your view, what is your organization's biggest contribution to peace and conflict resolution in the community/district/region?
8. What, in your view, can your organization do to promote sustained peace in the community or district?
9. What lessons can you identify about conflict transformation and reconciliation that could be helpful for future programming?
10. To what extent were women and/or youth engaged in this project? Please elaborate and give examples.
11. To what extent did the project focus on addressing conflicts triggers associated with oil and gas extraction? Please elaborate and give examples.

KII Guide: For USAID (e.g. Democracy and Governance; M&E; Program Management; Conflict and Democracy) and SAFE (e.g. Land administration, peacebuilding, conflict advisors, M&E, field officers) on Theory of Change.

1. Can you explain the theory of change in your own words?
2. To what extent was the theory of change explicit in the program design?
3. What, if any, were the underlying assumptions behind the intervention theory and how did they (or not) affect the on theory?
4. To what extent is the project design coherent with theory of change (both land administration and conflict transformation)?
5. Was the theory of change understood by SAFE staff? Partners?
6. To what extent are project objectives consistent with USAID DO2 and IR 2.2 and IR 2.3 and consistent with national priorities?
7. Which contextual factors, if any, may have rendered the theory of change irrelevant or made it more useful, or both?
8. To what extent did the theory of change inform programming over the course of the Activity?

9. To what extent did the theory of change evolve to correspond to contextual and programming adjustments?

KII Guide: For USAID, SAFE and grantee staff on Adaptive Management.
1. What was your specific role with the SAFE program? Land administration or conflict transformation? Management or implementation? M&E?
2. To your knowledge, was the program implemented as originally designed? If not:
   - What were the major changes that occurred?
   - What caused these changes?
   - Was the response from SAFE effective? Please elaborate and give examples.
   - Were there challenges that were not addressed? Why/why not?
3. What monitoring, evaluation and learning systems were in place for implementation of the Activity? Were those systems effective in supporting adaptive management? Please elaborate and give examples.
4. Was the learning cycle effective in leading to program adjustments? How would you improve the systems?
5. How, if at all, did adaptive management affect the Activity's performance? Please elaborate and give examples.
6. What lessons can you identify regarding soliciting grantee applications? Managing the application process? Direct vs. grantee implementation? Use/effectiveness of the APS mechanism?

Annex 7: Interview Guides for Focus Group Discussions

Guide for FGDs on Land Administration (component 1)

Theme	Questions
Needs of the community (pre- and post-intervention)	1. Returning to your communities immediately after the war, what would you say were the most pressing needs for peace and security for (a) individuals; (b) families; (c) communities? 2. What are the most pressing needs today?
Impact of SAFE interventions on targeted communities	3. What specific SAFE activities (training, awareness raising, ADR, etc) do you believe were most useful? For example, can you demonstrate how training has enabled you or your community to resolve land disputes? 4. How would you describe the situation in the district/sub-district/community after different SAFE interventions in terms of: a) Awareness/protection of land rights? b) Resolution of land disputes? c) Land registration? d) Other
Impact of contextual factors on the SAFE program	5. What are some of the contextual factors that took place in the last five years (between 2011 and 2016) that could have affected SAFE interventions?
Targeted beneficiaries	6. The SAFE program was in place to support different categories of people, including women, youth, formal and informal leaders, etc; which of the targets groups would you say benefited the most/least? Please elaborate and give examples.
Sustainability	7. The SAFE program tried to bring about change that will be long lasting. In your view, what are some of the ways that the program will leave a lasting change in this community and in the region?

Guide for FGDs on conflict transformation (component II)

Theme	Questions
Needs of the community (pre- and post-intervention)	1. Returning to your communities immediately after the war, what would you say were the most pressing needs for peace and security for (a) individuals; (b) families; (c) communities? 2. What are the most pressing needs <u>today</u>?

Impact of SAFE interventions on targeted communities	3. What specific SAFE activities (training, awareness raising, ADR, etc) do you believe were most effective? For example, can you demonstrate how training has enabled you or the community to transform violent conflict into peaceful outcomes?
	4. How would you describe the situation in the district/sub-district/community after different SAFE interventions in terms of:
	    a. Conflict transformation (addressing emerging conflict)
	    b. Reconciliation
	    c. Conflict related to oil and gas extraction?
	    d. Other

Impact of contextual factors on the SAFE program	5. What are some of the contextual factors that took place in the last five years (between 2011 and 2016) that could have affected SAFE interventions?
Targeted beneficiaries	6. The SAFE program was in place to support different categories of people, including women, youth, formal and informal leaders, etc; which of the targets groups would you say benefited the most/least? Please elaborate and give examples.
Sustainability	7. The SAFE program tried to bring about change that will be long lasting. In your view, what are some of the ways that the program will leave a lasting change in this community and in the region?

Annex 8: List of Documents

1 Alker, H.R. (2002). Designing Information Resources for Trans-boundary Conflict Early Warning Networks
2 Augustinus, C., Ed. (2003) Handbook on Best Practices Security of Tenure and Access to Land, pp.110, Nairobi, UN-Habitat.
3 Boutros-Ghali B. (1992). An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. United Nations, New York.
4 Government of Uganda. (August 2004) The National Policy for IDPs
5 Land and Equity Movement of Uganda, (31 March 2004) First draft. Land market research by LEMU
6 Lederach, Jean–Paul. (1997) Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
7 Lederach, Jean–Paul. (2003) The Little Book of Conflict Transformation. Intercourse, PA: Good Books Publishing.
8 Mayne, J. (2008) Contribution Analysis: An approach to exploring cause and effect, ILAC methodological brief, Methods briefing paper setting out six steps available at http://www.cgiar-ac.org/files/publications/briefs/ILAC_Brief16_Contribution_Analysis.pdf
9 NCSC/SFCG. (2014) Mapping Conflict in Uganda causal patterns and emerging trends. Kampala Uganda
10 Republic of Uganda. (Sept 2017Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP). Report. Kampala, Uganda.
11 Report on Gender and Conflict Transformation training for Women leaders in the Rwenzori region, Uganda: 3-5 November 2016
12 Republic of Uganda. (2015) Draft Uganda National Peace building and Conflict Transformation Policy.
13 Robins Sylver and Hyman Jerry (1998). Handbook of Democracy and Governance Program Indicators. USAID Technical Publication Series, Centre for Democracy and Governance
14 Rugadya A. Margaret., Nsamba-Gayiiya E. and Herbert Kamusiime. (2006) A review of literature on Post Conflict Land Policy and Administration issues, during return and resettlement of IDPs: International experience and lessons from Uganda
15 SAFE Annual 5 reports: 2013 – 2017.
16 SAFE Baseline Conflict report. 2013. Kampala Uganda
17 SAFE Conference, May 2018: SAFE experience Group 4_Ian Morrison _ LAND JUSTICE RESULTS (final)
18 SAFE Conflict monitoring training. (June 2013) Training guide in conflict analysis, monitoring and reporting. Kampala Uganda
19 SAFE Monthly Conflict Assessment reports: MCAs from 2013 – 2017
20 SAFE Performance Monitoring Plan. (April 2014) The National Center for State Courts (NCSC)
21 SAFE program documents: SAFE Evaluation Scope of Work (SOW), SAFE baseline study (draft), SAFE mid-term evaluation, All SAFE annual reports since inception (Years 2014 -2017), SAFE quarterly reports (2013 -2017), SAFE Program Management Plan (PMP), Outcome harvesting reports, Sample of grantee final evaluation reports, Sample of success stories, All SAFE monthly conflict reports (these are available electronically through SAFE website, USAID Field Portfolio Reviews, Land Rights Handbook 2014, Initial Country Assessment Report, Mapping Conflict in Uganda: Causal Patterns and Emerging Trends, Situation Assessment: Natural Resource Development Issues in Uganda and Opportunities for Locally-Led Collaborative Problem Solving. SAFE program proposal. SAFE Quarterly progress reports: (From Aug-Dec 2012 – 0ct –Dec 2017. Sixteen reports. SAFE Request For Proposals
22 SAFE Sub- grantees progress and Final reports :(LEMU Final, LDC, AYINET, RICE WN, KRC, MIRAC, CEDO, CDRN, Justice and Reconciliation Project, SAFERWORLD, ACORD, CAP, CJ&P, FIDA ,LICO, MASINDI NGO FORUM,NUMEC, RIAMRIAM,TIP,THRIVE,WSF & ARLPI)

23   SAFE (2015) Mid- Term Review Report by /Uganda Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Program (aka The Learning Contract); QED Group, llc
24   UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 of 2000
25   USAID, 2005. Public participation in Peace Building. A summary of dialogues in the Uganda Reconciliation Process, Kampala, Uganda.
26   USAID/Uganda Solicitation -617-12-000002)-Supporting Access to Justice, Fostering Peace and Equity (SAFE)
27   USAID, 2005 Land and Conflict: Toolkit for Interventions
28   USAID/Uganda Solicitation # SOL-617-12-000002
29   USAID (July 2017) Program Cycle, How-To Note, Developing a project logic model. Version 2. Washington DC, US
30   Veronica F. Grasso. Early Warning Systems: State-of-Art Analysis and Future Directions. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)